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Terms of reference 
I, PETER COSTELLO, Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity 
Commission  Act 1998, refer post 2005 assistance arrangements for the textile, 
clothing and footwear industries to the Productivity Commission for inquiry and the 
provision of an information report. The Commission is to report its findings by 
31 July 2003 and is to hold hearings for the purpose of the inquiry. 
Background 
Current TCF Assistance Arrangements 
The Government’s current assistance arrangements for the textile, clothing and 
footwear (TCF) industries comprise: 
•  the Textile, Clothing and Footwear (Strategic Investment Program) Scheme 
(SIP); 
•  a commitment to hold tariffs for TCF products at 2001 levels until 2005: 
−  at that time tariffs are legislated to reduce from 25 percent to 17.5 percent for 
clothing & finished textiles; from 15 percent to 10 percent for cotton 
sheeting and fabrics, carpet, and footwear; and from 10 percent to 7.5 percent 
for sleeping bags, table linen and footwear parts. 
•  the Expanded Overseas Assembly Provisions Scheme, specific TCF policy by-
laws and market access initiatives. 
Other policies that have the potential to impact on the industries include: 
•  Australia’s commitment to free and open trade and investment with APEC 
members by 2010, its WTO obligations in respect to subsidies and our broader 
trade liberalisation objectives; 
•  bilateral trade negotiations and possible Free Trade Agreements;  
•  the Government’s industry and innovation support programs; and 
•  the market access policies and support programs of other economies towards 
their domestic TCF industries. 
Scope of industry and current performance 
TCF manufacturing covers all stages of production of textile, clothing, footwear and 
leather products, from processing of raw materials such as cotton, wool, leather and 
synthetics, to the production of final goods. Linkages extend upstream to the supply 
of natural fibres and downstream to service areas including design, pattern making, 
retailing and major consumers such as furniture manufacture, engineering and 
health.     




Substantial budget support has been provided to the TCF industries over many years 
to assist firms in undertaking structural change. The TCF (SIP) Scheme currently 
provides funding of $678 million over 5 years to 2005 to encourage increased 
investment and innovation with the objective of achieving international 
competitiveness. The effective rate of assistance for the TCF sector declined from 
85.5 percent in 1989/90 to 25.6 percent in 1999/2000. The effective rate for 
manufacturing as a whole declined from 16.3 percent to 5 percent over the same 
period. 
The TCF industries directly employ 64,000 people, representing 7 percent of the 
manufacturing workforce and account for around 4  percent of manufacturing 
turnover. Exports excluding wool scouring, leather tanning and dressing currently 
stand at $1.1 billion, with New Zealand as the largest customer. Over the ten years 
to 1999/2000, turnover in the sector contracted by almost 16 percent and 
employment declined by 37 percent. Productivity as measured by turnover per 
employee increased by almost 48 percent. 
The pressures for structural change have intensified in recent years due to a range of 
factors including import competition, technological change and shifts in household 
expenditure. Firms in the various TCF subsectors have responded by rationalising 
and modifying their operations through vertical integration, contracting out lower 
value added activities, and developing higher value and more sophisticated products 
and applications. Others have sought to maintain their competitiveness with more 
export activity, increased investment in capital equipment and technology and 
innovative design. There has also been an increased emphasis on services such as 
design, logistics and brand management and the establishment of new markets 
including exporting. Successful firms have emerged with strong brands and 
technologies. The factors driving this success have included strategic approaches to 
marketing and investment, managerial skills, innovation and supply chain 
integration.  
Scope of Inquiry 
Drawing on the Background, the Commission should consult with a cross section of 
the industries and other members of the community. In undertaking the inquiry, the 
Commission should bear in mind the Government’s desire to: 
•  encourage the sector to adjust into activities where it will be internationally 
competitive with lower levels of Government assistance; and 
•  improve the overall performance of the Australian economy.  
The inquiry should:     




Evaluate Current Arrangements 
•  Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of current assistance 
programs in meeting the Government’s goal of achieving structural change and a 
more internationally competitive TCF sector by 2005, including a consideration 
of outcomes at the sub-sector level. 
Assess long term viability and opportunities 
•  Identify and analyse major impediments to the long term viability of the TCF 
sector. These would include factors such as cost structures, and market and firm 
characteristics such as import competition, corporate structure, existence of 
critical mass, management and workforce skills, the purchasing strategies of 
major retailers, the ability of the sector to attract investment, and international 
trading arrangements including market access issues. 
•  Identify major opportunities for the sector and its strengths and weaknesses for 
securing these opportunities. 
•  Identify policy options, including tariff options, consistent with the 
Government’s international obligations, such as those under WTO and APEC, 
which would encourage the sector to adjust to a more viable and sustainable 
competitive position. 
•  Analyse the short and long term implications of each policy option for the 
structure, performance and competitiveness of the sector, investment, 
employment, consumers, resource allocation, flow on effects for other 
industries, general growth prospects and appropriate role for government. 
Particular attention should be given to the impact of policy options on those 
regions where TCF accounts for a high level of regional industry concentration. 
•  Examine relevant workplace issues including the more effective use of flexible 
modes of employment, labour mobility in and out of the sector, especially in 
regional Australia, and the scope for innovative workplace reform including 
policy options to improve the competitiveness of the sector. 
•  Report on the likely impact on the TCF industries of international trade 
developments, including, but not limited to, the Doha round of trade 
negotiations and proposed Free Trade Agreements.  
Consideration by the Government 
The Government will consider the options of the Inquiry and will announce its 
response as soon as possible after receiving the Inquiry report. 
 
PETER COSTELLO 
[Received 19 November 2002]    
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OVERVIEW     






•  Major structural change has occurred in the Australian textile, clothing, footwear and 
leather (TCF) industries, mainly in response to global competitive pressures 
affecting producers in all developed countries. More adjustment and job losses are 
inevitable, regardless of future assistance arrangements. 
•  Even so, some Australian TCF producers are internationally competitive. Others 
have the capacity to become so, particularly if impediments and weaknesses that 
reduce viability can be addressed. Improving workplace outcomes is a priority. 
•  But large labour cost disadvantages mean that many firms producing standardised 
clothing and footwear will not survive. This in turn poses threats to some of their 
suppliers. Workers displaced by change in the sector will need help. 
•  The current tariff pause and transitional budgetary support have helped some firms 
to improve their international competitiveness and long term viability. However, this 
special assistance treatment is costly for others in the community and cannot 
continue indefinitely.  
•  Further reductions in tariffs after 2005 would reduce the prices of TCF products for 
consumers, reinforce incentives for improved performance in the sector and signal 
Australia’s continuing commitment to the APEC trade liberalisation process. 
•  The Commission’s preferred tariff option is to maintain all TCF tariffs at the new 
legislated 2005 levels until 2010, then reduce most of them to 5 per cent. However, 
tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles, which are significantly higher than 
those on other TCF products, would not be reduced to 5 per cent until 2015. 
•  To facilitate adjustment to these tariff reductions, the Commission proposes that 
transitional budgetary support be extended for a further eight years from 2005, but 
with funding levels reducing over time. Such support should be delivered using a 
modified version of the current Strategic Investment Program. 
•  Given the inevitability of more firm closures, the characteristics of the sector’s 
workforce and the importance of TCF activity in some regions, special labour 
adjustment support is warranted during the tariff transition period. The Commission 
proposes that such support should be provided through an augmentation to Job 
Network services when large scale, or regionally significant, retrenchments have 
occurred or been announced.  
•  Voluntary approaches based on cooperation between the parties are likely to 
achieve better compliance with pay and condition requirements for outworkers than 
would more regulation, or heavy handed attempts to enforce existing regulation. 
•  Continuing microeconomic reform and government efforts to improve access to 
overseas markets would help TCF firms to become more internationally competitive. 
•  But there is little that can or should be done to stop further adjustment out of labour 
intensive, standardised TCF production in Australia. Rather, the policy focus should 
be on facilitating and supporting the adjustment process. 
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Overview 
What is the inquiry about? 
Major structural change is occurring in the textiles, clothing, footwear and leather 
(TCF) industries in virtually all developed countries. It is being driven by intense 
competition from suppliers in developing countries, changes in consumer tastes and 
technological advances.  
The Australian TCF sector (see box 1) has not been immune to these pressures. 
Sectoral output and employment are declining as production is rationalised; the 
product mix and supply chains are changing; and exports as well as imports have 
increased. 
Reductions in protection over the past 15 years have added to the pressures 
confronting Australia’s TCF producers. The main purpose of this inquiry is to 
provide advice to the Government on options for assistance after 2005, at which 
time TCF tariffs will be reduced further and transitional budgetary support for the 
sector is due to end. 
What are the government’s objectives for the TCF sector? 
The terms of reference specify that the Government wants to encourage the sector to 
adjust into activities where it can become internationally competitive with lower 
assistance, and to improve the overall performance of the Australian economy. This 
latter objective implies that future support for TCF producers must not be 
detrimental to Australia’s long term economic interests. 
Some TCF activities can prosper 
The common perception that the entire Australian TCF sector has little future is 
wrong. Some firms in the sector are already internationally competitive or capable 
of becoming so. Others, however, are unlikely to survive even if the current high 
levels of government support were maintained.     





Box 1  A snapshot of the Australian TCF sector and market 
•  TCF manufacturing in Australia covers a diverse range of activities, including: early 
stage processing of leather and natural fibres; the production of textiles; the 
transformation of leather, yarns and textiles into clothing and footwear, carpets and 
other fabric products for the home and office; and ‘technical’ textiles such as shade 
cloth, medical and sanitary products, filtration products and insulation materials. 
•  In 2000-01, Australia’s 5000 TCF firms generated turnover of $9 billion and provided 
factory-based employment for at least 58 000 people (though employment levels 
have since declined). Clothing producers also rely heavily on outworkers to 
assemble garments. In the absence of official data, the Commission estimates that 
there could be the equivalent of 25 000 full time employees engaged in outwork. 
•  This makes TCF one of Australia’s larger manufacturing sectors — specifically, it 
accounts for 4 per cent of manufacturing value added and 6 per cent (excluding 
outworkers) of manufacturing employment, and 0.4 per cent of value added and 0.6 
per cent of employment in the economy as a whole.  
•  TCF production is more significant for some States and regions: 
–  It accounts for 6 per cent of value added and 9 per cent of employment in 
Victoria’s manufacturing sector. 
–  While production is mainly based in the capital cities — especially Melbourne and 
Sydney — there is significant TCF activity in regional centres such as Geelong, 
Bendigo, Wangaratta, Albury-Wodonga and Devonport. 
•  The sector includes many small and medium sized privately-owned firms, 
particularly in the clothing industry. Enterprises employing 20 or fewer people 
account for a quarter of sector-wide production and a third of the jobs. (Also, in the 
official industry statistics, many small businesses which undertake some TCF 
manufacturing are not classified in the sector.) 
•  In recent years, various global and domestic pressures have led to major changes 
in the sector: 
–  Rationalisation, including many firm closures, has reduced output by 25 per cent 
and employment by 35 per cent since the early 1990s. 
–  Imports, particularly from China, have increased rapidly and now account for over 
50 per cent of the domestic TCF market. Australian TCF exports also grew 
rapidly during the 1990s, albeit from a low base. However, this growth has 
recently stalled.  
–  The mix of domestic TCF production has changed, with more emphasis on high 
value, capital intensive and niche products, and less on labour intensive, 
standardised products. 
–  The boundaries between manufacturing, distribution and retailing have become 
blurred. Local TCF suppliers now source more of their products offshore and 
provide ancillary services such as inventory management for retailers and 
corporate apparel services. Also, retailers have become major importers and 
distributors of TCF products.  
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There are diverse opportunities 
Across the spectrum of TCF activities, there are successful firms which are 
exploiting competitive advantages to develop new products and secure new 
markets. Many opportunities exist, including where: 
•  rapid turnaround for short-run orders is required (eg ‘quick response’ fabric and 
garment production for the domestic market); 
•  a value adding service can be combined with ‘just-in-time’ production (eg 
corporate apparel and inventory management for retailers); 
•  proximity to the customer provides logistical benefits (eg the production of 
complex designer clothing);  
•  differentiated design and branding provide marketing advantages — even if the 
products are manufactured offshore; 
•  advanced scientific and engineering skills, combined with sophisticated 
machinery, are required to provide innovative, specialised products (eg various 
non-woven technical textile applications);  
•  low volume niche supply is unattractive to large overseas producers set up for 
long output runs; and 
•  product and market development is facilitated by international linkages that 
provide advantageous access to inputs, the latest technologies and market 
information. 
Realisation of these opportunities will be assisted by emerging strengths in parts of 
the sector. These include increased flexibility, responsiveness and innovative 
capacities, a stronger focus on brand development and customer service, and 
growing commitment to performance improvement and market development. 
Some weaknesses can be addressed 
Further rationalisation would enhance viability in parts of the sector 
Extensive structural change in the TCF sector in recent years has helped many firms 
to operate in increasingly competitive markets. Among other things, it has led to: 
•  more emphasis on high value, capital intensive and niche products, and less on 
labour intensive, standardised products; and 
•  greater plant throughput in parts of the sector resulting from rationalisation of 
production capacity and increased export activity.     




Nonetheless, production volumes in most capital intensive areas of the Australian 
TCF sector remain low by world standards. In some cases, the legacies of 
previously very high protection for the sector — fragmented production, inefficient 
location of facilities and separation of the supply chain — continue to impose 
sizeable cost penalties. Further rationalisation and consolidation of capacity in these 
parts of the sector therefore offer opportunities for significant competitive gains. 
As would improved workplace relations 
More flexible and productive workplace arrangements and industrial stability have 
helped many TCF firms to improve their international competitiveness. 
However, improvement is still possible in many parts of the sector:  
•  Restrictive shift patterns, and constraints on the use of casual employees and 
contract labour to cater for peaks in demand, typify inflexibilities that detract 
from performance in some workplaces. 
•  Wage increases and productivity gains are seldom linked. 
•  A focus in workplace negotiations on redundancy and employee entitlement 
issues is deflecting attention from opportunities to improve productivity and 
efficiency, and thereby to enhance job security in the sector. 
Also, recent industrial disputes in some carpet plants in Victoria have been costly. 
Greater cooperation and more effective communication between those involved in 
workplace negotiations would help to address such constraints on firms’ 
performance. Indeed, the competitive pressures confronting the sector leave no 
place for adversarial workplace relations. 
Improving the skills of some of those managing workplace relations, or negotiating 
on behalf of employees, would assist the parties to take full advantage of Australia’s 
now more flexible arrangements for setting wages and conditions. And, finding a 
way acceptable to all of the parties to provide greater security for employee 
entitlements would help to engender a more productive workplace climate, as well 
as removing a trigger for industrial disputation. 
But some firms are unlikely to survive 
While the outlook for some firms and parts of the sector is positive, particularly if 
weaknesses can be addressed, in other areas, prospects are poor.      
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Clothing and footwear production remains labour intensive, with limited scope for 
more automation. High unit labour costs in Australia mean that local TCF firms — 
like those in other developed countries — have a serious competitive disadvantage 
in producing standardised clothing and footwear. In the past, higher productivity has 
partially offset this disadvantage. However, there is now little if any productivity 
difference between Australian producers and efficient suppliers in China, the main 
source of Australia’s clothing imports. Productivity in other developing countries is 
also improving. 
As a result, the profitability of firms still producing standardised TCF commodities 
is generally poor. Most in the sector accept that such production will continue to 
decline, regardless of the assistance regime. This in turn will put pressure on 
upstream yarn, textile and leather firms supplying these vulnerable segments. 
However, seeking to offset these competitive disadvantages through high tariffs 
would be neither effective nor in Australia’s interests. As many participants in the 
inquiry acknowledged, the future of an internationally competitive Australian TCF 
sector lies elsewhere — mainly in the manufacture of differentiated, high value, 
innovative products where labour costs are not the primary driver of market success, 
and in the provision of bundled products and services (such as corporate apparel).  
Where current activity is unlikely to be viable in the medium to long term, the 
policy imperative is to facilitate adjustment into more sustainable activities and to 
reduce the risk of disruption when firms exit the sector. This has implications for 
the pace of future assistance reductions, particularly as many TCF employees may 
have limited alternative job opportunities and the sector is still important in some 
regions (see below). 
The current assistance arrangements have shortcomings 
The current TCF assistance package (see box 2) provides for: 
•  a pause in tariffs at 2000 levels until 2005, when further reductions will occur; 
and 
•  nearly $700 million in transitional budgetary support over the period 2000-01 to 
2004-05 through the TCF Strategic Investment Program (SIP).  
The package is intended to provide ‘a period of consolidation’ after previous tariff 
reductions and to encourage investment and innovation that will help the sector to 
adjust to a ‘freer trade environment’.      





Box 2  The current TCF assistance package 
Under the package, which commenced in 2000, tariffs are maintained at 2000 levels 
until 1 January 2005, when they will be reduced as follows: 
•  25 per cent to 17.5 per cent for apparel and certain finished textiles; 
•  15 per cent to 10 per cent for cotton sheeting and woven fabrics, carpets and 
footwear; and 
•  10 per cent to 5 per cent for sleeping bags, table linen, tea towels and footwear 
parts. 
Tariffs on items currently at 5 per cent (for example, textile yarns and finished leather) 
will not change. 
The other main element of the package is the Strategic Investment Program. Its 
objective is to improve the competitiveness of TCF firms by encouraging investment 
and innovation. The program, which finishes on 30 June 2005, makes available nearly 
$700 million over the five-year period 2000-01 to 2004-05 — though current indications 
are that some of this money may not be spent. 
SIP funding is available to all entities undertaking TCF manufacturing and/or design 
activities in Australia, subject to them meeting a minimum expenditure threshold. 
Grants are payable for: 
•  investment in new capital equipment (up to 20 per cent of eligible expenditure); 
•  research and innovation (up to 45 per cent of eligible expenditure); 
•  value added (where firms have received grants for investment or innovation); and 
•  certain restructuring costs incurred by firms operating in ‘TCF dependent 
communities’ (up to 20 per cent of the cost of state-of-the-art, second hand plant 
and equipment and ancillary expenditures). 
To reduce the risk of complaints to the World Trade Organization, annual SIP funding 
to individual firms is capped at 5 per cent of their sales in the previous year. 
Only 5 per cent of TCF firms have so far received SIP support. But those firms account 
for around three-quarters of value added and two-thirds of employment in the sector.  
Other elements of the package include: Overseas Assembly Provisions to encourage 
the use of Australian fabrics and leather by clothing and footwear producers in low 
wage developing countries; and policy by-laws that provide duty free entry for selected 
yarn and fabric inputs. TCF firms also have access to a range of generally available 
support measures such as R&D grants and the Export Market Development Grants 
Scheme. Also, some State Governments provide specific support to the sector. 
However, these forms of assistance are minor in comparison to tariff protection and the 
SIP. Moreover, in terms of the total quantum of assistance provided, tariff protection is 
worth several times more to the sector than the SIP. 
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The objectives of the current package are appropriate 
Well-designed tariff reductions and transitional assistance can encourage the 
development of internationally competitive economic activity able to provide 
sustainable jobs, without imposing excessive costs on consumers and the wider 
community. They can also reduce the incidence of disruptive adjustment out of non-
viable activities. The objectives of the current TCF assistance package — to 
facilitate further tariff reductions in 2005 with transitional budgetary support — are 
therefore broadly appropriate. 
But aspects of the package detract from its effectiveness 
Many firms reported that SIP funding, in combination with the tariff pause, is 
supporting spending initiatives that will improve their international competitiveness. 
Such improvements in competitiveness are not yet apparent in overall sectoral 
outcomes. Import shares continue to increase, export growth encouraged by the 
previous assistance regime has stalled, and sectoral value added is still contracting. 
Also, there has been no discernible increase in sector-wide investment. 
Of course, such aggregate data, must be interpreted with caution. For example, the 
boost to sectoral performance from the activities of firms which are taking 
advantage of the current arrangements to re-position themselves, or to build on 
existing competitive strengths, will be offset by firm exits and reduced activity by 
enterprises with limited prospects.  
Nonetheless, aspects of the package are likely to detract from its capacity to induce 
new spending that will improve firms’ international competitiveness. In particular, 
under the SIP, which is intended to be a key facilitator of change (even though, in 
quantitative terms, it provides much less assistance than tariffs): 
•  Firms do not have to increase their levels of investment and innovation to 
receive SIP support. A portion of total support may therefore be underwriting 
spending that would have occurred anyway. 
•  Claims by firms for support are assessed after the spending has taken place. 
Though several definitional issues have been clarified, uncertainties about the 
outcomes of claims at the time spending decisions are made, may discourage or 
delay some worthwhile initiatives. 
Certain eligibility restrictions are likely to limit further the SIP’s effectiveness: 
•  It focuses on spending on new plant and equipment, R&D and product 
development. While this emphasis may be appropriate for some firms, others 
may be better able to enhance international competitiveness by investing in such     




things as state-of-the-art second hand equipment, brand support and market 
development. 
•  Specific support for rationalisation and consolidation of existing TCF activity is 
limited to regional areas, with little funding provided so far. Yet rationalisation 
of existing capacity — in metropolitan as well as regional areas — may be just 
as important in improving the sector’s international competitiveness as spending 
on new equipment, R&D or innovation.  
•  The minimum spending threshold (in place partly to contain administrative 
costs) means that transitional budgetary support is not available to many small 
TCF firms. Arguably, such support could have most impact on international 
competitiveness in this part of the sector, given the difficulties that small firms 
often face in accessing finance for investment and R&D. 
Also, the complexity of the SIP means that firms face substantial compliance costs. 
This dilutes the value of funding received and may discourage some firms from 
applying for support. 
Designing transitional support to induce new spending to improve international 
competitiveness is not easy, especially in a sector as diverse as TCF. Nonetheless, it 
is evident that improvements can be made to the current arrangements.  
Moreover, in terms of encouraging necessary change in the sector, the tariff pause 
may be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides breathing space for those 
firms seeking to invest to improve their international competitiveness and may be 
facilitating a more orderly exit of firms with limited prospects. But on the other, it 
may be reducing the pressure on some firms to restructure their activities. 
Achieving an appropriate balance in this regard is therefore a key issue for the post 
2005 assistance regime. 
The package is costly for others in the community 
Current support for TCF firms and their employees comes at a considerable cost to 
consumers and industries that use TCF products. (The latter includes various TCF 
industries that must pay tariff-inflated prices for inputs sourced from other parts of 
the sector): 
•  If the prices of TCF products — both locally produced and imported — increase 
to the full extent of the tariff, the cost to consumers and user industries would 
currently be about $1 billion a year, or about $150 annually for each Australian 
household. 
•  Even after the legislated tariff reductions in 2005, the impost would still be 
about $750 million a year.      
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In reality, some of these costs will be manifest through reductions in the quality of 
the products available at established market price points, rather than through 
observably higher prices. Also, competitive pressures may see importers or retailers 
absorb some of the impost. 
However, these observations do not alter the fact that tariffs on TCF products are a 
sizeable tax on basic items of household expenditure. Indeed, the tariff revenue 
collected on TCF imports costs consumers an amount equivalent to around 50 per 
cent of the GST raised on TCF products. And this ignores the price raising effect of 
tariffs on locally manufactured items. In addition, the cost to taxpayers of the SIP, 
though small compared with the consumer cost of tariffs, will still be $140 million a 
year over the life of the program. 
An alternative way of looking at the costs imposed on the community is that tariffs 
and the SIP together provide support to the sector worth around $13 000 a year for 
each TCF worker in Australia — including the estimated 25  000 full time 
equivalent employees engaged in outwork. This subsidy is equivalent to about 35 
per cent of average earnings across the sector. And, as a percentage of value added, 
assistance to TCF production is five times the average for manufacturing as a 
whole. 
Special support for the sector should not continue indefinitely 
The preceding discussion suggests that, while the objectives of the current 
assistance package are sound, changes are warranted to improve the effectiveness of 
the support provided and to reduce the costs imposed on the rest of the community.  
Many (though not all) in the TCF sector accept that the tariff cuts already legislated 
for 2005 should proceed. But most sought an extended tariff pause after 2005 — 
with any future reductions linked to ‘matching’ declines in barriers in other 
countries — as well as continuing budgetary support at existing or higher levels.  
A key plank in the sector’s arguments for special assistance treatment was the claim 
that TCF production makes a unique contribution to the economy in terms of 
employment, technology development, innovation and design. 
However, in the Commission’s view, the sector’s economic contribution, while 
significant, does not justify indefinite special assistance: 
•  All industries generate wealth and provide employment, often in regional areas. 
Many export and contribute to technology development, frequently to a greater 
extent than the TCF sector.  
•  Australia should aspire to have industries that are both internationally 
competitive and which offer well-paid jobs to skilled employees. As firms and     




unions alike acknowledge, TCF production which can only survive with high 
assistance and low wages, is not compatible with this goal. 
•  By increasing costs, assistance for TCF production reduces the contribution that 
other industries can make to Australia’s economic performance. 
Only if the TCF sector provided benefits to other activities for which it received no 
reward (‘spillovers’), and which would not be supported by general industry 
programs, might there be a case for maintaining special assistance treatment. No 
evidence was forthcoming to suggest this is the case to any significant extent. 
Similarly, the arguments for making reductions in Australia’s TCF tariffs 
conditional on matching cuts in other countries do not stand close scrutiny: 
•  The concept of ‘fairness’ underpinning these arguments has other dimensions. 
For example, many would regard it as unfair that Australia’s families pay higher 
prices for their clothing and footwear to protect domestic TCF producers. 
•  The scope for Australia to use its TCF tariffs as bargaining coin in international 
trade negotiations is likely to be very limited. Australia accounts for less than 
one per cent of global demand for TCF products, and imports already have a 
high share of the domestic market.  
•  While better access to overseas markets would benefit Australian TCF firms that 
are already internationally competitive, it is unlikely to be pivotal to the viability 
of most firms still moving to that goal. Prospects for these firms will be mainly 
determined by their capacity to sustain or expand their businesses in the local 
market in the face of intensifying competition from imports.  
Importantly, most of the gains for a country from trade reform come not from the 
opportunity to increase exports, but from the improvements in efficiency that ensue 
from greater import competition in the domestic market (see below). This means 
that, contrary to commonly held views, Australia will benefit from reducing its 
industry protection even if others do not follow suit. 
Further assistance reductions would be beneficial 
Much of the debate in this inquiry about the impacts of further reductions in 
assistance for the TCF sector has focused on the results of the quantitative 
modelling studies. All of these studies indicate that assistance reductions would, at 
best, provide only small economy-wide benefits. Those advocating an indefinite 
continuation of special treatment for the sector have argued that these benefits are 
not sufficient to justify the costs that reductions in assistance would impose on 
particular communities or regions.     
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However, such emphasis on, and use of, the modelling results is inappropriate: 
•  The models are designed to assess the effects of resource movements between 
sectors that would ensue from reducing TCF assistance. It is to be expected that 
these projected resource allocation effects, though beneficial, will be small in an 
economy-wide sense. The TCF sector accounts for much less than one per cent 
of economy-wide output and employment, and the extent of its special assistance 
treatment is less than in the past. 
•  While the resource allocation benefits are relevant to post 2005 policy settings, 
so too are other effects that are not embraced by the modelling. Indeed, with the 
resource allocation benefits now small, the ‘dynamic’ benefits of assistance 
reductions and adjustment costs (see below) dominate the future policy calculus. 
•  It is also to be expected that the effects of reductions in assistance on those 
regions where TCF production is concentrated will be proportionately greater 
(though absolutely smaller) than the economy-wide effects. The possibility of 
sizeable contractions in activity in specific regions is relevant to the pace of 
reform. But provided that firms and regions are given reasonable time to adjust, 
such contractions in activity are not a reason to forgo reform that would benefit 
the community as a whole. 
The incentives for performance improvement would be reinforced 
Reductions in assistance can play a catalytic role in encouraging firms to become 
more productive and outward oriented. Undoubtedly, adjusting to greater 
international competition is difficult, requiring firms and their employees to make 
significant changes. But the experience in a range of Australian industries that have 
been through this process indicates that the benefits can be substantial. Forced to 
deal with the removal of their protective cushion, many firms have identified 
opportunities — previously considered unlikely or impossible — where they can 
compete with the best in the world. 
Australia’s strong and sustained growth performance of recent years has 
accompanied an extensive program of microeconomic reform, including the 
dismantling of most trade barriers. The much greater responsiveness, innovativeness 
and flexibility now evident in many Australian firms provide a springboard for 
sustaining strong output and employment growth in the future. It also increases the 
resilience of the economy to external shocks. 
There is nothing to suggest that these effects of assistance reform are less 
pronounced in the TCF sector. Hence, assistance reductions after 2005 would 
reinforce the competitive pressures on TCF firms to improve their productivity, 
quality and delivery performance, to innovate, and to look for new markets.      




While there are limits on the capacity of firms to improve performance, evidence to 
this inquiry indicates that, in many parts of the sector, substantial gains can still be 
made. The scope for further rationalisation of excess and inefficient capacity, and 
for more productive workplace relationships, are previously noted examples. In 
addition, considerable managerial effort in parts of the TCF sector continues to be 
devoted to preserving high assistance and looking for ways to garner government 
support. If this energy and creativity were instead applied to improving international 
competitiveness, the sector and Australia would ultimately be better off.  
A commitment from the Government to remove progressively and unconditionally 
the sector’s special assistance treatment after 2005 would give a clear signal about 
the need for such a change of focus. It would also send a message to firms in other 
industries not to waste effort seeking protection from competitive pressures. 
Conversely, postponing the removal of special treatment, or making it subject to 
another review, would distract TCF firms from confronting the reality that, in 
future, they must survive and prosper on their own merits, not on the basis of costly 
support from the rest of the community. 
Consumers and user industries would benefit 
Reductions in TCF tariffs after 2005 would undoubtedly benefit consumers and user 
industries. For many years, these groups have borne the brunt of supporting 
internationally uncompetitive TCF production. An indefinite tariff pause after 2005 
would see this burden continue for many years to come. 
Claims that the cost savings from tariff reductions would not be passed on to 
consumers but would simply boost the profits of importers and retailers, ignore 
market realities: 
•  The global TCF industry is brutally competitive, with new production centres 
and surplus capacity putting intense pressure on wholesale prices. In these 
circumstances, attempts by importers to retain the benefits of lower tariffs would 
be futile. Distributors and retailers would simply obtain those items more 
cheaply elsewhere. 
•  The Commission has seen no evidence that Australian retailers of TCF products 
are making excessive profits. Indeed, the real price of TCF products has been 
falling over time, notwithstanding (until recently) the depreciation of the 
Australian dollar. 
This does not mean that price reductions or quality improvements at established 
market price points will immediately follow tariff reductions. But over time, the 
competitive nature of importing, wholesaling and retailing will ensure that benefits 
flow through to consumers. Several TCF firms acknowledged that, in contrast to a     
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decade ago when tariffs were much higher, Australian consumers can now purchase 
some clothing and footwear as, or more cheaply, than their counterparts in parts of 
Asia, Europe and the USA. Reductions in tariffs after 2005 would provide 
additional price benefits to consumers. 
Trade policy interests would be facilitated 
Australia has international commitments and broader trade policy interests that 
impinge on post 2005 TCF assistance. Australia was active in the formation of 
APEC and is a signatory to the Bogor Agreement to pursue free and open trade and 
investment in the region, by 2010 for developed countries and by 2020 for 
developing countries. It is also an active player in WTO negotiations. 
The gains for Australia from global trade liberalisation will be many times greater 
than the effects of changes to its TCF assistance levels. Thus Australia’s national 
interests will be served by assistance policies for the TCF sector that enhance, or at 
least do not compromise, the prospects of broadly-based liberalisation. An 
indefinite tariff pause, or making assistance reductions conditional on actions by 
other countries, could send the wrong signal, particularly to APEC. 
The way ahead 
The current assistance regime was designed to be transitional and to encourage 
adjustment into TCF activities that can become viable with levels of support similar 
to those available to other Australian industries. To put tariff reductions on hold 
after 2005 — as proposed by many firms, trade unions and some State Governments 
— would be a counterproductive reversal of an approach that has started to reshape 
and strengthen Australia’s TCF sector and which has reduced the costs of assistance 
for others in the community. 
Thus, just as when the current arrangements were formulated, the key question for 
the post 2005 assistance regime should be by how much, and over what timeframe, 
assistance is reduced, not whether it should be reduced. 
Adjustment costs are integral to the policy calculus 
In establishing a time path for future assistance reductions, adjustment costs are a 
key consideration.  
Much of the impending adjustment in the Australian TCF sector will occur 
regardless of the assistance regime. Global pressures mean that more firm closures     




are inevitable and further declines in sectoral output likely, even at current 
assistance levels. Moreover, the productivity improvements that will help some 
firms to survive mean that sectoral employment will continue to fall. The value of 
the Australian dollar will also influence the adjustment process. Indeed, some firms 
saw the potential for currency appreciation as a much greater threat to their viability 
than tariff reductions. 
However, declines in sectoral output and employment resulting from reductions in 
assistance will impose additional adjustment costs on firms, their employees and 
TCF dependent regions. So will initiatives by TCF firms to improve their viability 
at lower levels of assistance. 
As noted, such adjustment costs are not a reason to forgo the enduring community-
wide benefits from lower assistance for the TCF sector.  
Moreover, the likely declines in TCF output and employment from post 2005 tariff 
reductions and a phasing out of transitional budgetary support have been 
exaggerated by some parties. For example, the widely reported ‘19 000 jobs at risk 
in Victoria’ appears to include estimated job losses in the TCF sector from the 
already legislated 2005 tariff reductions, as well as flow-on job losses in other 
sectors, but neglects flow-on gains.  
These offsetting employment gains are important in assessing the adjustment 
implications of job losses in the TCF sector (projected by the modelling studies to 
be between 1000 and 10 000 Australia-wide) that would ensue from the post 2005 
assistance options outlined below. Significantly, the Victorian Government’s own 
modelling suggests that the net reduction in that State’s output and, by implication, 
employment would be just 0.02 per cent, equivalent to less than 500 jobs. Net job 
losses of this magnitude over a period of years would be very small in the context of 
general employment growth in the Victorian economy. 
Even so, changes to the assistance regime must give TCF firms, their employees 
and surrounding regions time to make necessary adjustments. Reducing assistance 
levels too quickly after 2005 could put at risk production that could become viable 
under a more gradual transition process. It would also increase the likelihood of 
disruptive adjustment, resulting in additional economic and social costs. 
In parts of the sector, future adjustment could be somewhat easier than in the past. 
Some of the least competitive firms have already ceased production; skill levels 
have improved, increasing the alternative job opportunities for some employees; 
and most of the TCF dependent regions are now more economically diverse and 
operate in wider employment catchments — for example, Geelong/Melbourne and 
Wangaratta/Wodonga.     
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Nevertheless, in many cases, the adjustment process will still be difficult: 
•  Firms that have already implemented the ‘easy’ options for improving their 
international competitiveness may find future adjustment more demanding. 
•  Characteristics of the TCF workforce suggest that many factory-based 
employees could still have difficulty finding alternative employment. For 
outworkers, alternative opportunities may be even more limited (see box 3). 
•  Though regional dependence on TCF activity is lower than in the past, the 
closure of large firms in centres like Wangaratta and Devonport would be 
disruptive to regional economic activity and the social fabric of these 
communities. The same could also be true for some TCF clusters within 
metropolitan centres.  
In formulating its post 2005 assistance options, the Commission has therefore given 
particular emphasis to avoiding the imposition of unreasonable adjustment pressures 
on the sector. 
Post 2005 options for tariffs and the SIP 
A clear assistance policy path should be established 
The pressures and uncertainties confronting firms in the TCF sector are intense. A 
clear and extended path for assistance reductions would remove one source of 
uncertainty. Without clear policy direction, investment that would help some firms 
to operate successfully in a low assistance environment could be put at risk. 
Accordingly, the post 2005 tariff and transitional support options outlined below 
establish an assistance regime for the sector for the decade through to 2015, without 
the need for a further review. Indeed, any provision for another review would be 
counterproductive (see later). 
A 5 per cent tariff should be the target 
From 2010, tariffs for all other Australian manufacturing industries will be 5 per 
cent or less. In the Commission’s view, 5 per cent should therefore be the tariff 
target for the TCF sector, supported by transitional budgetary assistance in the 
intervening period through a successor to the SIP. This would maintain the thrust of 
current policy. 
For most parts of the sector, achievement of this target rate by 2010 would not add 
unduly to adjustment pressures:     





Box 3  Factors impeding adjustment in the TCF sector 
While future adjustment in parts of the sector may be easier than in the past, 
characteristics of the TCF workforce may impede adjustment to external shocks, 
including reductions in assistance: 
•  Notwithstanding improvements in skill levels across the sector, many factory-based 
TCF employees have only industry-specific skills and few formal qualifications. 
•  TCF employees tend to be somewhat older than employees in other manufacturing 
industries. Female employment is also higher than the manufacturing average.  
•  The sector employs many recently arrived migrants which means that English 
language skills are often poor.  
These characteristics are likely to make it more difficult for many displaced TCF 
workers to find alternative employment in their existing locations, or to relocate in 
search of new work. (Recent data suggest, however, that re-employment rates may be 
higher, and the average time taken to find new employment lower, than in the past.)  
Some of the characteristics impeding adjustment by the factory-based workforce are 
even more pronounced among outworkers. They are typically women from East Asian 
backgrounds, often with few English language skills and no recognised educational 
qualifications. Moreover, cultural and family considerations prevent many outworkers 
seeking employment outside the home. Outworkers can also have personal equity in 
sewing equipment which may be difficult to realise in the event they are displaced, and 
have no notice periods or entitlements to redundancy and other severance payments. 
For those firms that have previously availed themselves of readily available 
opportunities to improve their international competitiveness, future adjustment may be 
more demanding. Also, some non-profitable firms may be continuing to operate only 
because they cannot meet, or are unwilling to meet, substantial redundancy payments 
and other exit costs. This suggests that there is some accumulated adjustment 
pressure in the sector which could be released by an external economic shock. 
The potential for such ‘lumpy’ adjustment is particularly relevant in a regional context. 
Small employment bases and constraints on inter-regional mobility make some 
regional centres vulnerable to firm closures and other lumpy adjustments.  
However, the diversity of most TCF-dependent regional economies has been 
increasing. Also, TCF firms in regional areas tend to employ more males and people 
from English-speaking backgrounds than their counterparts in metropolitan areas. This 
may help to reduce any general gap in the adjustment capacity of regional versus 
metropolitan areas. Indeed, the capacity of many of these regions to cope with further 
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•  The 2005 tariff reductions will add to the list of TCF products that will already 
be subject to a 5 per cent rate. 
•  For most of the other product groups, the required further reduction will only be 
5 percentage points. 
However, for the most highly assisted TCF products — apparel and certain finished 
textiles — the required tariff reduction after 2005 will be 12.5 percentage points. 
Ending special assistance treatment for these items by 2010 would therefore require 
a faster rate of tariff reduction than under the current assistance package (7.5 
percentage points at the end of five years). While such differences are small in the 
context of the broader competitive pressures confronting many clothing and 
finished textile producers, too rapid assistance reductions could undermine some 
potentially viable firms. 
Two broad tariff paths emerge 
The preceding discussion indicates that there are two broad ways to move to the 
5 per cent target, while providing the sector with a ‘decade of policy certainty’: 
•  reduce all TCF tariffs to 5 per cent by 2010, and then maintain those rates until 
2015; or 
•  reduce tariffs on products other than apparel and certain finished textiles to 5 per 
cent by 2010, with tariffs on the latter reduced to 5 per cent no later than 2015. 
The Commission’s judgment is that the second approach would deliver a better 
overall outcome. While the benefits to consumers and user industries from lower 
tariffs for apparel and certain finished textiles would be delayed, the potential for 
the assistance reductions to trigger disruptive adjustment in these industries would 
be diminished. The Commission is also mindful of the fact that the fortunes of many 
local yarn and textile suppliers are closely allied to those of their customers in the 
clothing and finished textiles industries. Hence, there is a risk that disruptive 
adjustment at the end of the production chain could create ‘knock-on’ problems.  
The case for ‘erring on the side of caution’ also provides a reason for delaying the 
attainment of the 5 per cent target for apparel and certain finished textiles until 
2015. Although this would represent a slightly lower rate of reduction over the  
10-year period than under the current package, many firms will already have availed 
themselves of the easier opportunities for performance improvement. Hence, in the 
future, they may have to work harder to increase their international competitiveness.  
In the transition to the 5 per cent tariff target, the choice between annual reductions 
(phasing) and a pause followed by a larger one-off reduction — the approach 
employed in the current package — is less important. Given the extended     




timeframes required to recoup many investments to improve international 
competitiveness, firms’ planning decisions may well depend more heavily on the 
tariff end point than on the somewhat higher duty rates applying in the intervening 
period. However, rates in the intervening period will obviously have some impact 
on decisions — particularly the timing of exits by non-competitive suppliers. In this 
context, the pause/step-down approach would provide firms with more breathing 
space and thereby facilitate a smoother adjustment process. It would also avoid the 
additional compliance costs for both the sector and the Government, associated with 
smaller annual reductions in duty rates. 
The preferred tariff option 
The Commission’s preferred tariff option (see figure 1) is therefore as follows: 
•  Maintain all TCF tariffs at 2005 levels until 2010. 
•  In 2010, reduce tariffs on all TCF products other than apparel and certain 
finished textiles to 5 per cent and then maintain this rate to 2015. 
•  Reduce tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles to 10 per cent in 2010 and 
then to 5 per cent in 2015. 
The Commission recognises that this option might be viewed as less compatible 
with Australia’s APEC commitment and other trade policy interests than options 
which would reduce all TCF tariffs to 5 per cent by 2010 (see chapter 7).  
However, these concerns could be addressed by legislating now for all of the post 
2005 tariff reductions. Legislating in advance would also reinforce the signal to the 
sector that the decade after 2005 is to be the last period of preferment for TCF 
production in Australia — irrespective of what might happen to TCF assistance 
levels in other countries. 
Transitional support to accompany post 2005 tariff reductions  
Cessation of transitional support when the current SIP expires in mid 2005 could be 
counterproductive. Given the magnitude of the adjustment task still facing the 
sector, immediate cessation in combination with further tariff reductions risks 
sacrificing some activity with reasonable prospects of becoming viable under more 
accommodating transitional arrangements. 
However, a successor to the SIP should be time limited. And, as part of a package to 
end the sector’s special assistance treatment, it would be difficult to justify higher 
levels of support than under the current program.      
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Apparel, textiles Sheeting, footwear, carpets
Linen, footwear parts Textiles, yarns
Modifying the SIP would be preferable to introducing a new scheme  
To maximise the effectiveness of further transitional budgetary support, the 
Commission examined three methods of delivery: 
•  a modified version of the current SIP; 
•  a bounty based on increases in firms’ value added; and 
•  a competitive bidding scheme under which firms would apply for assistance for 
proposed expenditures to enhance their viability. (As in several other industry 
support programs, applications would be assessed by an ‘expert’ panel against a 
range of selection criteria.) 
The Commission’s focus was on which of these delivery methods would encourage 
the most new spending by firms to improve their international competitiveness, 
while keeping compliance and administrative costs within reasonable bounds. 
While the incremental value added bounty and competitive bidding approaches 
would have some advantages over aspects of the current SIP (see box 4), there 
would be considerable benefits from taking advantage of the learning experience 
and precedents accumulated under the current scheme. The experience with the SIP 
illustrates that the costs for firms and the Government alike of bedding down 
completely new arrangements, and the associated uncertainty about outcomes, can 
be significant. Largely for this reason, the majority of participants favoured a     




modified version of the SIP. Moreover, the Commission sees scope to improve the 
effectiveness of the current program in helping firms to enhance their international 
competitiveness.  
 
Box 4  The alternative approaches for delivering transitional support 
Compared with the current SIP, an incremental value added bounty would: 
•  support a wider range of expenditures aimed at improving firms’ international 
competitiveness; and 
•  in some respects, provide for more ‘additionality’— only firms that increased their 
value added would receive support. 
But it would: 
•  pose definitional and measurement difficulties; 
•  increase uncertainty for firms, because changes in value added unrelated to 
spending to improve international competitiveness would affect funding 
entitlements; and 
•  provide no support where downsizing/consolidation was a part of a firm’s strategy to 
remain viable. 
In contrast to the current SIP, a competitive bidding scheme would place the onus on 
firms to demonstrate that spending proposals would improve their international 
competitiveness and viability. It could also: 
•  support a wider range of expenditures to improve competitiveness than the current 
SIP; and 
•  in one respect, provide more certainty to firms — decisions on funding support 
would be finalised before the expenditure concerned was made. 
However, it would be difficult to: 
•  keep compliance costs for firms and administrative costs for the Government within 
reasonable limits, particularly given the large number of firms in the sector; and 
•  get the right balance between reliance on pre-determined selection criteria and the 
degree of discretion afforded the selection panel. Too much discretion could see 
such a scheme degenerate into a non-transparent ‘beauty-parade’. 
In the Commission’s judgment, there are good reasons for sticking with a SIP-style 
arrangement after 2005 (see text). Though most participants also supported 
continuation of the current approach, some noted that a competitive bidding 
arrangement could be employed as part of a separate scheme for small TCF firms that 
would continue to have difficulty accessing a modified SIP regime. However, as 
discussed later in the text, while desirable in principle, the Commission envisages that 
improving the access of small firms to transitional support would raise implementation 
challenges. 
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What modifications are warranted? 
Viewed in isolation, many of the proposals from participants to make additional 
types of expenditures eligible for transitional budgetary support have merit.  
However, expanding the range of eligible expenditures, or increasing the number of 
firms receiving support, will necessarily spread overall funding for the new scheme 
more thinly. This would reduce its capacity to induce changes that improved firms’ 
international competitiveness. At the extreme, were the current level of support to 
be distributed proportionately to all firms in the sector, the funding rate would only 
be around 1.5 per cent of sales — hardly enough to make any difference to firm 
behaviour. Making too many changes would also impede a relatively ‘seamless 
transition’ from the current regime, thereby creating uncertainty and adding to 
compliance and administrative costs. 
Accordingly, the Commission proposes only a handful of ‘high level’ changes to 
deliver more effective transitional assistance to TCF manufacturing firms with 
reasonable prospects of becoming internationally competitive: 
•  Provide generally available support for expenditure on state-of-the-art second 
hand equipment. Surplus production capacity both in Australia and overseas 
means that the purchase of state-of-the art second hand equipment can often be a 
cost-effective way for TCF firms to improve their competitiveness. As noted, 
under the current SIP, support for the purchase of such equipment is only 
available when it is part of a restructuring initiative in regional areas. With 
appropriate safeguards to minimise the risk of gaming and abuse, generalising 
the current provisions could facilitate the development of internationally 
competitive firms across the full spectrum of TCF manufacturing. 
•  Subsidise investment in market and brand development for locally manufactured 
TCF products. Spending in these areas is evidently desirable for firms looking to 
move out of production of standardised commodities into branded or otherwise 
differentiated products; to develop export markets; or to exploit market niches 
more generally. Support for market and brand development could be particularly 
helpful for clothing manufacturers that have reasonable prospects of becoming 
internationally competitive. As noted, in many parts of the clothing industry the 
scope for more automation is limited. Also, garment design and visual appeal are 
critical to market success. Hence, the current restriction on eligible spending to 
investment in plant and equipment and ‘non-visual’ innovation limits the 
funding support received by some potentially viable clothing manufacturers. 
•  Discontinue ‘Type 3’ value added grants. As currently implemented, these 
grants simply increase the rates of subsidy for investment in plant and equipment 
and spending on R&D and innovation. But the way they are paid means that the     




increased rate of subsidy can vary arbitrarily among firms. Discontinuing these 
grants would help to simplify the new regime. It would also release funds that 
could be used to directly increase the subsidy rates for investment and R&D, 
and/or to pay for the two eligibility extensions outlined above. 
The Commission also proposes that the new transitional arrangements incorporate a 
clearly enunciated and explicit objective; namely, to foster the development of 
Australian TCF manufacturing activity that can be viable and internationally 
competitive without special assistance. 
The Commission emphasises that the detailed implementation of these changes (and 
some administrative modifications outlined in the report) would require consultation 
with the sector. It would also be necessary to develop appropriate safeguards against 
fraud and gaming. 
A separate small firm module? 
A recurring theme in submissions was that transitional support should be more 
accessible to small TCF firms. Many suggested that the minimum spending 
threshold to qualify for support should be reduced. Others proposed the introduction 
of a separate competitive bidding scheme for small producers (with funding of the 
order of $15-20 million a year). 
In the Commission’s view, the in-principle case for not discriminating against small 
firms is self evident. The entrepreneurial and innovative skills apparent in many 
small TCF firms suggests that there is good growth potential in this part of the 
sector. Indeed, given the financing difficulties that small firms often face, 
transitional budgetary support might induce more new activity to improve 
international competitiveness than support provided to large, established firms. 
However, attempting to bring a large number of small firms within the funding net 
would see overall support spread much more thinly and could cause administrative 
costs to escalate sharply. These problems would be particularly acute if better 
access for small firms were pursued through adjustments to the minimum spending 
threshold. Under a competitive bidding scheme, it would be possible to use 
screening criteria to limit the number of applicants. But to be effective in containing 
administrative costs, these criteria would have to be quite restrictive. The 
transparency and independence of the vetting procedures would also require 
attention. In sum, an initiative for small TCF firms warrants further consideration, 
but careful thought about how to address these practical issues, while still providing 
cost-effective transitional support, would be required.     
  OVERVIEW  XXXVII
 
The duration and level of funding 
In assessing how long transitional support should be extended after 2005, and the 
level of funding for the new scheme, the following considerations are relevant: 
•  Under the Commission’s preferred tariff option, the reduction to 5 per cent in the 
tariff on clothing and certain finished textiles would not occur until 2015. 
Ending transitional funding much earlier would see firms in those segments 
making the last part of the tariff transition without the support that others in the 
sector had enjoyed.  
•  Even though firms elsewhere in the sector would be operating at a 5 per cent 
tariff from 2010, many could experience knock-on adjustment pressures 
associated with the impending tariff reductions for clothing and certain finished 
textiles after that date. 
•  Reinforcing the message to firms that special assistance treatment is coming to 
an end is important. This suggests that, like tariffs, transitional support should be 
progressively reduced. 
•  As noted, as part of a package to end special assistance treatment, it would be 
hard to justify funding support higher than that provided by the current SIP. 
•  At the same time, in facilitating a seamless transition from the current regime, 
there is a case for maintaining funding levels in the early years of the new 
program. 
In the Commission’s judgment, the following funding profile would strike a balance 
between these sometimes opposing considerations: 
•  The new transitional support program would operate for eight years from 2005. 
•  Funding for the first four-year period would be equivalent to total payments in 
the last four years of the current SIP (in nominal terms). 
•  Funding for the second four-year period would be halved. 
•  Transitional support would then end in 2013. 
The Commission notes that provided adjustments were made to hold the total 
quantum of proposed funding constant in present value terms, a time profile of say 
two five-year periods, or five years and three years, would most likely make little 
difference to outcomes. Hence, in some senses, the key thrust of the Commission’s 
proposal is to set an indicative benchmark for the present value of funding for the 
new transitional support arrangement. However, though the Commission sees scope 
for some variation in the time profile of this support, if the sector’s special tariff 
treatment is not to end until 2015, distributing all funding very quickly after 2005 
would raise the prospect of subsequent calls for more transitional assistance.     




Assistance for displaced TCF employees 
The post 2005 assistance options outlined above give priority to reducing the risk of 
disruptive adjustment in the sector. 
But the possibility of disruptive change cannot be ruled out. The global competitive 
pressures confronting the sector are likely to see some TCF firms cease operation in 
the next few years, irrespective of assistance settings.  
Assistance for displaced TCF workers in finding alternative employment is 
sometimes provided by the firms themselves. Assistance with job search (and often 
financial support) is also available through the Job Network arrangements.  
As presently constituted, however, those arrangements might not be adequate in the 
event of large firm closures (or other major job shedding). In particular, when a 
large firm closes, it may be difficult to ensure that all displaced workers receive 
adequate attention, particularly in those regional areas where the number of Job 
Network providers is limited. Given the inevitability of more firm closures in this 
sector, the characteristics of the TCF workforce and the importance of TCF activity 
to some regions, targeted labour market support is warranted during the tariff 
transition period. 
This should not involve a separate scheme operating in parallel with the Job 
Network. That would be a recipe for wasteful duplication of services.  
Rather, such support should augment Job Network services when large scale, or 
regionally significant, retrenchments occur or are in prospect. Drawing on recent 
experience with labour market programs in the TCF sector in Australia and abroad, 
and the input from inquiry participants, this augmentation of the standard Job 
Network services should: 
•  provide scope to initiate Job Network-type support when large scale, or 
regionally significant, retrenchments have been announced, rather than only after 
job shedding has occurred. (There is evidence suggesting that the prospects of 
re-employment are improved if support services are made available while those 
facing retrenchment are still in their jobs); and 
•  use small teams of people with experience in the TCF sector to work with the 
displaced employees, or those facing retrenchment.  
There is also scope to make mainstream Job Network services more accessible to all 
displaced TCF employees. Because of limited communication and English language 
skills, some displaced TCF workers may be reluctant, or find it difficult, to access 
the Job Network. These difficulties could be ameliorated by regular dissemination 
of information on Job Network services to the TCF workforce, including     
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outworkers. Indeed, this would be a concrete way to assist outworkers, who might 
be more difficult to encompass in the specific program designed to deal with major 
job shedding in the sector.  
These initiatives need not be expensive. But they could help to ease the adjustment 
burden for one of the most vulnerable groups in the workforce. 
No changes are required to other parts of the assistance package  
The Commission does not see any reason to either abolish or change the Overseas 
Assembly Provisions or TCF policy by-laws. For most firms, these are minor parts 
of the assistance package and will become even less relevant as TCF tariffs decline 
in 2005 and beyond. Making changes could increase uncertainty as new 
arrangements were bedded down, as well as diverting attention from the main game. 
Accordingly, the Commission considers that these instruments should be left in 
place unchanged, until such time as tariff reductions render them redundant. 
Similarly, it is not proposing any changes to tariff rates applying on individual TCF 
items. While participants claimed that various anomalies and inefficiencies arise 
under the current broad tariff structure, ‘band-aid’ solutions would inevitably lead 
to new distortions. By far the cleanest approach to addressing such concerns is to 
reduce all tariffs to the benchmark rate of 5 per cent as soon as practicable. 
A further review would be counterproductive 
Many industry interests argued that there should be a 2008 (or later) review of TCF 
assistance before any post 2005 tariffs cuts go ahead.  
However, the prospect of a review would detract from policy certainty and the 
message to firms that the sector’s special assistance treatment must end by 2015. In 
so doing, it could delay new investments and other adjustments that would help 
firms to operate successfully in a low tariff environment. Also, previous experience 
suggests that managerial energy would be diverted into further lobbying to preserve 
the sector’s special assistance treatment. 
What else should be done? 
Responsibility for addressing many of the impediments and weaknesses that reduce 
the viability of TCF production in Australia lies with the sector itself. For example, 
more cooperation and better communication between firms and their employees and 
representatives is crucial to improving workplace outcomes. Similarly, more     




dialogue between firms, industry associations and education and training providers 
would help to ensure that firms have adequate access to necessary skills. 
However, government also has responsibility to provide a broader policy framework 
that facilitates firms’ efforts to improve their competitiveness: 
•  Workplace regulation which allows negotiation of flexible and productive 
outcomes is important to the sector’s future. So too is an industrial relations 
framework that encourages cooperative resolution of workplace disputes. 
•  Additional policy initiatives to address employees’ legitimate concerns 
(particularly given history in this sector) about the security of their entitlements 
in the event of firm closures are warranted. Establishing an independent review 
to assess the merits of different approaches should be a first step.  
•  Further microeconomic reform would assist the sector to compete internationally 
with lower levels of assistance. Improvements in Australia’s taxation regime 
could also be helpful — particular concerns were raised in this inquiry about 
inefficiencies in current payroll tax arrangements. There remains a strong case 
for removing the 3 per cent revenue duty imposed under the Tariff Concession 
System. And governments must ensure that their general industry programs are 
effective and efficient. 
•  While Australia’s tariffs should not be tied to those in other countries, the 
Commonwealth and State Governments must continue to place a high priority on 
securing better access to overseas markets for TCF and other producers. Though 
some progress has been made, Australian TCF firms still face widespread tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. These are impeding the efforts of some internationally 
competitive firms to improve their performance through increased exports. 
  That said, care is required in pursuing better market access through bilateral 
agreements. The likely benefits for Australia, and the effects on particular 
industries, will depend on both the coverage of an agreement and its detailed 
rules. Thus, as TCF interests pointed out to this inquiry, the rules of origin for 
the proposed bilateral agreements with the United States and Thailand will have 
a crucial bearing on outcomes for the sector. 
An appropriate strategy for outworkers 
Increasing reliance on outwork is a feature of the clothing industry in Australia and 
many other countries. This is primarily because of the scope it provides to firms to 
respond quickly, flexibly and cost effectively to customer demands. Given that 
short-run, quick response apparel production is one of the key areas where     
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Australian clothing producers can offer a competitive alternative to imports, such 
flexibility is very important.  
Moreover, some outworkers may prefer to work at home, particularly where 
flexibility in the pace and timing of tasks allows them to combine earning an 
income with family responsibilities. Outwork also provides job opportunities for 
those newly arrived migrants with poor English language skills, limited formal 
education and sometimes no immediate access to welfare. 
At the same time, the potential for the exploitation of outworkers through low rates 
of pay, long working hours and poor working conditions is a longstanding concern. 
While there is little hard information on the extent of exploitation, a variety of 
regulation has been introduced to try to ensure that outworkers are properly 
remunerated and work under appropriate conditions.  
However, regulation is not a panacea for the problems facing outworkers. It can be 
a two-edged sword — excessive regulation, or heavy handed enforcement, may 
simply make some production internationally uncompetitive to the detriment of the 
outworkers concerned. In any event, because of the nature of outwork and its long 
and convoluted supply chains, regulation has proved difficult to enforce.  
Achieving greater compliance with minimum pay and condition requirements for 
outworkers is therefore the goal of the Homeworkers Code of Practice — a 
voluntary arrangement among retailers, TCF suppliers and wholesalers, and the 
main industry union. Recently, the number of signatories to the Code has increased 
significantly.  
In the Commission’s view, the emphasis in the Code on voluntary compliance with 
current regulatory requirements provides the best way forward in this area. Indeed, 
there is a risk that heavy handed attempts to enforce existing regulation, or the 
implementation of more regulation, could undermine the increasing degree of 
cooperation now emerging under the Code, and therefore be counterproductive.  
A stronger and more competitive Australian TCF sector is achievable 
A key message that emerges from this inquiry is that there is little that governments 
in developed countries can or should do to stop labour intensive, standardised TCF 
production from migrating to developing countries. Further adjustment in 
Australia’s TCF industries is therefore inevitable.  
This change will be difficult for firms, their employees and surrounding 
communities. Hence, facilitation of, and support for, the adjustment process is 
essential.      




But this does not extend to turning back the clock by locking in tariffs or other 
barriers to try to avoid or delay inevitable change. The opposite is in fact the case, 
with further assistance reform having an important role to play in promoting a 
successful transition by the sector.  
With the right transitional policies, the Commission is confident that the 
development of a smaller but more internationally competitive TCF sector, able to 
provide well paid and interesting jobs to skilled employees, is achievable in the 
medium term. This would allow remaining TCF firms and their employees to face 
the challenges and opportunities of global markets with some confidence, as well as 
providing substantial benefits to the wider community. The options identified by the 
Commission in this report would serve to promote these outcomes.     
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Findings 
The following are the Commission’s findings on: the TCF sector’s future prospects; 
its capacity for further adjustment; the effects of the current assistance regime; post 
2005 assistance arrangements; and other policy-related matters impinging on the 
sector’s future performance and viability. The reasons for these findings are set out 
in the relevant chapters of the report. 
•  Some firms and parts of the sector are performing well, exploiting competitive 
advantages to develop new products and to secure new markets. 
•  Other firms are in a process of transition, with reasonable prospects of 
operating in a lower assistance environment in the medium to longer term. 
•  For firms producing standardised products in the more labour intensive parts of 
the sector, future prospects are very limited. Many will not survive, regardless of 
the assistance regime.  
•  Across the sector as a whole, future assistance levels will be but one influence 
on firms’ prospects. Global market pressures, firms’ business models and 
exchange rates are just some of the many other factors that will impinge on 
those prospects. 
•  Adjustment for workers displaced from the TCF sector, in cities as well as in 
regions, may be difficult: 
•  Educational attainment is often limited and skill levels are frequently basic 
and sector-specific. 
•  The predominance of female employees and low English language 
proficiency further reduce labour mobility and therefore re-employment 
opportunities. 
•  Many small and medium sized businesses have had a history of being unable 
or unwilling to pay employee entitlements in the event of closure. 
•  The prevalence of ‘at-risk’ firms increases the possibility of lumpy 
adjustments to an external shock. 
•  The costs of adjustment for displaced outworkers can be higher than for factory-
based employees. 
•  Regional dependence on TCF activity has declined significantly over the past 10 
years and overall growth in regional activity and employment has generally 
been strong. Nevertheless, dependence on TCF activity is still high in a few 
regions. 
THE TCF SECTOR’S FUTURE PROSPECTS (CHAPTER 3) 
ADJUSTMENT IN THE TCF SECTOR (CHAPTER 4)     




•  The long term effects of changes in TCF activity on regions depend on the 
interplay of several factors, including: 
•  the degree of dependence on TCF activity in those regions; 
•  the prospects of individual TCF firms; 
•  the strength of overall regional growth and employment; and 
•  job opportunities available in neighbouring regions. 
•  If the need arises, general measures such as the Regional Partnership 
arrangements are available to help regions experiencing problems from 
adjustment in the TCF sector.  
•  The tariff pause coupled with SIP support allows time for consolidation and 
appears to be encouraging some additional investment and R&D in parts of the 
sector that should improve international competitiveness.  
•  However, various elements of the package seem likely to limit its overall 
effectiveness. Moreover, tariffs and the SIP impose large costs on consumers, 
user industries and taxpayers. 
•  Changes are therefore required so that future support for the sector will better 
contribute to the Government’s objective of encouraging the TCF sector to 
become internationally competitive at lower levels of assistance and to provide a 
better balance between this objective and the interests of consumers, taxpayers 
and the wider community. 
•  While TCF activity has some distinguishing characteristics, these do not warrant 
indefinite preferential treatment for the sector. 
•  A policy of tying tariffs protecting Australian TCF producers to levels in other 
countries would not be in Australia’s interests. 
•  Further TCF tariff reductions would reinforce incentives for productivity 
improvement, provide benefits to consumers and industries using TCF products, 
and facilitate Australia’s trade policy objectives. 
•  The legislated tariff reductions for the sector should take effect on 1 January 
2005 as scheduled and further reductions should be made after 2005. Those 
reductions should be implemented in a measured manner over time, 
accompanied by transitional assistance to help facilitate the adjustment process. 
•  The tariff target should be 5 per cent, the maximum rate that will apply to all 
other Australian industries from 2010.  
CURRENT ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS (CHAPTER 5) 
APPROACH TO POST 2005 ASSISTANCE (CHAPTER 6)     
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•  To avoid uncertainty affecting investment and production decisions, it is 
important to lay down a path and timetable now for the sector to reach that 
target.  
•  Making provision for further review of TCF assistance would detract from the 
policy certainty the sector needs and diminish the pressure on firms to improve 
their international competitiveness. 
POST 2005 TARIFF OPTIONS (CHAPTER 7) 
•  The capacity of apparel and certain finished textile producers to absorb a tariff 
reduction of 12.5 percentage points over the 2005 to 2010 period without 
serious disruption is questionable. The reduction in tariffs for those goods to the 
five per cent target should therefore take place over the longer period to 2015. 
•  For other TCF products, including carpets and footwear, the required tariff 
reduction after 2005 to reach the five per cent tariff target is five percentage 
points or less. Making that reduction over the five-year period to 2010 is 
unlikely to place unreasonable adjustment pressure on those industries. 
•  In moving to the five per cent tariff target, there would be advantages in 
continuing the step down approach employed in the current assistance package. 
Hence the Commission’s preferred post 2005 tariff option is as follows: 
•  maintain all TCF tariffs at 2005 levels until 1 January 2010; 
•  on 1 January 2010, reduce tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles to 
10 per cent and tariffs on other TCF products to 5 per cent; and 
•  maintain tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles at 10 per cent until 
1 January 2015, and then reduce them to 5 per cent. 
•  Legislating early for all of these tariff reductions would deliver the policy 
certainty that the sector requires and maintain the pressure on firms to improve 
their performance. It would also help to minimise any negative perceptions 
about this option in relation to Australia’s commitment to the APEC goal of 
‘free and open trade and investment’ in the region by 2010 for developed 
countries. 
•  Further reductions in TCF tariffs would effectively continue the phasing out of 
the TCF policy by-laws and the Expanded Overseas Assembly Provisions. These 
arrangements should therefore be continued after 2005 without amendment. 
Sector-wide duty reductions would also diminish the need to consider requests 
for duty free entry for specific TCF goods not made in Australia.  
TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE (CHAPTER 8) 
•  A further period of transitional assistance is warranted after 2005 to help TCF 
firms which manufacture in Australia to improve their international 
competitiveness, as further tariff reductions are implemented.     




•  Transitional assistance arrangements should avoid spreading funding too thinly 
to make a difference to firms’ behaviour. 
•  Post 2005 transitional assistance should follow the approach of the existing SIP, 
with some modifications to improve its effectiveness. Although further analysis 
and discussion with the sector will be needed before operational arrangements 
are finalised, the following modifications have merit: 
•  incorporate a clearly enunciated and explicit objective; namely, to foster the 
development of Australian TCF manufacturing activity that can be viable and 
internationally competitive without special assistance; 
•  provide generalised support for purchase of state-of-the-art second hand 
equipment and for ancillary expenditure; 
•  subsidise investment in market and brand development associated with the 
manufacture of TCF products in Australia; 
•  discontinue specific additional assistance for value added; 
•  accelerate payments to firms as far as possible; 
•  eliminate provision for funding support to firms in administration or 
receivership; and 
•  enhance transparency and certainty by writing the new arrangements in 
simple and understandable language.  
•  An initiative to help small TCF firms to access transitional budgetary assistance 
warrants further consideration, but would require careful thought about how to 
address significant implementation problems, while still providing cost-effective 
support. 
•  Transitional support should not be extended to early stage wool processors — 
although they are currently experiencing some problems, these are not primarily 
linked to changes in Australian TCF tariffs. 
•  The following funding profile would provide the benefits of a seamless transition 
from the current SIP, while reinforcing the signal to the sector that its special 
assistance treatment is coming to an end: 
•  The new transitional support program would operate for eight years from 
2005. 
•  Funding for the first four year period would be equivalent to total payments 
in the last four years of the current SIP (in nominal terms). 
•  Funding for the second four year period would be halved. 
•  Transitional support would then terminate in 2013. 
•  The transition from the current SIP to the post 2005 arrangements should be as 
seamless as possible. Funding claims not paid to firms by the end of the current 
SIP because of the five per cent sales cap should be carried over into the post     
  OVERVIEW  XLVII
 
2005 scheme so that the companies concerned can be paid their entitlements in 
due course. 
LABOUR ADJUSTMENT SUPPORT (CHAPTER 9) 
•  Implementation of TCF-specific labour adjustment measures could help to 
reduce the likelihood of disruptive adjustment resulting from post 2005 
assistance reductions, or other pressures confronting the sector. Such assistance 
should focus on addressing large scale, or regionally significant, job shedding in 
the sector through an augmentation to Job Network services. In doing so it 
should: 
•  include provision for early intervention where there is prior notice of large 
scale, or regionally significant, retrenchments; and 
•  use people with experience in the TCF industry. 
•  There is also scope to make mainstream Job Network services more accessible 
to all displaced TCF employees through regular dissemination of information on 
those services, including to outworkers. 
WORKPLACE ARRANGEMENTS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SKILLING (CHAPTER 10) 
•  While workplace arrangements in many Australian TCF firms are more 
productive and flexible than in the past, further improvement would help some 
firms to compete successfully with lower levels of assistance. 
•  Given the number of ‘at-risk’ firms, the TCF sector can ill-afford the industrial 
disputation recently witnessed in some enterprises. 
•  Responsibility for achieving better workplace outcomes rests largely with 
managers and employees within individual enterprises. Better communication 
and more cooperation between the parties is crucial. 
•  Human resource and industrial relations skills in the sector require 
improvement. Among other things, this would help to promote cooperative 
solutions to industrial relations issues and assist managers to convey to their 
employees and union representatives the relationship between workplace 
outcomes and the viability of the enterprise and the industry. 
•  Workplace regulation has an important role in setting the framework for 
negotiations between firms and their employees and representatives. However, 
specific proposals put forward to constrain further the rights of employees to 
take industrial action raise complex issues that would have ramifications in 
other industries. This means that it is not possible to judge their merits solely on 
the basis of recent experience in the TCF sector. 
•  The protection of employee entitlements is a legitimate concern for employees in 
the TCF sector given its history, and has been a trigger for costly disputes in this     




and other sectors. An independent review of the broader entitlements issue is 
warranted.  
•  Some skill shortages and deficiencies in available training packages are evident 
in parts of the TCF sector. However, identifying what specific responses may be 
required is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Importantly, responsibility for 
ensuring that skill and training needs are met lies largely with the sector, 
educational institutions and training providers, rather than with governments. 
OUTWORKERS (CHAPTER 10) 
•  The flexibility provided to manufacturers by the use of outworkers can assist 
them in responding more effectively and efficiently to the needs of their 
customers. For some outworkers, there are advantages from being able to 
combine paid employment with family and other responsibilities. 
•  While it is difficult to ascertain the number of people periodically engaged in 
outwork, the full-time equivalent number of outworkers in Australia is unlikely to 
be much above 25  000. Nonetheless, with the decline in factory-based 
employment in the TCF sector over the past few years, outworker employment is 
now about 40 per cent of total factory-based employment in the sector and 
exceeds factory-based clothing employment by about 25 per cent. 
•  Concerns about the exploitation of outworkers appear to have more to do with 
the levels of compliance with legislated requirements than with the provisions of 
those requirements.  
•  Given the nature of outwork and the supply chain involved, achieving greater 
compliance will inevitably require cooperation between retailers, suppliers, 
their contractors and unions. More regulation, or heavy handed attempts to 
enforce regulation, could undermine the increasing degree of cooperation now 
emerging under the voluntary Homeworkers Code of Practice and therefore be 
counterproductive. 
•  Governments, employer and community groups, industry associations and trade 
unions have a role to play in promoting compliance with awards and the Code, 
and the contribution that good employment practices more generally can make 
to the sector’s future prospects. 
OTHER POLICY ISSUES (CHAPTER 11) 
•  The 3 per cent revenue duty imposed under the Tariff Concession System 
continues to disadvantage Australian manufacturers — including TCF firms — 
and imposes unnecessary costs on their customers. 
•  As currently implemented, payroll tax has significant deficiencies. However, an 
assessment of possible changes to address those deficiencies, or of the case for 
abolishing payroll tax, would need to be judged in terms of the community-wide     
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impacts, not just the benefits for some TCF producers. The efficiency of 
replacement revenue raising instruments, and/or the consequences of reducing 
government expenditures, would be important considerations in assessing the 
community-wide outcome. 
•  Some progress has been made in reducing trade barriers faced by Australia’s 
TCF exporters, but widespread barriers still remain. While Australia’s tariff 
levels should not be tied to assistance levels in other countries, Australian 
Governments must continue to pursue improved market access for TCF and 
other sectors in multilateral, regional and bilateral forums. 
•  However, the benefits for Australia from bilateral trade agreements will depend 
crucially on their coverage and detailed rules. Such agreements are unlikely to 
be a panacea for market access problems — either generally or in particular 
sectors — and should not reduce the emphasis given to securing better access 
through more broadly-based multilateral arrangements. 
•  There is scope for improved cooperation and information sharing between TCF 
suppliers and major retailers to help optimise the means of providing Australian 
consumers with TCF products at the lowest overall costs (including all supply 
chain costs). 
•  The application of ‘proof-of-safety’ requirements (NICNAS) for new industrial 
chemicals which have been certified as safe in other developed countries would 
only be warranted if the regulator can demonstrate both that a particular 
chemical is ‘high risk’ and that specific circumstances in Australia make re-
testing essential.     
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1 About  the  inquiry 
1.1  What has the Commission been asked to do? 
Australia’s textile, clothing, footwear and leather (TCF) industries are experiencing 
a sustained period of structural change. Major rationalisation of production has 
reduced sectoral output and employment; the product mix and supply chains are 
changing; exports of Australian TCF products have risen, as has the import share of 
the domestic market.  
To a large extent, structural change in the Australian TCF sector is a response to 
global pressures confronting producers in most developed countries. More intense 
competition from suppliers in developing countries, changes in consumer spending 
patterns and technological advances are key factors driving change. 
However, as in many other developed countries, reductions in protection for 
Australian TCF producers over the last decade and a half have added to these 
pressures. Australia abolished quantitative restrictions on TCF imports in 1993 and 
has progressively reduced tariff rates. To further encourage the development of an 
internationally competitive TCF sector, successive governments have also provided 
targeted budgetary support.  
The current assistance package commenced in 2000 following a broad ranging 
review of the sector and its assistance arrangements by the Industry Commission 
(1997). The key elements of the package are a pause in tariffs at 2000 levels until 
2005 when further reductions will occur, and the provision of nearly $700 million in 
budgetary assistance over the five-year period 2000-01 to 2004-05 through the TCF 
Strategic Investment Program (SIP). The main purpose of this inquiry is to provide 
advice to the Government on options for assistance after 2005. 
The terms of reference 
In reporting on post 2005 assistance arrangements and a range of related matters 
that will affect the TCF sector’s prospects and future viability, the Commission is to 
have regard to the Government’s desire to:     




•  encourage the sector to adjust into activities where it will be internationally 
competitive with lower levels of government assistance; and  
•  improve the overall performance of the Australian economy. 
Among other things, the Commission is to: 
•  evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of current assistance 
programs in achieving structural change and a more internationally competitive 
TCF sector by 2005; 
•  analyse the short and long term implications of policy options, including tariff 
options, consistent with the Government’s international obligations, which 
would encourage the sector to adjust to a more viable and sustainable 
competitive position, giving particular attention to the impacts on regional areas 
with significant TCF activity; 
•  identify major opportunities for the TCF sector, strengths and weaknesses in 
realising those opportunities and other impediments to its long term viability; 
•  examine relevant workplace issues and the scope for workplace reform to 
improve the competitiveness of the sector; and 
•  report on the likely impact on the sector of international trade developments. 
The full terms of reference are reproduced at the front of this report. 
1.2  How has the Commission approached its task? 
It has provided opportunities for extensive public input 
Given the short reporting period for the inquiry, the Commission sought to 
streamline and expedite its inquiry processes.  
Nonetheless, these processes have provided the opportunity for a wide range of 
interested parties to contribute to the Commission’s deliberations: 
•  At the outset of the inquiry, the Commission invited written submissions on the 
matters under review. Prior to releasing a Position Paper (see below), it received 
nearly 100 submissions from a broad cross-section of industry, union, 
government, regional and community interests, as well as from some retailers 
and users of TCF products. 
•  Over the period November 2002 to March 2003, the Commission met with more 
than 70 organisations and individuals in both capital city and regional locations 
covering a similar range of interests.     
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•  In April, it released a Position Paper (PC 2003b) outlining its initial views and 
findings, and setting out preliminary options for post 2005 assistance 
arrangements for the TCF industries. To elicit views on the paper, the 
Commission held public hearings in Melbourne, Geelong and Sydney in June. 
Some 35 organisations and individuals participated in discussions at those 
hearings. The Commission also received more than 80 additional  written 
submissions responding to the preliminary findings and options in the Position 
Paper. 
More detail on inquiry processes is provided in appendix A, including lists of those 
with whom the Commission met, those who made submissions and those who 
participated in the public hearings. The Commission wishes to thank all of the 
organisations and individuals who contributed to the inquiry. 
It has drawn on other relevant analysis 
In preparing this report, the Commission has had regard to assessments in recent 
published studies — listed in appendix A — examining the performance and 
prospects of the TCF sector and factors impinging on its future viability. 
The Commission also engaged three separate organisations to model the potential 
impacts of some specific post 2005 assistance options on the TCF sector, relevant 
regions and the wider community. To facilitate public scrutiny of the preliminary 
results of this modelling, and to allow comparison with some quantitative 
projections submitted independently by inquiry participants, it organised a 
modelling workshop prior to the release of the Position Paper (see appendix E).  
Following the release of the Position Paper, results from two additional modelling 
studies were submitted to the Commission: 
•  Several participants, including the Victorian Government, referred to a study by 
the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) examining 
the effects on regions within Victoria of TCF assistance reductions. 
•  The Victorian Government also provided some summary results and 
methodology from its in-house modelling (using the MONASH model) of the 
post 2005 assistance options for the TCF sector favoured by the Commission in 
the Position Paper. 
However, the limited explanations and details provided about some of these results 
made it difficult to reconcile them with findings in the other studies (see chapter 6 
and appendix E). Given that the Commission’s intention in organising the 
modelling workshop was to avoid such reconciliation difficulties, it was 
disappointing that the NIEIR did not take up an invitation to participate.      




1.3  What is in the rest of the report? 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: 
•  Chapter 2 outlines key features of the domestic TCF industries and the changes 
that have occurred in recent years. 
•  Chapter 3 looks at the prospects for the Australian TCF sector having regard to: 
–  global pressures affecting TCF producers in all developed countries; 
–  emerging opportunities for local suppliers in both domestic and export 
markets; and 
–  the sector’s strengths and weaknesses in realising those opportunities, as well 
as ‘external’ threats to its future viability. 
•  Chapter 4 looks at the capacity of Australian TCF firms, employees and 
communities to make further adjustments having regard to: 
–  broad workforce and regional characteristics; and 
–  adjustment experiences in the sector to date. 
•  The next suite of chapters looks at assistance arrangements for the sector: 
–  Chapter 5 examines the effectiveness of the current assistance regime in 
facilitating structural change and the development of an internationally 
competitive TCF sector. 
–  Chapter 6 discusses the Commission’s broad objectives and its approach in 
developing post 2005 assistance options. 
–  Chapter 7 sets out some specific tariff options, as well as examining other 
tariff-related aspects of the TCF assistance regime — including policy by-
laws and the overseas assembly provisions applying to certain TCF 
production. 
–  Chapter 8 spells out options for a further period of transitional budgetary 
support. These encompass both the design attributes of a successor to the 
Strategic Investment Program, and the duration and level of funding for a new 
program.  
–  Chapter 9 discusses the role for TCF-specific labour adjustment support in 
the event of disruptive future change in the sector and outlines some key 
requirements for such support to be effective. 
•  The final two chapters discuss industry and broader government policy 
initiatives that could facilitate adjustment in the sector: 
–  Chapter 10 looks at workplace arrangements and skilling issues, including 
matters relevant to outworkers.     
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–  Chapter 11 examines a range of issues including the role of taxation policy 
and microeconomic reform in promoting a more competitive sector; anti-
dumping; access for Australian TCF producers to overseas markets; 
relationships between TCF suppliers and retailers; and environmental 
regulations impacting on TCF production.  
Additional data and supporting analysis are contained in appendices to the report.     




2 The  Australian  TCF  sector 
2.1  A diverse component of Australian manufacturing 
Textile, clothing, footwear and leather (TCF) manufacturing in Australia covers all 
stages of production from the processing of raw materials to the supply of finished 
products. Despite considerable rationalisation and restructuring, it remains one of 
Australia’s larger manufacturing sectors. Australian TCF producers generated 
revenue in excess of $9 billion in 2000-01, with the sector accounting for   
4 per cent of value added and 6 per cent of employment in broader manufacturing 
and around 0.4 per cent and 0.6 per cent of value added and employment in the 
economy as a whole. Formal (factory-based) employment is at least 58 000, with 
some data sources suggesting a figure of around 70 000 (see appendix B). There is 
also a significant element of informal employment through ‘outwork’ (mainly in 
clothing manufacture). The Commission estimates that the number of outworkers 
(measured as full-time equivalents) is around 25 000 (see chapter 10). 
The sector is most important in the Victorian economy where production accounts 
for 6 per cent of value added and 9 per cent of employment in manufacturing. While 
most of this activity is in Melbourne, 15 per cent of total Victorian TCF 
employment is located in regional centres, such as Geelong, Ballarat, Bendigo, 
Warnambool, Wangaratta and Wodonga. Regional TCF centres in other States 
include Devonport (Tasmania), Albury (NSW) and the Gold Coast (Queensland). 
Sydney is also home to a large number of TCF manufacturers. 
TCF manufacturing is diverse. Aside from the range of products manufactured (see 
box 2.1), diversity is evident in the sector’s workforce (see chapter 4) and the 
characteristics of TCF establishments. At one end of the spectrum, there are some 
large establishments employing several hundred people. However, as in other 
developed countries, the Australian TCF sector features many small enterprises. 
ABS data indicate that firms employing less than 20 persons accounted for a third 
of total TCF employment and a quarter of production in 2000-01. In addition, there 
are a large number of micro businesses which combine some TCF design and 
manufacturing activity with the wholesaling and retailing of finished TCF products. 
In the official ABS statistics, these firms are generally included in the retail or 
wholesale services sectors (see appendix B).     





Box 2.1  TCF manufacturing activity 
TCF manufacturing in Australia covers the entire spectrum of activities from processing 
raw materials through to the production of final goods. Specifically, the supply chain 
comprises the following activities: 
•  early stage processing — the preparation or production of leather and textile fibres: 
–  leather production including activities such as salting, wet blueing (the first stage 
of tanning), finishing and fur dressing; 
– natural fibres — mainly cotton and wool but also niche materials such as 
cashmere and alpaca; and 
– man-made fibres: including cellulosics such as viscose; synthetics such as 
polyester, nylon, acrylic and polypropylene (all derived from petrochemicals); and 
fibres made from inorganic materials such as glass, metal or ceramics. 
•  production of textiles which involves the conversion of fibres into yarns and fabrics 
(through spinning, weaving, knitting, tufting etc); 
•  finishing activities — aimed at giving fabrics visual, physical and aesthetic properties 
(through bleaching, printing, dyeing, impregnating, coating, plasticising etc); and 
•  transformation of yarns, fabrics and leather into products such as: 
– clothing and footwear (involving design, pattern making, fabric cutting and 
assembly); 
–  carpets (woven, knitted, tufted and flocked) and other textile floor coverings; 
–  home and commercial textiles (including towels, bed linen, curtains, furniture 
coverings); and 
–  technical textiles which encompass performance or functional characteristics 
(including shade cloth, medical products, insulation materials, geotextiles). 
Source: TCFL Forum 2002. 
 
The mechanisms for setting wages and conditions also vary across the sector. 
Employees in small firms are typically covered by awards, while those in large 
firms tend to operate under enterprise agreements. 
The sector draws on a wide range of skills including trade, technical, design, 
manufacturing, logistics, sales, marketing and general management skills. However, 
many TCF employees have only basic and/or industry specific skills, educational 
attainment levels are often low, and employees are more likely to be older, female, 
married and not proficient in speaking English. These characteristics serve to 
restrict the mobility of much of the sector’s workforce relative to employees in 
many other parts of the economy (see chapter 4).     




2.2  A sector in transition 
There has been much rationalisation 
The TCF sector in Australia today is very different from that in the past. 
Traditionally, local activity was characterised by a series of manufacturing 
processes, with firms along the supply chain purchasing inputs from (mainly local) 
upstream suppliers and selling outputs to (mainly local) downstream customers. 
High tariffs and quota protection ensured the continued viability of firms along the 
chain, restricted the ability to source from competing offshore suppliers and reduced 
the incentive to find new (export) markets. Retailers played a largely passive role in 
selling final products designed and supplied by manufacturers with limited direct 
contribution to purchasing or production decisions (see below). 
In recent years, however, competition from emerging low-wage production centres, 
slowing growth in domestic consumer demand, large reductions in domestic 
assistance and increased concentration in retailing have collectively placed new 
pressures on local TCF manufacturers. Many firms have left the sector, while others 
have rationalised, merged and pursued new sourcing strategies to survive. As a 
result, aggregate domestic TCF manufacturing activity has contracted and import 
penetration has risen sharply (see below). 
The nature of local TCF activity has changed 
The interplay of global and local forces has profoundly affected the structure of the 
sector. In clothing and footwear, many firms have reorganised their supply systems 
by relocating part, or all, of their manufacturing processes offshore to reduce labour 
costs. Other firms have focused domestically on low volume ‘quick response’ 
supply systems which provide flexibility in responding to demand shifts; some have 
concentrated on quality, design, service and brand development strategies with 
production subcontracted to local or overseas manufacturers; and others have 
sought to cut production costs by rationalising product lines. 
There are many examples of firms successfully pursuing these strategies. For 
instance, Pacific Brands and Gazal Corporation — two of the biggest players in 
Australia’s clothing industry managing a wide range of established Australian brand 
names — have shifted the bulk of their manufacturing operations to China. Up-
market fashion houses such as Carla Zampatti have prospered by focusing on brand 
development. They use local and imported fabrics, modify international designs and 
subcontract production to outworkers. DPK Australia makes and imports fabric, 
subcontracts clothing manufacture for its larger customers and provides a stock     




service to small garment makers. Dowd Corporation (a Yakka subsidiary) has a 
successful business in the ‘high-end’ corporate apparel market with a significant 
proportion of revenue coming from the management of customers’ total apparel 
requirements. 
For their part, textile producers have responded to the internationalisation of supply 
chains and the changing strategies of producers of clothing and footwear using 
various diversification strategies. Where the textile industry was in the past 
regarded as simply a processor of wool and cotton, it is now more closely identified 
as a supplier of a broad range of inputs to the latter stages of the TCF supply chain. 
Bruck Textiles, Bradmill and Melba Tex, for example, supply fabrics which are 
incorporated into high-end fashion garments and/or specialty industrial clothing 
sold domestically and in international markets.  
Also, technological change (requiring investment in capital and R&D) has provided 
opportunities to develop new products in areas not traditionally regarded as part of 
the TCF sector. Specifically, a number of local firms have developed competitive 
advantages producing and/or using ‘niche’ technical textile products. Examples 
include Gale Pacific, which manufactures and exports shade cloth for domestic and 
commercial use, Textor which produces textiles for applications in the medical, 
automotive and building industries, Australian Defence Apparel which (among 
other things) manufactures bulletproof vests, Albany International which makes 
filtration materials and Kimberly Clark Australia which produces personal care 
products. 
Changes in retailing have reinforced pressures for change 
Another major development in the Australian TCF market has been the growing 
influence of retailers further up the supply chain. TCF retailing has become more 
concentrated with the larger department store operators — Coles Myer, David 
Jones, Woolworths and Best and Less — accounting for an increasing share of 
home textile, clothing and footwear sales. These firms now control some of their 
own supply chains, organise the manufacture of own brand (or private label) 
merchandise both here and abroad, as well as stocking brands controlled by local 
and overseas suppliers and manufacturers. 
Greater concentration has also altered the relationship between retailers and their 
suppliers. Apart from the increased pressure on price, quality and response time that 
can be exerted by retailers, greater buying power has provided the scope for them to 
transfer some inventory and delivery risk up the supply chain.     




In part, the pressure exerted on TCF producers reflects the extent of competition at 
the retail level. By way of example, consumer prices for clothing and footwear 
products have declined by 20 per cent in real terms over the last decade and a half 
despite the substantial depreciation of the A$ over this period. Producers of clothing 
and footwear, on the other hand, experienced a real price decline of just 2.5 per cent 
over this same period. While these divergent experiences would, to some extent, be 
explained by the shift into higher value products by local TCF manufacturers, lower 
retail margins may also have been a contributing factor. 
In combination with the increased role of manufacturers in wholesale and import 
activity, the changing relationship between retailers and suppliers has also seen the 
distinction between different groups in the supply chain become more blurred. One 
consequence of this is that the interpretation of statistical trends is now more 
difficult. For example, as some TCF firms have shifted away from manufacturing 
(into say, distribution) as their major activity, they are no longer regarded (by the 
ABS) as part of the TCF manufacturing sector even though their operations may 
still involve some production activity. And as noted above, many micro-TCF 
businesses which manufacture and market their own products would be counted as 
part of the services sector (see sub. PP167 for some examples of these firms). 
2.3  Impacts of recent changes 
Aggregate output and employment have declined  
Industry restructuring and rationalisation, in combination with a sharp rise in import 
penetration to more than 50 per cent of the total TCF market, have resulted in 
contractions in overall TCF manufacturing output and employment (see figure 2.1 
and table 2.1). The sector’s aggregate value added fell by more than 30 per cent in 
real terms between 1990-91 and 2001-02, while employment was approximately 35 
per cent lower. 
At the TCF industry level, clothing and footwear production has contracted the most 
with employment losses in these two industries accounting for 60 per cent of the 
decline in total sectoral employment since 1991 (though there may have been some 
offsetting increase in the number of outworkers — see chapter 10). This experience 
has coincided with a surge in imports of clothing and footwear, with China the main 
source. It supplied nearly 70 per cent of all Australia’s imports of clothing and 
footwear in 2001-02 (see appendix figure B.1). 
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Data sources: ABS (2002b - for latest two years) and information supplied by DITR. 
Moreover, many remaining firms are still ‘at risk’ with poor profitability detracting 
from their future prospects. While the emergence of new production activities 
(particularly in the technical textiles area) might conceivably see aggregate sectoral 
output increase in the future, output in some industry segments will almost certainly 
decline further. Any such contraction will reinforce the likely further decline in 
sectoral employment which will result from efforts by firms to increase 
productivity. That said, the significant amount of job shedding that has occurred 
over the last decade may limit the extent to which firms can use this strategy as a 
means to confront future competition. Thus, some firms suggested that future 
reductions in sectoral employment are likely to be smaller than those witnessed in 
recent years. 
But many individual firms have prospered 
While the TCF sector has contracted in aggregate, many firms are surviving and 
even flourishing by developing and exploiting competitive strengths in supplying 
differentiated products based on leading-edge technology, superior design and 
marketing attributes, high levels of productivity and/or a focus on customer service.  
 
 
     





Table 2.1  Australian TCF activity, selected measures 
$ billion (constant 2000-01 prices) and ‘000 persons 















Value  added  3.5 3.0 2.4  -15.0  -19.5 
Exportsa  0.4 1.1 0.9  177.1  -14.0 
Imports  3.7 5.3 6.4  43.6  19.7 
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a Excludes exports of scoured wool, tanned leather and dressed fur. 
Sources: ABS (2002a), Labour Force Survey and TFIA (2002b). 
Some of these firms have concentrated on servicing domestic market requirements. 
Others, however, have increasingly been looking toward overseas sales to maintain 
and expand their businesses. In some cases, firms have chosen to purchase or 
establish offshore operations to service international markets (for example, Gale 
Pacific and Billabong). In others, they have licensed their intellectual property (such 
as clothing designer and supplier Wildcard) and in yet others they have chosen to 
export directly from Australia (like denim cloth manufacturer Bradmill). Reflecting 
this more outward looking focus, exports as a share of total sectoral sales increased 
from just over 4 per cent in 1990-91 to around 14 per cent in 2000-01 (though 
export levels have since fallen, partly because of the cessation of the Import Credit 
Scheme — see appendix C). 
Notably, individual firms have proved to be internationally competitive across many 
TCF activities with specific examples including: manchester, outdoor fabrics, 
industrial applications, fashion design, surfwear, carpets, geotextiles, specialist 
boots, knitting wools and nonwoven textiles. The reasons for success have been as 
varied as the products themselves, although most relate to some ‘core strengths’ 
becoming increasingly evident in the sector. These strengths are discussed in some 
detail in chapter 3.     




Linkages within the sector have changed 
One consequence of export growth, and the changing nature of TCF supply chains 
more generally, is that there is potentially less interdependence between domestic 
industry segments than in the past. As the Victorian Government’s submission said: 
Today the TCF industry is in transition from its old domestically integrated supply 
chain structure to a new form. Increasingly, each sector is becoming its own stand-
alone industry that imports, exports and services a diverse range of customers. 
(sub. 78, p. 2) 
However, this is not to underplay the strong linkages that still exist in the sector, or 
to deny that there are benefits from having multiple customers and input suppliers. 
Indeed, many participants raised concerns about the ramifications for their activities 
of contraction in both upstream and downstream activities. Some commented that 
further offshore relocation of clothing manufacture would have major implications 
for textile plant viability and, in turn, for fibre suppliers. Others mentioned that the 
loss of volume in the local textile industry could undermine the viability of 
domestic chemical and machinery suppliers. The existence of some minimum 
production level below which the industry would collapse has, however, been 
questioned by some commentators (see chapter 3). 
The changing nature of the sector has also increased the importance of linkages in 
other areas. In particular, the greater emphasis on higher value production and 
design activities has led to a strengthening of relationships between TCF producers 
and a number of educational and research institutions. The City of Geelong 
highlighted the importance of these linkages in noting: 
The Geelong TCFL industry has a strong relationship with local education and research 
institutions like the Gordon Institute of TAFE, Deakin University, CSIRO Textile and 
Fibre Technology and the International Fibre Centre. … These education and research 
institutions provide the local industry with staff training programs and state of the art 
research capabilities. They give industry the opportunity to form partnerships to 
facilitate the successful development of value adding opportunities. This type of 
development assists the industry to become more globally competitive. (sub. 16, p. 11) 
There has been offsetting growth in TCF distribution activity 
The changes to the sourcing and distribution strategies of both TCF manufacturers 
and retailers described earlier have served to partly offset the declines in 
manufacturing production and employment (see appendix table B.3). For example, 
employment in TCF wholesaling increased by 6300 persons (or 39 per cent) 
between 1991-92 and 1998-99 (the latest available data). The biggest employment 
gains occurred in wholesale clothing activity.     




2.4  Further restructuring is inevitable 
Improved productivity will help some firms remain viable 
For some firms, productivity increases will provide a means to offset both global 
competitive pressures and future reductions in domestic assistance. This will often 
require investment in new plant and equipment, and R&D. While productivity 
growth across the entire sector is difficult to measure accurately (see box 2.2), there 
are many examples of strong productivity gains at the individual firm level which 
have helped those firms to cope with increasing competition. By way of example, J. 
Robins and Sons, while suggesting that its scope to improve productivity further 
was now limited, said: 
For the Robins group, our investment in people has had an excellent payback in terms 
of our strategic approach to the market. Our labour productivity per person has 
increased by 28% since 1991 … (sub. 34, p. 6) 
More broadly, at the TCF industry level, the Footwear Manufacturers’ Association 
of Australia commented that: 
… industry consolidation continues and we have achieved significant productivity 
gains over the 1990’s. For example: 
•  value added per employee has increased by 93%. (sub. PP132, p. 1) 
And in the carpet industry, the Carpet Institute of Australia reported that: 
… there have been significant productivity gains at the broad industry level since 1997, 
with sales revenue per carpet manufacturing employee increasing by some 20% over 
the period. This is on the back of strong growth in overall employment since 1997 (up 
14%…). (sub. 35, p. 17) 
The Strategic Investment Program (SIP) is designed to encourage investment and 
R&D to enhance the sustainability and international competitiveness of TCF firms 
(see chapter 5). To the extent that the program is successful, it should lead to further 
productivity improvements in recipient firms. However, as discussed in chapter 5, 





     





Box 2.2  TCF productivity performance 
Productivity performance can be measured in several different ways. The most 
commonly cited indicators are trends in labour productivity, measured as output per 
unit of labour input (see the text for some specific TCF examples), and multifactor 
productivity which includes the influence of all factors of production, typically labour 
and physical capital, on output growth. 
As part of its suite of work on productivity performance in the Australian economy, the 
Commission has estimated that since the mid-1980s measured labour productivity in 
the TCF sector has increased on average by around 2.5 per cent a year, while 
multifactor productivity has risen by 0.5 per cent a year. 
While these measures can provide useful insights into trends in the efficiency with 
which inputs are used, they need to be interpreted cautiously. Improvements in labour 
productivity, for example, can result from influences not directly attributable to the more 
efficient use of a firm’s workforce. Increased contracting out (such as through the use 
of outworkers in a TCF context), or the substitution of capital for labour, are two such 
influences. 
Changes in the composition of output over time can also complicate productivity 
measurement. In this context, the restructuring and rationalisation which has occurred 
in the Australian TCF sector over the past decade and a half, has seen a shift away 
from the production of standardised commodities towards higher quality products 
embodying greater levels of innovation and design, and more technical features. In 
many cases, higher quality products have been sold at unchanged market price points. 
In these circumstances, the ABS estimate of TCF output would be the same even 
though the real value of that output has increased. As a result, more recent estimates 
of productivity change in the sector are likely to be understated. 
 
Labour cost disadvantages mean that other firms are unlikely to 
survive 
For some firms, even raising productivity to world’s best practice levels would not 
enable them to overcome their labour cost disadvantages with developing country 
competitors. Wage rates in developing countries are a fraction of those in Australia 
(see chapter 3). While low productivity levels overseas have previously reduced 
total unit labour cost differentials, recent evidence suggests that the productivity of 
firms in countries such as China (the dominant source of Australia’s clothing and 
footwear imports) often matches or comes close to best-practice developed country 
standards. Hence, in the standardised product and labour intensive parts of the 
Australian TCF sector, restructuring and rationalisation will continue regardless of 
the future assistance regime.     




Poor profitability is indicative of the adjustment task ahead 
Available estimates suggest that profits as a share of sector-wide sales have 
declined since the mid-1990s to just 1.3 per cent in 2000-01 (see figure 2.2). 
Similarly, the sectoral average pre-tax rate of return on assets (a more accurate 
indicator of firm sustainability) has fallen from around 7 per cent in 1995-96 to just 
over 2 per cent in 2000-01. This latter figure was one third of the average return on 
assets for manufacturing as a whole. Those sector-wide trends are indicative of the 
intense competitive pressures confronting firms, as well as the considerable excess 
capacity in parts of the sector which is inflating unit costs. 
Of course, some firms are doing much better. One told the Commission that its 
return on assets was above 40 per cent. Others suggested that while their profits are 
low at present, the effect of recent restructuring and investment initiatives should 
flow through to higher sales and profit levels in the future. 
On the other hand, many firms are recording negative returns, with some 
appropriately characterised as ‘barely hanging on’. Some of these firms continue to 
operate only because of the high costs of exiting the sector. For example, the 
Commission was told that substantial redundancy entitlements (see chapters 4 and 
10) and the cost of site rehabilitation (in some plants) are delaying the closure of 
unprofitable production activities. The poor profitability of many firms provides 
evidence of the adjustment task that still lies ahead. 
















Note: Profit margin is measured as operating profit before tax as a percentage of operating income. Return on 
assets is measured as pre-tax profits as a percentage of the total value of assets. 
Data source: ABS (2002b).     




2.5  Changes in the sector have a range of policy 
implications 
The wide and growing range of outputs, and variations in the underlying 
international competitiveness of individual TCF industries, suggest the need for an 
assistance package which recognises this diversity. The blurring of boundaries 
between manufacturing and other TCF related activities poses further challenges 
because some activities of TCF manufacturers now lie outside the traditional focus 
of assistance policy. 
The inevitability of further change in the sector also focuses policy attention on 
adjustment issues. These have long been a central consideration in the formulation 
of TCF assistance policy and will be no less important in the future. Accordingly 
the ability of firms, employees and TCF dependent communities to cope with 
further restructuring is at the forefront of the Commission’s consideration of post 
2005 assistance options. 
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3 Prospects 
TCF firms in all developed countries are facing strong competitive pressures. High 
labour costs compared with those in developing countries; global excess capacity in 
many TCF products (placing downward pressure on prices and reducing profit 
margins); declining government assistance; strategic positions apparently being 
taken by developing countries such as China; changing consumer spending patterns; 
technological change; the increasing stringency of environmental regulation 
affecting certain TCF products; and more stringent labour laws designed to promote 
better treatment of TCF workers; have combined to substantially alter the TCF 
business environment. 
To survive, firms are being forced to change both their methods of operation and the 
types of products they supply. In particular, production of standardised, labour 
intensive clothing and footwear products is increasingly migrating to developing 
countries. Highlighting the fact that Australia is not alone in facing these pressures, 
the recent TCFL Market Access Study noted: 
It is clear that no developed economy, even countries that have been consolidating their 
position in the international market … can escape the contraction in local textile and 
garment production. Further trade liberalisation will only accelerate the decline of local 
apparel production. Australia is no exception to this. (Werner International 2003, p. 9) 
In the face of these broad pressures, and with further reductions in government 
support for Australian TCF producers legislated to occur in 2005, parts of the sector 
will continue to contract. At the very least, there is general consensus that efforts by 
firms to address increased competition by improving productivity will inevitably 
reduce Australia’s TCF workforce.  
Nevertheless, the prospects for Australian producers in particular market segments 
are quite positive. Information from participants indicates that a range of 
opportunities exist or are likely to emerge in domestic and export markets. Even in 
market segments where the outlook is less optimistic, there will be niche 
opportunities for individual firms able to satisfy particular customer requirements. 
Such varying prospects illustrate both the diverse nature of Australian TCF activity 
and the strengths that individual firms have developed in responding to the 
challenges in increasingly competitive markets. Nevertheless, competition from     




low-wage production centres and some ‘external’ impediments will inhibit future 
prospects. 
A detailed assessment of the prospects for each and every segment of the TCF 
sector is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Recent reports on the sector by the TCFL 
Forum and others have already provided a solid foundation in this regard. The 
Commission has sought to synthesise some key themes and messages from those 
studies and from the input of participants to this inquiry, with a view to establishing 
an agenda of issues that will need to be addressed by the sector and by governments 
to assist firms to make the most of future opportunities. 
3.1  Global pressures are forcing change 
Labour cost differentials are a major influence 
With labour costs accounting for 40 per cent of textile production costs and 60 per 
cent of clothing and some footwear production costs (ILO 2000), labour intensive 
elements of production are relocating to developing countries to take advantage of 
much lower wage rates. 
Hourly wage comparisons paint a stark picture (see figure 3.1). In Germany, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, textile labour costs range from US$12 – 18 
per hour, while in Australia they are around US$11 per hour. In China, hourly 
wages are around US$0.70 and in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Indonesia they are even lower. With productivity in developing countries such as 
China growing rapidly and often matching that in best practice developed countries, 
any offsetting influence on total labour costs has greatly diminished and in some 
cases disappeared. 
Incentives for firms to relocate have been strengthened by the existence of often 
substantial trade barriers in developing countries that reduce the scope to supply 
those markets through exports (see chapter 11 and appendix D) and by advances in 
technology, communications and transport logistics. The upshot of this relocation of 
production is that developing countries (especially in Asia) now supply more than 
half of the world’s clothing, 40 per cent of its textiles and one quarter of its 
footwear (ILO 2000).     
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Figure 3.1  Labour cost comparisons in the textile industry, selected 
countries, 2000-01 
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Data sources: Textiles Intelligence (2002) and Werner International (cited in submission no. 44). 
Slow growth in consumer demand has exacerbated supply side 
pressures 
Intensifying competition from developing country producers is occurring at the 
same time as demand for TCF products in developed countries is slowing. 
Consumers in developed countries have been spending a declining share of their 
household budgets on TCF products for several decades. This trend results from 
several changes including: declining relative prices for clothing and footwear 
products (see chapter 2 for the Australian experience); increased consumption of 
services as incomes rise; and changing demographics. Australia has not been 
immune to this international trend and, in fact, had one of the lowest TCF 
consumption shares among developed countries in 2000 (see appendix table B.4). 
Producers in developed countries have responded in variety of ways 
As well as relocating labour intensive components of their manufacturing 
operations, TCF firms in developed countries have responded to these pressures 
using a range of strategies including: investment in labour saving technologies to 
lower domestic production costs (resulting in further job losses); pursuit of 
economies of scale through mergers and acquisitions; and initiatives to raise 
efficiency, quality and labour productivity. There has also been a notable trend     




toward higher value added activities based on design, marketing, customer service 
and brand management (see box 3.1). 
 
Box 3.1  Some recent business trends in the global TCF market 
In recent years, a number of specific responses to the changing international 
environment have been observed in TCF enterprises. 
•  There has been an unprecedented increase in mergers and acquisitions — trebling 
in Europe in the three years to 2001 — among firms up and down the supply chain 
(Stengg 2001). In consequence, there has been a blurring of traditional boundaries 
between activities as manufacturing firms move into distribution. This has been 
more common in the clothing sector than in textiles; and increasingly evident in 
medium sized companies which have been acquiring firms in the same market 
segment (larger firms have tended to make acquisitions in downstream or upstream 
parts of the supply chain). These changes have been driven by the need to increase 
the return on investment in existing brands and distribution networks. 
•  An increasing number of firms have also attempted to exploit the so-called ‘fashion 
system’ by which a well known brand name in another sector is acquired and then 
used to increase the return on investment in TCF products. 
•  Another trend has been for luxury and up-market clothing manufacturers to diversify 
into accessories such as jewellery and eyewear. And a shift into the corporate 
apparel market and customer inventory management are examples of diversification 
into service activities. 
•  Traditionally, TCF products were sold to small and medium sized retailers by 
wholesalers. Distribution in most developed countries is now undertaken by a small 
number of large retailers who exert considerable pressure on suppliers in terms of 
price, quality and delivery performance. As a result, the supply chain has changed 
from being ‘industry’ driven to ‘customer’ driven. 
•  The proliferation of preferential trade agreements has encouraged offshore 
processing centres to reduce the costs of supplying developed country markets. 
This has resulted in a more diverse set of supply chains. Examples of these 
offshore arrangements include Mexico and Caribbean countries supplying the US 
market, countries in Eastern Europe supplying the EU and, until recently, Fiji being 
a major supply source for the Australian market. 
 
 
3.2  A range of new opportunities will emerge 
Restructuring and rationalisation have characterised the Australian TCF experience 
over the past decade and a half. Many firms have left the sector and a considerable 
number still in operation remain ‘at-risk’. Others, however, have been able to adapt 
successfully to the increasingly trade-exposed environment.      
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For firms that have adapted successfully, or which are capable of doing so, new 
opportunities will arise in coming years. As well as the emergence of markets for 
new products and services, the removal or relaxation of overseas trade barriers 
should provide opportunities to expand sales in existing product lines (although it 
will also pose some threats). As the TCFL Forum reported, many of these new 
opportunities involve building on existing activities and competencies rather than 
doing something completely new: 
… the new market opportunities for the TCFL industry are more about reinventing 
‘old’ products, new approaches to ‘old’ markets and new competitive paradigms for 
‘old’ businesses than they are about entirely new products or new markets. (TCFL 
Forum 2002, p. 8) 
Several general characteristics can be identified 
The Commission’s discussions with the industry and submissions to the inquiry 
have identified a variety of specific product opportunities that are likely to either 
emerge or continue to be relevant to the future success of Australian TCF firms (see 
box 3.2). Some of the general characteristics of these opportunities include: 
•  the ability to provide rapid turnaround for short-run orders. Quick response 
fabric production and garment assembly are the most commonly cited examples, 
although participants identified such opportunities in several market segments. 
Offshore sourcing of these sorts of requirements is in fact becoming more 
feasible. Minimum production runs in Asia have declined; some firms have 
examined the possibility of locating their warehousing facilities offshore; and 
airfreighting imported fabric and apparel has become a viable option (although it 
is seemingly little practised at present). However, the general consensus is that 
quick turnaround requirements will provide the basis for a significant level of 
local manufacturing in years to come; 
•  activities where physical proximity to the customer is important. As the 
preceding discussion makes clear, proximity to the customer is likely to be an 
advantage in securing quick turnaround business. But proximity to the customer 
can be important in a number of other contexts. These include the supply of 
more complex products where the designer and manufacturer need to be in close 
contact, vendor-managed inventories (see below) and ‘just-in-time’ supply to the 
automotive industry;     





Box 3.2  Emerging or continuing product opportunities for Australian 
TCF firms 
In terms of specific products, emerging or continuing opportunities identified by 
participants include: 
•  lightly processed raw materials (eg wet blue hides, scoured wool); 
•  wool based products such as carpets and knitting wool for home use; 
•  specialist nonwoven fabrics for use in medical and sanitary applications; 
•  industrial textiles, defined to include products such as shade cloth, filter fabrics and 
geotextiles, often using nonwoven fabrics; 
•  supply to the automotive industry; 
•  surf wear and ‘wearable’ art where cultural recognition is a marketing factor; 
•  quick response fashion garments and fabric for those garments; 
•  complex, high fashion low-volume garment production, where proximity of the fabric 
provider to the Australian designer/producer and brand recognition is important. For 
example, in commenting on local ‘ready-to-wear’ designers, Australia Fashion 
Innovators said: 
It is the sector in the industry that is looking to generate a premium at retail for their 
products, given recognition of their brand profile, and many in the industry believe that 
this is the sector that has the opportunity to actually … be able to support Australian 
labour content … (trans., p. 435); 
•  products with well recognised brands where a local manufacturer is more likely to 
be able to maintain a market position through both the brand premium and 
competitive total ‘end-to-end’ costs, even if local manufacture is more expensive 
than sourcing offshore; 
•  niche fabric and garment/footwear production such as defence apparel, fire 
retardant clothing, coated furnishing products and industrial footwear, where 
Australian firms have developed expertise; and 
•  the corporate apparel market where service is an important part of the product 




•  scope to combine a service with the physical product to establish a local 
advantage. As well as ‘after-sales’ services for the corporate apparel market, 
local manufacturers are providing inventory management (or ‘stock services’) 
for retailers in areas such as towels, men’s suits and fabric production. Vendor- 
managed inventory offers a range of benefits to retailers including quick 
response to changes in consumer preferences and cost savings through fewer 
product returns and lower average inventory holdings. Developments in 
information technology will extend opportunities for this sort of service     
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provision in the future. A February 2002 study cited by Australian Business 
Limited (sub. 98, p. 12) found that more than 65 per cent of surveyed TCF firms 
offered at least one service additional to their standard product range; 
•  the creation of competitive advantage through differentiated technologies, 
design, branding or marketing, or other forms of embodied intellectual capital. 
(However, manufacture in Australia is not necessary to realise many of these 
opportunities — even though it may be efficient in some circumstances — and it 
may even reduce returns to firms if labour cost disadvantages are not offset by 
other factors); 
•  activities with a degree of natural protection because of specific Australian 
market requirements. Examples include work boots which meet Australian 
safety standards and woollen carpets that suit Australian preferences;  
•  activities where proximity to raw material suppliers can provide a basis for 
competitive supply (for example, cotton, wool scouring and top manufacturing 
and early stage leather tanning). Traditionally this has been seen as giving 
Australia an inherent competitive advantage, but access by itself does not 
guarantee an advantage when offshore operators can buy the same products at 
similar prices; and/or 
•  capacity to draw on international linkages providing advantageous access to 
inputs, the latest technologies and market information which in turn facilitate the 
development of new products, markets and exports. Indeed, it is unlikely in this 
increasingly globalising sector that firms will become internationally 
competitive unless they are constantly abreast of international developments and 
able to take advantage of them. 
Export markets offer a broader range of opportunities 
Strong growth in imports in combination with only modest growth in overall 
demand in the domestic market implies that, for many firms, exporting will be 
important to secure their future viability. There has already been export growth over 
the past decade, though some of this growth was dependent on the now defunct 
Import Credit Scheme (see appendix C). As a result, export growth has stalled in 
recent years (see chapter 2). 
Future opportunities in export markets will be based on similar characteristics to 
those underpinning opportunities in the domestic market. For example: 
•  competitively priced and readily available raw materials;     




•  differentiated technologies; 
•  marketing advantages from an identification with Australian culture; 
•  a strong domestic production base (sometimes linked with global players) 
providing opportunities to leverage international sales. Custom-made woven 
wool carpets and military garment manufacture are cases in point; and 
•  the capacity to satisfy low-volume niche products requiring quick response 
supply. 
Other opportunities are likely to be available for the provision of services such as 
design, and education and training, and for the licensing of technology or 
established brand names. For example, the TCF Resource Centre of Western 
Australia commented: 
Australia is design rich, it is technology rich, and it is fresh, lively and innovative, and 
the rest of the world wants that in their products. (trans., p. 276) 
The link between domestic and export opportunities suggests that exports can be a 
natural transition for firms operating successfully in the Australian market. 
Removal of EU and US textile and clothing quotas may create new 
export opportunities 
The prospective elimination of all textile and clothing quotas under the WTO 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) will affect global patterns of TCF 
production and trade after 2005 (though the extent of these impacts will partly 
depend on the degree to which ‘safeguard’ measures are invoked). China — already 
the world’s leading exporter of textile and clothing products — is expected to derive 
the greatest benefit from its capacity to provide cost competitive products across the 
entire TCF commodity range. As well as displacing domestic suppliers in the 
United States and EU markets, increased Chinese exports will come at the expense 
of some of the other developing countries currently supplying these markets. 
Such developments should, in time, have implications for the Australian TCF 
sector. There is some concern that a re-direction of products by those developing 
country suppliers that will be displaced from the US and EU markets may make it 
more difficult for Australian firms selling in other export markets and may also 
increase import competition in the domestic market. However, any effects are likely 
to be primarily in standardised labour intensive products where Australian growth 
prospects are limited anyway. On the other hand, growth in developing country     
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finished product exports to the US and EU may offer opportunities for Australian 
intermediate suppliers of wool, cotton, leather, fabrics etc. 
As would reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers 
A variety of sometimes high tariff and non-tariff barriers presently directly 
constrain the export activity of some Australian TCF firms (see appendix D). A 
number of multilateral initiatives are currently underway, with the Doha Round of 
WTO trade negotiations and APEC being the two most notable examples. There is 
clearly scepticism in parts of the TCF sector about the degree to which these fora 
will be successful in reducing trade barriers. Godfrey Hirst, for example, said: 
Looking forward, it is possible that there will be reductions in tariffs as a result of the 
Doha Round. However the policy of the world’s leading players such as the United 
States of America to make any reductions conditional on being linked and reciprocated 
means that unilateral unconditional reductions of benefit to the Australian carpet 
industry are unlikely to occur. (sub. 77, p. 9) 
This view was not universal, however, with other participants more optimistic about 
the additional export opportunities that WTO and APEC processes are likely to 
provide to the Australian TCF sector. For example, the Technical Textiles and 
Nonwoven Association (TTNA) commented that: 
… the Australian technical and nonwoven industries’ fortunes will be greatly enhanced 
by the realisation of the WTO’s intentions that would provide greater market access to 
other markets. (sub. 68, p. 8) 
Similarly, the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
(sub. PP176) suggested that China’s accession to the WTO could lead to increased 
exports of Australian textile fibres (though it noted that use of safeguards and other 
adjustment measures in China’s export markets could limit that increase). 
Mooted free trade agreements may benefit some TCF producers 
New opportunities could also arise from a free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
United States — currently being negotiated. Some analysts have suggested that 
these opportunities would be modest (see, for example, ACIL-Tasman 2003). 
Conversely, a recent study by the Centre for International Economics (CIE 2001) 
estimated that an agreement with the United States could provide a major boost to 
Australian TCF exporters. This latter view was mirrored by several participants. 
Specialty Coatings Australia said: 
Although The Specialty Group’s export sales have declined in the last two years … we 
are encouraged by the commencement of FTA negotiations between Australia and the     




United States, as this offers to open up significant market access opportunities … 
(sub. 79, p. 4) 
And the Victorian Government commented: 
To date, the Australian Government has signed a free trade agreement with Singapore, 
commenced negotiations with the US and announced negotiations with Thailand, Japan 
and China. Through such agreements, particularly with large TCF players such as the 
US, Thailand and China, Australia has a great opportunity to improve export market 
access for the TCF industry. (sub. 78, p. 9) 
However, it is important to recognise that while prospective FTAs may benefit 
some Australian TCF exporters, other firms could be disadvantaged by such 
arrangements. Australian carpet manufacturers, for example, were concerned with 
the risks inherent in an agreement with the United States. In responding to the 
Position Paper, Godfrey Hirst said: 
At the industry level, there is a need for effective safeguards to prevent the Australian 
market being swamped by imported carpet. (sub. PP129, p. 2) 
The potential effects of proposed FTAs at the economy-wide level and on the TCF 
sector will also depend critically on the rules of origin and safeguard measures 
negotiated in the agreements. For example, there is some concern among Australian 
TCF producers that a free trade agreement with Thailand could see that country 
used as a conduit for Chinese product seeking to gain duty free access to Australia. 
These issues are discussed further in chapter 11.  
3.3  The Australian TCF sector is developing important 
strengths 
General features of the Australian economy provide a platform for parts of the 
sector to remain viable or attain that goal. These include the stable business climate, 
good basic physical infrastructure and education systems, and domestic access to 
basic raw material inputs necessary for TCF production. 
Flexibility, innovation, customer focus, branding and a commitment to 
performance improvement are increasingly evident 
Successful firms within the TCF sector also have specific strengths which enhance 
their ability to compete against overseas suppliers in the domestic and export 
markets. These strengths typically relate to flexibility in adapting products and 
processes to meet market requirements; a focus on identifying and meeting the 
needs of customers; a demonstrated capacity to service quick turnaround orders;     
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skills in using branding to develop and sustain markets; innovativeness (including 
the development of niche products); and a commitment to productivity and quality 
enhancement. The case study provided by Specialty Coatings Australia provides a 
specific example of how these sorts of factors have allowed some firms to 
successfully meet the challenges of a more competitive market environment (see 
box 3.3). 
 
Box 3.3  Success factors for Specialty Coatings Australia 
Specialty Coatings Australia described its business strategy in the following way. 
The company’s recent success can be attributed to our conscious pursuit of, and focus on, 
both short-term and long term strategies including: 
•  reducing fixed manufacturing and overhead expenses. 
•  ensuring satisfactory reporting systems are established. 
•  providing our customers with a quality product, in a timely fashion, at a competitive price 
that is also profitable for the company. Maximising customer service, by adding value at 
every stage of the selling, production and distribution process.  
•  extending existing and developing new (export) markets by focusing on new product 
development geared around high technology, high value add applications. 
•  pursuing growth opportunities in the safety workwear, window furnishings and industrial 
markets and consolidating the military market, which is looking to move towards 
laminated textiles. 
•  establishment of strategic alliances with key customers, suppliers, research 
organisations and educational institutions, to develop high performance products such 
as laminates and advanced coated and breathable industrial products. 
•  a commitment to innovation, focused on high performance/ high technology product 
(specifically technical textiles), underscored by a continued heavy investment in 
research and development and product development for commercialisation. 
•  ongoing market research to identify world trends and pre-empt Australian moves.  
•  shifting production towards specialised high value added product rather than 
concentrating on the commodity end. 
Source: (sub. 79, p.3). 
 
 
More broadly, the TCF sector’s increasingly skilled and flexible workforce is 
contributing to the success of many firms (though in the latter case it is clear that 
further improvement is possible as well as desirable — see below). Skill 
development has, in turn, been enhanced by links to research, education and training 
bodies that have increased the availability of design, technological, brand support 
and marketing skills needed to develop innovative products sold to high value 
market segments (see chapter 10). 
Examples of participants’ views on firm specific and broader strengths are provided 
in box 3.4.     





Box 3.4  Participants’ views on strengths 
Flexibility/Quick response 
Quick response is a key non-price advantage for local supply in a retail market place 
seeking shorter and shorter lead times. … Further developments are underway to increase 
these opportunities to better service fast turnaround demand through local supply lines. 
(sub. 72, p. 3) Pacific Brands 
… through local manufacturing … Defab is able to offer customers a wide spectrum of 
potential fabric applications because it produces innovative and effective solutions efficiently 
and can respond to changing market demand quickly. (sub. 65, p. 2) Defab Weavers 
… Australian industry players will be primarily niche and ultra niche players whose 
competitive advantage will be quality and certainty of supply to an international market on 
time and with short lead-times. (sub. 32, p. 8) Australian Association of Leather Industries 
Branding 
One of the key determinants for long-term viability in the garment industry is ‘brand equity’. 
Pacific Brands’ whole ‘modus operandi’ is based on the premise that without strong brand 
equity matched with new product development, major retailers have no reason to source 
through local suppliers and will increasingly reduce their costs through direct retailer imports. 
(sub. 72, p. 3) Pacific Brands 
Quality, design and innovation 
Australia is amongst the world’s best designers and producers of specialty performance and 
technical textiles, which is undeniably the growth area in the international textile industry. … 
The FAI members have sustainable competitive advantages in the following areas: 
•  High quality 
•  High level of production expertise 
•  Production flexibility 
•  Innovation in raw material processing, yarn and fabrics development, design, quality 
control and dyeing & finishing techniques. (sub. 70, p. 10) Fabrics Australia Inc. 
Services 
The Yakka philosophy of building quality into its product and then marketing a total service 
package so that end-users know that they can depend on product quality and reliability has 
meant that price is not the prime determinant in gaining sales. (sub. 31, p. 5) Yakka 
Education and research linkages 
The Geelong TCFL industry has a strong relationship with local education and research 
institutions like the Gordon Institute of TAFE, Deakin University, CSIRO Textile and Fibre 
Technology and the International Fibre Centre. … These … institutions provide the local 
industry with staff training programs and state of the art research capabilities. They give 
industry the opportunity to form partnerships to facilitate the successful development of 
value adding opportunities. This type of development assists the industry to become more 
globally competitive. (sub. 16, p. 11) City of Geelong 
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3.4  But the sector also has weaknesses 
As mentioned earlier, TCF firms in most developed countries are facing pressures 
on both the supply and demand sides of their operations. High labour costs, 
shrinking margins, slowing demand growth, and technological and regulatory 
developments all require new and innovative strategies by firms to survive. 
Labour cost disadvantages inhibit growth prospects 
While labour cost disadvantages can be offset by productivity increases, the general 
view is that there is now little productivity difference between Australian suppliers 
and many suppliers in China (the main source of import competition). Similarly, 
productivity in other developing countries is improving. As previously noted, this 
implies that labour intensive production of standardised commodities is unlikely to 
be viable in Australia in the medium term. Indeed, as in other developed countries, 
this productivity/wage cost equation has already caused the substantial migration of 
labour intensive production offshore. 
Labour cost differences are, of course, an inherent feature of the global TCF 
operating environment and not something that government policy intervention 
should seek to offset. Rather, government policy settings should provide a 
supportive general business climate and facilitate adjustment into activities where 
labour costs are less important and where Australia has other advantages. As a wide 
cross-section of participants acknowledged, there is little if any benefit for the 
sector, its employees, or the Australian economy of seeking to preserve otherwise 
undifferentiated and uncompetitive labour intensive production activities. 
Lack of scale and fragmentation of the domestic supply chain 
increases costs 
Low volume production sometimes facilitates flexibility and quick response, and 
can be an asset in niche product markets. Also, in some of the areas in which the 
sector’s best opportunities lie, the unit cost penalties from low production runs are 
not all that large. 
However, low scale/small firm size is much more disadvantageous in capital 
intensive activities. The resulting cost penalties can be particularly significant where 
several small producers compete to supply the small domestic market. The unit cost 
savings available from increased volume have underpinned rationalisation in a 
number of industry segments.     




Lack of scale can also: reduce the opportunity for managerial specialisation; limit 
access to finance (resulting in under-capitalised operations); make it more difficult 
to cover the initial fixed costs of exporting and to access training packages and 
government support programs such as the SIP; and preclude the sort of workplace 
flexibility that can be achieved under the best enterprise bargaining agreements 
(although it should be noted that while small firms may not have negotiated a 
formal EBA this does not mean that they cannot improve their flexibility through 
informal means). 
Fragmentation/small size also disadvantages some suppliers when dealing with the 
large retail chains. According to suppliers, imbalance in bargaining power (and lack 
of skills among buyers) sometimes leads to retail purchasing decisions that are 
inimical to the local industries’ future. Previous reports have identified the need for 
more cooperation between retailers and suppliers, including through sharing 
information relevant to demand forecasting and inventory management. 
Increased scale/firm size in the domestic TCF manufacturing sector should enhance 
the scope for more sophisticated information and technology linkages with 
customers, as well as improving firms’ marketing and negotiation skills. 
Relationships between retailers and suppliers are discussed further in chapter 11. 
Aspects of workplace arrangements are impeding performance 
improvement 
Improvements in workplace flexibility have been evident across the local TCF 
sector over the past decade with many, though not all, participants quite positive 
about their workplace arrangements. 
However, there is evidence of continuing inflexibility in some workplace 
arrangements, including restrictive shift patterns and obstacles to the use of casual 
employees to cater for peaks in demand. As noted above, in parts of the sector, 
small firm size may limit the use of EBAs as a vehicle to overcome such 
inflexibilities. There were also claims that confrontational attitudes in the workplace 
are an impediment to improving flexibility. For example, Victoria Carpets 
commented on a reduction in its operating flexibility caused by a change in shift 
arrangements: 
Union demands and intransigence demonstrate there is very little evidence of any co-
operation or understanding of the need to have competitive workplaces. This has 
worsened in recent years. Last year we discontinued a permanent week-end shift at our 
Castlemaine mill, due in part to the obstacles and difficulties constantly presented by 
the union. We now operate at week-ends on overtime rates. (sub. 86, p. 3)     
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Similarly, while industrial disputation has not been a widespread problem in the 
sector, recently it has caused significant disruption in the carpet industry in Victoria. 
There are some concerns that the trigger for these disputes — the issue of employee 
entitlements — could be the source of costly disputation elsewhere in the sector. 
Several firms also indicated that concern about the security of employee 
entitlements has contributed to an emphasis in their workplace negotiations on 
redundancy matters rather than on developing workplace arrangements which 
would enable their businesses to survive and prosper. Some firm-specific ‘solutions’ 
to guarantee employee entitlements have been expensive. 
Moreover, the inability of some firms to meet previously negotiated and accrued 
entitlements has become a barrier to them exiting the sector. Their continued 
operation in turn helps to maintain negative perceptions about TCF activity, making 
it more difficult for those firms with a future to access finance, develop new 
markets and attract talented staff. 
Of course, these costs and workplace problems are not unique to the TCF sector. 
For this reason, some have suggested that further general policy responses are 
required to deliver more effective workplace outcomes across the economy as a 
whole (see chapter 10). 
Characteristics of the TCF workforce can reduce labour mobility 
The characteristics of the TCF workforce suggest that many employees could find it 
difficult to secure alternative employment. This is likely to increase the economic 
and social costs associated with further downsizing and restructuring in the sector. 
As discussed at length in chapter 4, educational attainment levels are often low, 
skills are frequently basic and sector-specific, and employees are more likely to be 
older, female, married and less proficient in speaking English than in other parts of 
the workforce. A less mobile workforce also means that growing and emerging 
firms could have some difficulty in attracting employees best suited to their needs. 
Other weaknesses include … 
•  There is evidence of some skill gaps and shortages in several areas including; 
human resource and financial skills in middle and upper management; specialist 
sewing machinists (capable of working with designers); textile production 
workers; tanners and fabric cutters. However, given the relatively basic skill 
requirements for much of the sector’s activities and the scope for ‘on-the-job’ 
training, skill deficiencies may not be as important as in some other sectors. 
Skilling issues are considered in more detail in chapter 10.     




•  There is a dependency culture in some parts of the TCF sector, that it is up to 
government to support domestic activity by any means necessary, including 
through high levels of protection. This culture impedes the drive to confront 
change required to improve firm viability, whether through improved efficiency, 
lower costs, increased investment, innovation or pursuit of export opportunities. 
•  An incomplete statistical platform (particularly in relation to outworkers and 
very small TCF businesses) makes some aspects of policy making more 
difficult. 
Examples of participants’ views on weaknesses and other impediments to their 
longer term viability are provided in box 3.5. 
3.5  TCF firms face a range of threats 
As well as the intrinsic weaknesses that detract from performance, various external 
factors threaten the future viability of parts of the sector. 
The competitiveness of developing country producers will continue to 
improve 
The traditional role of TCF manufacturing in the economic development of poorer 
countries indicates that competition from new low-wage production centres will be 
a continuing feature of the global TCF industry. The latest manifestation is 
occurring in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam, where labour 
costs are half those in China. As productivity in these countries improves, there is 
the distinct possibility that they will take market share from Australian firms in both 
domestic and export markets, particularly at the commodity end of the production 
spectrum. Also, as some participants noted, as of July 1 this year least developed 
countries such as Bangladesh have had duty free access to the Australian market. 
This has raised a related concern regarding the consequences for Australian TCF 
firms of rules of origin clauses in this and other tariff preference arrangements (see 
chapter 11). 
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Box 3.5  Participants’ views on weaknesses and other impediments 
Lack of scale 
The small domestic market creates scale disadvantages for Australian manufacturers. In 
addition, the market is diverse in terms of consumer taste and fibre preference, and this 
further constrains production run size. (sub. 35, p. 15) Carpet Institute of Australia 
… the TCF industry is comprised mostly of small companies. Many small firms do not have 
the individual resources to make large capital outlays (eg computer pattern making 
systems). Many technical areas of the industry are still operated manually – this is inefficient. 
(sub. 82, p. 8) Fashion Technicians Association Australia  
Workplace flexibility 
Employers and the various components of the labour force (employees and unions) must 
understand that in a low tariff environment the workforce must be prepared to accept 
change. The opportunity to prosper behind a tariff barrier is gone and there will be no 
industry, and hence no jobs, unless all players accept the need for change and move to an 
internationally competitive position. (sub. 80, p. 8) Feltex Australia 
Industrial disputation 
Feltex experienced a costly industrial dispute in 2001 which closed its operations for 6 – 8 
weeks. Feltex believes that an adverse industrial relations environment will negatively 
impact investment decisions … strong legislative measures are needed to provide a stable 
business environment. (sub. 80, p. 8) Feltex Australia 
Low wage production centres 
It matters little whatever assistance is given the footwear industry by way of tariffs, because 
production would not be competitive against low cost imports, particularly from China (sub. 
27, p. 4) Sporting Footwear Importers Group 
Entitlements 
Australia’s high redundancy costs by world standards exaggerates the consequences of 
long-term viability decisions. In small firms this may lead to delayed adjustment followed by 
bankruptcy. … Redundancy payments form one of the largest costs in rationalisation and 
structural improvements to existing operations. (sub. 72, p. 3) Pacific Brands 
The cost of closing a business with redundancy and long service leave payments is so great 
that many companies cannot afford to close. (sub. 51, p. 5) Melbourne Textile Knitting 
Skill shortages and training 
The shortage of skills and the inability of firms to attract sufficient numbers of top quality 
young people into the textiles industry act as major barriers to growth, particularly in regional 
areas. By way of example, companies contributing to this submission noted that it was 
difficult to employ laboratory assistants in the Albury-Wodonga area. (sub. 68, p. 13) 
Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association 
Skill shortages exist in a number of areas including sewing machinists, textile production 
workers and tanners. … Vocational education and training programs in secondary schools 
should give young [people] greater career alternatives that include TCF&L. (sub. 36, p. 2) 
Queensland Light Manufacturing and Industry Training Centre 
 
     




The growth in new production centres, together with China’s apparent 
determination to take a strategic position across most elements of the TCF supply 
chain, indicates that global excess capacity and low profit margins will persist in the 
TCF business environment for some time to come. ‘Dumping’ of this excess 
capacity may also occur from time to time, further increasing the competitive 
pressure on domestic TCF firms (see chapter 11). 
Many firms are sensitive to exchange rate changes 
The low value of the Australian dollar in recent years has shielded local TCF firms 
from some of the adjustment pressures that tariff reductions and global influences 
would otherwise have brought to bear. Over the year to July 2003, however, the 
currency has appreciated by around 20 per cent against the US dollar and 15 per 
cent against the trade weighted index. Many firms indicated that this recent (or any 
further) appreciation of the Australian dollar threatens their viability. Indeed, for 
some, the appreciation of the currency was of more concern than tariff reductions. 
An appreciating currency will, of course, also reduce the cost of imported inputs 
(including capital equipment). More broadly, exchange rate variability has been a 
feature of the general Australian business environment since the A$ was floated in 
March 1983. It is therefore something that firms in all parts of the economy have to 
manage. 
Contraction in parts of the supply base could raise critical mass 
concerns 
A prominent theme in submissions was that a contraction in parts of the supply 
chain below a level considered to form a ‘critical mass’ would put at risk other parts 
of the supply chain. For example, further contraction in domestic clothing 
production was seen as threatening textile and yarn production, while continuing 
contraction in footwear manufacture was argued to be jeopardising leather 
suppliers. Conversely, there was concern that reduced production of certain yarns 
and other raw material inputs could put some downstream activities at risk. In this 
context, it was suggested that it is both difficult and costly to source imported yarns 
in low volume batches. 
Participants also said that a contraction in TCF activity could have implications for 
the cost and availability of inputs and services sourced from outside the sector. For 
example, concerns were raised that:     
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•  reduced demand for specialist textile machinery and chemical inputs (such as 
dyes) could raise costs and/or reduce efficient supply or service options for 
remaining users of these inputs; and 
•  a contracting TCF manufacturing base would undermine current linkages 
between the sector and research and education institutions, as well as spreading 
the cost of external skills development more thinly. 
However, a recent review of the Australian circular knitted fabric sector suggested 
that critical mass concerns may be overstated, with the reviewers commenting: 
During industry forums the industry made it clear that it believed that there was a 
critical mass of about 444 [tonnes per week production level] and that if the industry 
dropped below this level it would implode. However, DRA believe that the Australian 
industry will respond to what the local market demands, whatever size this market is. 
The Western European experience has shown that despite the massive falls in 
production a much smaller and leaner industry has emerged, often involving new 
owners. (David Rigby Associates 2003, p. 2) 
Moreover, supply interdependencies arise in all parts of the economy. It is far from 
clear that interdependence and the associated critical mass issues in the TCF sector 
are any more significant than elsewhere. Also, as noted above, increased import and 
export activity have reduced interdependencies within the Australian TCF supply 
chain. This is not to deny that contraction in particular parts of the TCF supply base 
(eg clothing) would have adverse flow-on effects for firms in other areas. However, 
it is unlikely that there are sudden discontinuities at the industry or sectoral level. 
Other potential threats for local TCF suppliers include … 
•  Delays in securing better access to overseas markets, although it is important not 
to overstate the benefits that this would bring to the sector as a whole (see 
chapter 11). Some participants also considered that ‘natural barriers’ such as 
distance from export markets are a threat to the sector’s future viability. 
However, as others acknowledged, those same natural barriers can also reduce 
import competition. For example, local tastes for carpets in Australia provide 
some cushion from overseas competition. 
•  The emergence of new technology that leads to rapid asset and technology 
redundancy (especially in areas such as technical textiles). 
•  Inflated operating costs arising from inefficient solutions to the employee 
entitlements issue. 
•  Increased involvement of retailers in upstream elements of the supply chain.     




•  Costs associated with the failure to pursue microeconomic and taxation reform. 
•  Risks for wool processors of continued increases in fibre substitution toward 
synthetics. 
•  Uncertainty about future policy settings for the industry. 
Examples of participants’ views on threats are provided in box 3.6. 
 
3.6  What are the implications? 
Contrary to perceptions in some quarters, it is inappropriate to categorise the TCF 
sector as being in terminal decline. Prospects in particular activities are quite strong 
and some firms and industry associations are optimistic about their future, even 
though they face increasing global competition and lower protection.  
Nevertheless, further adjustment is not only required, but is inevitable. Accordingly, 
the mix of production will continue to change. And while optimistic views are that 
aggregate TCF production may increase from its present level, firms’ efforts to 
improve productivity in response to global competitive forces suggest that 
employment will continue to decline, irrespective of the support provided to the 
sector by Australian governments. 
In effect, the outlook for the sector is a continuation of the process that has been 
occurring over the past decade or so — rationalisation of production, firm closures 
and the emergence of new suppliers and products. Hence, the key task for firms and 
their employees is to build on strengths and to address weaknesses so the sector can 
make the most of what are likely to be a diverse array of opportunities. 
Governments also have an important role to play in formulating a well understood, 
stable and predictable assistance policy regime to provide for an appropriate balance 
between the interests of firms, employees and TCF regions on the one hand, and 
user industries, consumers and taxpayers on the other. Appropriate policy settings 
for taxation, workplace arrangements and overseas market access will also be 
important. The respective roles of the industry and governments in a number of key 
areas are the subject of the remainder of this report.     
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Box 3.6  Participants’ views on threats 
Exchange rates 
Australian manufacturers’ vulnerability to fluctuations in exchange rates remains a significant 
issue. Australia’s main role in international trade is as a supplier of commodity items such as 
mining and agricultural products. The result is that in the medium term the exchange rate is 
primarily determined by the state of world commodity and financial markets. The exchange 
rate therefore does not appropriately reflect the competitiveness of local manufacturing. 
(sub. 77, p. 10) Godfrey Hirst 
Critical mass 
Domestic demand for early stage processed product has contracted significantly over the 
last decade. As the clothing industry has increasingly moved offshore … so too in turn does 
weaving and spinning. This is a fundamental shift in industry; as the weaving sector’s 
competition is not imported fabrics – it is imported garments. This contracting local market 
and the resultant restructuring pressures have now flowed through to early stage 
processing. (sub. 45, p. 6) Australian Wool Processors Council 
… while we are striving to maintain our international competitiveness, we remain concerned 
about the ability of our core customer base in Australia to retain the necessary critical mass 
to ensure its own sustainability. (sub. 55, p. 9) Bruck Textiles 
Market access 
The WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha agreed on the parameters of a new round of 
negotiations as part of the future work programme of the WTO. The round is due to end by 
1 January 2005 at the earliest. Even if such a deadline is met, new rules would be unlikely to 
come into force before 2006, and they would set a target (of tariff reductions) to be reached 
no sooner than 2010. It is unlikely that this target for 2010 will be less than the scheduled 
rate of TCF tariffs to be implemented in Australia by 2005. (sub. 75, p. 39) TFIA 
Competition from low-cost goods 
There is also a strong belief within the Australian technical and nonwoven textiles industry 
that overseas suppliers (usually in low labour cost countries) that have exhausted their 
quotas to other countries often use Australia to offload excess capacity (and/or cancelled 
orders) to a quota free Australia. Whilst it may not technically be dumping, nevertheless it 
has the equivalent effect of pushing the price of domestic production down by allowing an 
increase in supply of low-cost goods. (sub. 68, p. 17) Technical Textiles and Nonwoven 
Association 
Microeconomic reform 
There is a strong perception in the carpet industry that the micro-economic reform program 
has failed to deliver a significant improvement in the cost structures facing the carpet 
industry. (sub. 35, p. 19) Carpet Institute of Australia 
The spinning industry in Australia has seen a significant departure of machinery and 
investment from Australia to New Zealand over the last five years. Undoubtedly this is due 
partly to the significantly more competitive infrastructure costs applying in New Zealand; I 
refer particularly to payroll tax and workers’ compensation premiums (currently costing us in 
excess of $1.5 million per annum). Prohibitive sea freight rates from Australia compared to 
our overseas opposition remain an anti-competitive burden. (sub. 86, p. 3) Victoria Carpets 
 
     




 FINDINGS ON THE TCF SECTOR’S PROSPECTS 
•  Some firms and parts of the sector are performing well, exploiting competitive 
advantages to develop new products and to secure new markets. 
•  Other firms are in a process of transition, with reasonable prospects of 
operating in a lower assistance environment in the medium to longer term. 
•  For firms producing standardised products in the more labour intensive parts of 
the sector, future prospects are very limited. Many will not survive, regardless of 
the assistance regime.  
•  Across the sector as a whole, future assistance levels will be but one influence 
on firms’ prospects. Global market pressures, firms’ business models and 
exchange rates are just some of the many other factors that will impinge on 
those prospects.     




4  Adjusting to change 
4.1  A sector in a continuing state of transition 
Earlier chapters explain some of the global and domestic influences that contribute 
to adjustment pressures on the Australian TCF sector.  
For many TCF firms, global market pressures overwhelm the influence of domestic 
assistance settings. As the ACTU acknowledged, in its response to the Position 
Paper, ‘global pressures dwarf the effects of the tariff changes proposed by the PC’ 
(sub. PP169, p. 6). For many labour intensive products, even much higher tariffs 
would not compensate for the labour cost advantage of developing country TCF 
suppliers, such as China. Moreover, the quality and range of products available 
from those overseas suppliers is increasing rapidly.  
Australian producers will therefore need to continue efforts to develop new or 
improved products, to explore new markets and to improve productivity. This will 
place adjustment pressure on firms, their employees and the communities where 
they live, particularly where productivity improvements reduce labour 
requirements. Firm exits will add further to these pressures. 
4.2  Change brings benefits as well as costs 
Change is a natural part of any market environment. Most firms adapt their 
activities from time to time in response to increased competition or to take 
advantage of new opportunities. Even though such change imposes costs on firms, 
they expect to benefit in the long term. Earlier chapters discuss how many 
successful Australian TCF firms have expanded the scope of their activities beyond 
traditional manufacturing, looking increasingly for increased integration with 
overseas producers and moving into downstream distribution. 
Many individuals who leave employment in the TCF sector (or change jobs within 
it) do so from choice. They may find employment elsewhere, may relocate or may 
just decide to retire. Indeed, labour turnover is a feature of all parts of the economy,     




including the TCF sector (box 4.1). Like firms, employees may trade short term 
costs for long term gains. 
 
Box 4.1  Job mobility of the TCF workforce 
Workers in the TCF sector are less job mobile than workers in many other sectors. In 
2002, for example, around 11 per cent of TCF workers changed jobs compared to 15 
per cent of workers in all industries. The corresponding TCF figures for 2000 and for 
1996 were 9 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. 
The composition of the figures also varies somewhat from year to year. For example, in 
the 12 months to February 1996, about 7 per cent of TCF workers found jobs outside 
the sector and 4 per cent found new jobs in the sector. About 5 per cent of TCF 
workers in the sector at February 1996 had worked in other industries a year earlier. In 
the 12 months to February 2002, about 5 per cent of TCF workers found jobs outside 
the sector and about 6 per cent moved within the sector. At February 2002, about 5 per 
cent of TCF workers had been employed in other industries a year earlier. 
There is also significant movement out of and into work. About 10 per cent of TCF 
workers at February 1995 were not working 12 months later, while about 10 per cent of 
February 1996 TCF workers were not in work 12 months earlier. The corresponding 
figures for the 2001–2002 period were 9 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively. 
Source: Appendix tables B23–B28.  
 
 
Appropriate and timely change, albeit costly to firms and employees in the short 
term, may forestall higher costs in the future. For example, failure to respond 
progressively to the increasing competitiveness of imports could leave firms and 
possibly whole segments of Australian TCF activity exposed to pent up adjustment 
in response to an external shock (eg an exchange rate appreciation) which would 
magnify the adjustment costs otherwise incurred. 
But some change, particularly involuntary change, can bring high adjustment costs 
when an industry or sector is contracting and alternative job opportunities are 
limited. Firms, their employees, and the regions in which they operate, face not only 
direct economic costs such as loss of income and employment, but a range of flow-
on social and economic costs, arising from closure of regional infrastructure, 
reductions in property values, loss of self-esteem, and family dislocation. Many 
such costs — examples of which are listed in box 4.2, with an extract from the 
TCFUA submission about the effects on workers given in box 4.3 — are not 
captured in economic models which attempt to estimate the net effects of changes in 
assistance and other policy parameters. Yet it is important that these costs not be 
overlooked.      





Box 4.2  Listing the ‘involuntary’ costs of change 
Employees: 
•  loss of income (not fully offset by social welfare support or redundancy payments), 
leading to debt, mortgage and loan foreclosure; 
•  inability to obtain work (or future work is casual and intermittent); 
•  loss of skills (as they become unpractised); 
•  costs of retraining; 
•  relocation costs; 
•  lowered property values; 
•  social costs (loss of self-esteem, depression, illness, drug and alcohol dependence, 
family problems). 
Firms: 
•  loss of income; 
•  reduced value of assets such as buildings and machinery; 
•  write down of inventory; 
•  lease exit costs; 
•  costs of redundancy payments; 
•  costs of site clean up in the event of closure. 
Regions: 
•  multiplier effects on other firms and their employees; 
•  longer term effects on social infrastructure (from population drift and lower economic 
activity levels in the region); 
•  declines in property values and associated pressure on local government income. 
 
 
4.3  Industry characteristics suggest adjustment costs 
could be high 
Adjustment costs for workers displaced from the TCF sector are likely to be higher, 
on average, than for workers displaced from other sectors. There are a number of 
reasons for this, including: 
•  Skills are often sector-specific and basic, while educational attainment levels are 
generally low. 
•  Capacity to relocate or to travel for job search are often limited.     





Box 4.3  Negative effects of retrenchment on workers 
According to the TCFUA: 
‘The negative effects of retrenchment on workers are broad and widely documented. 
Such effects include the obvious economic problems unemployment brings such as 
inadequate income, debt, mortgage and loan foreclosure, eviction and also include 
feelings of boredom, depression, social dislocation, impaired mental health etc.  
It has been suggested by counsellors that workers who are retrenched experience a 6-
8 week period coming to terms with the loss before they can effectively engage in 
seeking alternative work. 
Work often constitutes the means by which a person defines their identity, this is 
realised not only by the type of work performed but the sense of well being which 
ensues from feeling that one is making a contribution to society and being involved in a 
group.  
Job loss, especially when it is sudden, immediately removes this avenue through which 
people feel part of the work community, this in itself produces feelings of isolation. 
Moreover, without paid employment, people do not have the fiscal means to engage in 
activities which would have the effect of ameliorating such feelings of social dislocation. 
Hence, retrenched workers, despite having ample time to engage in activities which 
would generate feelings of self worth, have reduced capacity to do so due to lack of 
fiscal resources. 
In addition to feelings of anger, frustration and worthlessness, retrenched workers 
typically experience financial difficulties which further impacts on their psychological 
and emotional health. Redundancy payments, when made, provide short-term security, 
however in a lot of cases retrenched workers are often forced to sell property in order 
to get by. This is particularly the case in situations where workers who having received 
little or no warning that their job was threatened have invested in property and other 
assets and are hence over committed financially. As social security payments are 
governed by means tests, a number of these workers were deemed ineligible for 
welfare payments, hence, having no access to basic financial advice, such workers 
proceeded to fritter away their assets before being eligible to claim unemployment and 
other benefits.  
These financial problems brought about by a lack of information, which is a particular 
issue for migrant workers who face language and cultural barriers, is common among 
retrenched workers and is one of the many issues that could be addressed and 
remedied by a labour adjustment program.’ 
Source: TCFUA (sub. 33, pp. 69–70). 
 
 
•  TCF adjustment is often ‘lumpy’ — for example, the closure of firms or 
factories displacing many workers at the same time — increasing adjustment 
costs, particularly in regional areas.      




In separate recent work, the Commission has prepared weighted indexes for 
Australian industries of adjustment relevant workforce characteristics, such as the 
degree of English proficiency, level of educational attainment and age of workers 
(PC 2003, forthcoming). To the extent that such factors predispose displaced 
workers to difficulty in finding new employment, the indexes suggest that workers 
in the TCF industries are particularly vulnerable.  
Such workforce characteristics are most acute in the clothing and footwear 
manufacturing industries. In addition, most non-factory outworking occurs in the 
clothing industry. Outworkers generally have no redundancy or severance payment 
entitlements, or notice periods, and often face the loss of personal investment in 
sewing equipment if they are displaced.  
Many firms face high exit costs, including redundancy costs. And the flow on 
effects to communities and regions from adjustment costs imposed on workers and 
firms can be high. 
Much of the information in the following sections describing workforce 
characteristics draws on the ABS Labour Force Survey and the Population Census. 
Each of these data collections encompasses workers in small firms, outworkers, as 
well as proprietors working in their own businesses, provided the individuals 
identify themselves as working in the TCF sector. Coverage of outworkers is likely 
to be incomplete, however, as it is generally believed that many outworkers are 
reluctant to identify themselves as such. Further, the TCF Resource Centre of WA 
commented that available data understate the number of firms in the TCF sector and 
the number of workers (sub. PP167, p. 1). However, this is partly a classification 
issue — people working in occupations commonly associated with TCF (eg design, 
cutting, sewing) are often classified by the ABS into non-TCF industries in the 
services sector, such as design services, wholesale or retail trade. 
Skill profiles and educational levels impede adjustment 
The TCF sector exhibits a lower skilled occupational profile than either total 
manufacturing or the economy as a whole. In 2003, for example, 62 per cent of TCF 
workers were classified into the lower skilled occupational groups, compared to 46 
per cent for manufacturing as a whole (appendix table B.18, groups 6 to 9). 
Although this does not necessarily mean that individual TCF workers have low 
skills, the non transferability of the skills used in many areas of the sector could 
limit alternative job opportunities.  
Low educational attainment could also impede adjustment:     




•  In 2001, nearly two-thirds of TCF workers had no post-school qualifications 
(compared to around 50 per cent of manufacturing workers overall), with over 
40 per cent not having completed the highest level of secondary schooling 
(appendix table B.14).  
•  Within TCF manufacturing, the lowest levels of educational attainment were in 
the footwear industries with 75 per cent of workers without post-school 
qualifications. In clothing manufacturing, the corresponding figure was around 
68 per cent (appendix table B.14). 
These skilling and educational characteristics mean that factory-based TCF 
employees on average earn much less than manufacturing employees in general. In 
May 2002, average hourly earnings of $18.37 were about 20 per cent lower than the 
manufacturing average of $22.82 (appendix table B.16). Moreover, the difference 
between TCF and average manufacturing wages has increased slightly over the last 
ten years — with the annual average wage increase in TCF being between 0.5 and 
0.9 percentage points lower than for manufacturing as a whole (DEWR, sub. 84, 
p. 10). There is some variability within the TCF sector, however, with the average 
hourly rate for employees in the textile, fibre and yarn manufacturing industries 
more than 15 per cent above that for employees in the clothing industries (appendix 
table B.15), possibly reflecting differences in skill requirements. 
Labour mobility is relatively low 
As noted in box 4.1, labour mobility of the TCF workforce as a whole is lower than 
for industry in general. This is partly explained by the age profile of TCF 
employment and the high proportion of female and migrant workers. (Mobility may 
be higher in some individual TCF industries, however — for example, Austanners, 
the ‘only vertically integrated manufacturer of finished apparel and furniture leather 
in Australia’ (sub. 73, p. 8), noted that its workforce is largely ‘itinerant’ (sub. 73, p. 
23).) 
An older age profile 
The TCF workforce is somewhat older than in many other manufacturing industries, 
with 72 per cent of TCF workers aged 35 or over in 2003 compared with 62 per cent 
for manufacturing in general. In parts of the TCF sector, the age profile is 
noticeably older than the manufacturing average, with the over-35 figure for 
knitting mills being more than 80 per cent and clothing manufacturing over 70 per 
cent (appendix table B.11 and appendix figure B.3).     




In general, older people are more likely to have established family and community 
ties to the regions in which they live and to be more reluctant than younger people 
to move to find work. People closer to retirement age are also less likely to relocate 
for employment reasons.  
Female employment is high 
Women accounted for more than 55 per cent of the TCF workforce in 2003, more 
than double the proportion for manufacturing as a whole (appendix table B.5). But 
in textile manufacturing and the leather industries the proportion of female workers 
is lower than the manufacturing average. Further, women in TCF employment 
account for about 13 per cent of total female manufacturing employment, whereas 
the corresponding figure for men is just under 4 per cent (appendix table B.5). 
For females, alternative work in male dominated manufacturing industries can be 
hard to find. In addition, a slightly higher proportion of female TCF workers are 
married than their counterparts in other parts of manufacturing, possibly also 
contributing to a reluctance to relocate in search of alternative employment 
(appendix table B.13).  
Women have borne more of the burden of recent adjustment in the sector. Over the 
last 5 years, total female employment has fallen by just over 36 per cent (22 000 
persons) compared with 31 per cent (13  300 persons) for male employment 
(appendix table B.5). 
A high proportion with an ethnic background 
The sector has historically been an important employer of migrants. Just under half 
of all TCF workers were born overseas — predominantly in non-English speaking 
countries — compared with about one third of workers in manufacturing generally 
(appendix table B.12 and appendix figure B.4). Indeed, the proportion of non-
English speaking background (NESB) workers in TCF has increased in recent years 
from about 41 per cent in May 1997 to about 44 per cent in May 2003 — during 
that period the corresponding proportion for manufacturing as a whole declined 
slightly.  
Many recent migrants have poor skills in English, as well as lower levels of 
educational attainment than those born in Australia. This is likely to add to their 
difficulty of finding alternative employment if displaced from their current jobs, 
particularly if they are more recent arrivals in Australia.      




There is some evidence that the TCF sector provides the first job opportunity for 
many migrants to Australia. For instance, while ethnic TCF employment in the past 
was dominated by migrants from Southern Europe, more recently, Asian born 
(female) workers have become the predominant grouping, in line with the growing 
migration from South East Asia. 
Many outworkers have few alternative job opportunities 
As the use of outworkers provides firms with important flexibility advantages, job 
opportunities for outworkers appear to have increased recently, notwithstanding an 
overall decline in TCF production levels. Indeed, the TCFUA claimed that previous 
tariff reductions have led to a ‘massive surge’ in outworking, though no data were 
provided (sub. 33, p.  15). A recent Victorian report similarly concluded that the 
number of outworkers, particularly in the TCF sector, ‘has risen with the 
restructuring of the manufacturing industry over the past ten to fifteen years’ (cited 
in sub. 40, p. 4). The Commission’s estimates suggest that the full-time equivalent 
number of outworkers may have increased slightly since 1997 (see chapter 10). 
Nonetheless, when firms contract or close down, outworkers displaced from those 
firms may find it difficult to obtain new work. As noted above, adjustment costs 
faced by individual displaced outworkers can be just as high, if not higher, than 
those faced by factory workers who lose their jobs: 
•  A recent survey by Christina Cregan (see sub. 30) of 119 outworkers suggests 
that many work at home because they are unable to find, or their circumstances 
do not permit them to find, work outside the home. Their often limited 
education, lack of English proficiency and inability or unwillingness to relocate 
severely limits alternative job prospects. 
•  The survey indicated that a small minority prefer to work at home rather than to 
seek outside work. The likelihood of obtaining alternative employment which 
offers them this flexibility is often limited, particularly in regional areas.  
•  Outworkers generally receive lower pay, on an hourly basis and in total, than 
factory workers. This implies that lost income from unemployment could be 
lower. But outworkers may lose personal investment in equipment, such as 
sewing machines. Further, displaced factory workers often receive redundancy 
payments and may have greater recourse to social welfare support. The longer 
term cost of job loss for many displaced outworkers could therefore be higher 
than for workers displaced from factory employment.      




Lumpy adjustment adds to costs 
When firm closures or rationalisations result in many workers being displaced at the 
same time, adjustment for individuals can be more difficult and costly than when 
only a small number of employees lose their jobs, for example as a result of small 
scale labour shedding by firms continuing in business. Lumpy adjustment results in 
more people looking for work from the pool of available jobs. If significant 
numbers seek to relocate, demand for property in a region can stagnate and property 
values fall. Thus, even where individuals are otherwise prepared to move to find 
work, difficulty in selling their houses at a satisfactory price may prevent them 
doing so. The flow-on effects to regional communities will also be larger than if just 
a few employees are displaced. 
Firms can face high exit costs 
The adjustment costs for firms depend on many things including: alternative uses 
for their fixed assets and working capital; costs of paying out leases, dismantling 
existing operations and paying for necessary site clean up and refurbishment; and 
accrued employee entitlements.  
While the Commission has no information to suggest that most of these exit costs 
are any greater in the TCF sector than in other industries, there is some evidence 
that many TCF firms face large redundancy payments in the event of closure.  
Many firms, of course, would be able to pay entitlements to their employees if the 
need arose. But a view expressed during discussions with some participants, and 
mentioned also in some submissions (see for example, sub. 51 from the Melbourne 
Textile Knitting Co), was that others could not afford such payments in the event of 
closure and therefore keep operating despite poor profitability and limited future 
prospects. There were also suggestions that some firms which could afford to make 
redundancy payments were unwilling to do so — it being less costly for them to 
continue to trade, even at a loss, than to close and meet the immediate costs of 
redundancy payments.  
In the short term, continued operation postpones the costs of adjustment. However, 
it may add to the cost of adjustment in the long term by backing up adjustment 
pressure which would otherwise have been spread out over a period. As noted 
above, a deterioration in international competitiveness from an external shock (eg 
appreciation of the exchange rate) could trigger a lumpy and therefore more costly 
adjustment episode.      




4.4  The regional dimension 
Irrespective of location, adjustment costs for individuals can be high 
Workforce characteristics affecting mobility (described above) vary by location. 
Some characteristics are more pronounced in city areas and others more pronounced 
in the regions. For example, appendix table B.20 shows that (as a broad summary): 
•  TCF workers in metropolitan areas are more likely to be better qualified with 
jobs requiring higher skill levels than those in the regions; but  
•  those in the cities are more likely to be older, female, overseas born and married 
than regional workers. 
There was no substantive evidence presented to the inquiry that, in general, 
individual TCF workers in the regions face higher adjustment costs than their 
counterparts in metropolitan areas, or vice versa. Many individuals, irrespective of 
their city or regional location, have characteristics which suggest that the 
adjustment costs likely to be imposed on them through loss of their current jobs 
could be high. On this count, there appears little basis for differentiating between 
metropolitan and regional areas in future TCF adjustment assistance. 
But flow-on costs may be more significant in regional areas 
Where TCF firms close down or reduce employment, adjustment costs extend 
beyond their employees and families to the broader community. Although these 
flow-on costs can affect city areas — a fact emphasised in several submissions 
including those from the City of Darebin (sub.  25) and the City of Whittlesea 
(sub. PP115) — they are potentially more significant in regional areas where the 
total job pool is smaller and where alternative job prospects are generally more 
limited than in the metropolitan centres. The repercussions spread to non-TCF 
firms, their employees, and the region’s social infrastructure. The City of Greater 
Geelong, for example, contended that each textile job leads to the creation of an 
additional 1.38 jobs elsewhere in the local community, with each clothing and 
footwear job creating an additional 1.27 places (sub. 16, p. 11). Hence, it argued 
that a scaling back of TCF activity would adversely affect the Geelong region to a 
much greater extent than indicated by the direct loss of TCF jobs.  
However, while the existence of flow-on effects is unarguable, the longer term 
regional effects of TCF change depend on the interplay of many factors, including: 
the importance of TCF employment in the region; employment in individual TCF 
firms; regional growth, particularly employment growth, and alternative regional     




job opportunities; and the extent of integration with neighbouring regions. Box 4.4 
illustrates some of the relevant factors, with reference to Geelong. 
 
Box 4.4  The adjustment process in Geelong 
The TCF sector currently directly employs over 2150 people in the Geelong region, 
accounting for 14 per cent of the region’s total manufacturing workforce and 2 per cent 
of its workforce overall. (In comparison, TCF employment accounts for about 9 per cent 
of Victoria’s manufacturing employment.) The City of Greater Geelong estimated that 
TCF activity in the region supports somewhat more than this number of jobs in the 
wider community. 
TCF employment in the Geelong region has decreased in recent years as assistance 
has fallen and global pressures have increased. In the past five years, around 1150 
jobs have been lost in the sector. 
Nonetheless, the City of Greater Geelong’s overall unemployment rate declined from 
10.6 per cent in 1997-98 to 5.7 per cent in 2001-02. In the Barwon-Western district as 
a whole — which includes Geelong — there are now about 21 000 more jobs than five 
years ago. 
The submission from the City of Greater Geelong suggested that the unemployment 
problem is higher than the official figures suggest, because many of the long term 
unemployed shift onto social security and leave the workforce, and changes in income 
tests have encouraged those on welfare to accept part time employment. 
Available data, however, show that workforce participation rates in the Barwon-
Western district have decreased only slightly since 1996-97. The small reduction is 
nowhere near sufficient to explain the reduction in the unemployment rate, particularly 
as the total regional population has increased over the period. Moreover, recent trends 
identified by the City of Greater Geelong (2002) indicate a reduction in the number of 
those requiring welfare assistance: 
The Region’s buoyant labour market was further supported by Centrelink data that showed 
the number of unemployed people in the Geelong region that required financial assistance 
decreasing by 5.8% in the 12 months to 30 June 2002. 
Hence, the adverse effects of declining TCF employment in Geelong over the past few 
years must be seen in the perspective of significant employment growth in other 
industries and increased regional activity. This is not to deny, however, that even better 
results for Geelong might have been achieved if that sector had not contracted. Nor 
does it deny the often high adjustment costs imposed on displaced employees and 
their families.  
Sources: City of Greater Geelong, sub. 16, pp. 10-11 and pp. 14-17, City of Greater Geelong 2002 and 
table 4.2. 
 
     




Regional dependence is still high in some regions 
About 80 per cent and 75 per cent of TCF employment in Victoria and New South 
Wales respectively is located in Melbourne and Sydney (appendix table B.8). In 
May 2003, TCF employment outside those cities was around 6000 persons and 
5800 persons, respectively. Across Australia, more than 16 000 people work in the 
TCF sector outside the capital cities. 
Table 4.1 shows that TCF employment still accounts for more than 5 per cent of 
total manufacturing employment in many regions, although the extent of regional 
dependency on TCF activity has declined over the past 10 years.  
•  About one-third of Victoria’s regional industry is situated in Geelong, a major 
production centre for carpets, as well as the home of several large textile 
manufacturers. The Wangaratta/Wodonga region has the highest regional 
dependency on TCF in Australia. TCF firms are also major employers in 
Bendigo, Ballarat and Traralgon.  
•  In New South Wales, Albury, Tamworth, Goulburn, Unanderra and Gosford 
have substantial TCF employment.  
•  Regionally significant TCF centres in other States include the Gold Coast in 
Queensland and Devonport in Tasmania.  
Individual firms are major regional employers 
Further contraction of the TCF sector appears inevitable, possibly including closure 
of major firms or factories. Most of the large regional employers are located in 
Victoria. However, there are also major employers in regional areas of New South 
Wales and Tasmania (see box 4.5). In some regions, individual TCF firms account 
for significant proportions of regional employment. As the Tasmanian Government 
commented: ‘loss of even one key player in a regional community [such as 
Devonport] would have serious economic consequences’ (sub. PP180, p. 3). If such 
firms were to close, the consequent adjustment costs could be higher than for 
incremental adjustment, involving similar job losses, over a longer period.  
There is no firm evidence to suggest that major firms or factories in regional areas 
are necessarily any more or less likely to close than those in the cities — this will 
depend on the particular circumstances of individual firms. For example, Yakka 
indicated that if or when it contracted to a single manufacturing operation, it was 
more likely to be in Wodonga than at the Brunswick facility in Melbourne (trans., 
p. 88). Albany International commented that, if it were starting its operations from 
scratch again, it ‘would still probably end up where we are’ at Gosford, rather than 
in a major metropolitan area (trans., p. 354).      




Table 4.1  Persons employed in the TCF sector: 1991, 1996 and 2001 
 
TCF employmentb as a share of 
































   no.  no.  %  % %  %
105  Sydney  14 033  -5 400  9.3  9.0  6.4  0.8
120 Lismore,   
Tweed Heads 
415 -78  9.0  7.4 6.6  0.6
125 Coffs  Harbour  385  -200  7.3  6.7  5.1  0.4
130 Tamworth  421  206  9.1  4.4  8.8  0.6
140 Orange,   
Bathurst 
407 -303  7.9  8.6  5.1  0.6
145 Queanbeyan, 
Goulburn 
506 -81  8.9  10.0 8.4  0.6
155 Albury  364  55  11.7  5.8  5.9  0.8
205  Melbourne  22 416  -8 346  13.8  12.8  9.1  1.5
210 Geelong  2  194  -541  17.3  16.6  13.5  2.2
220 Ballarat  556  -192  11.5  9.8  6.6  1.0
235 Bendigo  748  -234  15.7  11.1  7.9  1.1
245 Wodonga, 
Wangaratta 
977 -79  21.4  16.5  14.5  2.3
255 Traralgon  410  -258  12.0  11.3  6.3  0.7
305 Brisbane  4  498  19  6.3  5.6  5.0  0.6
310 Coolangatta, 
Surfers 
2 002  -8  9.8  8.6  7.0  0.7
405  Adelaide  3 414  -1 015  8.2  6.5  4.8  0.7
505 Perth  3  317  47  4.9  5.4  5.0  0.5
605 Hobart  616  -41  8.0  8.4  8.2  0.8
620 Burnie, 
Devonport 
459 -53  7.7  8.5 8.2  1.2
705 Darwin  123  35  4.4  4.3  4.5  0.2
805 Canberra  221  23  3.8  4.0  4.0  0.1
Total  Australia  64 565  -17 482  9.4  8.5  6.4  0.8
a A statistical division is listed if it relates to a capital city, or TCF employment in 2001 exceeded 250 and the 
TCF share of total manufacturing employment exceeded 5 per cent. b TCF covers all industries within 
ANZSIC code 22. c Not strictly comparable with data for 1996 and 2001 — TCF covers all industries in ASIC 
codes 23, 24 and 345. 
Source: Estimates based on unpublished ABS Population Census data.     





Box 4.5  Examples of employment by individual firms in regional areas  
Firm        Activity       Region    Employment  (no.) 
Victoria 
Australian Defence Apparel     Clothing                 Bendigo       160 
Australian  Country  Spinners   Knitting  yarns     Wangaratta    250 
Bruck  Textiles       Textiles       Wangaratta    482 
Hilton  Fabrics      Fabric  dyeing  and  finishing  Ballarat     80 
Oliver  Footwear      Footwear  mfg     Ballarat     80 
Godfrey  Hirst      Carpet  mfg      Geelong   700 
Godfrey  Hirst      Carpet  mfg      Benalla     140 
Huyck  Australia      Disposable  clothing    Geelong   186 
Brintons  Carpets      Carpet  mfg      Geelong   170 
Yakka        Clothing       Wodonga    109 
Victoria  Carpets      Wool  spinning     Castlemaine    100 
Victoria  Carpets      Carpet  mfg      Bendigo     100 
Creswick Woollen Mills      Spinning and weaving    Creswick      50 
New South Wales 
Macquarie  Textiles     Woollen  fabrics     Albury     320 
Geofabrics         Technical  textiles   Albury     60 
Kimberly  Clark      Technical  Textiles    Albury     56 
Albany  International     Engineered  textile  products  Gosford     320 
Pacific  Brands      Clothing       Unanderra    220 
Tasmania 
Ulster  Tascot      Carpet  mfg      Devonport    220 
Australian Weaving Mills     Towels and manchester    Devonport      250 
James  Nelson      Woven  fabrics     Launceston    88 
Waverley Woollen Mills      Woollen products      Launceston      80 
Sources: Visit notes, submissions, direct contacts. 
 
 
Regional growth and employment has been strong 
The costs imposed on individuals, their families and regional communities from 
loss of TCF activity and employment will be mitigated where regions are growing     




strongly and have capacity to provide alternative employment to displaced 
employees. Indeed, in many regions, regional unemployment rates have fallen, 
while workforce participation rates have been maintained, despite losses in TCF 
employment (see table 4.2 and box 4.4). Similarly, in providing a metropolitan 
perspective, Moreland City Council noted that ‘we are likely to see a net loss of 
TCFL businesses and jobs … [but] new business and employment opportunities are 
also likely’ (sub. PP119, p. 29). 
Of course, aggregate labour force and employment statistics do not tell the whole 
story. For example, the Victorian Government reported on a study it commissioned 
from the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) on 
structural unemployment associated with decreased TCF employment. The 
Government stated that the study: 
… illustrates that structural unemployment has increased significantly in areas that 
have suffered TCF job losses (even in areas that have experienced overall employment 
growth), thus creating social and economic inequities not apparent when analysing 
macro statistics … (sub. 78, p. 12) 
Although the full results and methodology of this study were not provided to the 
Commission, this broad conclusion is not surprising given the characteristics of the 
TCF workforce discussed above. As noted, those characteristics suggest that 
adjustment costs for displaced TCF workers are often likely to be higher than for 
those displaced from other sectors. And it is unarguable that an increase in 
structural unemployment associated with TCF job loss is likely to increase 
adjustment costs in the regions concerned. However, this does not undermine the 
obvious conclusion that regional responses to declines in TCF activity will be easier 
where there is strong regional growth. Those responses also need to be seen in the 
context of the overall significance of TCF activity to regional economies — in only 
two ABS statistical divisions does TCF employment account for more than two per 
cent of total regional employment, 2.3 per cent for Wodonga/Wangaratta and 2.2 
per cent for Geelong (table 4.1). 
Some people find employment in neighbouring regions 
Regional adjustment costs can be reduced if displaced employees find jobs in 
neighbouring centres. This is more likely for workers in regions adjacent to major 
metropolitan centres. For example, 2001 population census data show that almost 
25 per cent of employed persons residing in Geelong worked outside the Geelong 
region, about half of those in Melbourne (Geelong 2002). Similarly, some people 
living in Wangaratta work in Albury/Wodonga, and vice versa, and some in 
Wollongong and Newcastle commute to Sydney.     




Table 4.2  Regional employment, unemployment and workforce 
participation 



































% % %  %
Sydney  2  095.2  200.6 6.2 5.6  64.3  65.0
Hunter  264.3 36.5 12.9  7.0 59.4  58.0
Illawarra and South 
Eastern 
259.8 12.4 10.4  7.6 59.9  60.6
Richmond-Tweed and 
Mid-North Coast 
184.2 43.8 16.5  6.7 50.1  54.3
Northern, Far West-
North Western and 
Central West 
215.9 3.8 5.4 6.2  61.9  61.5
Murray-Murrumbidgee 132.7  14.2 9.7 6.0  62.1  66.2
Melbourne  1  769.3  180.0 8.6 6.1  65.0  64.0
Barwon-Western 
District 
166.3 17.1 13.2  6.0 63.0  61.6
Central Highlands-
Wimmera 
85.3  -4.4 10.9  6.1 62.8  58.9
Loddon-Mallee  141.2  36.1 8.8 4.9  56.8  67.9
Goulburn-Ovens-
Murray 
121.9 -1.1  6.4 2.9a 62.3  61.9
All  Gippsland  106.3 33.9 11.5  6.6 56.9  61.3
Brisbane  857.8  119.2 8.6 6.2  66.0  66.3
South and East 
Moreton 
203.3  40.1 9.8 6.9  64.2  65.4
North and West 
Moreton 
136.9 26.7 11.8  7.7 61.2  59.2
Adelaide  530.4  150.3 10.1  6.6 61.0  62.0
Perth  714.0  73.7 7.2 5.9  65.9  65.3
Greater Hobart-
Southern 
101.6 7.4  11.0 6.9  59.7  59.4
Mersey-Lyell  42.6  -0.7 11.8  9.8 58.0  53.7
       
a Relative standard error greater than 25 per cent. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey datacubes r1 and RM1. 
The scope for such job relocation depends on whether job opportunities in 
neighbouring regions are suitable for displaced TCF workers. Given the contraction 
in TCF employment generally, TCF jobs may also be scarce in neighbouring 
regions, even in the capital cities. And, as noted above, the ability of many current 
TCF workers to find work in other industries may be limited. Nevertheless, inter-    




regional linkages are still likely to play some role in reducing the impact of TCF job 
loss on regional economies and communities. 
Existing regional programs can help ease adjustment costs 
A number of Commonwealth and State programs provide assistance to regions 
experiencing adjustment problems. For example, at the Commonwealth level, 
regions can receive assistance through the Regional Partnerships arrangements, 
incorporating the previous Regional Assistance Program. One of the objectives of 
Regional Partnerships is to ‘assist in structural adjustment by investing in projects 
that assist specifically identified communities and regions adjust to major economic, 
social or environmental change’ (http://www.regionalpartnerships.gov.au/). Thus, if 
the need arises, this program should be available to help regions experiencing 
problems arising from adjustment in the TCF sector. 
Although a generally available assistance measure, rather than a TCF specific 
regional adjustment program, the Regional Assistance Program received specific 
supplementation of $22.3 million through the post 2000 TCF assistance package. It 
is unclear how much of this money has been spent in assisting ‘TCF dependent 
communities’. 
4.5 Recent  experiences 
Case study material about the experiences of individual TCF workers, their families 
and regions, can be helpful in illustrating the extent to which the workforce and 
regional characteristics described in preceding sections affect adjustment capacity in 
practice. Interpreted carefully, it is useful input for future policy development. 
However, up to date and comprehensive case study information is scarce.  
Many participants drew on a study undertaken during the 1990s by Webber and 
Weller into the experience of around 600 displaced TCF workers (see box 4.6). In 
particular, many quoted the conclusion that one third of displaced TCF workers ‘did 
not work again’.  
However, since that study was completed in 1997, the Australian economy has 
improved significantly and considerable structural change has occurred in the TCF 
sector. Thus, the study may not be representative of recent adjustment experience, 
nor indicative of likely future outcomes. According to DEWR, the number of 
retrenched workers in the TCF sector declined from 17 700 in the three years to 
1997 to 8600 in the three years to June 2001. Furthermore, although results can be 
skewed by lumpiness in retrenchments, it appears that the re-employment prospects     




for retrenched workers in TCF improved markedly in the three years to 2001 
compared with the three years to 1997: 
Around 79.1 per cent of TCF workers who had become retrenched in the three years to 
June 2001 had found alternative employment by the time the survey was undertaken in 
July 2001. This is substantially higher than the 47.5 per cent of TCF workers who had 
found alternative employment after becoming retrenched in the three years to June 
1997 and higher than the proportion of workers in all industries who had found 
alternative employment by July 2001 after becoming retrenched in the previous three 
years (67.2 per cent). (sub. 84, p. 11–12) 
 
Box 4.6  ‘Refashioning the rag trade’ 
A recent book by Webber and Weller (2001) includes information about a longitudinal 
study of 605 workers retrenched from the TCF sector, mostly during late 1992 and 
early 1993.  
The study indicates that: 
About one third of the workers found a secure new job of similar or better status and 
conditions to their TCF job, about a third were relegated to insecure, intermittent 
employment, and the other third did not work again after retrenchment. (p. 7) 
The results of the study were often quoted by participants to illustrate the magnitude, 
and continuing nature of, the adjustment costs faced by individuals who lose 
employment in the TCF sector. 
However, caution is necessary in seeking to generalise the results to today’s situation: 
•  retrenched workers were followed only to April 1997; 
•  since then, general economic conditions have improved, with unemployment 
generally lower; 
•  TCF workforce characteristics have changed, with relatively more concentration on 
more highly skilled activity; 
•  regional dependence has reduced substantially; and 
•  general unemployment assistance has been overhauled. 
Today, a higher proportion of displaced employees may well find alternative 
employment in a more ‘reasonable’ timeframe (see text, and box 9.2). 
 
 
In contending that the re-employment prospects for displaced TCF workers 
continue to be limited, the TCFUA disputed the validity of this data: 
Despite all evidence to the contrary the DEWR statistics suggest that in the three years 
up to 2001 the rate of re-employment of TCF workers leapfrogged the rate of re-
employment of general manufacturing workers … The DEWR statistics would be more 
realistic if TCF employment was booming and displaced workers could find new 
employment in other TCF companies (where their specific skills are easily     




transferable). However, this ‘result’ has occurred at a time when the TCF sector has 
continued to substantially contract in relation to general manufacturing and therefore 
the statistics are anomalous. (sub. PP154, p. 15) 
ABS labour force survey data suggest, however, that employment for the sector as a 
whole remained relatively constant over the period in question (88 000 in February 
1998 and 90 000 in May 2001). During that period, employment rose as high as 
93 000 (November 1998 and May 2000) and fell as low as 76 000 (August 1999). 
Together with the job mobility data set out in appendix tables B23–B28, these data 
suggest that there was both considerable job turnover and considerable job 
opportunity within the sector over that period. In the context of a stronger 
Australian economy compared with the earlier three year period to 1997, the DEWR 
retrenchment data are not inconsistent with that hypothesis.  
However, the stronger re-employment record during the three year period to 2001 
may not be indicative of the future. Employment in the sector has since declined 
sharply to about 68 000 persons. 
At a more individual level, the TCFUA presented a number of brief case studies 
about the experiences of some workers who had been displaced from the sector (see 
box 4.7). Although most had found further work, this was usually after a delay and 
it was sometimes part time or casual. Another common theme in those case studies 
was that many displaced workers had missed out on some or all of their 
employment entitlements (such as pay, annual leave, long service leave, 
superannuation, redundancy — see chapter 10). 
The TCFUA went on to argue that appropriate help to workers, provided in a timely 
manner, can ameliorate some of the adverse effects of job displacement. It cited the 
example of employee retrenchments at Bradmill-Undare, where over half of the 
workers who participated in a company-specific program had found new jobs within 
6 months of being retrenched (box 9.2).  
Yakka commented on the experience of its workers displaced by plant closures in 
recent years. Although indicating that some special circumstances applied, it said 
that in regard to its closure at Wangaratta: 
… the track record on the number of people who actually got re-employed in the region 
post the closure was particularly good … I’d suggest that 60 to 70 per cent of them had 
been re-employed in some capacity in the area within … 12 months … (trans., p. 80) 
The company also provided survey information on some 68 workers who had been 
displaced from its Shepparton site in early 2003. Of the 38 workers responding to 
the survey (conducted in July 2003), 33 indicated that they had sought work, with 
29 obtaining new jobs. For some the wages and conditions were considered to be     




better and for others, worse. The vast majority of jobs were in the Greater 
Shepparton area. Depending on the assumptions made about the experience of those 
who did not respond to the survey, the possible range of success in finding 
alternative employment ranges between about 40 and 90 per cent. 
 
Box 4.7  Information provided by the TCFUA about the experiences of 




































No  No  Yes, after 18 
months, at a 
lower wage 
Milica Ludas  48  Maison de 
Couture 







  No    Yes, part time 
George 
Sammut 






35 John  Redpath 
Fabrics 
10  Yes, after  
 a fight 
 Yes 
Lindsay Cook  53  Classweave  160    Hardship  No 
Maurice 
Ruffles 






 Yes,  through 
GEERS 
 Yes 
June Ambler  37  Surefit  30  No    Yes, part time 






Minh Nguyen  50  Sleepmaster        Yes, short 
term casual 
work 
Source: TCFUA, sub. 33.  
 
     




4.6  Quantifying regional adjustment costs from further 
assistance reductions 
Modelling commissioned for this inquiry by the Commission, as well as modelling 
work undertaken for participants, has attempted to measure some of the regional 
effects of assistance reductions (see chapter 6 for a discussion of economy-wide 
effects and appendix E for more detail).  
While there are differences between the models in terms of the projected 
magnitudes of the economy-wide and regional impacts, in all models those impacts 
are generally very small. This confirms what could be expected given the relatively 
small contribution of TCF activity both to the overall economy and to most regional 
economies, and the fact that TCF assistance levels are now much lower than in the 
past.  
Specifically, the modelling suggests that, under an assumption of fixed aggregate 
employment in the economy overall, reducing TCF assistance would lead to a small 
net loss in production and in overall employment in Victoria, an almost neutral 
effect on New South Wales, and minor gains in the other States and the Territories. 
At the statistical division level, the projected effects are not much larger. For 
example, the MONASH modelling undertaken for the Commission by the Centre of 
Policy Studies indicated that even in the Barwon region — which includes Geelong 
— removing the TCF sector’s special assistance treatment would reduce total 
regional employment by just 0.03 per cent (appendix figure E4). 
Projections were also made by the Centre of Policy Studies under an assumption of 
‘short-run sticky wages’ — this allows for a short term decline in total employment 
consequent on a cut in TCF assistance. Here, the projected regional employment 
effects are larger in the short term, but still small at the economy-wide level in both 
the short and long term. While most States are projected to suffer employment loss 
in the short term, only in Victoria is the loss carried into the long term.  
Many participants also referred to a modelling study commissioned by the Victorian 
Government from the NIEIR (sub. PP173). A projection commonly quoted, both in 
submissions and in media reports, was that ‘it [is] estimated that the implementation 
of the PC’s preferred option would lead to the loss of 6300 TCF jobs, and 19 600 
direct and indirect jobs in Victoria’ (Victorian Government submission, sub. 173, 
pp. 4–5). This claim is difficult to evaluate, as the full methodology and results of 
this work were not provided to the Commission. However, it appears not to tell the 
whole story: 
•  The projections incorporate effects arising from the already legislated 2005 tariff 
cuts. When adjusted for this, the projected job loss from the post 2005 assistance     




reduction options considered by the Commission, decline to about 4000 TCF 
jobs and 12 000 associated jobs — figures quite consistent with projections from 
the other models. Indeed, the 4000 figure is very similar to the decline in 
Victorian TCF employment implicit in the Econtech projections for reductions in 
tariffs to five per cent and removal of SIP assistance. 
•  No industry results from the NIEIR work other than for the TCF sector were 
reported to the Commission. Yet there would be benefits to Victorian industries 
and consumers from more efficient resource allocation and price reductions 
consequent on lower TCF assistance. In the other models, the resulting growth in 
output and employment in other industries largely offsets reduced activity and 
employment in the TCF sector. For example, Victorian Government projections 
using the MONASH model indicate a negative impact on Victorian GSP (gross 
state product) of just 0.02 per cent compared to the NIEIR result of 0.6 per cent 
— strongly suggesting that the NIEIR does not incorporate positive feedbacks 
for non-TCF industries and for consumers.  
None of the modelling, however, includes several categories of adjustment cost 
listed in box 4.2. Nor does it include any of the extra costs likely to arise from 
lumpy rather than smooth adjustment, and the associated flow-ons to other 
activities. Generally, firms anticipated closure of entire sections of their activity, 
rather than only changes at the margin. For example, J. Robins (a footwear 
manufacturer) suggested that its total employment might need to be reduced by 
between 25 and 35 per cent following the legislated 2005 tariff reduction: 
It is extremely difficult to forecast the effect of the legislated tariff drop of 5% in 2005 
on total employee numbers. Factors such as our exchange rate can have such a major 
effect either way. However, considering the margin pressure (and ensuing profitability) 
that most TCF companies are under, our estimate based on current trends, is that we 
will need to reduce employment by between 25 and 35%. (sub. 34, p. 4) 
Yakka noted that if, following further tariff reductions post 2005, it cannot continue 
to support the local fabric industry to the extent it does now, there could be: 
… severe consequences for local fabric mills … YAKKA owned companies are major 
customers for Bradmill, Bruck and Macquarie, and if they cease buying from them, and 
import fully made up garments, these fabric mills will be hard pressed to retain critical 
mass. (sub. 31, p. 5) 
For reasons such as these, the regional effects of future assistance reductions are 
almost certainly underestimated by modelling designed to look at the effects of 
policy changes on the economy as a whole. 
Accordingly, regionally based modelling projections of the effects of TCF job loss, 
such as those submitted by the Wangaratta City Council and some other Victorian 
local government bodies, can provide a useful further perspective (box 4.8). Though     




the multiplier techniques used have limitations (appendix E), the results add weight 
to the conclusion that TCF job losses consequent on assistance reductions could 
have sizeable flow-on consequences for particular communities.  
 
Box 4.8  Regional modelling results — Wangaratta 
The City of Wangaratta (sub. 46, pp. 7–9) commissioned the La Trobe University’s 
Centre for Sustainable Regional Communities (CSRC) to model the impacts of job 
losses on the Wangaratta region. 
This modelling suggests that for every 100 manufacturing jobs lost in Wangaratta 
another 123 persons would lose their jobs. Output would decrease by $31.45 million 
and household income by $6.28 million. 
More specific information about TCF jobs was provided in a subsequent submission by 
the CSRC (sub. PP149). It presented results for a range of scenarios, that included 
some allowance for the possibly beneficial effects for other regional industries of TCF 
assistance reductions. For a TCF job loss of 100 persons, the projected impacts were 
a $20–24 million loss of regional output and a total employment loss ranging from 165 
to 200 persons. Of course, the base employment loss of 100 persons is arbitrary. 
Different bases could be chosen — for example, the loss of 79 TCF jobs for 




4.7  Lessons for the future 
Further change is inevitable in the TCF sector, with continued contraction in 
employment, regardless of future assistance arrangements. The existing workforce 
(including outworkers) is vulnerable to involuntary displacement, with regional 
concentration potentially adding to adjustment difficulties in some situations.  
Current policy was framed with a recognition of the costs imposed by adjustment. It 
aims to cushion the adjustment burden by providing a pause in tariff reductions until 
2005, as well as providing assistance through SIP to enhance the sector’s capacity 
to compete in a more open market after 2005.  
Future assistance policy should not try to stop adjustment. But it needs to continue 
to encourage transition and cushion the adjustment process. Hence, the Commission 
has placed adjustment issues at the forefront in formulating its post 2005 assistance 
options. It has also investigated changes to broader policy settings and industry self-
help measures which could further facilitate non-disruptive adjustment (see chapters 
10 and 11).     




•  Adjustment for workers displaced from the TCF sector, in cities as well as in 
regions, may be difficult: 
•  Educational attainment is often limited and skill levels are frequently basic 
and sector-specific. 
•  The predominance of female employees and low English language 
proficiency further reduce labour mobility and therefore re-employment 
opportunities. 
•  Many small and medium sized businesses have had a history of being unable 
or unwilling to pay employee entitlements in the event of closure. 
•  The prevalence of ‘at-risk’ firms increases the possibility of lumpy 
adjustments to an external shock. 
•  The costs of adjustment for displaced outworkers can be higher than for factory-
based employees. 
•  Regional dependence on TCF activity has declined significantly over the past 10 
years and overall growth in regional activity and employment has generally 
been strong. Nevertheless, dependence on TCF activity is still high in a few 
regions. 
•  The long term effects of changes in TCF activity on regions depend on the 
interplay of several factors, including: 
•  the degree of dependence on TCF activity in those regions; 
•  the prospects of individual TCF firms; 
•  the strength of overall regional growth and employment; and 
•  job opportunities available in neighbouring regions. 
•  If the need arises, general measures such as the Regional Partnership 
arrangements are available to help regions experiencing problems from 
adjustment in the TCF sector.  
FINDINGS ON ADJUSTING TO CHANGE     





5  Current assistance arrangements 
5.1  The Government’s policy objectives 
The terms of reference for this inquiry spell out the Government’s desire to: 
•  encourage the TCF sector to adjust into activities where it will be internationally 
competitive with lower levels of government assistance; and 
•  improve the overall performance of the Australian economy. 
These objectives are consistent with the broad policy guidelines set out in the 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 which focus the Commission’s attention on 
improving the wellbeing of the community as a whole. In pursuing this goal, the 
Commission needs to have regard not only to economic impacts, but also to a wide 
range of social, regional and environmental impacts that can follow from policy 
change. 
5.2  Key elements of the current arrangements 
The TCF sector has historically benefited from very high levels of government 
support. Tariffs have been used to protect the sector from import competition since 
1908 and, for much of this period, were progressively raised to compensate for the 
sector’s declining international competitiveness. While there has been considerable 
dispersion in tariff rates across the sector, tariffs on particular products have been as 
high as 125 per cent. In addition, the sector was previously shielded by a range of 
non-tariff barriers (such as quotas and import licences) and has received substantial 
budgetary support in the form of production bounties and a range of ‘targeted’ 
assistance programs. 
Since the late 1980s, however, Australian governments have pursued the goal of 
enhancing the ability of the TCF sector to compete with lower levels of assistance. 
This goal has also underpinned the policy of general tariff reductions elsewhere in 
the manufacturing sector. 
An initial step was the introduction of the TCF industry plan in 1987 which 
provided for a systematic reduction in tariffs. This plan was modified by the 1991     




industry statement which led to the termination of quotas in 1993 and an accelerated 
timetable for tariff reductions down to a maximum of 25 per cent by 2000. 
Under current arrangements, TCF tariff reductions were paused from 2000 to 
January 2005. Other measures include: the Strategic Investment Program (SIP) — a 
transitional assistance measure designed to improve competitiveness by promoting 
investment and innovation; and extension of previous arrangements to encourage 
overseas assembly of Australian produced fabrics and leather (the Expanded 
Overseas Assembly Provisions Scheme — EOAP). These arrangements are 
summarised below, with details given in appendix C. 
Tariffs 
Different tariff rates currently apply across the range of TCF imports:  
•  25 per cent for apparel and certain finished textiles; 
•  15 per cent for cotton sheeting, woven fabrics, carpets and footwear; 
•  10 per cent for sleeping bags, table linen, tea towels and footwear parts; and 
•  5 per cent for textile yarns, sewing threads and finished leather. 
Some other commodities, such as unprocessed wool, can be imported free of duty, 
although quarantine restrictions apply. 
Under amendments made in 1999 to the Customs Tariff Act 1995, items at 25 per 
cent will be reduced to 17.5 per cent from January 2005, those at 15 per cent to 10 
per cent and those at 10 per cent to 7.5 per cent. Those items currently at 5 per cent 
or less will not change. 
Tariffs do not apply to imports from some countries, including New Zealand under 
the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement, least developed countries (since 1 
July 2003), and East Timor. However, imports from major developing country TCF 
producers such as China, Indonesia and India are dutiable at the applicable general 
rate. Some TCF imports are allowed concessional entry under policy by-laws or the 
general Tariff Concession System irrespective of their country of origin. 
Revenue from TCF tariffs totalled around $950 million in 2001-02. This was about 
26 per cent of total tariff revenue for that year, or about 0.6 per cent of total 
Commonwealth revenue.     





Strategic Investment Program 
The SIP applies to the financial years from 2000-01 to 2004-05, with two ‘pre-
program’ years, 1998-99 and 1999-00. Funding is capped at $678 million for the 
life of the program.  
The program is open to all entities undertaking eligible TCF manufacturing and/or 
design activities in Australia, subject to a minimum spending threshold on eligible 
activities of $200 000, which can be accumulated over more than one year. 
Five types of grants are available: 
•  Type 1: grants for investment in new equipment, associated buildings or 
alterations and for environmental upgrading (up to 20 per cent of eligible 
expenditure); 
•  Type 2: grants for research and development, including innovative product 
development (up to 45 per cent of eligible expenditure); 
•  Type 3: value added grants limited to (and conditional on) the amount received 
under Types 1, 2 and 4 grants. The maximum Type 3 grant payable is capped at 
5 per cent of a firm’s TCF value added in the year of the claim or the total 
amount received under Types 1, 2 and 4, whichever is the lesser; 
•  Type 4: grants for purchases of state-of-the-art second hand plant and equipment 
as part of restructuring by firms operating in ‘TCF dependent communities’ (up 
to 20 per cent of eligible expenditure); and 
•  Type 5: special miscellaneous grants for ancillary activities relating to 
restructuring initiatives by firms operating in ‘TCF dependent communities’ (up 
to 20 per cent of eligible expenditure). 
To minimise the risk of action against TCF firms under WTO rules, assistance to 
individual firms in any one year is capped at 5 per cent of their annual sales (see 
appendix C). Also, the SIP legislation makes provision for annual downward 
‘modulation’ of grants to keep expenditures within the funding cap, but this has not 
been applied to date. Types 1, 2 and 3 grants are administered by AusIndustry, 
while Type 4 and 5 grants require Ministerial approval. 
Appeals related to SIP claims can be made to AusIndustry. Decisions not to register 
a firm as eligible to participate in the program, not to pay a claim, or to reduce 
payment for specific claims can also be appealed through the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (AAT). In 2000-01, 16 decisions on registration and claim 
assessments were appealed to the AAT. However, in the following year, only 2 
decisions — both on claim assessments — were appealed (information supplied by 
DITR).     




In 2000-01, $130 million was paid through the SIP (including some $27 million in 
respect of the pre-program years) and around $100 million has so far been paid for 
2001-02 (see table 5.1). (Final figures for both program years will depend on the 
outcome of current appeals.) To date, Type 1 and 2 grants have accounted for 60 per 
cent of SIP payments and Type 3 grants nearly all the rest. (Type 4 and 5 grants in 
total have accounted for less than 2 per cent of payments so far.) 
By number, only 5 per cent of TCF companies have so far received support from 
the SIP. However, those firms receiving SIP funding in 2000-01 accounted for 
around three-quarters of the TCF sector’s value-added and two-thirds of its 
employment (Information supplied by AusIndustry). 
 




Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4  Type 5  Total
2000-01  28 251  27 737  45 797a  500  1 263  103 549b
2001-02   22 272  34 456  42 148  73  28  98 977
a The Type 3 payment figure for 2000-01 includes the payments approved in the two pre-program years. b In 
addition, some $27 million was paid in respect of the two pre-program years for eligible Type 1 spending. 
Source: Information supplied by DITR. 
Expanded Overseas Assembly Provisions Scheme (EOAP) 
This program is intended to encourage the use of Australian fabrics and leather by 
clothing and footwear manufacturers in low-wage developing countries while 
retaining the higher value added and skilled activities involved in the production of 
those inputs in Australia. Under the EOAP (scheduled to expire in 2005), footwear 
and garments assembled overseas from predominantly Australian fabric and/or 
leather can be imported into Australia with duty payable only on the cost of 
overseas processing and content. To use the EOAP, the exporter of the fabric or 
leather is required to be the importer of the assembled goods. There has only been 
limited use of the EOAP in recent years. 
5.3  How do existing arrangements measure up? 
The TCF sector has for many years received more generous assistance than the rest 
of manufacturing. This continues to be the case under the current assistance 
arrangements. Such high assistance partly reflects the traditional role of the sector     





as a provider of a large number of jobs requiring only basic skills. The significance 
of the sector in some regional locations has also played a role. As most of the 
assistance now provided to the TCF sector comes in the form of tariffs and the SIP, 
the following discussion focuses on these measures. 
The objective of the assistance package is appropriate 
The Commission considers that the broad objective of the current TCF assistance 
package — namely, encouraging the TCF sector to adjust into activities where it 
will be internationally competitive with lower levels of government assistance — is 
appropriate. As the sector itself acknowledges, the high levels of assistance 
provided in the past served to create an inward-looking business culture, where the 
incentives to raise productivity, improve quality, innovate and seek out new markets 
were stifled. The costs imposed by this assistance on other groups in the community 
were also very substantial. 
The current package continues the process of bringing assistance to the sector more 
into line with that accorded to other Australian industries. As well as reinforcing 
incentives for performance improvement and reducing costs for consumers and user 
industries, the tariff reductions legislated to take effect in 2005 send a powerful 
signal that the Government no longer views high tariff protection as an appropriate 
strategy for this sector. 
At the same time, the package recognises that even firms with good prospects of 
competing successfully in a low tariff environment may need some support in 
making the necessary adjustments to their operations. Hence, the SIP is aimed at 
‘promoting investment and innovation’ (Moore 1997) that will assist TCF firms to 
improve their international competitiveness during the transition process. In the 
Commission’s view, well designed budgetary assistance can be beneficial in 
assisting such a transition, as well as minimising the adjustment costs for both firms 
and their employees. 
Is the assistance package facilitating spending that will raise 
competitiveness? 
As discussed in chapter 2, there have been major changes in the structure of the 
Australian TCF sector in recent years as it has been forced to respond to global 
market pressures and declining levels of assistance at home. The restructuring 
undertaken by many firms has often necessitated new investment in plant and 
equipment, and spending on R&D. In moving to a lower tariff environment, further     




investments in these areas will often be required. This has been explicitly 
recognised in the stated objectives of the SIP. 
However, assessing how much new spending to improve competitiveness has 
actually been encouraged by the SIP in combination with the tariff pause is 
inherently difficult. This is because it requires some notion of what spending would 
have occurred had assistance not been provided, or been provided differently. 
The problem of establishing the counterfactual is particularly pertinent when 
attempting to identify impacts on sectoral outcomes. For the most part, these do not 
indicate an improvement in the sector’s international competitiveness. Since the 
commencement of the current package, aggregate investment declined in both   
2000-01 and 2001-02 (indeed, it fell by more than 20 per cent in the latter year). 
And while R&D expenditure increased by 50 per cent between 1999-00 and 2000-
01, this was from a very low base. Over this two year period, sectoral value added 
and employment have both fallen sharply (despite the tariff pause) and export 
growth has stalled. 
But the counterfactual issue is not the only problem in interpreting the sectoral data: 
•  Investment and innovation take time to plan and implement, meaning that many 
of the effects on sectoral outcomes are likely to be delayed. In addition, some 
firms may make use of SIP assistance in the later years of the program (with the 
effects of that spending appearing even later). It is also possible that the SIP will 
have a generally stronger impact on aggregate investment and R&D in the latter 
part of the program as firms become more familiar with its requirements. 
•  The aggregate sectoral data include firms with limited longer term prospects 
which (given the breathing space provided by the tariff pause) continue to 
operate but may be reducing their investment and R&D spending. This may be 
offsetting higher spending by firms that are taking advantage of the current 
arrangements to shift into more viable activities. 
•  Firm exits that improve the overall viability of the sector will nonetheless 
contribute to declines in sectoral output and employment. 
Hence, the sectoral data may in fact provide little guidance on the success of the 
package in meeting the Government’s objectives. For these reasons, assessments 
must also consider effects at the firm level. In this respect, the ‘early stage’ review 
of the SIP conducted by the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources in 
2002 (see box 5.1) concluded that: 
The experience of the Scheme to date, including the evidence of the claims process for 
the first year, does provide some confidence that the TCF sector is undertaking 
significant investment in new plant and equipment and R&D/product development. 
(DITR 2002, p. 5)     






Box 5.1  Review of the SIP by the Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources 
The Departmental review of SIP was conduced during 2002 and was based on 
interviews with 61 TCF firms representing a cross-section of geographic, size and 
activity characteristics (and nominated by the seven main industry associations), 8 TCF 
consultancy firms and the program administrator — AusIndustry. Written submissions 
also formed part of the review process. 
Among other items, the Terms of Reference for the review asked DITR to: 
•  establish whether the policy purposes of the SIP were being met; and 
•  identify what policy refinements for the Scheme, or other changes, might be 
warranted. 
In general terms, the review found that interviewees were generally satisfied that the 
aim of the program and that its focus on encouraging investment in new plant and 
equipment, and R&D/product development, was appropriate to improving international 
competitiveness in the sector. 
However, the review found that there were differing views about the effectiveness of 
the program in meeting its objectives. The major issues related to:  
•  the eligibility provisions for plant and equipment under the Type 1 grants, including 
the restriction of eligibility to new plant and equipment; 
•  the nature of innovation supported under Type 2 grants and whether this was 
consistent with the type of innovation being undertaken within the TCF sector; and 
•  administrative interpretations that were seen to be unreasonably narrow — for 
example, that the definition of innovation had been based on novelty and risk 
characteristics that were not appropriate for the TCF sector. This issue was a 
particular concern for clothing firms which participated in the review. 
The review team did not propose significant change to the SIP. This was predicated on 
the arguably narrow judgment that the review’s purpose was primarily to establish 
whether the policy aims of the program were being met. It also expressed concern that 
providing a more liberal treatment of eligible activities risked forcing the program into 
modulation and, as a consequence, spreading the available funding too thinly. 
Hence a range of suggested amendments raised by review participants were not 
pursued. These included: extending Type 1 assistance to second hand equipment; 
more liberal treatment of brand support; de-linking Type 3 value added grants from 
Type 1 and 2 grants; removing or reducing the $200 000 threshold; and moving to a 
quarterly payment basis. Instead, the review team proposed that the broad issue of re-
configuration of assistance to the TCF sector be examined by the Commission in its 
post 2005 assistance inquiry. The same sorts of suggestions have therefore been 
reiterated to the Commission (see chapter 8). 
 (Continued next page) 
     





Box 5.1  (continued) 
The review team did, however, propose a few interim changes, including provision for 
grant entitlements over the 5 per cent sales cap to be paid in a later year in some 
circumstances, and preparation and dissemination of policy and decision-making 
guidelines in relation to: acquisition of new plant and equipment; eligible expenditure 
on buildings, warehousing and distribution activities; and innovation. 
Source: DITR (2002, pp. 4–12) 
 
Similarly, many participants in this inquiry commented that the current assistance 
package, and in particular the SIP, has helped them to undertake investment, 
innovation and other activities that have increased their competitiveness (see 
box 5.2). A survey by the Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) elicited similar 
responses from member firms (see box 5.3). 
In the Commission’s view, it would be surprising if SIP support, coupled with the 
tariff pause, were not inducing firms with reasonable longer term prospects to 
undertake some additional spending activity. Both forms of assistance add to the 
financial resources available to a firm: the tariff by supporting prices and indirectly 
market share; SIP through a direct contribution to firm revenues conditional on 
having first made investments in plant and equipment, R&D or product innovation. 
But a much more difficult judgment to make is whether that additional spending has 
augmented expenditures above what firms would have done anyway in response to 
broader competitive pressures. 
Aspects of the SIP are likely to limit its effectiveness  
As discussed above, the sectoral data shed little light on the effectiveness of the 
assistance package in encouraging the sector to adjust into activities where it will be 
internationally competitive at lower levels of assistance. Other indicators of the 
package’s impact are therefore needed to determine whether the Government’s 
objectives are being met. 
 
     






Box 5.2  Participants’ views on the benefits of SIP 
Most participants held strong views that the SIP has encouraged and accelerated 
investment in plant and equipment and in R&D and innovation. Examples included: 
SIP has increased exports, stabilised employment and encouraged rapid growth in research 
and capital expenditure, leading to the development of successful niche products on world 
markets. (sub. 75, p. 2) Council of Textile and Fashion Industries of Australia (TFIA) 
SIP has been vital in securing support for continued investment in the latest technologies in 
plant and equipment, and fostering innovation in new products and processes. 
(sub. 35, p. 6) Carpet Institute of Australia 
Our real growth areas can be tracked back to SIP. Without it, we would not be doing all of 
our research and development and be able to fast-track products. With SIP, you have to be 
a doer. (sub. 75, p. 6) Australian Defence Apparel 
SIP has allowed us to develop things faster than normal and some benefits have accrued 
from bringing new capabilities to market faster. (sub.  32,  p.  7) Australian Association of 
Leather Industries 
[SIP] gave us the necessary impetus to accelerate our investment in new plant and 
equipment and in developing new products. (sub. 79, p. 4) Speciality Coatings Australia 
Some explicitly referred to the role of the SIP in supporting restructuring in the sector:  
SIP has provided necessary and crucial support to the industry during a crucial period of 
restructuring. (sub. 33, p. 30) Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia (TCFUA) 
… SIP has worked well for Bruck. It has provided the necessary encouragement to enable 
us to undertake necessary operational restructuring, new capital investment and product 
development to help us reposition our business. (sub. 55, p. 6) Bruck Textiles 
… SIP has assisted in accelerating [the] restructuring process through the acquisition of new 
plant and equipment …, new computer hardware and software for manufacturing, revision of 
our management information system with regard to production control, and encouraged an 
innovative product development strategy. (sub. 64, p. 4) James Nelson Textiles Group 
Yet others said that the SIP had facilitated access to finance: 
The first SIP payment was a clear message to the banks that the government was also 
genuinely keen to see the business succeed. The fact that the plan had 4 more years to run 
and that the business had been successful with its first application gave the banks comfort to 
consider the expansion plans. (sub. 76, p. 5) Textor 
 
One suggested indicator was that the amount actually claimed under the SIP was 
only around half the anticipated expenditure for both investment and R&D 
nominated by SIP registrants at the start of the 2000-01 program year (DITR 2002). 
This has contributed to significant underspending of the SIP funding allocation for 
the first two program years. A major part of this underspend may, of course, reflect 
the teething problems associated with bedding down a new program. However, 
advice provided to the Commission by DITR is that there remains a strong 
likelihood of an underspend of total program funds over the life of SIP despite the 
clarification of program guidelines that have emerged from the Department’s 
review and an apparently less restrictive interpretation of innovation (see below).     





Box 5.3  The Ai Group survey and the effects of the SIP 
In January 2003, the Ai Group surveyed 123 TCF firms about their views on post 2005 
assistance arrangements for the sector. A part of the survey focused specifically on the 
impact of the SIP on firm behaviour. According to the survey results, those firms 
receiving SIP funding were more likely to have: 
•  invested in new capital; 
•  engaged in product development; 
•  undertaken more R&D activity; 
•  started to export or expand exports; 
•  rationalised operations; 
•  improved supply chain control; and  
•  improved labour flexibility. 
The Ai Group commented that the results suggest that, faced with lower tariffs from 
2005, firms have adopted measures involving a mix of downsizing domestic operations 
(including staff cuts, moving production offshore and other rationalisation), and an 
increasing focus on pursuing growth strategies (including product development, new 
capital equipment, exports and more R&D). The survey found that those firms receiving 
SIP funding placed a significantly higher level of importance on technological 
improvement, R&D and investment than those firms not receiving SIP funds. 
Though these findings provide a useful perspective on the effects of the SIP, they need 
to be treated with caution. The number of firms surveyed represented less than 3 per 
cent of all TCF firms and only around 10 per cent of the sector by sales. Moreover, it is 
axiomatic that firms receiving SIP funds are more likely to invest in new capital, R&D 
and product innovation than those firms not receiving funding. Hence, cause and effect 
are difficult to establish in the survey results. 
Source: Ai Group (sub. 11, pp. 17–19). 
 
 
Lower than anticipated spending on investment and R&D does not, of course, 
constitute conclusive evidence of the package’s failure to achieve its objectives — 
although to the extent that SIP funding was based on the Government’s expectations 
of what might be achieved, it certainly raises some questions. 
However, in the Commission’s view, aspects of the SIP — intended to be an 
important motivator of change in the assistance package — may detract from its 
capacity to induce new spending that will improve firms’ international 
competitiveness. In this regard: 
•  SIP support does not depend on firms undertaking higher levels of investment 
and R&D. A portion of total support may therefore be helping to underwrite 
spending that would have occurred anyway.      





•  Claims by firms for support are assessed after investments have been made. 
Although certain definitional issues have now been clarified and guidelines 
issued, uncertainty about the likely success of claims at the time of investment 
may still discourage or delay some worthwhile spending initiatives. 
In addition, several eligibility restrictions are likely to detract from the achievement 
of the Government’s policy aims. 
Notably, while most participants supported the thrust of the program, many repeated 
the criticisms of specific aspects of its design and application put previously to the 
review conducted by DITR. Collectively, these perceived shortcomings are likely to 
reduce the attraction of the program to many firms and hence its capacity to induce 
new spending that will enhance the sector’s ability to compete internationally at 
lower levels of assistance. The main issues are discussed below. 
Targeting investment, R&D and innovation 
In seeking to encourage improved competitiveness, SIP targets investment in new 
plant and equipment, and expenditure on R&D and innovation. According to the 
Department’s review, this targeting is based on the premise that: 
… the key to sustainable and internationally competitive TCF industries in Australia 
lies in significant investment in new plant and equipment and R&D/product 
development. (DITR 2002, p. 35) [emphasis added] 
For some firms this focus is likely to be appropriate because at some stage of the 
business cycle they will need to invest in plant and equipment and/or product and 
process innovation. However, other firms might choose to enhance their efficiency 
in different ways: by improving workforce flexibility; better training and skilling of 
employees; improving linkages with suppliers and customers; changes to product 
range; better supply chain management; improved marketing and branding 
(recognising that some limited support is provided for brand development for 
‘innovative’ products under the Type 2 grant provisions); improved quality of 
production; reduction in inventories; better IT systems; efficiencies in work in 
progress; or purchase of productivity enhancing second-hand equipment. The 
emphasis on such matters will change over time and vary among firms.  
Accordingly, many participants argued that the effectiveness of the SIP would be 
improved by expanding the range of spending initiatives eligible for funding 
support. James Nelson Textiles Group, for example, requested that funding be made 
available to develop export markets. It said: 
JNTG believes a framework like the EMDG scheme could be incorporated into the SIP 
scheme to support market access initiatives within the TCF industry. (sub. 64, p. 7)     




Pacific Brands commented that support for ‘brand equity’ (or promotion) should be 
increased by incorporating such spending within the investment grant category: 
Under Type 1 arrangements investment in brand equity (pro rated according to the level 
the brand is locally produced) should also be directly encouraged with a more open, all-
media, definition of brand support than used in the limited areas of Type 2 currently. 
(sub. PP138, p. 5) 
Bruck Textiles sought funding for training initiatives. It said: 
SIP (or the appropriate subsequent program) must recognise … and provide specific 
assistance for skills development within a company. (sub. 55, p.13) 
However, as discussed in chapter 8, achieving the right balance between an 
appropriate range of eligible spending and avoiding excessive dilution of funding 
support poses major challenges in a program of this type. 
The Commission also notes that the current focus of the program on investment and 
R&D/innovation may not completely constrain the ways in which many firms use 
funding to improve their competitiveness. This is because assistance is provided 
after spending has occurred and, as noted above, does not require that such spending 
is incremental. Hence, provided firms have sufficient ‘base’ investment and 
appropriate R&D/innovative activity, they are eligible for SIP assistance which they 
are free to use in any way they choose, including spending on other initiatives to 
improve competitiveness. 
Rationalisation and restructuring 
Rationalisation (including firm exits) and restructuring may be no less important in 
helping to improve the viability of the sector than investment in plant and 
equipment, and R&D. As discussed in chapter 3, while major rationalisation and 
restructuring has occurred in the sector over the past decade or so, there still appears 
to be considerable scope for this process to continue — particularly in the capital-
intensive parts of the sector. 
However, while the SIP does provide some support for restructuring through the 
Type 4 and 5 grants for purchases of state-of-the-art second hand equipment and for 
ancillary expenditure, this support has been limited to regional areas only. 
Moreover, even here, the grants paid have been minor, accounting for less than 2 
per cent of total grant payments to date (see table 5.1).  
Many participants argued that the lack of support for restructuring in metropolitan 
areas is a major deficiency. For example, the Footwear Manufacturers’ Association 
of Australia said:     





Type 4 and 5 claims have been negligible. It appears the main reason for this is the bias 
against assisting rationalisations involving metropolitan facilities — as most footwear 
firms are located in the metropolitan area this has effectively precluded the footwear 
sector from participating in this element of the scheme. (sub. 28, p. 17) 
There were also concerns from firms operating in regional areas. Rocklea Spinning 
Mills, for example, stated: 
The Type 4/5 (ie Regional Adjustment) Grants have not achieved their stated 
objectives. The assistance provided should be required to meet the original policy intent 
(as discussed with Minister Moore when it was first introduced). (sub. 44. p, 9) 
Similarly, Austanners said that the Type 4 and 5 grant provisions were not fulfilling 
their original intention and that this resulted in a claim to consolidate a number of 
production facilities on the one regional site being rejected: 
Due to a change from what we had been led to expect as to the interpretation of the SIP 
arrangements this world scale investment [a greenfields site] was not treated as eligible 
for assistance under the regional component of the scheme. (sub. 73, p. 8) 
The Department’s review noted that expanding the coverage of Type 4 and 5 grants 
to provide generalised support for purchases of second hand equipment would dilute 
the current emphasis of the scheme on investment in new plant and equipment, 
R&D and product innovation. It did, however, suggest that such a change be 
examined in the Commission’s post 2005 assistance review. 
As discussed in chapter 8, the Commission sees a good case for generalising the 
current Type 4 and 5 grants — not only to remove the current discrimination against 
firms operating in metropolitan areas, but also because of the more general role that 
purchases of state-of-the-art second hand equipment can play in boosting firms’ 
international competitiveness. 
The scope of innovation 
The interpretation of what constituted innovation under the SIP proved a particular 
problem in the first program year. This issue, however, appears to have been 
resolved for many claimants through the clarification of program guidelines 
regarding innovation that have resulted from the Department’s review and the 
growing case history and precedents establishing what activities qualify as being 
innovative under the program. 
A number of participants pointed to improvements in this aspect of the scheme. For 
example, the Carpet Institute said:     




AusIndustry’s definition of innovation (for SIP) is well understood and now working 
well — as reflected in the reduced number of appeals in the second program year. 
(sub. PP126, p. 14) 
And the City of Greater Geelong commented: 
Certainly in the first year of the program there was a great deal of confusion about this 
matter, but AusIndustry now appears to be working closely with claimants to clarify the 
nature of projects undertaken and the companies concerned have every opportunity to 
explain the nature of the innovation implemented. (sub. PP118, p. 8) 
But the clarification of the definition of innovation has not quelled concerns from 
the clothing sector about the impact of that definition on its access to SIP funding. 
In particular, many apparel firms argued that the exclusion of ‘visual innovation’ 
from Type 2 funding is discriminatory and discourages spending which would help 
to improve their international competitiveness. S&R Fashions, for example, said: 
… the exclusion of ‘visual innovation’ from such encouragement works to exclude 
fashion from the positives of this approach … (sub. 39, p. 5) 
And in recommending amendments to the definition of innovation, Pacific Brands 
commented: 
Currently the interpretation of ‘innovation’ is the critical determinant of Government 
support for the non capital intensive clothing industry. … the interpretation of 
innovation in product development focussing only on ‘non-visual’ and physical 
properties bears little relevance to the visually based clothing industries. … We contend 
that the definition of ‘innovation’ should be simplified to: ‘innovative means a new, 
improved or different product, process or characteristic that involves an appreciable 
element of novelty’. (sub. PP138, pp. 5–6) 
The company said that this was the definition of innovation used in the R&D Tax 
Concession Scheme. 
Concern was also expressed about the requirement that process improvements be 
new to the industry rather than to the firm. Some participants suggested that this 
meant that some productivity enhancing improvements, which lifted a firm’s 
performance to industry best practice, may not be eligible for support. 
A number of clothing producers went on to argue that the current definition of 
innovation is contributing to a disproportionately small share of SIP funding going 
to the clothing sector.  
As discussed in chapter 8, there is no reason why the allocation of SIP funding 
should be directly proportional to the share of activity in each of the TCF industries. 
Rather, funding should be allocated to activities where it is most likely to help firms 
become internationally competitive. In this context, TCF Services said that there is     





little point providing SIP support for activities which are unlikely to survive in 
Australia (sub. PP174, p. 12). At the same time, it is important that potentially 
viable clothing producers have a reasonable opportunity to access SIP funding. 
Changes proposed by the Commission to the SIP in chapter 8 are designed to ensure 
this is the case. 
Access to funding for small firms 
The current minimum spending threshold and high compliance costs (see below) 
can make it difficult for small firms to secure SIP funding (see box 5.4). The 
threshold is partly intended to reduce administrative costs by limiting the number of 
claimants and the likelihood of many small claims. But it also carries the 
assumption that small firms are not able to undertake significant investment or 
R&D/innovation, and that the future of the industry lies with large enterprises. As 
the Department’s review of the SIP noted, any reduction in the threshold would also 
spread available funding more thinly and therefore reduce its capacity to improve 
the competitiveness of recipient firms (DITR 2002, pp. 35–36). 
Yet, just as there are many ways in which firms can improve their competitiveness, 
small firms can be as (if not more) competitive as large firms in certain activities. 
Indeed, smallness may be one of the characteristics which contributes to innovation, 
responsiveness and success in some market areas (eg clothing design and branding). 
From this perspective, the minimum threshold may detract from the Government’s 
objectives for the sector. Again, however, getting the right balance between 
avoiding inappropriate discrimination against smaller firms, containing compliance 
costs and not spreading funding too thinly, poses challenges for program design. 
Administration and compliance costs 
The costs of administering the SIP appear to be relatively low at $1.6 million since 
2000 (information supplied by DITR), although this figure does not include the cost 
of appeals to the AAT. 
However, the complexities associated with the SIP mean that there can be high 
costs involved for firms accessing the program. A number of firms commented on 
the costs of gathering and presenting the requisite claim data and in having this 
information audited. Additionally, many have resorted to using consultants to assist 
them with SIP claims. While this presumably reflects their perceived value to firms, 
payments to consultants are often costing firms the equivalent of 10 per cent of their 
funding entitlements.      





Box 5.4  Small firms and the SIP 
Various participants suggested that the SIP discriminates unfairly against small firms. 
The TCFUA, for example, said: 
The current SIP scheme is substantially biased towards large companies. This is no surprise 
given that they were the only companies consulted during its development. The TCFUA also 
believes there is a bias in Government towards large TCF companies because they believe 
these are the only companies likely to survive the future. (sub. 33, p. 33) 
The TCF Resource Centre of Western Australia raised similar concerns by saying: 
The SIP program …. [is] against small business and nothing has changed. Small business 
does not have the amount of money to access SIP … (trans., p. 278) 
Some participants identified both the minimum spending threshold and compliance 
costs as impediments to small business access. The CSIRO — Textile and Fibre 
Technology — said the $200 000 threshold: 
… has the effect of excluding many small innovative companies that have the potential to 
drive the development of new products, processes and markets. (sub. 52, p. 8) 
Similarly, the Harold Boot Company said: 
The eligibility threshold is too high. Compliance procedures and the post investment claim 
feature are too complex for small firms.  
Addressing this [and other] criticisms would go some way towards adapting the scheme to 
meet its aim of helping innovative small firms adapt to change. (sub. PP124, p.3) 
The TFIA sought to extend SIP support to small firms but only through increasing the 
overall funding pool. It suggested: 
Consideration be given to the needs of smaller to medium-sized business operators and 
how they can be encouraged to instil activities and processes assisted by SIP without 
damaging the overall value to existing SIP clients. (sub. 75, p. 7) 
 
Such compliance costs appear high in comparison to the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Investment Program (PIIP — less than 1 per cent) and in the Export Market 
Development Grant Scheme (EMDG — 7 per cent). (See PC 2003a and Austrade 
2000.) While very low firm numbers using the PIIP scheme would help to keep 
compliance costs low, there are a large number of firms accessing the EMDG 
Scheme. 
The clarifications to guidelines flowing from the DITR review, and increasing 
familiarity with the program’s requirements over time, should lead to a reduction in 
compliance costs. However, SIP remains complex. Accordingly, the scope to reduce 
administrative and compliance costs is an issue for any successor to the SIP (see 
chapter 8).     






In terms of promoting the Government’s objectives for the TCF sector, there were a 
range of other concerns about SIP raised by participants. These included: 
•  subsidies for investment may result in (or exacerbate existing) overcapacity in 
some sectors; 
•  the exclusion of early stage processing, particularly wool processing; 
•  capping Type 3 grants and the inability to carry forward amounts which exceed 
the cap; 
•  a perceived failure to recognise the claimed special needs of regional business; 
and 
•  the absence of a link between the provision of assistance and employment 
outcomes. 
Some of these concerns are canvassed in chapter 8. 
The package is costly for others in the community 
With the substantial decline in tariffs since the late 1980s, the total cost of 
assistance to the TCF sector is now much lower than in the past. Nevertheless, costs 
imposed on consumers, user industries and taxpayers remain high. 
The Commission estimates that, if selling prices increase to the full extent permitted 
by the tariff, the total cost of TCF tariff assistance would currently be around 
$1  billion a year. It would still be around $750 million a year following the 
legislated tariff reductions in 2005. 
In practice, some of the costs of the tariff will be manifest in reductions in the 
quality of products that are available at particular market price points. Also, 
competitive pressures may well see some of the costs absorbed by overseas 
suppliers or retailers in the form of lower margins.  
Nonetheless, tariff assistance for the TCF sector adds considerably to the cost of 
purchasing one of the ‘necessities’ of life. In effect, TCF tariffs are a ‘defacto’ 
surcharge on purchases of clothing and footwear. Indeed, the tariff revenue 
collected on TCF imports adds an impost equivalent to around 50 per cent of the 
GST raised on TCF products. And this ignores the price raising effect of tariffs on 
locally manufactured items. Tariff protection also adds to the costs of industries 
such as furniture manufacturing which use TCF inputs as well as to the costs of 
those TCF firms that purchase items from other producers in the sector.     




The costs to the community of TCF assistance are increased further by taxpayer 
funding of the SIP program — some $678 million over a five year period (if 
available funding is fully expended). However, in terms of the total quantum of 
assistance provided, tariff protection is worth several times more to the sector than 
the SIP. 
An alternative way of looking at the costs imposed on the community is that tariffs 
and the SIP together provide support to the sector worth around $13 000 a year for 
each TCF worker in Australia — including the estimated 25  000 full time 
equivalent employees engaged in outwork. This is equivalent to around 35 per cent 
of average earnings across the sector. 
This support is much more generous than that provided to other Australian 
manufacturing industries. The Commission estimates that the TCF sector’s effective 
rate of assistance — a measure which aggregates all forms of assistance into a 
single measure and expresses it as a percentage of value added — is about five 
times the manufacturing sector average. 
Conclusion 
In the Commission’s view, the objective of the current assistance package — to 
assist the sector to adjust into activities where it can be internationally competitive 
with lower levels of assistance — is appropriate. 
However, as a means of giving effect to this broad objective, the current assistance 
package has shortcomings. In particular, while it appears to be encouraging some 
new spending that should raise international competitiveness, it is far from clear 
whether the overall level of induced activity has been, or will be, all that great. The 
costs imposed on others in the community by the package are also high. For these 
reasons, simply ‘rolling over’ the current assistance package after 2005 would not 
be appropriate. In the following chapters, the Commission has detailed a range of 
options for post 2005 assistance that would give better effect to the Government’s 
stated objectives for the sector. 
•  The tariff pause coupled with SIP support allows time for consolidation and 
appears to be encouraging some additional investment and R&D in parts of the 
sector that should improve international competitiveness. 
•  However, various elements of the package seem likely to limit its overall 
effectiveness. Moreover, tariffs and the SIP impose large costs on consumers, 
user industries and taxpayers. 
FINDINGS ON THE CURRENT ASSISTANCE ARRANGEMENTS      





•  Changes are therefore required so that future support for the sector will better 
contribute to the Government’s objective of encouraging the TCF sector to 
become internationally competitive at lower levels of assistance and to provide a 
better balance between this objective and the interests of consumers, taxpayers 
and the wider community.     




6  Approach to post 2005 assistance 
6.1  Views about future TCF assistance  
There were a range of views on future assistance policy 
Most participants in this inquiry represented TCF (including leather) firms, their 
industry associations, employees in the sector or particular regions in which the 
sector operates. Generally, they supported ongoing assistance for the sector (box 
6.1) in the form of tariffs and budgetary assistance. 
•  In regard to the 2005 legislated tariff reductions: 
–  Some argued that those reductions should be deferred or cancelled.  
–  But many, including some key industry associations, were prepared to accept 
them, usually with the proviso that considerable budgetary assistance should 
continue beyond 2005.  
•  In regard to post 2005 assistance: 
–  Nearly all TCF interests argued for an extended tariff pause after 2005. Some 
countenanced further tariff reductions after such a pause, sometimes 
nominating particular reduction schedules, but generally with provisos about 
improved access for exports to other countries, another review of TCF 
assistance in 2008 or later, and/or significant continued budgetary assistance.  
•  Some TCF industry participants requested the removal of tariffs on certain 
imported products, such as some footwear parts, fabrics and yarns. 
Only limited input was received from industrial users of TCF products, other sectors 
affected by TCF tariffs and consumer interests: 
•  The Furnishing Industry Association of Australia, representing a major textiles 
and leather using industry, requested ‘redress’ of the effects of the ‘furniture tax’ 
(ie TCF tariffs) on the furnishing industry (sub. 22, covering letter). However, it 
emphasised that it was not calling for TCF tariff reductions or removal 
(sub. PP125).     





Box 6.1  Illustrating the assistance requests of TCF interests 
The legislated 2005 tariff reductions: 
… tariff rates for the TCF sector remain at their current (2003) levels until such time as it is 
proven to be in the interest of Australian workers, their families and communities to reduce 
them further. That no further review of tariff levels be considered until at least 2012. (sub. 33, 
p. 6) TCFUA 
… tariff reductions have been legislated to occur after 1 January 2005, however the City will 
be actively campaigning to have this legislation repealed. (sub. 16, covering letter, p. 2) City 
of Greater Geelong 
The City of Ballarat and local industries would prefer to have the tariff freeze extended 
beyond 2005 … (sub. 14, p. 5) City of Ballarat 
We are writing to express our concern at the forthcoming reduction of the tariffs in 2005 … 
[this] will threaten the jobs of our 53 staff and may result in the closure of our factory. (sub. 8, 
p. 1) Tuffa Workwear 
Post 2005 assistance: 
… hold [footwear tariffs] at the 10% [2005] level for the future [until 2015] … any future 
reductions to be conditional upon reciprocal trade liberalisation occurring globally … a full 
review before any changes take place … (sub. PP132, pp. 6, 9) Footwear Manufacturers’ 
Association of Australia 
… the carpet tariff should be held at the 2005 levels for a period of at least 5 years, and any 
further reductions should be the subject of an Industry Tariff Review. (sub. 35, p. 6) Carpet 
Institute of Australia 
Bruck recognises that tariffs are legislated to come down again on 1 January 2005, to 17.5% 
and 10% respectively for clothing and fabrics … It is imperative … that these duty rates be 
not reduced further before 2010, at least. (sub. 55, p. 10) Bruck Textiles 
Our position on the subject of TCF import tariffs on footwear is that they should remain at the 
legislated level of 10% and that percentage to be maintained indefinitely … any proposed 
reduction in future tariff levels should be offset by commensurate increases in industry 
grants and incentives. (sub. 12, p. 1) National Footwear Retailers’ Association 
From SUTG’s perspective the preferred option is to defer any further reductions in tariffs 
[beyond the 2005 cuts] until at least 2010 pending the results of a review of international 
progress in reducing trade barriers. (sub. 71, p. 16) Standard Universal Textile Group 
… a 3 step reduction program from current garment rates of 25% down to 10% in 2015 is 
achievable with minimum economic and social disruption if accompanied by an adequate 
SIP program extending the current program in place. (sub. 50, p. 2) Berkeley Apparel 
[The TFIA accepts further] tariff adjustments in the period post 2010 … subject to a 
commitment by the relevant authorities to examination and finding [that] Australian industry 
is not faced with the inability to access markets offshore, while continuing to see their own 
domestic market share eroded … [and subject to] continuation of direct assistance … 
through the period 2005 to 2015. (sub. PP164, pp. 1,2) TFIA 
An Australian Industry Group survey of 123 TCF members, representing some 10 per cent 
of Australia’s TCF sector, indicated that some firms would be prepared to accept further tariff 
declines after 2005, but ‘contingent on a pause in tariffs until 2010 and continued 
government support for domestic TCF firms’. (sub. 11, pp. 17, 36) Australian Industry Group 
 
     




•  The National Farmers’ Federation recommended that TCF tariffs be reduced as 
originally planned in 2005 and then be rapidly eliminated by 2010 in line with 
Australia’s APEC commitments (sub.  PP104). (Membership of the NFF, the 
peak industry body representing farmers at a national level, includes producers 
of fibres such as wool and cotton, which are key inputs into the TCF industries.) 
WoolProducers, the peak body for wool producers in Australia, supported the 
NFF’s recommendations (sub.  PP103), as did Australian Wool Innovation 
(sub.  PP158) and the Victorian Farmers Federation (sub.  PP152). This latter 
organisation also called for cessation of the SIP program on 30 June 2005 as 
currently scheduled. 
•  Some importers and retailers requested the selective reduction or removal of 
tariffs on some particular products, including sporting footwear and clothing.  
There was some divergence of views between State Governments. The Victorian, 
South Australian and Tasmanian Governments opposed further tariff reductions 
until better overseas market access for Australia’s TCF producers was obtained: 
… the Victorian Government will oppose any future unilateral reduction in tariff levels 
unless progress is achieved …[in]… supporting labour market adjustment; maintaining 
a critical mass of the manufacturing base; improving export market access; providing 
incentives for increased innovation and R&D; developing a highly skilled and 
collaborative workforce; and encouraging inter-firm collaboration. (sub. 78, pp. 4, 2)  
The South Australian Government recommends the retention of 2005 level tariffs from 
2005 until at least 2010 and until real market access outcomes for TCF companies are 
achieved … acceptance of tariff reduction in 2005 is contingent upon … continued 
budgetary assistance … for at least another five years beyond 2005. (sub. 87, covering 
letter) 
The Tasmanian Government agrees with the general principle that reduced 
Commonwealth Government assistance and protection, and the promotion of 
international free trade, helps create efficient and competitive industries and businesses 
… The Tasmanian Government maintains that current tariff rates should be preserved 
at current levels until our major trading partners bring their tariff and non-tariff barriers 
into line with ours. (sub. PP180, p. 2)  
In contrast, the New South Wales Government indicated that it: 
… would support a continuation of the TCF tariff reduction policy post 2005 until such 
time as it reaches the general manufacturing tariff rate of 5 per cent … The proposed 
tariff policy would take the form of transparent, pre-announced, incremental reductions 
in the tariff level, at a rate that would be similar to the ‘effective annual percentage 
reduction’ between 2000 and 2005. (sub. PP175, p. 3) 
Support by New South Wales for tariff reductions was conditional on further 
transitional assistance for the sector, though it also suggested that such assistance     




‘should, in principle, be progressively reduced over the proposed period of the tariff 
reduction and cease within a specified timeframe’ (sub. PP175, covering letter). 
The Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources similarly supported 
the reduction of TCF tariffs to five per cent by 2015 for apparel and certain finished 
textiles and by 2010 for other TCF products (sub. PP179, p. 2). 
Many participants also commented on other assistance measures, particularly the 
Expanded Overseas Assembly Provisions Scheme (EOAP). Some called for new 
assistance measures, for example to support export market development and an 
‘outreach’ program for small and medium size enterprises. 
A variety of supporting arguments were advanced 
Those supporting continuing assistance for the sector at 2005 or higher levels 
presented many different arguments: 
•  the sector makes an important contribution to the Australian economy; 
•  many TCF firms would be unable to compete at lower assistance levels; 
•  reductions in assistance would adversely affect employees, and the cities, towns 
and regions in which they live; 
•  more time is required to adjust to existing tariff levels; 
•  previous government policies impose costs on the sector which should be 
compensated; 
•  the potential community gains from further tariff reductions would be small; 
•  the cost savings from lower tariffs would be retained by retailers rather than 
leading to lower prices for consumers; 
•  it would be unfair to the industry if Australia was to reduce its TCF tariffs while 
other countries maintain their trade barriers; 
•  unilateral reductions by Australia would squander ‘negotiating coin’ in 
international negotiations; and 
•  government revenue would be lost. 
Participants’ rationales are explored in detail below, but the following extract from 
the submission from the Council of Textile and Fashion Industries of Australia 
(TFIA) provides a summary of many of their views: 
Australia’s textiles, clothing and footwear and fashion industries are on the cusp of a 
new period of growth and development. With fair and reasonable encouragement and 
assistance, the industry is gradually redefining itself with a combination of the strengths     




from traditional operations and the opportunities arising through a modern strategic 
industry based on innovation, export success and greater efficiency … The industry 
provides substantial employment in regional and metropolitan areas, particularly for 
females. Much of the workforce is particularly difficult to redeploy in other sectors of 
the economy … Australia is now one of the most open TCF markets in the world. The 
pace of overall global reform has slowed and the use of non-tariff barriers in overseas 
markets has complicated historical comparisons of tariff rates … The two most 
important issues for the Australian industry are certainty and fairness. (sub. 75, p. 2) 
[emphasis in original] 
Many in the TCF sector believe that they would be disadvantaged by the sort of 
tariff reduction options outlined by the Commission in its Position Paper. These 
would see the sector’s special assistance treatment removed by 2015, at the latest, 
irrespective of assistance policy in other countries (chapter 7). The TFIA presented 
the results of a telephone survey of 87 of its members which, not unexpectedly, 
found that most respondents preferred the TFIA’s conditional approach to future 
assistance reductions (sub. 164, pp. 6–7). 
On the other side of the argument, some participants focused on the benefits to the 
community of reductions in TCF assistance, or the costs imposed on other industry 
sectors by continuation of that assistance. For instance, the New South Wales 
Government identified a number of benefits from tariff reduction: 
Such a [tariff reduction] policy would be desirable because it would: 
•  be in line with broad industry trends for continuing microeconomic reform policies; 
•  reduce input costs for other sectors and lead to lower costs for consumers; 
•  facilitate the growth of a TCF import/distribution industry in Australia; and 
•  signal to other countries Australia’s continuing commitment to the APEC trade 
liberalisation process. (sub. PP175, pp. 3–4) 
The NFF considered that the ‘fear of job losses’ was not a valid argument against 
tariff reductions. It pointed to the negative effect on farmers of TCF tariffs: 
Agriculture is a much larger regional employer than the TCF industries, and is hurt by 
TCF tariffs. Continued tariff reform is needed to ensure farmers remain competitive 
and can provide employment in rural and regional Australia. (sub. PP104, p. 9) 
It also rejected ‘strategic industry arguments’ for TCF support (sub. PP104, p. 9) 
and argued against the view expressed by the TCF industry and some State 
Governments that unilateral tariff reductions would not be in Australia’s best 
interests. 
Although it did not explicitly call for TCF tariff reductions, the Furnishing Industry 
Association commented on the negative impact of TCF tariffs on its industry:     




The Furniture Tax [ie TCF tariffs] is clearly having a negative impact on the 
manufacture of product in the industry and is unsustainable. The Tax is a significant 
depressant on production, employment and industry competitiveness. Local imposts 
such as the Furniture Tax can make the difference between success and failure in the 
industry. The future of the furnishing industry in Australia is dependent on the redress 
of the Tax in a manner which supports the industry’s potential to grow and become 
world competitive. (sub. 22, covering letter) 
6.2  The Commission’s response 
The policy guidelines set out in the Productivity Commission Act 1998 focus the 
Commission’s attention on improving the welfare of the community as a whole. 
Similarly, the current terms of reference indicate the Government’s desire to 
improve the overall performance of the Australian economy. In pursuing these 
objectives, the Commission must consider the wide range of social, regional, 
economic and environmental interests of the community.  
It is explicit in the terms of reference that facilitating the development of a more 
internationally competitive TCF sector in Australia is an important efficiency goal. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that assistance for TCF production, for 
example through tariffs and budgetary support, imposes costs on consumers and 
other industries — as Gilmour’s (a footwear importer and retailer) noted, ‘import 
duties are really just another tax on consumers’ (sub. 81, p. 3). Just as the benefits 
of TCF activity flow through the economy, so too do the costs of assisting that 
activity.  
These costs have two separate dimensions. First, assistance to the TCF sector 
affects the efficiency of resource use across all sectors of the economy, including 
within the TCF sector itself. Second, assistance to the TCF sector imposes costs on 
users and consumers of TCF products. The Commission’s task is to formulate 
policy options that balance competing interests to produce beneficial outcomes for 
the community as a whole. 
When considered within this framework, the arguments advanced for continuing 
special assistance treatment for the TCF sector are not persuasive. On the contrary, 
there are good reasons why the legislated 2005 tariff reductions need to go ahead 
and further tariff reductions made beyond that date. The rest of this current section 
discusses arguments for and against assistance reductions in some detail, while the 
next section (section 6.3) sets out the Commission’s approach to post 2005 
assistance.     




Assessing arguments against further assistance reductions 
The sector’s economic contribution is no justification for continuing special 
treatment 
The TFIA presented a range of information and data about the role of the TCF 
sector in the Australian economy (box 6.2). It contended that: 
The economic significance and contribution of the TCF&L industries is unique — 
whether the focus is employment, technology, design or involvement in a knowledge-
based economy. Its economic importance and strategic significance has been well 
recognised, and responded to, by Governments all around the world. (sub. 75, p. 18) 
The Commission recognises that the workforce and regional characteristics of the 
sector are somewhat different from other manufacturing (chapter 4), and that 
reductions in TCF assistance would impose costs on firms and their employees, as 
well as flow-on costs in the cities, towns and regions in which they are located. For 
this reason, the Commission has given particular weight to adjustment issues when 
evaluating future assistance strategies (see below). 
But a sector’s contribution to the economy, however important, does not itself 
justify special assistance treatment: 
•  Industries and firms in all sectors contribute to the economy. All manufacturing 
industries, for example, provide employment, produce and invest, purchase 
inputs and sell outputs. Many export. To a greater or lesser extent, all industries 
form part of vertically integrated activity. Hence, multiplier effects flow from all 
such activity.  
•  Australia should aspire to have industries that are internationally competitive 
while offering well paid jobs to skilled employees. Those parts of the TCF sector 
which can only survive with high assistance and by keeping wages low, do not 
contribute to this goal. 
•  Assistance to a particular sector, such as TCF, imposes costs on other sectors 
which reduces their economic contribution. 
There might be a case for special assistance treatment if the sector provided 
substantial benefits to other parts of the economy, for which the sector itself 
received no reward. For example, expenditure on R&D by a particular firm might 
‘spill over’ and be freely employed by other firms throughout the economy. But, 
notably, the TCF sector’s expenditure on R&D is lower than in most other 
industries. Moreover, even in the absence of SIP, the TCF sector would still have 
access to the various general programs designed to encourage investment in R&D.     




If there are deficiencies in these general programs, it is usually better to address 
them directly, than to provide compensating support to specific sectors.  
 
Box 6.2  Summary of the TFIA’s comments on the significance of the 
sector 
The TCF&L industries provide employment for nearly 80  000 people (ABS Labour 
Force Survey estimates). For every job generated in the sector, a further 2.5 to 3 jobs 
are created indirectly. 
This is of particular significance to key regional areas, such as Geelong, Bendigo, 
Devonport and Wangaratta, which are heavily reliant on employment opportunities 
created by the sector.  
As well, it employs a large number of females. TCF firms employ between 15 and 18 
per cent of females involved in manufacturing in New South Wales and Victoria.  
Industry investment is substantial (nearly $10 billion over the past decade), industry 
output was over $9 billion in 2000-01 and value added of $2.6 billion in that year 
accounted for over 3.6 per cent of total manufacturing value added. There are close 
linkages with other industries, both in manufacturing and in the services sector. 
The TFIA believes that the TCF sector contributes to the Australian economy in several 
areas that are not generally recognised. For instance, TCF firms significantly invest in 
human capital and skills formation, invest in product and process improvement, are 
adopting best practice manufacturing methods and technologies, and help to build 
Australia’s reputation as an exporter of complex manufactured products. Assistance 
from SIP and developing closer links to universities and research institutions have 
helped in this process.  
According to the TFIA, there is potential for the TCF&L industries to grow at a 
significantly faster rate in the next five to ten years. The main sources of this growth 
would be: 
•  improved productivity associated with effective use of new IT and production 
technologies; 
•  the continued development of niche demands in the Australian market; 
•  increased exports of innovative products; and 
•  further growth through demand for innovative Australian fashion designs. 
TCF&L manufacturers, by demanding high standards of cost and quality 
competitiveness from suppliers of materials, will also spur greater productivity and 
competitiveness across the wider economy. 
Source: TFIA (sub. 75, pp. 18–24). 
 
     




Tariffs and other assistance should not be used to compensate for other policies 
The Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of Australia (FMAA) sought assistance 
to ‘offset costs associated with the effects of previous policies’ such as: 
•  state based decentralisation programs causing structural inefficiencies and 
fragmenting capacity; 
•  import replacement and self sufficiency manufacturing strategies; 
•  employment intensive operations. (sub. 132, p. 4) 
Certainly, some previous assistance and other government policies may have 
caused, or helped to sustain, inefficiencies in the sector. Rather than continuing to 
provide indefinite compensation for the costs imposed, however, the sensible policy 
approach is to seek to remove the causes of distortion in a considered and timely 
manner. This is especially so when the means of compensation, such as tariff 
protection for the TCF sector, itself causes economic and equity distortions 
elsewhere in the economy. 
Trade based arguments are understandable but not compelling 
Not surprisingly, Australian producers competing with TCF imports, albeit subject 
to tariff, regard it as ‘unfair’ that they cannot gain satisfactory access to many other 
countries’ markets because of trade barriers. Many argued that further tariff 
reductions by Australia before other countries lowered their trade barriers would 
exacerbate this situation. The Australian Industry Group, for example, contended 
that there should be no reduction in Australia’s TCF import tariffs ‘until tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in overseas countries are reduced proportionately to levels that 
exist in Australia’ (sub. 11, p. 39). The ACTU indicated that it: 
… believes the TCF sector has a viable future in Australian manufacturing and is of 
continuing importance to rural and regional Australia. To secure this future it is vital 
that tariffs be paused at present levels until further Review in 2012 or such time as 
tariffs and non-tariff market access barriers in other countries are significantly reduced. 
(sub. 92, p. 1) 
The Geelong Chamber of Commerce similarly argued that: 
… to be fair to all involved, Australia should not ‘lead the march’ world-wide to reduce 
its import tariffs. The Chamber believes and strongly makes the point that Australia 
should not allow any further tariff reductions unless there is open, transparent and 
unconditional agreement and a guarantee that its trading partners will definitely do 
likewise. (sub. 62, p. 4) 
And the TFIA commented:     




… the industry is struggling to understand how the unilateral reductions in the 
Australian instance could lead to a better outcome overall if the export focused 
companies cannot obtain at least the volume of production that is lost due to the 
reduction in the Australian barrier arrangements. (sub. PP164, p. 8) 
However, there are good reasons why Australia’s assistance policies should not be 
set on the basis of ‘fairness’ nor be automatically linked to progress in trade 
liberalisation overseas. Fairness/equity is in the eye of the beholder. For example, 
Australian TCF tariffs could be regarded as unfair to those groups in the community 
that must pay higher prices for footwear, clothing and other items to support local 
producers. Also, other industries might see it as unfair that they do not get similar 
assistance.  
Moreover, the concept of fairness would be very difficult to apply in trade or 
assistance policy formation. For instance, which of the many different countries and 
assistance regimes would be chosen to trigger assistance changes in Australia? 
Would different countries or trigger levels apply to different commodities? Rules of 
thumb — such as the suggestion by the FMAA that further tariff reductions for 
footwear only occur if ‘more than 85% of world trade in footwear is subject to a 
tariff of 10%’ (sub.  PP132, p.  6) — could be used. But how would non-trade 
barriers be factored in? Such rules, if adopted by several countries, would just 
become a recipe for inaction. Multilateral negotiations in the WTO and other 
international trade organisations pursue a rules-based global trading system, 
divorced from emotive and ill-conceived sectoral notions of fair or balanced trade.  
Above all, linking Australia’s assistance policies automatically to overseas policies 
would disregard what is in Australia’s national interest. For instance, such linking 
would ignore the range of domestic considerations that have been central to 
assistance reductions for the TCF and other sectors over the past 15 years and which 
remain relevant to future assistance decisions. As discussed below, these include the 
costs imposed on consumers and other Australian industries, including exporters, by 
TCF tariffs, as well as the potential productivity stimulus from exposing the sector 
to greater international competition.  
These domestic considerations have meant that, in the past, the gains to Australia 
from trade liberalisation have come mainly from unilateral removal of protection 
rather than from the bargaining with other countries. This is likely still to be true — 
CIE modelling commissioned for this inquiry indicates that the benefits to Australia 
from unilateral TCF tariff removal would exceed the benefits it would receive from 
removal of TCF protection by either the United States, the EU or China (CIE 2003). 
Further, the gains from Australia’s own liberalisation efforts are more certain, and 
more immediate, than those dependent on liberalisation elsewhere.     




There might conceivably be some benefits from slowing or pausing assistance 
reductions in Australia if this were to increase leverage in international trade 
negotiations, or if it avoided short term damage to domestic producers which would 
be viable in the longer term with better access to overseas markets.  
Arguments about negotiating leverage were raised by several participants. For 
example, the Carpet Institute of Australia argued that: 
… further tariff reductions should only arise as a result of negotiated outcomes with our 
trading partners and where there is clear reciprocation in trade liberalisation from those 
partners. Furthermore, it would be counterproductive to reduce Australia’s TCF tariffs 
unilaterally as a result of this Review as this would eliminate our negotiating leverage 
in future trade talks. (sub. 35, p. 28) 
Similarly, Bruck Textiles contended: 
If Australia is embarking on a series of FTA negotiations, then surely it is in our 
interests to retain our global tariffs as high as possible, so that we have some 
negotiating leverage. This applies equally to the Doha Round negotiations as it does to 
individual bilaterals. (sub. 55, p. 14) 
And the Victorian Government stated: 
If Australian TCF tariffs are reduced unilaterally, and Australia’s negotiation partners 
are already able to import relatively freely, Australia will have limited leverage in 
seeking TCF tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions in future trade negotiations. 
(sub. 78, p. 5) 
However, the Australian market is small in world terms, accounting for less than 
one per cent of global TCF sales. As well, imports already have around 50 per cent 
of the domestic TCF market, and as much as 70 per cent of the clothing and 
footwear market (chapter 2). Hence, for other countries collectively, there can only 
be a very modest gain from better access to the Australian TCF market.  
Even if the potential gain for a particular country was more significant, WTO rules 
effectively prohibit countries from negotiating product specific deals limited to two 
trading partners. Also, multilateral negotiations proceed on the basis of ‘bound’ 
rather than applied rates. Australia’s bound rates for TCF tariffs are much higher 
than the rates currently applied. Were the negotiating coin argument for TCF to 
have any weight, and this is extremely doubtful, the option of negotiation on the 
basis of these higher bound rates would remain open to Australia, even if it were to 
further reduce its applied tariffs. 
Finally, it would appear that very few ‘at risk’ Australian TCF firms would have 
their future guaranteed by better access to overseas markets. Discussions with, and 
submissions from, participants provided no notable examples. Although a recent 
study conducted for the sector estimated that Australia could expect to gain     




additional exports in the range of US$50–100 million from improved market access 
in Asia (Werner 2003, p. 7), this figure is small in the context of existing sales 
levels of about $9 billion and exports of about $1 billion. This reinforces the 
conclusion that the future viability of most firms will depend on inherent features of 
their business models and sustainable competitive advantages. While improved 
overseas market access could help some firms which are already internationally 
competitive, in the Commission’s view, it is seldom likely to be a make or break 
issue for firms yet to make this transition.  
This is not to argue that Australia should in any way relax its attempts to secure 
improved overseas market access for TCF and other exporters (chapter 11). 
Internationally competitive exporters would clearly be better off if they had 
unfettered access to overseas markets. 
In summary, future Australian TCF assistance reductions should not be linked to 
improved access to overseas markets. Such an approach would have few benefits. 
And any benefits would be highly unlikely to outweigh the costs and risks involved. 
Loss of tax revenue? 
Although the purpose of TCF tariffs is to protect local activity, they raised revenue 
of some $950 million in 2001-02. Flicker’s Australia (sub. 63, p. 7) suggested that 
‘there can be no net benefit to the economy as tariff revenue lost is replaced by tax 
increases elsewhere domestically or by reduced domestic government spending’.  
TCF tariff revenue, however, makes up less than 0.6 per cent of total 
Commonwealth Government revenue. Moreover, the tariff options considered by 
the Commission (chapter 7) involve only gradual removal of tariffs at a time when 
imports are likely to continue to grow. Thus, the revenue effect from lower tariffs 
would be offset to some extent by increases in import levels.  
More importantly, the revenue generated is not, of itself, a reason for maintaining 
tariffs provided that the overall effect of tariff reductions on community welfare is 
positive (taking account of the benefits and costs arising from increases in other 
taxes or reductions in government spending to match any loss of tax revenue). The 
quantitative modelling undertaken for the Commission during this inquiry 
incorporates the net effects of changes in tariff revenue and tax mix.     




Arguments favouring further tariff reductions 
While the potential for resource allocation benefits has diminished, there are 
worthwhile long term gains 
Reductions in TCF assistance will allow some economic resources to shift into 
activities that generate higher returns for the community. But with assistance now 
much lower than in the past, and the sector shrinking, the potential for resource 
allocation gains from further tariff reductions is diminishing. Hence, the 
quantitative modelling commissioned for this inquiry — which focuses primarily on 
such resource allocation effects — not surprisingly indicates that gains from 
removing the sector’s preferred assistance treatment would be very small (box 6.3 
and appendix E). Because the static resource allocation benefits of future TCF 
assistance reductions are small, benefits and costs not encompassed in the 
modelling, together with considerations of equity, have become the primary 
consideration in policy formation. 
Assistance reductions encourage firms to become more productive and 
internationally competitive. Undoubtedly, adjusting to increased international 
competition is often hard, requiring that firms and their employees make significant 
changes. But the experience in many industries that have been through this process 
shows that the benefits can be substantial. In being forced to deal with the removal 
of their protective cushion, many firms have identified opportunities — previously 
considered unlikely or impossible — where they can compete with the best in the 
world. 
Australia’s strong and sustained growth performance of recent years has paralleled a 
broadly-based program of microeconomic reform, including the progressive 
dismantling of most trade barriers. The much greater responsiveness, innovativeness 
and flexibility now evident in many Australian firms should provide a springboard 
for sustaining strong output and employment growth in the future. It also increases 
the resilience of the economy to external shocks. 
There is nothing to suggest that these effects of assistance reduction will be less 
pronounced in the TCF sector. Indeed, earlier chapters describe changes in the 
sector which have come about in response to a wide range of global and domestic 
pressures, including domestic assistance settings. While the TCF sector as a whole 
has contracted, many firms have responded well to increased competitive pressure 
by reducing costs, improving productivity, developing innovative products, and 
improving customer service and links to suppliers.      





Box 6.3  Modelling the effects of TCF tariff reductions 
Economic modelling can indicate some of the likely effects and adjustment pressures 
of post 2005 assistance options for the sector, TCF regions and the wider community. 
Modelling, of course, cannot replicate reality. For example, it does not take account of 
the full range of adjustment costs, nor does it allow for the productivity improvements 
likely to be stimulated by reduced TCF assistance (see text). For such reasons, 
modelling can be only one input into an assessment of policy options. 
The modelling results (appendix E) suggest that the resource allocation gains from 
reducing tariffs to 5 per cent after 2005 would be very small. After adding in terms of 
trade effects, the projected community welfare gains would become even smaller, and 
possibly negative. (These terms of trade effects depend on assumptions about export 
demand elasticities which, as noted in appendix E, are a subject of controversy.) This 
outcome contrasts with previous modelling exercises where terms of trade effects were 
swamped by the resource allocation gains from reducing very high protection.  
At a more detailed level, the modelling projections indicate that a reduction in TCF 
tariffs to 5 per cent, together with the cessation of SIP support, would over the longer 
term: 
•  Reduce activity and employment in the TCF sector relative to the ‘business as 
usual’ base case. In the MONASH model, projected reductions in output and 
employment across the TCF industries average about 4 per cent, with somewhat 
larger falls in the footwear and knitting mill products industries. In the Econtech 
MM600+ model, aggregate output and employment in TCF are projected to decline 
by up to 15 per cent in the long term. Results of ACIL-Tasman modelling lie in 
between. The National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) results 
presented by the Victorian Government suggest a total TCF employment loss in 
Victoria of about 6300 jobs, but this estimate includes the effect of the already 
legislated 2005 tariff reductions. As discussed in chapter 4, when adjusted for this, 
projections of TCF job loss in the State from the post 2005 assistance options 
considered by the Commission decline to about 4000 — a figure quite consistent 
with projections from the other models. Employment results for the TCF sector from 
MONASH modelling undertaken by the Victorian Treasury were not reported.  
•  Lead to a slight decline in total employment in Victoria relative to the base case — 
by 0.4 per cent (7800 jobs) in the MM600+ projections, and 0.02 per cent (460 jobs) 
in the MONASH longer term projections — with even smaller balancing increases in 
employment in most of the other States and Territories. Total state employment 
projections were not provided in the ACIL-Tasman, the NIEIR or the Victorian 
Treasury results. In the latter case, though, the projected reduction in the State’s 




From this perspective, further reductions in assistance could reinforce competitive 
pressures on TCF producers to improve technology, to better integrate production 
and distribution, to improve firm and industry organisation, and to improve     




workforce flexibility and workplace arrangements. Also, managerial effort that, in 
parts of the sector, has been devoted to preserving high assistance and looking for 
ways to garner and ‘game’ government support, could be directed to improving 
international competitiveness. As well as enhancing the sector’s future prospects 
and bringing lasting benefits to TCF firms and their employees, such changes would 
benefit the wider community. 
Some participants specifically alluded to the role of earlier tariff reductions in 
spurring improvement within the sector. For example, the New South Wales 
Government considered that TCF reforms have ‘enabled many Australian 
manufacturers to become more flexible and responsive to emerging market 
opportunities’ (sub.  PP175, p.  1). The Technical Textiles and Nonwoven 
Association commented that: 
Trade liberalisation and, thus, increased competition across all global economic 
activities has produced comprehensive changes to markets worldwide … Indeed, the 
most influential factor in shaping Australian manufacturing has been the process of 
opening Australia to the influence of international market forces through the reduction 
of tariffs. The impact of lowering tariffs is a transitional force across products in all 
targeted tariff chapters and has resulted in considerable change to the industry, its 
products, their competitiveness and the way in which business is done. (sub. 68, p. 3) 
Ulster Tascot similarly noted that: 
Tariff reductions to date, have had the desired effect of opening our markets to 
competition and encouraging manufacturers to produce quality products at world 
competitive prices. (sub. 53, p. 4) 
Conversely, continuing tariff assistance could stimulate production which, without 
tariff assistance, would not be sustainable. For example, the Northern Grampians 
Shire Council asserted that a new cut-and-sew project at AUNDE Australia 
‘progressed on the basis that tariff protection enabled the facility to be competitive 
against the existing supplier in Thailand’ (sub.  PP133, p.  1). It is clearly not in 
Australia’s longer term interests to broaden its activity base if that needs high 
government support to survive. 
None of this suggests that achieving further productivity improvement in response 
to reduced assistance will be easy or will come without cost. This is why, as 
discussed below, the Commission considers that future tariff reductions should be 
accompanied by substantial transitional budgetary assistance. But it does indicate 
that the benefits of a successful transition by the TCF sector to lower assistance are 
potentially sizeable.      




Users and consumers would benefit 
Further reduction of TCF tariffs would undoubtedly reduce the costs imposed on 
user industries and final consumers of TCF products. Existing tariffs tax these 
groups by up to about $1 billion a year (chapter 5).  
As noted, the furnishings industry pointed to the costs currently imposed on it by 
TCF tariffs, referring to these as the ‘furniture tax’. Even some firms within the 
TCF sector would benefit from cost reductions arising from further tariff reductions. 
Indeed, users of intermediate TCF goods such as fabrics and footwear parts 
requested tariff reductions on those goods (see below). 
Several participants argued that cost savings from lower tariffs on TCF products 
would simply increase the profit margins of distributors, retailers and shopping 
centres, rather than benefit consumers.  
In the Commission’s view, however, that ignores market realities. The global TCF 
industry is brutally competitive, with new production centres and surplus capacity 
putting intense pressure on wholesale prices. In these circumstances, attempts by 
importers to retain the benefits of lower tariffs would be futile — distributors and 
retailers would simply source those items more cheaply elsewhere. 
Similarly, the Commission has seen no evidence that Australian retailers are making 
excessive profits. On the contrary, as Coles Myer asserted: 
The retail environment is intensely competitive with growing numbers of retailers of all 
sizes, often operating with very similar offers. Each retailer is striving to gain a greater 
share of the consumer’s limited spend on apparel which is placing continuing 
downward pressure on prices. (sub. 95, p. 1) 
Indeed, the real price of TCF products has been falling over time, notwithstanding 
(until recently) depreciation of the Australian dollar. The Commission also notes 
that nominal prices at the retail level have been rising more slowly than the 
wholesale prices received by Australian TCF producers. 
This does not mean that price reductions or quality improvements at established 
market price points will immediately follow tariff reductions But over time, the 
competitive nature of importing, wholesaling and retailing will inevitably see 
benefits flow through to consumers. Several TCF firms made the point that, in 
contrast to a decade ago when tariffs were much higher, Australian consumers can 
now purchase some clothing and footwear as cheaply as, or more cheaply than, their 
counterparts in parts of Asia, Europe and the USA. Carpet producers similarly 
acknowledged that increased import competition has resulted in consumer price     




reductions (see sub. 173, p. 9). Further tariff reductions would provide further cost 
savings for consumers. 
Further assistance reductions could contribute to Australia’s broader trade policy 
objectives 
Australia has a number of international commitments which are relevant to 
consideration of future TCF assistance. The terms of reference draw particular 
attention to: 
•  Australia’s commitment to free and open trade and investment with APEC 
members by 2010 [the Bogor goal], its WTO obligations with respect to 
subsidies and its broader trade liberalisation objectives; and 
•  bilateral trade negotiations and possible Free Trade Agreements. 
The economic gains to Australia from further global trade liberalisation are many 
times greater than the effects of changes to its TCF assistance levels. Thus 
Australia’s national interests would not be served by assistance policies for the TCF 
sector that in any way compromised the prospects for wider trade liberalisation. A 
policy of indefinite preferment for the sector, or making assistance reductions 
conditional on actions by other countries, would send the wrong signal, not only in 
an APEC context, but also in wider forums. The National Farmers’ Federation 
argued that Australia’s ‘international credibility could be totally undermined if we 
say one thing at the WTO but do the opposite back home’ (sub. PP104, p. 11). More 
specifically, WoolProducers stated that it supports the ‘removal of domestic tariffs 
[as that would] enhance opportunities for reducing tariff barriers for our wool 
exports’ (sub. PP103, p. 1). 
6.3  The Commission’s approach 
For the reasons set out in the previous section, the Commission considers that 
further tariff reductions would bring community-wide benefits in the medium to 
longer term that would more than offset the adjustment costs imposed on the TCF 
sector. However, reductions should be made in a measured manner, accompanied 
by continuing transitional assistance, to help ease the adjustment process.  
Re-commence tariff reductions 
In the Commission’s view, the options of reversing the legislated 2005 tariff 
reductions, or pausing TCF tariffs at 2005 levels for a very extended period, should     




be immediately ruled out. It believes that tariff reductions already legislated should 
come into effect on 1 January 2005 as scheduled and that there are good reasons for 
legislating further tariff reductions for the sector beyond that date.  
There are no overriding characteristics of the TCF sector, or of the markets in which 
it operates, which, in the Commission’s view, would justify providing the sector 
with higher long term levels of assistance than are provided to other Australian 
industries. Except for the TCF sector, all general tariffs in Australia will be at five 
per cent or less by early 2010. In the Commission’s view, the tariff target for the 
TCF sector should also be five per cent. 
The Commission rejects charges by some participants that it is driven by ideology. 
It also rejects the charge of the ACTU that the Commission ‘goes to farcical lengths 
to support its prior view that TCF tariffs should be cut’ (sub. PP169, p. 4). The 
discussion above recognises that there will be costs from further tariff reductions for 
the TCF sector, its workforce and affected regions. But the Commission’s analysis 
and judgment is that the medium to longer term benefits to the community overall 
will more than outweigh those costs, given appropriate phasing of tariff reductions 
and the provision of adequate transitional assistance. In particular: 
•  Assistance reductions would encourage the sector to continue to improve its 
international competitiveness through such means as increased investment and 
innovation, technological development, enhanced quality and more cooperative 
workplace arrangements. Such changes would help to secure the future of TCF 
firms and their employees and increase the value of the sector’s contribution to 
the Australian economy.  
•  It would also send a message to producers across the economy that the 
government is not in the business of sheltering firms from competitive pressures 
to the detriment of the wider community. 
•  Consumers and users of TCF products, including some firms in the TCF sector 
itself, would benefit from lower prices. The imperative to seek assistance 
reductions through other arrangements such as the Tariff Concession System and 
the EOAP would thereby be reduced, with savings in administrative and 
compliance costs. 
•  Further reductions in tariffs after 2005 would send helpful signals to other 
countries about Australia’s commitment to reduce trade barriers in line with its 
APEC and other international trade policy commitments.     




Allow sufficient time for adjustment 
As noted, the Commission considers that adjustment capacity is a crucial concern in 
determining the pace of future assistance reductions: 
•  past adjustment has already imposed costs on TCF firms, their employees and 
the regions in which they operate; 
•  many of the sector’s workers (particularly employees and outworkers in the 
apparel industry) are among the most vulnerable in the community; and 
•  although regional TCF activity is lower than in the past, and regional economic 
growth and development has been generally strong in recent years, some 
particular towns and regions remain vulnerable to firm closures and reduced 
output. 
Too rapid a reduction in assistance would add unnecessarily to the broader and 
significant competitive pressures confronting the sector. In so doing, it might affect 
adversely the prospects of some firms which, given more time, could become 
internationally competitive. 
Achieving the right balance between the community-wide gains from assistance 
reductions and adjustment costs requires careful judgment. However, in the 
Commission’s view, the need to minimise the risk of disruptive adjustment 
associated with assistance reductions rules out the option of very quickly removing 
the sector’s preferred assistance treatment after 2005.  
Continued transitional assistance is justified 
The current SIP is intended to assist TCF firms to prepare for the tariff reductions 
legislated for 2005: that is, to help them compete successfully with lower levels of 
assistance. Given the Commission’s view that further tariff reductions should be 
made post 2005, it would be appropriate to extend transitional assistance. Indeed, 
without an extension of such support, it may be difficult to meet the Government’s 
objectives for the sector in a reasonable timeframe without undue disruption.  
In the Commission’s view, however, the continuation of transitional assistance post 
2005 should be conditional on the recommencement of tariff reductions. Without 
this link, budgetary support would just become an additional form of long term 
assistance for the TCF sector. While many in the sector sought continuation of SIP 
assistance without linkage to further tariff reform, Pacific Brands agreed that 
‘acceptance of transitional adjustment assistance [should be] conditional on the 
acceptance of lower tariffs’ (sub. PP138, p. 2).     




There is a need for policy certainty 
The pressures and uncertainties confronting firms in the TCF sector are intense. A 
clear and extended path for assistance reductions would remove one source of 
uncertainty. Without clear policy direction, investment that would help some firms 
to operate successfully with low assistance could be put at risk. Accordingly, the 
post 2005 tariff and transitional support options outlined below establish an 
assistance regime for the sector for the decade through to 2015.  
A further review would be counterproductive 
Many participants argued that there should be a 2008 (or later) review of TCF 
assistance before any post 2005 tariffs cuts went ahead. For example, the TFIA 
noted that: 
… the industry has continued to argue that there should be a review in 2008 (or there 
about) of the reforms in tariff and non-tariff barriers that are being implemented 
[overseas, before further tariff reductions go ahead in Australia]. (sub. PP164, p. 8) 
In the Commission’s view, the prospect of a 2008 (or later) review would: 
•  detract significantly from the policy certainty that is vital for the sector at its 
current stage of development; 
•  induce some firms to delay new investments and other adjustments that would 
help them to operate successfully with lower tariffs; and 
•  inevitably divert managerial energy into further lobbying to preserve the sector’s 
special assistance treatment. 
For these reasons, the Commission does not favour a further review.  
•  While TCF activity has some distinguishing characteristics, these do not 
warrant indefinite preferential treatment for the sector. 
•  A policy of tying tariffs protecting Australian TCF producers to levels in other 
countries would not be in Australia’s interests. 
•  Further TCF tariff reductions would reinforce incentives for productivity 
improvement, provide benefits to consumers and industries using TCF products, 
and facilitate Australia’s trade policy objectives. 
•  The legislated tariff reductions for the sector should take effect on 1 January 
2005 as scheduled and further reductions should be made after 2005. Those 
reductions should be implemented in a measured manner over time, 
accompanied by transitional assistance to help facilitate the adjustment process. 
FINDINGS ON THE APPROACH TO POST 2005 TCF ASSISTANCE     




•  The tariff target should be 5 per cent, the maximum rate that will apply to all 
other Australian industries from 2010.  
•  To avoid uncertainty affecting investment and production decisions, it is 
important to lay down a path and timetable now for the sector to reach that 
target.  
•  Making provision for further review of TCF assistance would detract from the 
policy certainty the sector needs and diminish the pressure on firms to improve 
their international competitiveness.     




7  Post 2005 tariffs and related 
assistance issues 
A range of tariff reduction options would be consistent with the Commission’s 
approach to post 2005 tariffs outlined above. Judgment is required about which 
particular option, in conjunction with transitional assistance (chapter 8), offers the 
best chance of encouraging increased international competitiveness in the TCF 
sector, in a reasonable timeframe, while minimising adjustment costs. This chapter 
also discusses several tariff related issues including policy by-laws, the Expanded 
Overseas Assembly Provisions Scheme (EOAP) and requests for duty free entry of 
particular TCF products. 
7.1  Tariff options outlined in the Commission’s 
Position Paper 
The Position Paper set out four options to illustrate the issues involved in choosing 
a preferred tariff time path. In these options, all reductions would occur on 
1 January in the relevant year (figure 7.1): 
•  Option 1: Maintain all TCF tariffs at 2005 levels until 2010, then reduce to 5 per 
cent and maintain to 2015. 
•  Option 2:   Reduce all 2005 TCF tariffs in even annual steps to achieve 5 per cent 
in 2010, then maintain to 2015. 
•  Option 3: ‘Tops down’ to 5 per cent in 2010, then maintain to 2015. (That is, 
higher tariffs are reduced before lower tariffs.) 
•  Option 4: As for option 1, but reduce tariffs on apparel and certain finished 
textiles to 10 per cent in 2010 and then to 5 per cent in 2015. 
Apart from the differences in the treatment of apparel and certain finished textiles 
— option 4 would delay the final tariff adjustment for those industries until 2015 — 
the main difference between these options relates to the manner in which the tariff 
adjustments are made: stepping (ie at the end of the relevant period), phasing 
(during the period), or a combination of the two (tops down). Self evidently,     




phasing or tops down adjustment could also be incorporated in the option 4 
approach. 































In the Position Paper, the Commission indicated that, subject to further 
consideration in response to participants’ comments on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different options, it preferred option 4.  
In reaching this judgment, the Commission considered it is appropriate for tariffs on 
goods other that apparel and certain finished textiles to be reduced to 5 per cent in 
2010 — this would require further tariff reductions (after 2005) of five percentage 
points or less. However, the Commission expressed doubt about the capacity of 
apparel and certain finished textile producers to absorb a tariff reduction of 12.5 
Apparel, finished 
textiles 
Sheeting, woven fabrics, 
footwear, carpets 
Table linen, tea 
towels, footwear parts
Textile yarns     




percentage points over the 2005 – 2010 period, as required by options 1 to 3. It 
acknowledged that there would be some risk that such a rate of tariff reduction 
might cause excessive disruption in those industries. 
Participants’ responses 
Many participants reiterated their general views on tariffs (discussed in chapter 6), 
rather than commenting on the merits of the four options proposed by the 
Commission. Some, including the TFIA, the Carpet Institute of Australia and the 
FMAA, did propose possible future tariff change arrangements. But these were 
conditional on improved overseas market access and involved slower changes 
and/or higher tariff end points than contemplated by the Commission.  
It can be surmised that, if forced to choose, most industry participants would favour 
the ‘softer’ stepped down approach to tariff reduction over the ‘tougher’ phasing or 
tops down approaches. Yakka, for example, commented that ‘a 5-year period of 
stability and then a stepped down approach is much more manageable for the 
industry’ (sub. PP128, p, 6).  
However, the Carpet Institute and the FMAA supported variations of the tops down 
approach which, in effect, would enable the carpet and footwear industries to retain 
their current tariff rates for a longer period than under any of the options outlined in 
the Position Paper. Indeed, the Carpet Institute, together with some individual 
carpet manufacturing firms, argued that an ‘anomaly’ exists in the tariff treatment of 
carpets. It claimed that in the 1991 Industry Statement, which accelerated tariff 
reductions for the TCF sector, ‘carpet was inadvertently linked in with intermediate 
products’, whereas carpet should have been treated as a finished consumer textile 
product and thus subject to the same tariff as apparel and certain finished textiles. 
Although it did not request the carpet tariff be increased, the Carpet Institute 
proposed that ‘further reductions in carpet tariffs (after 2005) should be deferred 
until other finished consumer textile products come down to carpet level’ 
(sub. PP126, p. 10). The Commission, however, does not accept the tariff ‘anomaly’ 
argument: there are other finished TCF products that have lower tariffs than carpets; 
and in any case, so-called ‘anomalous’ tariff decisions made 12 years ago or more, 
provide no guidance for appropriate post 2005 tariff arrangements. 
The Commonwealth Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry favoured 
option 2 or option 3, on the basis that they were considered to be most in line with 
Australia’s trade interests (sub. PP176, att. A, p. 2). 
The New South Wales Government favoured a tariff option in which annual 
reductions in tariffs would occur post 2005, with the target of five per cent being     




met, depending on the product, from 2009 to 2014. It considered that annual 
reductions should then continue until imported TCF products became duty free. It 
stated that this option was preferred because: 
… it would establish tariff reductions that are broadly consistent with the effective 
annual tariff reductions that: 
•  are currently being imposed upon the industry (between 2000 and 2005); and 
•  had previously been imposed upon the general manufacturing sector between 1991 
and 2000 (of around 1.1 per cent p.a.). (sub. PP175, p. 3) 
7.2  The Commission’s findings on post 2005 tariff 
levels 
Two main issues arise in considering post 2005 tariff assistance under the approach 
outlined by the Commission in chapter 6. First, when should the tariff target of five 
per cent be achieved: should it be 2010 for all products; or should some parts of the 
sector be given until as late as 2015? Second, what sort of arrangement — stepping, 
phasing, tops down, or some other combination — should be employed to achieve 
the target of five per cent by the chosen due date or dates? 
As noted earlier, the maximum remaining required tariff reduction post 2005 for all 
TCF products, other than apparel and certain finished textiles, is just five percentage 
points. In the Commission’s judgment, a tariff reduction of this magnitude could be 
made over the five year period to 2010, without placing unreasonable adjustment 
pressure on producers. This assessment includes the carpets and footwear industries 
— there is no convincing evidence that producers of those products require, or 
deserve, differential treatment.  
The Commission would envisage this five per cent tariff being subsequently 
maintained through to 2015. This is in line with its view that policy certainty should 
be provided for the sector through the decade until then (chapter 6). Even if tariffs 
for other goods were reduced below that rate, the cost to the community as a whole 
of providing this certainty and stability to the TCF sector would not be large.  
In contrast to the tariffs for other TCF products, there are arguments for delaying 
the achievement of a five per cent tariff for clothing and certain finished textiles 
beyond 2010 — these goods face further reductions after 2005 of 12.5 percentage 
points to achieve that rate. While the benefits to consumers and user industries from 
lower tariffs for apparel and finished textiles would be delayed by deferring the full 
reduction, the potential for the assistance reforms to trigger disruptive adjustment 
would be diminished. The Commission is also mindful that the fortunes of many 
local yarn and textile suppliers are closely allied to those of their customers in the     




clothing and finished textiles industries. Hence, there is a risk that disruptive 
adjustment at the end of the production chain could create ‘knock-on’ problems.  
The case for ‘erring on the side of caution’ also provides a reason for delaying the 
attainment of the 5 per cent target for apparel and finished textiles until 2015. 
Although this would represent a slightly lower rate of reduction over the 10 year-
period than under the current package, many firms will already have availed 
themselves of the easier opportunities for performance improvement. Hence, in the 
future, they will have to work harder to improve their competitiveness. 
Delaying removal of special tariff treatment for some TCF products until 2015 
might be seen as less compatible with Australia’s commitment to the APEC Bogor 
goal of ‘free and open trade and investment’ in the region by 2010 for developed 
countries than options that would reduce all TCF tariffs to 5 per cent by 2010. 
However, the tariff approach favoured by the Commission would signal a clear 
move in that direction: from 2010 a maximum tariff of 5 per cent would apply to all 
imports into Australia, other than apparel and certain finished textiles. Any 
remaining negative perceptions could be minimised if all the future TCF tariff 
reductions, including those to occur in 2015, were to be legislated as soon as 
possible, just as the 2005 reductions were legislated in 1998. 
In the transition to the 5 per cent tariff target, the choice between annual reductions 
(phasing) and a pause followed by a larger one-off reduction — the approach 
employed in the current package — is less important. Given the extended 
timeframes required to recoup many investments to improve international 
competitiveness, firms’ planning decisions may well depend more heavily on the 
tariff end point than on the somewhat higher duty rates applying in the intervening 
period. However, rates in the intervening period will obviously have some impact 
on decisions — particularly the timing of exits by non-internationally competitive 
suppliers. In this context, the pause/step-down approach would provide firms with 
more breathing space and thereby facilitate a smoother adjustment process. It would 
also avoid the additional compliance costs for both the sector and the Government, 
associated with smaller annual reductions in duty rates. 
In summary, the Commission prefers a reduction to five per cent by 2010 for goods 
other than apparel and certain finished textiles; a reduction to five per cent by 2015 
for those latter goods; with tariff reductions made at the end of each relevant five 
year period (ie option 4). This would best meet the goal of enhancing overall 
community welfare while giving the sector time to adjust and minimising the risk of 
excessive disruption. The Commission also considers that the required tariff 
reductions should be legislated as soon as possible after the Government makes a 
decision on post 2005 TCF assistance.     




7.3  Other tariff related issues 
Policy by-laws 
Around 20 policy by-laws enable certain TCF goods to be imported duty free. 
These cover mainly blended cotton and blended synthetic lightweight fabrics. Duty 
forgone in 2001-02 under these by-laws was around $40 million (ACS 2002b) 
compared to some $150 million in 1994-95 and $110 million in 1995-96. 
If these by-laws were removed, the goods they cover would become subject to the 
criteria of the more widely available Tariff Concession System. If the goods were 
accorded concessional entry under that scheme, they would become dutiable at 
three per cent rather than free of duty as under the current policy by-laws. (As 
discussed in chapter 11, the Commission considers that the revenue duty of three 
per cent should be abolished.) If, however, they were not accorded concessional 
entry, either because they failed to meet the criteria for such entry or they became 
subject to the Excluded Goods Schedule (see below), they would become dutiable at 
the applicable general rate, currently 15 per cent falling to 10 per cent in 2005. 
In the Commission’s view, such increases in duty consequent on the removal of the 
policy by-laws would be counterproductive. They would increase costs for some 
producers and would lead to unpredictable changes, both up and down, in the levels 
of assistance accorded particular activities in the sector. Given that the future 
reductions in tariffs proposed by the Commission would reduce the impacts of these 
by-laws, it considers that they should be left in place unchanged until such time as 
they become redundant.  
In commenting on the Position Paper, the TFIA agreed that there is no need at this 
stage to change the policy by-law regime (sub. PP164, p. 14). A request from Wax 
Converters Textiles to create a new policy by-law for certain cotton polyester and 
cotton fabrics is discussed below. 
EOAP 
As noted in chapter 5, the EOAP scheme allows footwear and garments assembled 
overseas from predominantly Australian fabric and/or leather to be imported into 
Australia with duty payable only on the cost of overseas processing and content. 
There has been only limited use of the scheme, at least in recent years, with duty 
forgone in 2001-02 of only $4.75 million.     




The Victorian Farmers Federation called for the EOAP to lapse on 30 June 2005 as 
currently scheduled (sub. PP152, p. 4). However, notwithstanding its now limited 
use, several participants called for the scheme to be continued, for its product scope 
to be expanded and/or for duty free entry to be allowed for the foreign as well as the 
Australian content of imported product (box 7.1). 
 
Box 7.1  Examples of participants’ views on the EOAP 
Several called for its continuation: 
This scheme [the EOAP] should be continued as it helps to retain higher value-added 
activities in the Australian market if labour intensive stages are moved off-shore. (sub. 62, 
p. 9) Geelong Chamber of Commerce 
… EOAP provides valuable support to Victoria’s textile manufacturing base … The Victorian 
Government believes this program has been used extensively and is beneficial to industry. It 
should be extended beyond 2005 as Victorian companies continue to adjust to global 
changes. (sub. 78, p. 18) Victorian Government 
Some wanted further products included: 
The expansion of [the] EOAP Program to all sectors of the TCF industries will ensure the 
continuing existence of growth of sectors of the TCF that are subject to labour market 
pressures. (sub. 49, p. 2) Albany International 
TTNA recommends the EOAP scheme should be extended to include additional products. 
(sub. 68, p. 4) Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association 
The EOAP arrangements should be continued, but they need to be extended beyond 
garments to encompass make up of the full range of textile products. (sub. 55, p. 13) Bruck 
Textiles 
EOAP should be extended till 2010 for all imports of leather footwear, shoe uppers and 
components, leather goods, garments and finished leather where wet-blue, crust or finished 
leather imported from Australia was used. (sub. PP110, p. 5) ENVITAN Consultancy 
Some called for duty free entry to be extended to the foreign content: 
Consideration should also be given to introducing fully duty free access of EOAP products, 
where the fabric is entirely of Australian make up, to maintain the effectiveness of the 
scheme, once tariffs are further reduced on 1 January 2005. (sub. 55, p. 13) Bruck Textiles 
EOAP could provide for the full remission of duty when Australian leather is used as the 
upper in finished footwear. (sub. 73, p. 22) Austanners 
The TFIA suggested the scheme could be modified to provide for duty credits that 
could be applied to other imports: 
There could … be a factor applied to EOAP imports that developed a duty credit to 
encourage the internationalisation of the Australian markets through further duty free imports 
of apparel, garments or textiles of the same nature as the EOAP import. (sub. PP164, p. 14) 
 
 
However, the extent to which changes of this sort would increase usage of the 
scheme is unclear. Given the growing competitiveness of direct imports from third 
countries, such as China, and reductions in Australian general tariffs, the basic     




economics of even an enhanced EOAP would remain questionable for many firms. 
As Pacific Brands noted: 
The operation of EOAP arrangements were of considerable importance in the mid to 
late 90s when end-product tariff levels were of a higher order. Pacific Brands was the 
initiator and principal user of the OAP arrangements for virtually all of this period. 
Under new tariff arrangements we now see this policy dimension to be of limited 
strategic relevance to our operations especially in view of the long supply lines 
involved and the increasing retailer pressure for short lead times. (sub. 72, p. 2) 
Similarly, Charles Parsons commented that ‘whilst the structure of the scheme is 
sound and some companies have found it a useful scheme, it has proven to be 
impracticable due to the costs involved and the lead times for delivery’ (sub. 26, 
p. 4). 
More importantly, enhancing the EOAP would be a questionable policy approach at 
a time when general tariff rates are falling. Any enhancement could only give a 
temporary benefit to some Australian producers of intermediate TCF products — 
benefits that could come at some short term costs for any Australian producers of 
the products concerned. The Commission therefore considers that, like the policy 
by-laws, the EOAP should simply be continued past 2005, without any fundamental 
change. With further reductions in TCF tariffs, this would effectively represent a 
continued phasing out of these arrangements over time. 
Requests for duty free entry 
Some participants made requests for duty free entry of particular goods. For 
example: 
•  Sporting footwear, clothing and bras. The Sporting Footwear Importers Group 
contended that there is no production in Australia of sporting footwear, except 
bowls shoes and riding boots and that ‘removal of Customs duties will not 
impact on Australian industry manufacturing fashion, semi-fashion and casual 
footwear’ (sub.  27, p.  4). In a request directed at reducing tariffs on some 
categories of imported clothing, the Group also requested the removal of TCF 
products from the TCS Excluded Goods Schedule (see below), or even abolition 
of the EGS altogether (sub.  PP122, p.  6). Similarly, Coles Myer suggested 
removal of TCF product chapters from the EGS because products such as 
sporting footwear and women’s bras are not made in Australia (sub. 95, p. 2). 
•  Footwear parts. According to the FMAA, removing the duty on footwear parts 
would ‘enhance the use of parts as opposed to the importation of finished 
footwear and thus encourage further employment in the Australian factories’ 
(sub. 28, p. 19). The Association made it clear that it was seeking tariff removal     




only on footwear uppers, and not on bottom stock (trans., p. 411). (Shoe Lasts & 
Components indicated it made bottom stock, such as soles, lasts and heels in 
Australia (sub. PP172, p. 1).) 
•  Yarns. Australian Weaving Mills said that the legislated 2005 tariff reductions 
would impose ‘significant pressures on our cost competitiveness if the duty on 
our key input (ie yarns) is not reduced at the same time’ (sub. 67, p. 5). It further 
contended that ‘elimination of yarn tariffs should not impact adversely on local 
yarn producers (sub. 67, p. 5), but would allow it to import duty free those yarns 
which cannot be made locally. Bruck similarly noted that as many man made 
fibre yarns and ring spun cotton yarns are only available from offshore, they 
should become duty free, particularly as tariffs on fabrics are to be reduced in 
2005 (sub. 55, p. 10). Similarly, Melba Tex requested removal of duties on yarns 
not manufactured in Australia, including Aramid, Meta Aramid and 
Multifiliment Textured Polyester yarns (sub. 83, p. 6). 
•  Cotton polyester and cotton fabrics. A user of such imported goods, Wax 
Converters Textiles, sought elimination of the 10 per cent tariff ‘at the earliest 
opportunity’. Alternatively, it sought the creation of a policy by-law covering 
these goods to take effect from 1 January 2004 (sub. PP171, p. 3). 
Some of these requests appear to be driven by the desire to reduce costs for 
particular TCF manufacturing activities in Australia. Some are based on the premise 
that the goods in question are not made in Australia. Others are because these goods 
would be ineligible for consideration for concessional entry under the TCS or that, 
if granted concessional entry, they would still be subject to the three per cent 
revenue duty. 
The focus of the current tariff arrangements and, hence, of this inquiry is on the 
TCF sector and its component industries in the broad, rather than on particular TCF 
products. Nevertheless, the Sporting Footwear Importers Group considered that it is 
within the brief of the Commission ‘to recommend the introduction of permanent 
rates of duty such as 5% … or minimum rates, if there is no Australian 
manufacturer’ (sub. PP122, p. 1).  
In the Commission’s view, however, recommendations to make tariff exceptions for 
individual TCF products would detract from the general approach to post 2005 tariff 
reductions outlined in this chapter and in chapter 6. In practice, examination of the 
case for duty free substantive rates for particular products would require the 
Commission to go over the same ground as that currently canvassed by Customs in 
its assessments of applications under the TCS: that is, the extent to which there are 
substitutable goods produced in Australia. And although the Commission considers 
that the three per cent revenue raising duty on business inputs under the TCS should 
be abolished (see chapter 11), pending that abolition there would be little     




justification for making an exception for particular TCF products merely because 
they have been brought to attention in this particular inquiry.  
Goods such as sporting footwear, clothing and bras are in a somewhat different 
situation. As part of the Excluded Goods Schedule under the TCS, the merits of any 
case for concessional entry cannot even be considered. The rationale for the 
schedule — which includes a range of foodstuffs, apparel, footwear, jewellery and 
furniture — is as follows: 
Within certain classes of goods there exists a wide and comprehensive range of both 
Australian made and imported goods which, notwithstanding differences in character, 
construction, quality, price, etc., basically compete with each other in the market place. 
Such goods are excluded by Regulation from concessional entry. (ACS 2003b, p. 11) 
In effect, the EGS seeks to limit the costs of Customs, applicants and Australian 
producers by ruling out numerous applications for concessional entry of certain 
categories of goods which, prima facie, are likely to be substitutable with Australian 
made goods. However, as the schedule is necessarily specified in broad terms, there 
is always the possibility of automatic exclusion from concessional entry of 
particular goods which would have received concessional entry if the merits of their 
case could have been assessed.  
Currently, it is possible ‘in extraordinary circumstances’ to have particular goods 
removed from the EGS. This requires approval from the Minister for Industry, 
Tourism and Resources, after consultation with other relevant Ministers. When so 
removed, the case for concessional entry for those goods can be assessed under the 
usual TCS criteria. Some categories of studded sports footwear were in fact 
removed from the schedule following such a process, with concessional entry 
subsequently granted. 
The Position Paper commented that, in principle, the opportunity to argue for the 
removal of goods from the EGS should be generally available to importers, not just 
‘in extraordinary circumstances’. It said that applications should ideally be assessed 
against appropriate, publicly available, evaluation criteria. However, it went on to 
note that, in practice, administrative and compliance costs may militate against 
moving too far in this direction. Further, it commented that a balance could be 
difficult to strike, given that the underlying criterion for exemption from the EGS 
would necessarily be the same as that used in assessing application for concessional 
entry under the TCS: that is, the degree of substitutability of imports with locally 
produced goods. With a view to exploring this issue further in its final report, the 
Commission invited comment on the advantages and disadvantages of making the 
opportunity to apply for exemption from the EGS more generally available, together 
with suggestions for controlling the associated administrative and compliance costs.     




Responses from the various sectional interests involved, however, have done little 
to clarify where an appropriate balance might lie. Those supporting the status quo 
pointed to the compliance and administrative costs likely to be associated with, and 
follow, changes to the EGS, as local manufacturers and importers argued issues of 
product substitutability. Those seeking change reiterated their views that the EGS 
acts to prevent concessional importation of goods for which there are no locally 
made substitutes (box 7.2). 
 
Box 7.2  Sporting shoes and substitutability 
The Sporting Footwear Importers Group argued that there is no Australian 
manufacturer of sporting footwear (sub. 27) and that the retailing of this footwear is 
also specialised. Although it noted that ‘some low cost imitation sporting footwear is 
imported and sold through discount footwear stores [and] it could be argued that this 
type of footwear may substitute for, say, a casual shoe of the type made locally’ 
(sub. 27, p. 3), it argued that ‘you don’t use that for cross-country running or basketball 
or playing tennis and things like that’ (trans., pp. 416–7). 
In contrast, Coles Myer said that language ‘such as “cheap, imitation” is both 
inaccurate and misleading’ and that ‘there can be no artificial divide in the broad 
sporting footwear category based on notional attributes or concepts of quality’ 
(sub. PP143, pp. 2–3).  
These statements taken together suggest that sporting footwear does substitute, to 
some extent, for casual footwear. Indeed, it would be surprising if this were not the 
case. But this begs the question of whether the degree of substitutability is sufficient to 
preclude concessional entry under the TCS, were the EGS hurdle overcome. 
The Importers Group was not optimistic about prospects for concessional entry. It said 
that the FMAA’s attitude that ‘a shoe is a shoe’ would be sufficient to bar concessional 




The Commission notes that all of these issues will become of much less concern as 
TCF tariffs are reduced in 2005 and subsequent years. It notes also that, in any case, 
removal from the EGS might not do much to help importers, unless the criteria for 
the TCS were to be changed (box 7.2). That matter, and the possible abolition of the 
EGS as a whole, are beyond the scope of the current inquiry. 
Arrangements with Fiji 
Submissions and supporting material from the TCF Council of Fiji and Fiji Ministry 
of Commerce, Business Development and Investment, and from some other 
participants, raised issues about the relationship of the Australian TCF sector with 
TCF producers in Fiji. Some of those issues, for example the extension of SIP     




support to include Australian investment in Fiji, the provision of Australian aid 
money to help initiate Fiji’s own SIP-type scheme, and a proposal for the 
introduction of a Partnership Development Program for Australia-Fiji trade, are 
considered to be outside the scope of the inquiry.  
Submissions also canvassed the operation of the SPARTECA-TCF arrangements 
which were introduced to help cushion the impact of the termination of the Import 
Credit Scheme on the Fijian TCF industry (appendix C). The TCF Council of Fiji 
(sub. 66, p. 24) stated that the scheme ‘has not proved as beneficial for the industry 
as had been hoped (and promised)’. It sought a number of changes including 
reductions in the local content necessary to secure duty free entry into Australia and 
extended scheme coverage to include wool products. Similarly, Bruck Textiles, the 
Australian TCF firm with the largest operations in Fiji, considered that ‘urgent 
action’ was required to ensure that the stated objectives of the scheme are achieved 
(sub. PP109, p. 5).  
However, a number of proposed modifications to the SPARTECA-TCF 
arrangements — for example, a reduction in the local content threshold to 25 per 
cent, as proposed by Fiji, or allowing cash redemption of content points, as 
suggested by Bruck Textiles — could have ramifications beyond this inquiry for 
issues of trade and aid more generally, as well as for rules of origin. The 
Commission therefore considers these issues are beyond the scope of the current 
inquiry. 
In any event, the merits of modifying these special TCF arrangements with Fiji are 
open to question. As witnessed by requests to extend these arrangements, even the 
assistance currently provided to Fiji has proved insufficient for it to build or sustain 
a competitive advantage. Continuing reductions in Australia’s general TCF tariffs 
will erode that advantage further in the future. (This is perhaps the reason why Fiji 
sought continuation of Australian TCF tariffs at relatively high levels beyond 2010.)  
Rules of origin issues 
Bruck Textiles (sub.  PP109, p.  6), Yakka (sub.  PP128, p.  8) and the TFIA 
(sub. PP164, p. 15) expressed concern about the rules of origin associated with the 
Australian Government’s decision to allow all imports from the 49 Least Developed 
Countries and East Timor duty free access to the Australian market from 1 July 
2003. They noted that the proposed rules will allow defined local content to include 
content from third party least developed countries and defined Developing 
Countries, including China. Their concern was that this will erode tariff protection 
for Australian apparel manufacturers and will reduce the incentive for producers in 
LDCs to use Australian produced textiles.     




The TFIA stated that ‘similar issues’ also arise in relation to other bilateral trade 
agreements being currently pursued by the Government, including those with the 
United States and with Thailand: 
… while the consultation and discussions with the government representatives on the 
USA FTA have been significant and inclusive, the same cannot be said for the Thai 
negotiations … The TFIA has supported the Singapore, USA and LDC initiatives and 
will continue to work through them. (sub. PP164, p. 14) 
However, while the Commission understands these concerns, the underlying issues 
are complex and affect many sectors, and are again considered beyond the scope of 
this current inquiry into TCF assistance post 2005.  
•  The capacity of apparel and certain finished textile producers to absorb a tariff 
reduction of 12.5 percentage points over the 2005 to 2010 period without 
serious disruption is questionable. The reduction in tariffs for those goods to the 
five per cent target should therefore take place over the longer period to 2015. 
•  For other TCF products, including carpets and footwear, the required tariff 
reduction after 2005 to reach the five per cent tariff target is five percentage 
points or less. Making that reduction over the five-year period to 2010 is 
unlikely to place unreasonable adjustment pressure on those industries. 
•  In moving to the five per cent tariff target, there would be advantages in 
continuing the step down approach employed in the current assistance package. 
Hence the Commission’s preferred post 2005 tariff option is as follows: 
•  maintain all TCF tariffs at 2005 levels until 1 January 2010; 
•  on 1 January 2010, reduce tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles to 
10 per cent and tariffs on other TCF products to 5 per cent; and 
•  maintain tariffs on apparel and certain finished textiles at 10 per cent until 
1 January 2015, and then reduce them to 5 per cent. 
•  Legislating early for all of these tariff reductions would deliver the policy 
certainty that the sector requires and maintain the pressure on firms to improve 
their performance. It would also help to minimise any negative perceptions 
about this option in relation to Australia’s commitment to the APEC goal of 
‘free and open trade and investment’ in the region by 2010 for developed 
countries. 
•  Further reductions in TCF tariffs would effectively continue the phasing out of 
the TCF policy by-laws and the Expanded Overseas Assembly Provisions. These 
arrangements should therefore be continued after 2005 without amendment. 
Sector-wide duty reductions would also diminish the need to consider requests 
for duty free entry for specific TCF goods not made in Australia.  
FINDINGS ON POST 2005 TARIFFS AND RELATED ASSISTANCE ISSUES     




8 Transitional  assistance 
The Commission’s broad approach to post 2005 assistance for the TCF sector 
comprises further tariff reductions, phased over a period to allow sufficient time for 
adjustment, together with the provision of transitional budgetary assistance. Without 
an extension of such transitional support, it may be difficult to meet the 
Government’s objectives for the sector in a reasonable timeframe without risk of 
undue disruption.  
In the Commission’s view, transitional assistance should be focused on the 
objective of assisting TCF firms which manufacture in Australia to improve their 
ability to compete in domestic and export markets without the need for ongoing 
preferential tariff assistance. In this context, this chapter considers appropriate 
arrangements for transitional assistance, including issues relating to design, duration 
and funding.  
8.1  Options canvassed in the Position Paper 
The Position Paper noted that participants proposed an array of changes to 
overcome the perceived deficiencies of the current SIP arrangements. The 
Commission concluded that, viewed in isolation, many of these suggestions for 
change might have merit. However, it noted that, with total funding capped, 
changing arrangements to meet the needs of particular firms or industries would 
reduce funding available for others.  
The Commission therefore outlined some design criteria, related to efficiency and 
effectiveness, to assist in evaluating the tradeoffs between alternatives (box 8.1). It 
observed, however, that designing a scheme which satisfied all of these principles 
simultaneously is impossible.  
Three options for further consideration were canvassed in the Position Paper — 
these are briefly summarised in box 8.2. Two of them, options A and B, would 
continue the present ‘entitlements’ approach — that is, all firms which demonstrate 
that they have met the necessary qualifying criteria would be entitled to assistance. 
Option C would be a ‘competitive’ approach. Under that approach, firms would 
apply for assistance before undertaking spending, their proposals would be assessed     




against specified criteria and the higher ranking proposals funded first — some 
firms might miss out.  
 
Box 8.1  Efficiency and effectiveness criteria for evaluating transitional 
assistance 
As far as possible, transitional assistance should: 
•  Reward incremental/new activity rather than subsidise activity that would have been 
undertaken without support. 
•  Give firms flexibility to judge what spending will best promote their future 
competitiveness (including, where appropriate, reducing dependence on TCF 
manufacturing activity). 
•  Provide support to the firms most likely to survive and prosper as a result of that 
support. 
•  Provide a sufficient level of support to make a difference to firm behaviour. 
•  Take account of the extent of the tariff reductions facing firms in different parts of 
the sector. 
•  Not discriminate against small firms, which otherwise meet assistance criteria. 
•  Promote certainty and transparency. 
•  Keep administrative and compliance costs low, while minimising the risk of gaming 
and abuse. 
•  Minimise the risk of complaints to the WTO. 
 
 
8.2  Participants’ responses to the Position Paper’s 
options 
Most participants which commented on future transitional assistance supported 
option A, implicitly or explicitly — that is, they supported various modified 
versions of the existing SIP arrangements. Some of their suggestions for change 
were outlined in chapter 5 and other examples are listed in box 8.3. 
Those few participants that explicitly compared the merits of the Position Paper’s 
three options generally favoured option A. One important reason was articulated by 
Pacific Brands which, although it saw some merit in the option C approach, 
preferred to work with ‘the essentially strong SIP approach and to correct 
administrative flaws’: 
The desire to develop a completely new policy approach has been a major weakness of 
policy moves in the past. We support the maximising of the investment firms have     




made in understanding the operation of the current SIP entitlement approach. 
(sub. PP138, p. 3) 
 
Box 8.2  Transitional assistance options canvassed in the Position 
Paper 
Option A — modify existing arrangements. Most of the basic parameters of the 
existing SIP would remain in place, with modifications to its detailed requirements to 
improve its effectiveness in encouraging firms to increase expenditure in ways which 
would improve their international competitiveness.  
Option B — a bounty based on additional value added. Firms would be entitled to 
assistance each year solely on the basis of increases in their value added relative to a 
base period or periods. 
Option C — firms ‘compete’ for assistance. Firms would apply for assistance on the 
basis of proposed expenditures to facilitate future viability and improved 
competitiveness in a lower tariff environment. Applications would be assessed by an 
‘expert’ panel against a range of selection criteria. Eligible expenditure categories 
could potentially include expenditure in such areas as investment, R&D, innovation, IT, 
enhancement of product range, quality improvement, brand and market development 
(including export markets), and workforce skilling. An assistance rate (or rates) could 
be specified in the program’s design parameters. Alternatively, or as well, the panel 
could be given some discretion in varying assistance rates between firms. 
 
 
The Carpet Institute of Australia similarly favoured continuation of the current SIP 
approach because it is ‘well known and understood and [the] least disruptive 
approach’. In contrast, option B ‘creates definitional problems and generates 
uncertainty’ while option C ‘is workable but tantamount to picking winners’ 
(sub. PP126, p. 12).  
Likewise, TCF Services considered that ‘the simplest and most effective way of 
providing certainty, and improve alignment with government policy, is to 
recommend simple modification of the existing SIP scheme’ (sub. PP174, p. 5). Its 
two proposed variations to existing arrangements, however, each effectively 
incorporated some of the elements of option C: 
•  under the first proposal, assistance to small firms would be provided on an 
entitlements basis, but large firms would need to make a case to the Government 
for funding, before they spent the money; 
•  under the second proposal, all firms would be entitled to assistance, subject to 
eligible expenditure exceeding $100 000. However, there would be additional 
provisions for ‘loans’ to firms for proposed future expenditure.     





Box 8.3  Illustrating participants’ views on overcoming the deficiencies 
of SIP 
… the basic SIP principles should be supplemented to provide industry assistance across 
the fundamental industry drivers: product development, investment, technology and sales 
(sub. 77, p. 17) Godfrey Hirst 
SIP funding arrangements [should] be changed to provide for a greater degree of flexibility in 
funding investment, R & D, and process improvement activities. (sub.  11, p. 30) Australian 
Industry Group 
A program similar to the current Strategic Investment Program (SIP), as provided to the rest 
of the TCFL sector, needs to be made available to the whole wool processing supply chain. 
(sub. 45, p. 14) Australian Wool Processors Council 
Consideration [should] be given to the needs of smaller to medium-sized business operators 
and how they can be encouraged to instil activities and processes assisted by SIP without 
damaging the overall value to existing SIP clients. (sub. 75, p. 7) TFIA 
The scope of the SIP program should be expanded to accelerate the development of 
emerging new businesses in the TCF sector. These businesses are particularly vulnerable to 
market inequities and are the likely source of growth in employment … (sub. PP180, p. 16) 
Tasmanian Government 
It is vital that the Government introduces greater flexibility under SIP to ensure it is more 
relevant for the spinning sector. (sub. 44, p. 7) Rocklea Spinning Mills 
Inclusion of current state of the art second hand equipment as eligible … (sub. 32, p. 13) 
Australian Association of Leather Industries 
Capital Expenditure grant payments should be increased from 20% to 30% or higher of 
eligible expenditure to assist with the ongoing essential task of substantial re-equipment with 
state of art technology. (sub. 53, p. 4) Ulster Tascot 
… [delinking] Type 3 grants from Type 1 and 2 grants … would be to put in place a type of 
production bounty that rewarded those companies employing Australian workers. The 
TCFUA supports this type of proposal … (sub. 33, p. 32) TCFUA 
… examination of the merits of paying the Type 3 payments as import credits … 
incorporation of ‘investment in brand equity’ as well as ‘investment in physical assets’ as 
currently applies under Type 1. (sub. 72, pp. 3–4) Pacific Brands 
Types 4/5 grants need to be completely revisited and they should be restructured to match 
the original intent of the draft scheme … (sub. 67, p. 8) Australian Weaving Mills 
… consideration should be given to ways of improving the level of certainty participants have 
about the value of projects undertaken under the auspices of the program. (sub. 73, p. 12) 
Austanners 
Research and development needs to be clarified so that the scheme is easier to manage. 
The scheme should have an R&D focus or simply day to day development rather than the 
fashionable yet vague definition – innovation. (sub. 65, p. 9) Defab Weavers 
 
A key concern raised about option B was the problem of defining ‘value added’ and 
‘incremental’ so that firms would have sufficient certainty about likely levels of 
support, and problems of gaming would be avoided. Bruck Textiles, for example, 
believed that a bounty system based on increments in value added:     




… would create too much confusion over the uncertainty about what is meant by value 
added and the manner in which increments are determined. (sub. PP109, p. 4) 
Another important concern related to the subsidisation of labour expenditure. The 
Australian Association of Leather Industries considered that ‘there is no logical 
basis for providing support to value added in isolation [as in option B]’: 
… such a move would merely reward labour intensive industries with minimal prospect 
for substantial export earnings. (sub. PP161, p. 2) 
The Australian Industry Group was of the opinion that ‘funding should embrace not 
only R & D and investment, but also the other main driver of competitiveness, ie 
labour productivity’ (sub. PP140, p. 4). But it considered that this could be done 
through option A.  
Some participants also pointed out that, in the context of the contracting TCF sector, 
option B might fail to support activity that would lead to improved international 
competitiveness. For example, Pacific Brands considered that the ‘incremental 
notion’ is: 
… of little relevance in an industry (especially clothing) with massive underlying 
contraction potential. (sub. PP138, p. 3) 
There was little unqualified support for option C, although Bruck, while supporting 
option A, indicated it was ‘not opposed to the concept of a competitive scheme (ie 
picking winners), provided the right criteria for selection are applied’ (sub. PP109, 
p. 4). Some participants, for example the Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of 
Australia, pointed to the unsatisfactory experience with similar arrangements in the 
past: 
Historically this [option C] approach has always reduced the number of recipients, had 
a very mixed record of success and meant that application costs, time and the use of 
consultants increases dramatically — as evidenced by the TCFDA experience. 
(sub. PP132, p. 7) 
However, several participants, including footwear manufacturing firms and the 
Victorian Government (sub. PP173, p. 7), suggested that an option C type approach 
might offer a means of extending transitional assistance to small firms that are 
excluded from the current SIP by the minimum spending threshold. For instance, 
the Harold Boot Company, in noting that the current SIP is limited in its application 
to small firms, considered that ‘Option C would provide assistance in a more cost-
effective way especially for smaller firms’ (sub. PP124, p. 3). It suggested that a 
limited number of pilot projects might be tried, targeting small firms ‘judged 
capable of and likely to grow and remain as efficient manufacturers in Australia in 
the long term’ (sub. PP124, p. 3). The TFIA also proposed that some SIP funding 
should be set aside for:     




… the smaller elements of the industry that have significant projects or investments 
relevant to their size yet are outside the current SIP criteria. (sub. PP164, p. 3) 
And the Carpet Institute of Australia commented that: 
… there may be merit in providing specific support to SMEs for specific activities that 
will lead to future growth. But this would need to be a stand-alone program, with a 
specific amount of funding quarantined for just that purpose. (sub. PP162, p. 4) 
While the Western Australian Department of Industry and Resources considered 
that option C ‘appears to be the most equitable of the three options’, this conclusion 
was premised on the ‘fact that the overwhelming majority of TCFL industries in 
Western Australia fall into the small, mini and micro business category’ and that 
options A and B would fail to meet the needs of those smaller businesses 
(sub. PP179, p. 3). 
8.3  Judging transitional assistance options 
The many different schemes and variants of adjustment assistance for the TCF 
sector tried (and abandoned) in recent years bear testament to the difficulty of 
translating efficiency and effectiveness objectives into operationally sound 
adjustment schemes. For this reason, the Commission has not tried to flesh out all 
the administrative details, nuances and safeguards which would have to be built into 
future transitional assistance — it realises that ongoing analysis and discussion 
would be needed on such issues, including with the sector, before operational 
arrangements are finalised.  
The main conclusions 
Earlier chapters describe the rapid and ongoing change occurring in the TCF sector. 
In particular, many firms have ceased or reduced manufacturing activity in 
Australia and have moved more into design, purchasing/importation, distribution, 
marketing and selling. Indeed, without such diversification, some of these firms 
might not have been able to continue in the sector. Nevertheless, the Commission 
believes that the focus of future transitional assistance needs to remain on firms 
undertaking TCF manufacturing and design activity in Australia, as it is such 
activity which is directly affected by past and future tariff reductions. For this 
reason, the Commission considers there is no reason to depart from the definitions 
of eligible TCF activity under the present SIP. 
This emphasis on targeting manufacturing and design activity in Australia should 
help internationally competitive TCF firms, or those with this potential, to grow and     




thereby to increase or to sustain employment. However, in the Commission’s view, 
it is not appropriate to make transitional assistance conditional on employment 
levels as called for by the TCFUA. Many of the changes required by firms to enable 
them to become internationally competitive will require them to use labour more 
efficiently. Discouraging such changes by requiring firms to maintain or increase 
employment to qualify for transitional assistance would be counterproductive. 
Having weighed up comments from participants in response to the Position Paper, 
the Commission’s main conclusions about the broad approach to post 2005 
transitional assistance are as follows: 
•  For larger TCF firms, future transitional assistance would be best provided 
through a modified version of the existing SIP approach, ie option A. 
•  There is in-principle merit in extending transitional assistance to smaller firms. 
However, significantly lowering the existing $200 000 qualifying threshold for 
eligible expenditure would risk spreading assistance too thinly and would 
increase administrative costs. Any assistance to smaller firms might best be 
provided through a separate arrangement, perhaps along the lines of option C. 
Even then, administrative costs and difficulties would need careful consideration 
to avoid detracting from the contribution such assistance would make towards 
improving the sector’s international competitiveness.  
The rest of this section presents the detailed reasons for these conclusions, while the 
next examines possible modifications to SIP. 
The reasons 
The aim of transitional assistance is to help firms to make significant efforts to 
improve their international competitiveness, rather than just to ‘struggle on’. This 
means that strong emphasis should be given to additionality, ie encouraging firms to 
take steps they would not otherwise take to improve their international 
competitiveness.  
As some participants noted, additionality is a difficult concept to operationalise. 
Additional spending or value added (compared to a base period) may arise from, for 
example, general market growth, rather than additionality in its true sense. Further, 
when placed in the context of a declining sector such as TCF, actions taken by a 
firm to improve competitiveness (for example, enhancing productivity or 
modernising but rationalising its product range) may not result in increased output 
or value added overall. To some extent, options A and C can overcome these 
difficulties by indirect means (see below). But it is a particularly serious flaw with 
option B, which explicitly targets increased value added.     




Additionality can be encouraged by ensuring that assistance is not spread too thinly 
— the higher the subsidy rate the more likely the subsidy is to encourage additional 
spending and behavioural change at a firm level. As well, careful choice of target 
variables can induce firms to do something new and desirable. For that reason, 
adjustment programs often target investment, R&D/innovation, or market 
development, rather than linking assistance with production or sales levels. Further, 
paying assistance in advance of expenditure, rather than after the event, can also 
enhance additionality by providing firms with certainty of funding. Depending on 
their specific provisions, both options A and C are better in these terms than option 
B. 
At the same time, assistance should be flexible and not unduly proscribe what steps 
should be taken by a firm to improve competitiveness. But too much flexibility 
could compromise the additionality objective in two ways: the wider the range of 
eligible expenditure, the closer the arrangement comes to an unconditional 
production bounty rather than an encouragement to real change. Wider eligibility of 
spending types, or numbers of firms, will also necessarily spread funding more 
thinly, thereby diluting any impact on firm behaviour. Option C in theory offers a 
direct way to control these tradeoffs, but careful modification of SIP, ie option A, 
could introduce more flexibility without unduly diminishing the focus on change. 
The extent of tariff reduction faced by different industries and firms, while relevant, 
is less important than the other assessment criteria. As well as depending on 
changes in its tariff protection, the need for a firm to improve international 
competitiveness may also be affected by changes in tariff protection for its upstream 
suppliers or downstream customers. Further, as the Carpet Institute noted: 
… the focus of positive assistance should not be simply to help hold up industry 
suffering from increased import competition, but to develop the industry so that it can 
become internationally competitive and sustain this position. Such positive 
development is vital for all sectors. (sub. PP162, p. 2) 
In any case, this criterion offers little guidance in choosing between options A, B 
and C — each would be able to accommodate differences in tariff reduction levels 
through variation in subsidy rates, were that considered to be desirable. 
Certainty and transparency are important in facilitating additionality — transitional 
support is unlikely to induce significant change if firms are uncertain whether they 
will receive funding for a particular spending initiative to improve competitiveness, 
or cannot understand assistance arrangements. Transparency is also important in 
assuring the community that administration is efficient and funding is provided 
appropriately.      




As noted by participants, option A has the advantage of building on experience with 
the existing SIP. Past experience with value added bounties (option B) indicates that 
their simplicity can be more apparent than real. Giving too much discretion under 
option C to the scheme’s administrators could significantly undermine transparency 
and certainty — but too little would negate some of the potential advantages of this 
option. 
Finally, it is obviously important to avoid unnecessary administrative and 
compliance costs. There is little information on which to judge the relative merits of 
the options in this regard although, given the nature of these sorts of arrangements, 
each would inevitably entail significant costs. However, any departure from existing 
arrangements would add to such costs, at least in the short term. (TCF Services 
considered it would take up to two years to bed in an entirely new scheme 
(sub.  PP174, p.  5).) Hence, because option A builds on the current SIP 
arrangements, it should entail lower transition costs than the other two options. 
In conclusion, while the incremental value added bounty (option B) and competitive 
bidding (option C) approaches would have some advantages over aspects of the 
current SIP, there would be considerable benefits from utilising the learning 
experience and precedents accumulated under the current scheme. The experience 
with the SIP illustrates that the costs for firms and the Government alike of bedding 
down completely new arrangements, and the associated uncertainty about outcomes, 
can be significant. Largely for this reason, the majority of participants favoured a 
modified version of the SIP (option A). Moreover, the Commission sees scope to 
improve the effectiveness of the current program in encouraging firms to improve 
their international competitiveness.  
Small firms 
A recurring theme in submissions was that transitional support should be more 
accessible to small firms. Many suggested that the minimum spending threshold to 
qualify for support should be reduced. Others suggested the introduction of a 
separate competitive bidding scheme for small producers. 
In the Commission’s view, the in-principle case for not discriminating against small 
firms is self evident. The entrepreneurial and innovative skills apparent in many 
small TCF firms suggest that there is good growth potential in this part of the 
sector. Indeed, given the financing difficulties that small firms often face, 
transitional budgetary support might induce more new activity to improve 
international competitiveness than support provided to larger, established firms.     




However, attempting to bring the large number of small firms in the sector within 
the funding net would spread support much more thinly and could cause 
administrative costs to escalate sharply. These problems would be particularly acute 
if better access for small firms was pursued through adjustments to the minimum 
spending threshold. 
Developing a separate transitional assistance scheme for small firms along the lines 
of the option C approach would bring a host of challenges too. These would 
include: defining the meaning of ‘small firms’ for the purpose of the scheme; setting 
eligibility thresholds to avoid spreading assistance too thinly; and defining the scope 
of activities to be assisted. There would also be the need to determine the balance 
between being too prescriptive, in which case the main advantages of the option C 
approach would be lost, and leaving everything to the judgment of the ‘expert 
panel’ administering the scheme, risking loss of transparency and certainty. As well, 
finding panel members with the necessary knowledge, expertise and experience to 
administer such a scheme, while avoiding vested interests, would be difficult. 
Funding allocated to such a scheme would need, in the Commission’s view, to come 
out of total funding allocated for transitional assistance to the TCF sector, rather 
than add to it (see below). Thus, there would be a tradeoff between funding the 
mainstream program and establishing a small firm arrangement. The amount 
required would not necessarily be large — some participants nominated annual 
amounts in the order of $15–20 million as appropriate. But such a figure implies 
tight targeting of assistance given the large number of small firms in the sector. The 
cost of developing such a scheme, and the ongoing administrative and compliance 
costs necessarily incurred, would be further factors militating against such an 
approach, especially if funding levels were low.  
In sum, although the in-principle merit of extending transitional assistance to small 
firms is undoubted, and the possible mechanisms for providing support to small 
firms warrant further consideration, the practical problems could be difficult to 
overcome. 
8.4  Modifying existing arrangements 
This section discusses some modifications to the existing SIP which the 
Commission believes would better focus transitional assistance on encouraging 
improved international competitiveness. It also discusses some changes suggested 
by participants which the Commission considers would detract from that objective.      




As noted, scheme design is difficult, with the ‘devil in the detail’. The Commission 
recognises that further study and consultation with the sector would be needed 
before future arrangements could be finalised. 
Incorporate a clear and explicit objective 
The 2002 DITR review of SIP illustrated some community and industry 
misunderstanding about the objectives of the program. To some extent, the problem 
has been rectified since then, through efforts to clarify definitions of 
R&D/innovation, for example. However, to avoid similar problems with the post 
2005 arrangement, the Commission considers that there is a need to incorporate a 
clearly enunciated and explicit objective, both in the enabling legislation and in the 
detailed specifications of the arrangements. This objective should be to foster the 
development of Australian TCF manufacturing activity that can be viable and 
internationally competitive without special assistance. 
Provide more general support for purchase of state-of-the-art second 
hand equipment and for ancillary expenditure 
Under the current SIP, assistance is available for the purchase of state-of-the-art 
second hand equipment and ancillary expenditure by firms in defined regions of 
TCF dependence (Types 4 and 5 assistance). In each case, such assistance must 
relate to a ‘restructuring initiative’ between two or more unrelated entities. Another 
requirement is that the resultant entity is likely to be more financially viable than if 
the restructuring initiative did not take place. 
However, restructuring of metropolitan firms can be just as valuable in improving 
the TCF sector’s international competitiveness as restructuring of firms in regional 
areas. Perhaps more importantly, independently of restructuring initiatives, purchase 
of appropriate state-of-the-art second hand equipment can offer many firms an 
efficient and effective way to improve their competitiveness.  
The Commission therefore considers that there is a good case for generalising and 
liberalising Types 4 and 5 assistance. The geographic restriction should be removed, 
as should the requirement for assistance to be associated with a restructuring 
initiative between unrelated entities.  
The Commission acknowledges that some firms might be able to improve their 
competitiveness through the purchase of second hand equipment, not judged to be 
state-of-the-art. But, partly for administrative reasons, and partly because genuine     




improvement in international competitiveness is more likely to be achieved, the 
Commission considers that a state-of-the-art restriction is desirable. 
Even with this restriction, additional administrative safeguards would be required. 
State-of-the-art would have to be clearly defined. Many participants requested that 
assistance should be made available to help with restructuring within firms, as well 
as restructuring of unrelated entities. However, to prevent gaming and abuse, 
requirements for purchase of state-of-the-art second hand equipment to be at arms 
length, at fair market values, and from a non-related entity, would probably be 
required. There would also need to be controls on resale. Similarly, assistance for 
ancillary expenditure might have to be restricted to payments made to external 
unrelated entities.  
Subsidise investment in market and brand development 
Many participants considered that the current restriction of SIP support to 
investment and R&D/innovation limits their flexibility to enhance competitiveness 
in the most efficient and effective ways (see chapter 5). Many ideas for extension of 
the menu of allowable expenditures were put forward. 
While such extension could, in principle, encourage increased competitiveness in 
more firms, the Commission considers that, to avoid excessive dilution of assistance 
and for administrative reasons, the menu should continue to be restricted. For the 
large firms in particular, this would not greatly limit their options — as discussed in 
chapter 5, payment arrangements effectively allow firms the freedom to choose 
forms of expenditure most likely to improve their future competitiveness, provided 
they incur the necessary qualifying expenditure in the form of investment and/or 
R&D/innovation. 
Nonetheless, many participants argued that the current restrictions particularly 
affect the clothing industry. As discussed above, there is no sound reason for 
transitional assistance to TCF industries to be allocated in proportion to the tariff 
reductions they face. Nor is there prima facie reason for assistance to be divided in 
proportion to industry output or sales. However, the Commission accepts that the 
current focus on investment, and the current definitions of R&D/innovation, can 
make it difficult for clothing firms to access SIP assistance, even when they are, for 
example, making considerable efforts to improve their competitiveness through 
market and brand development, or through ‘visual’ innovation.  
For this reason, there was much comment from participants on the merits, or 
otherwise, of further liberalising the current definitions of R&D and innovation to 
extend assistance to a greater range of activity. For example, the TFIA considered     




that current definitions under SIP do not ‘properly accommodate the innovative 
product development … in the wider clothing and fashion industries’ (sub. PP164, 
p. 3). But firms in some other industry segments opposed such extension of eligible 
activity, as that would possibly dilute their assistance. 
In the Commission’s view, substantially widening the scope of eligible R&D and 
innovation would be likely to reopen considerable uncertainty about interpretation 
experienced earlier in the life of the SIP. Importantly, this has diminished in 
importance, as time has passed, and appeals have declined, to the benefit of all 
parties. Further, the Commission is not convinced that assisting ‘visual innovation’ 
will necessarily result in a sustainable competitive advantage for clothing firms.  
Rather than attempting to expand the scope of the current definitions of R&D and 
innovation, the Commission considers that a better alternative would be to expand 
eligible expenditure to include market and brand development, including for export 
markets. This would help firms in the clothing industry with a reasonable prospect 
of becoming competitive in a lower tariff environment and, in turn, help their 
suppliers to maintain their domestic markets. But more generally, many firms, not 
just those in the clothing industry, undertake considerable market and brand 
development to improve competitiveness. Spending in these areas will clearly be 
necessary for firms looking to move out of production of standardised commodities 
into branded or otherwise differentiated products, or to develop export markets, and 
to exploit market niches more generally.  
Accordingly, the Commission considers that in the post 2005 transitional support 
regime it would be appropriate to extend the eligible expenditure categories to 
investment by firms in market and brand development (including export market 
development), in both instances in respect to TCF products manufactured in 
Australia. Precise definitions would again require careful formulation to help ensure 
that subsidies contributed to a genuine improvement in the long term 
competitiveness of recipient firms, rather than simply subsidising ‘business as 
usual’ expenditure. 
Fine tune definitions of R&D and innovation? 
While the Commission considers that it would be preferable to extend support to 
market and brand development than to liberalise the existing definitions of R&D 
and innovation, there would be merit in giving further consideration to whether: 
•  current limits on R&D salaries remain appropriate; 
•  collaborative R&D/innovation by groups of firms should be eligible for 
assistance; and     




•  expenditure on process improvement to bring a firm up to industry best practice 
should be eligible for funding support. 
Discontinue Type 3 assistance 
According to the 2002 DITR report on SIP, the rationale for the current Type 3 
value added assistance is to reward additional value added arising from investment 
or R&D/innovation by the firm. However, in practice, Type 3 assistance is not 
contingent on additional value added being achieved — it is provided automatically, 
provided qualifying expenditure on investment etc. is made, and the relevant caps 
are not exceeded (see below). From this perspective, it is not clear why the subsidy 
rates for Types 1 and 2 assistance were not just set at higher rates in the first place 
— Bruck Textiles commented that, for many firms, Type 3 operates purely as a 
doubling mechanism (trans., p. 331). 
Discontinuing Type 3 assistance would have implications for the distribution of 
assistance for some firms. This is because, in contrast to eligible claims in excess of 
the overall assistance cap of five per cent of sales, which can be rolled over into 
subsequent years, value added in excess of the separate Type 3 cap cannot. Textor 
claimed that: 
A larger company has less chance of capping out on Type 3 and hence receives an 
effective 40% for an approved capital investment. In the 2002 claim Textor will receive 
an effective 26% grant due to the cap out in Type 3 grants. (sub. PP135, p. 2) 
Nevertheless, the Commission considers that Type 3 assistance should be 
discontinued. As currently implemented, these grants simply increase the rates of 
subsidy for investment in plant and equipment and spending on R&D and 
innovation. But the way they are paid means that the increased rate of subsidy can 
vary arbitrarily among firms. Discontinuing these grants would help to simplify the 
new regime. It would also release funds that could be used to increase the subsidy 
rates for investment and R&D, and/or to pay for the eligibility extensions outlined 
above. 
If Type 3 assistance were to be continued, however, then the Commission considers 
that it should continue to be linked to the receipt of assistance under the other grant 
types. As discussed in relation to option B in the previous section, the case for 
subsidisation of value added (alone) is not strong. Further, if Type 3 assistance were 
to continue, the current cap based on value added should be discontinued, with 
WTO compliance issues addressed solely through the overall funding to sales cap.     




Speed up payment to firms 
Under the present SIP arrangements, all payments to firms are made in retrospect. 
The period for reimbursements varies widely — from as little as two months or so, 
to a year or more.  
Self evidently, avoiding long delays in payment would enhance a firm’s cash flow, 
and improve certainty, with possibly beneficial flow-on effects to competitiveness.  
However, the payment lag depends, to some extent, on the actions of the firm: 
•  Assistance for eligible expenditure, particularly investment, made late in a 
financial year can often be paid to the firm very early in the next financial year. 
(Reimbursement for R&D/innovation can take longer to process.) 
•  Advances of 50 per cent of the expected assistance amount can be paid to a firm 
before AusIndustry’s full auditing and assessment of a claim is completed — 
this brings forward a significant part of the payment where these administrative 
processes are expected to be lengthy. 
Administrative requirements, including the need to allow for the possibility of 
modulation, mean that some delay in payment is inevitable. Payment rates for a 
particular financial year cannot be finalised until all relevant claims have been 
submitted.  
The available 50 per cent advance is an attempt to overcome this problem, without 
running the risk of ‘overpaying’ firms, and requiring grant repayments if a 
significant degree of modulation eventuates. Keeping the advance to less than 100 
per cent also allows a ‘margin of safety’ for the circumstance where a firm’s claim 
was overstated.  
Nevertheless, under present arrangements, modulation has not been required so far. 
Indeed, there are suggestions that there could be some considerable underspending 
of total SIP funds available over the life of the program. In this situation, there is 
merit in investigating ways to speed up payment to firms. For example, at least for 
the remainder of the present scheme, the proportion of advance payment could be 
increased quite substantially to, say, 75 per cent. (This would require reassessment 
in the post 2005 regime, however, as the suggestions discussed above could have 
considerable implications for the amount and distribution of funding.) 
Finally, there would be merit in speeding up decision making as far as possible, 
without incurring excessive administrative costs in AusIndustry.     




Eliminate payments to firms in administration/receivership 
Providing assistance to firms which are likely to leave TCF manufacturing, or even 
go out of business, is wasteful when assessed against the objective of fostering the 
development of internationally competitive TCF firms in a low tariff environment. 
Although such support could help firms to ‘exit gracefully’ and possibly assist them 
to pay employee entitlements, the Commission considers that these latter objectives 
are better encouraged by a further tariff pause to 2010 (after the 2005 cuts take 
effect), and by explicit mechanisms to assist displaced workers (see chapter 9 and 
section 10.2).  
Some provisions in the current SIP seek to ensure that a firm receiving funding 
support is viable and likely to continue TCF operations beyond the period of the SIP 
scheme. But, in practice, judging a firm’s prospects has sometimes proved difficult. 
Hence, there have been examples of firms which have gone offshore, left the sector, 
or failed shortly after receiving SIP assistance. 
Current arrangements make provision for special advance payments to firms in 
administration/receivership, but still in operation. Again, the Commission 
recognises that, in some cases, payment of assistance — a reimbursement for 
expenditure already made — could enhance a firm’s capacity to trade through and 
survive. In other cases, such assistance could help fund redundancy payments and 
other exit costs. Nevertheless, given the objective of transitional budgetary 
assistance, and limited overall funding, the Commission considers that firms in 
administration/receivership at the time assistance would normally be paid should be 
ineligible for assistance under the post 2005 transitional support regime. 
Enhance transparency and certainty, simplify administration and 
compliance 
Enhancing transparency and certainty, and simplifying administration and 
compliance, would reduce costs for firms and the Government. It would also help to 
assure the wider community that the scheme is administered efficiently and funding 
provided appropriately. But, perhaps more importantly, it would enhance the 
prospects of firms undertaking additional expenditure that is likely to improve their 
future competitiveness. 
However, there are limits on the extent of transparency and certainty possible in an 
inherently complex scheme such as SIP. Specification of clear objectives would be 
an improvement in this context (see above). But some of the possible changes 
mooted above might reduce certainty and transparency, at least while they were 
being bedded down.      




Nonetheless, particularly given the apparent complexity of SIP compared with other 
assistance programs such as the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment 
Scheme, there are areas in which improvements could be made to enhance 
transparency and certainty: 
•  Write the new scheme in simple and understandable language. This would 
provide some compliance cost savings by enabling more firms to prepare claims 
using their own internal resources, rather than consultants. As such, it would be 
particularly helpful for smaller firms. 
•  Continue to clarify definitions such as R&D and innovation. The objective 
should be to increase certainty and clarity, rather than to expand the scope of 
assistance.  
In the Position Paper, the Commission raised the possibility of a system of binding 
rulings to enhance transparency and certainty. This received some support from 
participants, for example from TCF Services (sub. PP174, p. 8).  
Implementing a system of binding rulings would, however, raise difficult practical 
issues. For example, would they apply firm by firm or generically? Would 
commercial-in-confidence restrictions limit their usefulness? How much flexibility 
would there be for a firm to vary agreed expenditure plans before the ruling lost 
effect? Should there be negative as well as positive binding rulings?  
Further, given learning and precedent as SIP has progressed through its third year, 
certainty about the eligibility of various types of spending has improved 
significantly. Thus, while the issue of binding rulings might be worth considering 
again in the context of a future modified arrangement, at this stage the benefits of 
developing a system for binding rulings are unlikely to outweigh the costs. 
Reconsider subsidy rates and qualifying thresholds 
Implementation of the kinds of changes discussed above would have implications 
for subsidy rates and qualifying expenditure thresholds. These issues require full 
assessment in the context of the timing and funding arrangements for future 
transitional assistance (see below). They are complex and further clouded by 
uncertainty about whether all of the available SIP funding will be spent by the end 
of the current program. But whatever adjustments are finally made, the Commission 
considers that it is important that subsidy rates and expenditure thresholds together 
ensure that assistance provided to individual firms is sufficient to encourage 
spending that can make a real difference to their future competitiveness.     




Several participants requested ‘regional uplift factors’ — that is, higher rates of 
assistance for firms located in regional areas. As discussed above, however, the 
Commission considers that firms in metropolitan areas often face challenges just as 
severe as those faced by regional firms. Indeed, some firms noted advantages in 
operating in regional areas. More importantly, the objective of transitional 
assistance is to assist firms to improve their competitiveness, not to deal with 
regional problems. The Commission notes that, if the need arises, general measures 
such as the Regional Partnership arrangements are available to help regions 
experiencing problems from adjustment in the TCF sector (chapter 4).  
No justification for extending support to upstream or downstream 
activities, including early stage processing 
During the inquiry, several participants requested the Commission to consider 
transitional assistance for early stage wool processing. For example, the Australian 
Wool Processors Council sought inclusion of the early stage processing (ESP) 
industry in TCF support programs through introduction of: 
… a special early stage wool processing industry development program. The special 
industry development program would be geared towards the specific needs of the early 
stage wool processors given the unique market conditions now confronting the 
industry. Funding grants of up to 7.5% of a company’s value added triggered by agreed 
expenditure or performance targets should be made available to ensure the long term 
future of the Australian ESP industry. (sub. 127, p. 2) 
It estimated this assistance would cost about $12 million a year. While the Council 
acknowledged that the ESP industry ‘does not need access to a SIP like program to 
facilitate adjustment to a reduction in tariffs’ it said that such activity was 
‘recognised as a part of the TCF industry’ (sub. 127, pp. 2–3). It further argued that 
the ESP industry needed assistance to ‘consolidate and reposition itself’ in response 
to ‘an extremely difficult competitive position at this time’ (sub. PP127, p. 1). 
The Commission accepts that many early stage processors are currently facing 
difficulties because of protective barriers overseas, the growing competitiveness of 
China, global overcapacity and a decline in the production of Australian wool. It 
also acknowledges some linkages between the ESP industry and later stages of TCF 
production in Australia. Nevertheless, the ESP industry’s current difficulties are not 
primarily linked to changes in Australian TCF tariffs. Thus, the Commission does 
not consider that transitional budgetary assistance available for the TCF sector 
should be extended to such production activity.      




8.5  How much for how long? 
The Position Paper approach 
The Commission noted that under its preferred tariff option at that stage, parts of the 
TCF sector would not face a 5 per cent tariff until 2015. It argued that ending SIP-
style funding much before then would see firms in those segments making the last 
part of the transition to lower tariffs without the support that others in the sector 
would have enjoyed. It further noted that extension of budgetary support beyond 
2010 could provide an additional adjustment cushion for the rest of the sector in its 
efforts to operate successfully under the 5 per cent tariff applying from 2010. 
The Commission also pointed to the need to strike a balance between giving the 
sector time to adjust to future tariff changes and signalling that its special assistance 
treatment will need to end no later than 2015. It therefore argued that, like tariffs, 
transitional support should be progressively reduced. Given the competing 
considerations, however, the Commission commented that the appropriate duration 
of, and funding levels for, a successor to the SIP was a matter of judgment. To 
encourage comment, the Commission put forward the following possible approach 
in the Position Paper: 
•  After current arrangements expire in July 2005, budgetary support be provided 
for a further period of eight years. 
•  Total funding for the four year period 2005-06 to 2008-09 should match existing 
annual average available funding in nominal terms. 
•  Funding then be halved for the second four year period 2009-10 to 2012-13. 
•  Budgetary assistance terminate on 1 July 2013. 
Responses to the Position Paper 
There was some limited support for the approach put forward in the Position Paper: 
for example, from Australian Weaving Mills (sub.  PP163, p.  2), the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (sub.  PP147, p.  9) and TCF Services 
(sub. PP174, p. 4). The New South Wales Government also supported an eight year 
timeframe, but suggested year by year reductions in levels of support from $182 
million in 2005-06, scaling down each year to $23 million in the final year 
(sub.  PP175, pp.  6–7) — delivering about the same total overall funding as the 
Position Paper proposal.     




Generally, however, participants reiterated their initial requests for at least a 10-year 
extension of transitional assistance, with no reductions in annual funding levels over 
the period. Often their requests were aligned to the view that tariffs should be 
maintained, and budgetary support provided, until other countries increased access 
to their markets (chapter 6).  
Pacific Brands adopted a somewhat different approach. While supporting a 10-year 
extension of transitional assistance, in line with its views (see above) that assistance 
should be more focused on the clothing industry, it suggested that: 
If there is a case for reduced funding in the second 5 years … this would be better 
implemented by reducing the coverage of the adjustment assistance to those in 
transition rather than spreading the funding reductions across all sectors whether still 
moving to the 5% end point or not. (sub. PP138, p. 3) 
The Commission’s views on timing and funding 
A range of considerations are relevant in determining how long transitional support 
should extend beyond 2005, and its level of funding: 
•  Under the Commission’s preferred tariff option, the reduction to 5 per cent in 
the tariff on clothing and finished textiles would not occur until 2015. As noted, 
ending transitional funding much earlier would see firms in those segments 
making the last part of the tariff transition without the sort of support that others 
in the sector had enjoyed.  
•  Even though firms elsewhere in the sector would be operating at a 5 per cent 
tariff from 2010, many could experience knock-on adjustment pressures 
associated with the impending tariff reduction for clothing and finished textiles 
in 2015. 
•  Reinforcing the message to firms that special assistance treatment is coming to 
an end is important. This suggests that, like tariffs, transitional support should be 
progressively reduced. 
•  As part of a package to end the sector’s special assistance treatment, it would be 
difficult to justify funding support higher than that provided by the current SIP. 
•  But at the same time, in facilitating a seamless transition from the current 
regime, there is a case for maintaining funding levels in the early years of the 
new program. 
The Commission remains of the view that the funding profile outlined in the 
Position Paper would strike a reasonable balance between these sometimes 
opposing considerations:     




•  The new transitional support program would operate for eight years from 2005. 
•  Funding for the first four year period would be equivalent to total payments in 
the last four years of the current SIP (in nominal terms). 
•  Funding for the subsequent four year period would be halved. 
•  Transitional support would then terminate in 2013. 
There are other possible options, of course, including that proposed by Pacific 
Brands. A view can be taken that the prime purpose of transitional assistance is to 
help firms enhance their international competitiveness in the face of future tariff 
reductions, not those made in the past. Indeed, this is the rationale of the current SIP 
arrangements. From this viewpoint, there would be some merit in ending access to 
transitional assistance by 2010 for all firms except those in the apparel and certain 
finished textiles industries, with access for those latter groups ending no later than 
2015. Against this, as noted above, linkages between firms mean that TCF 
industries that provide intermediate inputs to apparel and certain finished textile 
products would inevitably face further tariff related adjustment pressures after 2010. 
For this reason, as discussed above, it is not appropriate to make a precise 
delineation of transitional assistance between TCF industries based on the extent of 
the future tariff reductions they face. 
Another approach would be that proposed by the New South Wales Government, 
for higher funding in the early years, scaling down year by year. This lined up with 
its proposal for tariffs to be similarly scaled down (chapter 6). In the final years of 
such an arrangement, however, available assistance would be so small as to make 
little difference to firm behaviour. Yet possibly significant administrative and 
compliance costs would continue to be incurred. 
Finally, the Commission notes that provided adjustments were made to hold the 
total quantum of funding constant in present value terms, a time profile of say two 
five year periods, or five years and three years, would most likely make little 
difference to outcomes. Hence, in some senses, the key thrust of the Commission’s 
proposal is to set an indicative benchmark for the present value of funding for the 
new transitional support arrangement. However, though the Commission sees scope 
for some variation in the time profile of this support, if the sector’s special tariff 
treatment is not to end until 2015, distributing all funding very quickly after 2005 
would raise the prospect of subsequent calls for more transitional assistance. 
Facilitating a seamless transition 
As seamless a transition as possible from the current SIP to the post 2005 
arrangements would be of considerable benefit to firms. Hence, the Commission     




considers that claim moneys not paid by the end of the current SIP program because 
of the five per cent sales cap should be carried over into the modified scheme so 
that the companies concerned can be paid their entitlements in due course. The 
Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association pointed out that this ‘provides 
certainty and … ensures that programs being developed aren’t put on hold’ (trans., 
p. 362). However, it is important to distinguish between funding for this purpose 
and those funds uncommitted because of the lack of eligible spending by firms. In 
the Commission’s view, such funds should lapse, with any underspend reflected in 
funding levels for the post 2005 transitional support instrument. 
•  A further period of transitional assistance is warranted after 2005 to help TCF 
firms which manufacture in Australia to improve their international 
competitiveness, as further tariff reductions are implemented. 
•  Transitional assistance arrangements should avoid spreading funding too thinly 
to make a difference to firms’ behaviour. 
•  Post 2005 transitional assistance should follow the approach of the existing SIP, 
with some modifications to improve its effectiveness. Although further analysis 
and discussion with the sector will be needed before operational arrangements 
are finalised, the following modifications have merit: 
•  incorporate a clearly enunciated and explicit objective; namely, to foster the 
development of Australian TCF manufacturing activity that can be viable and 
internationally competitive without special assistance; 
•  provide generalised support for purchase of state-of-the-art second hand 
equipment and for ancillary expenditure; 
•  subsidise investment in market and brand development associated with the 
manufacture of TCF products in Australia; 
•  discontinue specific additional assistance for value added; 
•  accelerate payments to firms as far as possible; 
•  eliminate provision for funding support to firms in administration or 
receivership; and 
•  enhance transparency and certainty by writing the new arrangements in 
simple and understandable language.  
•  An initiative to help small TCF firms to access transitional budgetary assistance 
warrants further consideration, but would require careful thought about how to 
address significant implementation problems, while still providing cost-effective 
support. 
FINDINGS ON TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE     




•  Transitional support should not be extended to early stage wool processors — 
although they are currently experiencing some problems, these are not primarily 
linked to changes in Australian TCF tariffs. 
•  The following funding profile would provide the benefits of a seamless transition 
from the current SIP, while reinforcing the signal to the sector that its special 
assistance treatment is coming to an end: 
•  The new transitional support program would operate for eight years from 
2005. 
•  Funding for the first four year period would be equivalent to total payments 
in the last four years of the current SIP (in nominal terms). 
•  Funding for the second four year period would be halved. 
•  Transitional support would then terminate in 2013. 
•  The transition from the current SIP to the post 2005 arrangements should be as 
seamless as possible. Funding claims not paid to firms by the end of the current 
SIP because of the five per cent sales cap should be carried over into the post 
2005 scheme so that the companies concerned can be paid their entitlements in 
due course.     





9  Labour adjustment support 
Current labour adjustment assistance arrangements provide support to those who 
lose their jobs, including income support and help with retraining or re-
employment. However, such arrangements are not specifically designed to cater for 
large scale job losses resulting from the closure of large firms.  
This is particularly relevant in the case of the TCF sector. As noted in earlier 
chapters, there is still extensive adjustment to occur in the sector and inevitably 
there will be more firm closures. Given the ethnic and educational characteristics of 
much of the TCF workforce and the continuing importance of TCF activity in some 
regions, those losing their jobs may often have difficulty in finding alternative 
employment, particularly if they are part of a large group of workers retrenched at 
the one time. Accordingly, in the Position Paper the Commission sought advice 
from participants on how best to deliver targeted support to retrenched TCF workers 
in these sorts of situations.  
In response, there was agreement from many participants that special support for 
retrenched TCF workers, beyond the general support that is currently available, 
would help to facilitate what may prove to be a difficult adjustment process. 
Encapsulating these views, the South Australian Government said: 
… the particular characteristics of the TCF workforce, as well as the significant 
adjustment still ahead of the sector, demand a more targeted approach. 
(sub. PP177, p. 4) 
This chapter proceeds on the basis that there will be a justifiable need for specific 
adjustment assistance to TCF workers during the transition period, where large 
scale, or regionally significant, job shedding occurs and there is a risk of disruptive 
adjustment. It describes some current general arrangements, examines why they 
might not be sufficient to meet the needs of displaced TCF workers in these 
situations and considers what sort of additional responses could facilitate re-
employment. 
9.1  What general support is available 
Commonwealth Government assistance to displaced workers is currently provided 
through:     




•  Newstart Allowance, which provides income support to job seekers. Payments 
are subject to income/assets tests applied to both the job seeker and their partner. 
Job seekers who have received a redundancy package may have to wait up to 13 
weeks to receive support. Mutual obligation requires recipients to undertake job 
search, usually through the Job Network, or participate in other activities such as 
Work for the Dole. 
•  The Job Network, which provides help in finding employment for all registered 
job seekers. More information on the Job Network is provided below. 
In addition, some State Governments provide labour adjustment support, although 
these are all on a much smaller scale than the Commonwealth programs and in 
some cases firms themselves provide assistance (see below). 
The Job Network 
Since 1998 the Commonwealth Government has purchased and regulated 
employment services for job seekers through the Job Network. The network now 
encompasses over 100 private, community and State Government organisations that 
are awarded business through a competitive tender process. 
Job Network providers are remunerated by the Government according to the 
services they provide and the outcomes that they achieve. Providers are required to 
provide a minimum level of services to each job seeker, but may provide more at 
their discretion. Some reimbursement is on a fee-for-service basis, with an 
additional outcome fee paid if the provider places a job seeker into either 
employment or further education. 
Outcome payments are linked to the estimated difficulty of finding a job for 
particular categories of individuals. Hence, job seekers that are likely to have more 
difficulty finding work, for example older workers, those from a non-English 
speaking background and the long term unemployed, will attract a higher outcome 
fee for the successful provider.  
Job Network processes and associated income support are triggered when displaced 
workers register with Centrelink. The timing of the particular services delivered to a 
job seeker will depend on their length of unemployment and on their assessed 
degree of disadvantage in finding employment: 
•  All job seekers can use job placement services. This includes access to job 
advertisements, the use of telephones, faxes and computers and some advice on 
résumé preparation.     





•  More intensive support is provided to those who have been unemployed for 
3 months or who are assessed as having a high level of disadvantage. These 
intensive support services vary depending on the needs of the individual and the 
judgment of their provider and range from simple job search training (such as 
help with résumé preparation and interview skills), through to more tailored 
support (such as English language courses) provided to the more disadvantaged 
job seekers and the long term unemployed. 
•  Provision also exists to provide highly specialised support (not necessarily to 
find work) to those assessed as having ‘severe’ disadvantage. These provisions 
apply to less than 5 per cent of Job Network registrants. 
The Job Network was the subject of a recent review by the Productivity 
Commission (PC 2002a). While the Commission found that overall employment 
outcomes were similar to previous programs, the Job Network achieved them at 
lower cost.  
State Government programs 
In recent years, some State Governments, notably Queensland, Victoria and 
Western Australia, have sought to augment Commonwealth employment services, 
especially in regard to assistance to disadvantaged job seekers. However, job 
seekers receiving assistance under State Government programs are generally not 
permitted to access corresponding Commonwealth assistance and visa versa. 
Some of these programs have specifically targeted retrenched workers. For instance 
in Queensland, the Worker Assistance Program (WAP) provides assistance where 
15 or more workers are facing retrenchment. Where larger scale retrenchments have 
been announced or have occurred, there is provision to establish a ‘shop front’ to 
provide assistance to those workers concerned. Special assistance programs are also 
in place in Victoria and Western Australia for forestry employees facing 
retrenchment as a result of changes to government forestry policies. These programs 
all offer a combination of training (including assistance with résumé preparation 
and interview techniques) and re-skilling, wage subsidies and relocation support.  
The Victorian and Western Australian WAPs have only been running since late 
2002, while the Queensland WAP began in 1999. Over 3500 workers have received 
assistance under the Queensland scheme since 1999, with 63 per cent of recipients 
subsequently finding employment. This percentage is similar to the success rate 
achieved by the Victorian WAP for 350 forestry workers so far assisted.     




9.2  Does current Job Network support meet the 
specific needs of TCF workers? 
The Job Network is designed to address the needs of individual job seekers rather 
than the requirements of a large group of retrenched workers from a single firm or 
factory. Hence, when a large firm closes it may be difficult to ensure that all 
displaced workers receive adequate attention in the short term. This could be a 
particular problem in regional areas where often there are a limited number of Job 
Network providers.  
Another problem is that to access the Job Network, individuals are required to be 
unemployed and registered with Centrelink. For some, accessing Job Network 
services after retrenchment may not be a problem. However, displaced workers 
without good communication skills or a limited knowledge of Australia’s 
unemployment support arrangements, may find it more difficult to access these 
services. This is relevant in the TCF industry, since there is a high proportion of 
employees who are from a non-English speaking background or who do not have 
recent experience of looking for work (see chapter 4). 
Moreover, this ‘retrospectivity’ effectively rules out early intervention by Job 
Network providers to assess the job search skills and training needs of workers 
where retrenchments have been announced, but not yet given effect. In the course of 
the Job Network review, the Commission was told that, because services can only 
be provided to those who have become unemployed, Job Network providers are 
unable to provide ‘on site’ assistance to employees prior to the closure of a firm. 
A consequence of the Job Network’s focus on outcomes is that it concentrates 
assistance on those who are perceived as having the greatest chance of finding 
employment. For this reason, the support provided to those displaced TCF workers 
considered to be more difficult to place in employment may vary considerably 
under the normal Job Network provisions. 
In summary, considerations such as these suggest that, by itself, the Job Network 
may not be sufficient to meet the needs of some displaced workers, including TCF 
workers, particularly where large scale, or regionally significant, job shedding is 
involved.     





9.3  What augmentation is required and how should 
services be delivered? 
Designing assistance that delivers effective labour adjustment support is a job best 
left to those with direct experience in delivering and administering such support. 
Hence, in the context of augmenting the Job Network services available to displaced 
TCF workers, the following discussion confines itself to the broad objectives of 
labour adjustment assistance and desirable features of the support to be provided. 
Examples of the views of participants are set out in box 9.1. 
 
Box 9.1  Participants’ suggestions for labour adjustment assistance 
The Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia said that its experience 
suggests that:  
•  targeted assistance is far more effective than general assistance;  
•  it is vital to access workers prior to them leaving the workplace;  
•  the people delivering the assistance must be known to the workers and be trusted by them;  
•  the providers of the assistance need to be located near the workplace but not be in the 
workplace;  
•  non-English speaking workers are reluctant to approach Centrelink and training providers;  
•  if workers are not provided with income assistance they are unable to consider re-training 
options as they are driven by the need for immediate income;  
•  an integrated advocacy approach is required, in effect a one-stop shop which provides and 
identifies what workers require and helps them navigate existing services and find out what 
assistance is available. (sub. PP154, p. 14) 
The City of Darebin called for: 
… more practical solutions through programs to re/up skill employees who are forced into 
redundancy through business closures resulting from tariff reductions. (sub. PP151, p. 4) 
The Geelong and Region Trades and Labour Council suggested that government: 
Fund a retraining program similar to the Labour Adjustment Program (LAP) that is specific to 
the TCF sector and pays workers for the period of retraining. (sub. PP141, p. 2) 
The South Australian Government stated that: 
the particular characteristics of the TCF workforce … demand a more targeted approach … 
[there should be] a sector-specific communications campaign … which informs workers of 
programs (general and direct) which would be available to them should they be displaced 
from their employment … [this] should be targeted at workers prior to loss of employment … 
(sub. PP177, p. 4) 
 
 
In general, the Commission considers that special labour adjustment support for the 
TCF sector should concentrate on situations where large scale, or regionally 
significant, job losses are involved and attempt to:     




•  improve the prospects of TCF workers who have been retrenched or have been 
given notice of retrenchment in finding employment in a reasonable timeframe; 
•  provide such outcomes in a cost-effective manner; and 
•  avoid as far as possible duplication of the services already available through the 
Job Network and any other current arrangements. 
Some participants argued that assistance should include non-means tested financial 
support during retraining or where displaced TCF workers do not receive their full 
entitlements (over and above any support from the General Employee Entitlements 
Redundancy Scheme). For example, the TCFUA, ‘strongly advocates for future 
retraining programs to incorporate income support that is not means tested’ 
(sub. 33, p. 73).  
However, delivering such support could be expensive. Further, income support, 
albeit means tested, is generally available to all displaced workers including those 
from the TCF sector. (As discussed in chapter 10, the Commission has proposed an 
independent inquiry to examine efficient ways of providing greater security for 
employee entitlements.) 
The Commission considers that sector-specific support should focus on addressing 
the gaps in the Job Network and generally available programs in keeping with the 
objectives outlined above.  
Past experience and overseas approaches can provide guidance 
In seeking to meet the above objectives, there is considerable experience to draw 
on. This experience includes previous TCF-specific assistance and other overseas 
labour adjustment schemes. A description of some of these programs is contained in 
box 9.2. 
The experience of previous programs points to features likely to promote better 
outcomes for retrenched workers and, just as importantly, some that will not. For 
instance, the TCF Labour Adjustment Program (LAP), which operated during the 
1990s, did not permit participants to find alternative employment in the TCF sector. 
In hindsight, this restriction appears to have been an integral factor in the poor 
outcomes achieved. Appendix table B.17 shows that in the 3 years to 1997 (part of 
the period for which the LAP ran), 28 per cent of retrenched TCF workers, 
subsequently found employment in the TCF sector. Yet this avenue of re-
employment was denied to LAP participants.     






Box 9.2  Labour adjustment programs in Australia and overseas 
The TCF Labour Adjustment Program 
The TCF Labour Adjustment Program (LAP) ran from 1988 to 1997 and assisted 
retrenched TCF workers to gain employment outside the sector. The LAP provided 
participants with wage subsidies, training (the most common form of assistance 
provided) and relocation assistance for up to one year. Under the program, participants 
were not permitted to find re-employment in the TCF sector, nor were they permitted to 
develop TCF-specific skills. 
In total, 25 per cent of LAP participants found employment within three months of 
receiving assistance. Although these employment outcomes are low, they were at least 
partly affected by the bar on participants finding work in the TCF sector. 
Firm specific adjustment assistance 
Recently, firm specific assistance has been provided to workers at Bradmill and Yakka. 
In the former case, assistance funded by the receivers was delivered by the TCFUA. In 
the latter case, the support was provided by the company when it closed a plant at 
Shepparton. In both cases, workers were contacted prior to retrenchment and were 
helped to:  
•  find employment, through the use of project officers who contacted TCF companies 
and other employers on behalf of the workers; 
•  develop their job seeking skills, including help with resume preparation, interview 
skills and motivation; and 
•  access training programs, including English language courses. 
In the case of the Bradmill workers, the TCFUA placed project officers, with former 
experience in the TCF industry, close to the Bradmill factories concerned. In 
conversations with retrenched workers, these project officers found that most 
participants were not interested in lengthy training courses. Most could not afford the 
time out of work and were cautious about re-entering formal education. 
In both cases, over half of those that responded to the follow up surveys found 
employment within a six month period. Although it is unclear that this success rate is 
much better than that achieved by the Job Network, the characteristics of some of 
those who found new jobs (many were of mature age and from a non-English speaking 
background) may have inhibited their re-employment prospects. [Indeed, the results of 
these programs were slightly better and were achieved over a shorter time period than 
those from the Webber and Weller (2001) study which surveyed TCF workers 
retrenched during late 1992 and early 1993. The results of this study were widely cited 
by participants.] Moreover, the aspects of these programs that contributed to majority 
of participants finding employment are clearly relevant in the context of sector-wide 
adjustment support. 
(Continued next page) 
 
     





Box 9.2  (continued) 
Overseas programs 
In the United Kingdom and the United States, there is general assistance available to 
workers when a large factory closes down. 
In the UK, the Job Transition Service (previously known as Rapid Response units) 
provides tailored support in areas where large scale redundancies are occurring and 
where the existing assistance infrastructure may not be able to deliver the necessary 
support. The assistance provided includes: 
•  setting up a ‘job shop’ on the employer’s premises; 
•  a fast track claims process for redundant employees; and 
•  early access to employment service programs (such as basic English skills, basic 
employment training and, in some cases, specific vocational training). 
In the US, the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment program requires large 
employers to give prior notice of retrenchments. Federal agencies then provide these 
retrenched workers with a combination of training, job search assistance, relocation 
allowances, as well as income support, beyond that provided by unemployment 
insurance. In some senses, however, this more generous adjustment assistance 
provided in the US can be viewed as compensation for the lack of a broad social safety 
net that exists in the EU, Canada and Australia. 
Source: IC (1997), TCFUA (2002), US Department of Labour (2001) and UK Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment (2001) 
 
 
Further, the focus on retraining in the LAP — a necessary consequence of the 
restriction on re-employment — appears to have further contributed to the poor 
outcomes achieved. This is particularly so as LAP participants were not required to 
look for work while retraining — possibly leading some participants to reduce their 
job search for the duration of the training period, and further eroding their 
employment prospects. 
Taking a more pro-active approach 
The recent experience with the firm-specific assistance delivered by the TCFUA at 
Bradmill and by Yakka, suggests that early intervention can improve retrenched 
workers’ chances of finding alternative employment. Such early intervention is also 
a key feature of Queensland’s Worker Assistance Program and the UK Job 
Transition Service (box 9.2).  
Early intervention, where there is prior notice of retrenchment, would provide a 
‘bridge’ to assistance for those workers who because of information or     





communication problems could otherwise have difficulty in accessing the Job 
Network. Moreover, early intervention would enable assistance to be provided to 
retrenched workers prior to their leaving the workforce rather than after they have 
become unemployed. The establishment of a ‘job shop’ in firms anticipating large 
scale retrenchments, similar to that of the Queensland Worker Assistance Program 
and the UK Job Transition Service, would be one vehicle for delivering such 
support. 
Even where there is no prior notice of retrenchment, there may still be scope to 
provide assistance to displaced TCF workers at the time of, and following, 
retrenchment to assist them in finding alternative employment.  
Involving people that workers are familiar with 
Involving individuals with previous experience in the TCF industry could also help 
retrenched workers find new jobs or access general assistance programs. The 
TCFUA reported that workers responded positively to project officers, employed in 
delivering assistance to Bradmill workers, that had previous experience in the 
sector.  
Focusing on finding a job 
The TCFUA experience of delivering assistance to Bradmill workers suggests that 
many retrenched workers are not interested in retraining, instead putting a priority 
on re-employment. Indeed, the firm-specific assistance delivered by the TCFUA at 
Bradmill and by Yakka focused on finding a job for participants, directing them to 
retraining only when clearly necessary, rather than as a matter of course. This 
feature is also integral to Job Network arrangements and would also be appropriate 
in any future sector-specific arrangement. 
However, some individuals may not be able to obtain a further job without some 
retraining or re-skilling. The nature of the training provided in these circumstances 
should, of course, depend on the needs of each individual. As a general rule, 
however, training provisions would probably concentrate on addressing TCF sector-
related barriers to re-employment including, where relevant, providing basic 
English language and literacy skills for those from a non-English speaking 
background, or job marketing skills (such as résumé preparation and interview 
skills) for those who have not actively sought employment for some time.     




Making mainstream Job Network services more accessible  
There is also scope to make mainstream Job Network services more accessible to 
displaced TCF employees across the sector generally. As noted, because of poor 
communication and English language skills, some displaced TCF workers may be 
reluctant, or find it difficult, to access the Job Network. These difficulties could be 
ameliorated by regular dissemination of information on Job Network services to the 
TCF workforce, including outworkers. Indeed, this would be a concrete way of 
assisting outworkers, who might be more difficult to encompass in the specific 
support designed to deal with major job shedding in the sector. 
What sort of institutional changes would be required? 
The types of support outlined above could be readily delivered through an 
inexpensive augmentation of the existing Job Network. Job Network providers 
already provide similar assistance, albeit after an individual has become 
unemployed. The key emphasis in sector-specific arrangements would be to make 
this sort of assistance more readily accessible for TCF workers, prior to and at the 
time of large scale, or regionally significant, retrenchments.  
Apart from reducing the risks of service duplication, delivery via an augmentation 
of the Job Network would be more cost effective and administratively efficient than 
two possible alternatives identified in the Position Paper (a stand alone scheme or 
assistance delivered on a case-by-case basis). Further, this type of focus could be a 
cost-effective way to test the merits of incorporating such assistance more generally 
within the Job Network framework. 
FINDINGS ON LABOUR ADJUSTMENT SUPPORT 
•  Implementation of TCF-specific labour adjustment measures could help to 
reduce the likelihood of disruptive adjustment resulting from post 2005 
assistance reductions, or other pressures confronting the sector. Such assistance 
should focus on addressing large scale, or regionally significant, job shedding in 
the sector through an augmentation to Job Network services. In doing so it 
should: 
•  include provision for early intervention where there is prior notice of large 
scale, or regionally significant, retrenchments; and 
•  use people with experience in the TCF industry. 
•  There is also scope to make mainstream Job Network services more accessible 
to all displaced TCF employees through regular dissemination of information on 
those services, including to outworkers.     





10  Workplace arrangements and skilling 
issues 
Effective and flexible workplace arrangements allow for the efficient use of 
employee skills and capital equipment and the adoption of new technologies that are 
important to improving productivity and competitiveness. There have been 
improvements in TCF workplace arrangements in recent years achieved across 
diverse workplace structures (see chapter 3). Indeed, in submissions and discussion 
with the Commission, a number of firms expressed satisfaction with the flexibility 
that their current arrangements provide and with the relationships they have built 
with their employees.  
However, further improvements which could enhance the viability of firms, give 
employees more job security and higher remuneration, and deliver taxpayers better 
value for their assistance dollar are still possible. The recent Victorian TCFL 
Strategic Audit summarised the problems that continue to be evident in the sector: 
Many employers are concerned about the difficulties of obtaining the necessary degree 
of workforce flexibility required for sustainability. The Textile Clothing and Footwear 
Union of Australia (TCFUA) is concerned at the poor management practices in the 
industry, the lack of security for their members, occupational health and safety …   
(Victorian Government 2000) 
While problems in some workplaces may have inhibited productivity growth rather 
than caused costly production stoppages, the issue of employee entitlements 
continues to be a threat to industrial relations stability, as well as deflecting 
attention in workplace negotiations from improving the viability of firms. 
The use of outworkers in the clothing industry also raises important policy issues — 
in particular, ensuring appropriate protection of this group from exploitation while, 
at the same time, providing firms with the flexibility and ‘just-in-time’ production 
capability that this form of employment arrangement can deliver.     




10.1  Current workplace arrangements 
The diversity in TCF activities described in earlier chapters is also evident in 
workplace structures. Wage and condition setting, union representation and work 
organisation vary widely among firms and regions within the sector. 
The award system dominates wage and condition setting 
Because the sector contains many small firms, awards remain the dominant 
mechanism for determining wages and working conditions. According to the 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), more than 80 per 
cent of the factory based TCF workforce operate under the award system.1 Large 
firms, typically in the capital intensive textile and carpet sectors, tend to operate 
with enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs). 
Notably, many firms expressed a strong preference for using the award system 
because it suits their individual circumstances; provides flexibility to tailor wage 
outcomes to improved work organisation; and reduces transaction costs and risks of 
industrial disputes associated with re-negotiating EBAs. 
Some firms operating with EBAs commented that this system has done little to 
improve their productivity and has simply been a mechanism for increasing wages. 
However, as DEWR observed, this may have more to do with the failure of firms to 
take advantage of the opportunities provided by the EBA process than with 
shortcomings in the regime itself: 
… the industry has generally failed to use the options which would allow it to move 
from the ‘one size fits all’ workplace arrangements of awards to a more tailored 
approach to meet the competitive needs of individual businesses. A number of 
enterprise agreements appear to have an over-representation of provisions that benefit 
unions at the cost of business, and hence jobs. This, coupled with an under-
representation of workplace relations initiatives to improve flexibility, further erodes 
the labour productivity and global competitiveness of many TCF businesses.   
(sub. 84, p. 1) 
Firms which have taken advantage of the flexibility offered by enterprise bargaining 
saw considerable merit in the process. For example, the Technical Textile and 
Nonwoven Association (TTNA) said: 
                                              
1 The four main awards relevant to the TCF sector are the Clothing Trades Award, the Textile 
Industry Award, the Footwear Manufacturing and Component Industries Award and the Felt 
Hatting (Consolidated) Award.     





There is no doubt that enterprise bargaining has played a significant role in the welfare 
of the Australian technical and nonwovens textile industry over the last ten years. 
Enterprise bargaining has enabled progressive firms to minimise demarcation problems 
and to create skills based promotional structures. The reforms to the system in recent 
years have strengthened firms’ abilities to put into practice workplace arrangements 
appropriate to the needs of individual enterprises. (sub. 68, p. 21) 
Union membership is low 
Union participation in determining workplace outcomes varies across the sector. 
While in some plants the workforce is completely unionised, other plants have no 
union membership. In the sector as a whole, less than 25 per cent of employees 
belong to a union — lower than in the mid 1990s and the present average for the 
broader manufacturing sector (see appendix table B.22). The dominant union is the 
Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia (TCFUA) although there is some 
representation by other unions.2  
Workplace flexibility has improved 
Over the past decade or so, there have been improvements in arrangements in many 
TCF workplaces. Examples include: 
•  more flexibility in work hours, allowing more efficient and longer use of capital 
equipment. Some firms now operate on a 24 hour, three-shift basis with several, 
especially in the nonwoven technical textiles sector, maintaining continuous 
production seven days a week; 
•  the use of casual and contract labour to meet seasonal peaks in demand, 
(although for some firms this remains a problem); 
•  the ability to re-organise leave arrangements to cater for fluctuations in demand 
using the existing workforce; and 
•  fewer restrictive work practices and less rigid demarcation of tasks, allowing 
increased emphasis on team-based work and multi-skilling. 
                                              
2 These include the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union, the National Union of Workers and 
the Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union.     




But inflexibility continues to impede productivity improvement 
While increased flexibility in work organisation is apparent in many firms 
(irrespective of whether they operate under an award or an EBA), there are areas 
where workplace arrangements still impede productivity improvement and reduce 
firm viability. Restrictions on optimal shift patterns, the scope to substitute time-off-
in-lieu for penalty rates of pay, and on the use of casual and contract employees are 
examples. DEWR highlighted reliance on the use of overtime to manage variations 
in production as a major inflexibility. It said: 
Analysis of federal certified agreements shows that 71% of current TCF agreements 
contain overtime provisions. … This indicates that managing peaks in production is an 
important issue for the industry. However the way in which this is managed varies. The 
traditional overtime arrangement has its limitations. … Alternatives such as time off in 
lieu (TOIL), flextime, annualised salary and other innovations can provide more 
appropriate options which meet the needs of both the business and the employees for 
managing the cost of overtime. (sub. 84, p. 4) 
In advocating the need for more flexibility in employment arrangements, the TFIA 
said: 
… the general industry perspective is that as the external environment is changing, it is 
imperative that the appropriate adjustments be made at the enterprise level to 
strengthen the position of all participants. Flexibilities such as the use of external 
contractors are and always will be a requirement for the TCF sector, if for no other 
reason than for the difficult if not impossible task of measuring demand at any point in 
time. 
The industry needs to ensure that it has a well-paid, motivated and appropriately skilled 
workforce. This will entail a significant mix of manufacturing and supplying 
alternatives ranging from full-time factory based employees through to offsite casual 
and sub-contract labour. (sub. 75, pp. 9–10) 
Achievement of more effective workplace outcomes is also impeded by: 
•  the absence, in most enterprises, of a link between pay and productivity 
improvements; 
•  skill deficiencies among managers and employees in both factory based settings 
and in the outwork sector (see section 10.3);  
•  the difficulty of satisfactorily addressing the employee entitlements’ issue (see 
below) which has recently caused damaging industrial action in the carpet 
industry; and 
•  an associated focus in workplace negotiations on redundancy matters rather than 
on how to assist firms become more viable.      





On this last point, Australian Defence Apparel echoed the views of several firms 
that a problem faced by the industry: 
… is a union that is preoccupied with redundancy … . We are confronted with a union 
that embarks upon industrial relationships purely based on what they can get; no 
attempt to work with firms to improve productivity, but produce a wish list that is 
usually headed by redundancy. (trans., p. 63) 
Increased coincidence of interests would reduce inflexibilities 
While current institutional arrangements provide scope for firms and their 
employees to improve workplace flexibility, this is hindered in some enterprises by 
ineffective communication and a lack of cooperation between managers and their 
employees. Notably, the Commission was told during discussions that the 
relationship between the union and TCF firms in Victoria is more adversarial than 
in other States. 
To achieve more productive workplace outcomes, many firms must improve their 
understanding of industrial relations issues and communicate better with employees 
and their representatives. The harmonious relationship that exists between some 
firms, their employees and the unions sets a benchmark for others. 
Employees and their unions must give more recognition to the relationship between 
workplace outcomes, international competitiveness, and the viability of firms and 
the sector. With many firms ‘at-risk’, this is crucial to facilitate the transition of 
those enterprises capable of becoming internationally competitive without high 
levels of government support. 
In turn, this suggests that appropriate skilling and training for all of those 
participating in workplace negotiations will be an important contributor to effective 
workplace outcomes. According to the Ai Group, the lack of specialist human 
resource managers in many small and medium sized firms, and inadequate training 
of shop-floor union stewards has: 
… not promoted the development of HR/IR skills generally across the sector. This is 
evidenced by the fact that there is a tendency for grievances to escalate into disputes 
because of the inability of parties to develop practical solutions. This may have the 
further consequence of damaging relations between management and employees. 
Given the obvious importance of effective grievance resolution at the workplace, it 
would be appropriate to establish effective training in this area, run by a genuinely 
independent body. (sub. 11, pp. 43–44) 
The Commission notes that improvements in workplace relations would also be 
facilitated by further consolidation in the sector, given that there is often more scope     




for specialisation and professionalism in human resource management in larger 
firms. 
The sector can ill afford industrial disputation 
Compared with other parts of the economy (notably the automotive industry), 
industrial disputation has not been a widespread problem in the TCF sector. Many 
participants reported that they had not had an industrial dispute for several years and 
were confident that their relationship with employees would ensure this continued 
in the future. 
Recently, however, industrial action has been evident in parts of the Victorian TCF 
sector. This is partly a result of the nature of TCF activity in that State. Victoria has 
more large capital-intensive textile firms which face higher costs from production 
stoppages than smaller firms. Combined with a highly unionised workforce, this 
increases the potential for industrial disputation compared with clothing production, 
for example, which relies heavily on a disparate and non-unionised group of 
outworkers to supply market requirements. 
It is not automatic that larger, highly unionised firms will experience industrial 
relations problems, however. The Commission notes that many large TCF plants 
have good industrial relations records. A key reason has been that managers, 
employees and their representatives have acknowledged that it is in their joint 
interests to work together to advance firms’ prospects. Effective communication and 
cooperation has provided the scope for issues to be resolved without recourse to 
industrial action. 
Also, the catalyst for the recent high profile disputes at two Victorian carpet 
manufacturers — employee entitlements — has been an issue not just in the TCF 
sector, but across manufacturing and services industries generally. It has become 
more acute with the fallout from high profile corporate collapses such as National 
Textiles, Coogi and Ansett. As large firms vulnerable to stoppages, Godfrey Hirst 
and Feltex were targeted in pursuit of a broad union agenda on the entitlements 
issue. The TCFUA acknowledged that certain firms had been ‘singled out’ 
commenting that: 
It is not fair on those companies that we continue to have disagreements with and 
disputes with, that they are the only companies that bear the brunt of the disgruntlement 
and fear and concern of thousands of workers about their entitlements. (trans., p. 40) 
As discussed below, it would be highly beneficial to firms in the TCF sector (as 
well as in other industries) if the entitlements trigger for industrial action could be     





defused. Given the number of ‘at-risk’ firms that remain, the TCF sector is among 
the least able to cope with the costs of this sort of disputation (see box 10.1). 
 
Box 10.1  Industrial disputation in the TCF sector 
According to the ABS, industrial disputation in the TCF sector during the latter part of 
the 1990s was only slightly higher than the all-industry average — although there has 
been a recent increase (see appendix figure B.7). Moreover, industrial disputation was 
not generally regarded as a widespread problem by inquiry participants. It has, 
however, been a costly source of lost production in the Victorian carpet industry. 
During negotiations for a new enterprise bargaining agreement, Feltex Australia was 
the subject of ‘protected’ industrial action in October 2001 which adversely affected 
production for more than 6 weeks. According to the company, the issue of employee 
entitlements was the main catalyst for the dispute, with the TCFUA arguing that a trust 
fund be established to guarantee accrued entitlements. 
The cost of lost production was substantial with the loss of operating cash flow to the 
company, and lost wages to employees, totalling millions of dollars. Employees 
eventually returned to work when the union and the company agreed to continue 
negotiations on an ‘appropriate industry-wide mechanism which would be acceptable 
to both parties’ to deal with the entitlements issue. 
Similarly, the expiration of Godfrey Hirst’s enterprise agreement at the end of 2001 
coincided with ‘protected’ industrial action aimed at the establishment of a trust fund to 
guarantee entitlements (including redundancy payments). This caused significant 
disruption to the business with overtime bans, the ending of shifts prior to normal 
completion times (shutting down machinery and causing additional waste, downtime 
and start-up production losses in a 24 hour shift operation) and rolling stoppages over 
a seven week period. 
Godrey Hirst suggested that the cost to its business was substantial, comprising 
production losses ‘running into millions of dollars’, the permanent loss of export sales 
to competing suppliers, and additional costs arising from the need to outsource certain 
processes to reduce production losses. In a longer term context, the company believed 
its reputation as a quality product supplier was permanently damaged by the dispute. 
The EBA negotiations were eventually completed without concession to the trust fund 
proposals of the TCFUA. As a consequence, the company indicated that the potential 
for further industrial action over this issue remains a major, and ongoing, concern.  
 
Further assistance reductions could reinforce incentives for 
cooperation 
Increased competitive pressures in the sector that would flow from reductions in 
assistance could facilitate better workplace outcomes. Specifically, reductions in 
assistance could:      




•  focus more managerial and employee attention on the need to improve 
productivity and efficiency; 
•  encourage greater cooperation to achieve this goal; and 
•  increase incentives to avoid costly industrial disputation. 
Some participants also suggested that such induced improvements in workplace 
arrangements could have flow-on benefits for other industries. For example, the 
Victorian Farmers Federation said: 
… tariffs are restricting industrial relations reform by protecting manufacturing 
industries from pressure to contain labour costs. This results in less political support for 
reforms that would benefit labour-intensive industries, including agriculture.  
… there is a strong concern in the farming sector that industries that have received 
tariff relief over the past three and a half years have not taken the full opportunities to 
adopt workplace flexibility measures to make them more cost competitive. (trans., 
pp. 309–11) 
10.2  Policy responses to particular workplace issues 
Proposed changes to workplace regulations raise complex issues 
In the light of recent industrial action and concerns about the possibility of further 
disputes over the entitlements issue, some groups suggested that changes to the 
Workplace Relations Act are necessary. The Ai Group proposed that Federal 
industrial relations legislation be amended to: constrain ‘protected’ industrial action 
further and to give the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) more 
power to intervene in disputes causing ‘significant damage’ to particular firms (see 
box 10.2). 
The Ai Group’s proposals have a similar intent to Commonwealth Government 
amendments (either recently legislated, blocked or still being considered) to the 
Workplace Relations Act. For example, the Act was amended in November 2002 to 
constrain protected industrial action by: 
•  providing for ‘defined consequences’ in cases of pattern bargaining; and 
•  allowing the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining period on the grounds 
that a party is not genuinely trying to reach agreement. 
The originating Bill had also sought to provide the AIRC with the power to order 
cooling off periods in cases of protected industrial action (also suggested by the Ai 
Group), but this provision was blocked by the Senate.     






Box 10.2  The Ai Group’s proposed changes to the Workplace Relations 
Act 
In a submission to the Commission, the Ai Group suggested a number of amendments 
to the Workplace Relations Act. These proposals — which were endorsed by several 
firms and associations — included the following: 
•  Additional powers be given to the AIRC to suspend or terminate a bargaining 
period. These powers would apply where protected action is: 
–  causing significant damage to an enterprise; and 
–  significantly endangering the welfare of employees in an enterprise. 
•  Protected action be outlawed for the purposes of pattern bargaining. 
•  The AIRC be given the power to establish a ‘cooling-off’ period in appropriate 
circumstances. 
•  Secret ballots be mandatory before protected action can be taken. 
•  The Workplace Relations Act be amended to clarify that protected action cannot be 
taken prior to the expiry date of a certified agreement. 
Source: Ai Group (sub. 11). 
 
Another amendment suggested to the Commission by the Ai Group — introducing 
secret ballots as a precondition for protected industrial action — was put forward in 
a separate Bill and also rejected by the Senate (in March 2003). Yet a further 
amendment is currently before the Senate which aims to strengthen the AIRC’s 
ability to stop ‘unprotected’ industrial action (especially during the life of a certified 
agreement), and for applications for a cessation order by affected parties to be 
determined within 48 hours (with the discretion to issue interim orders stopping 
industrial action where this is not possible). 
However, legislative amendments of the kind proposed by the Ai Group raise 
complex issues with ramifications beyond the TCF sector which could not be 
properly addressed in a sectoral inquiry of this nature. Moreover, as the 
Commission argued in its recent report on post 2005 assistance for the automotive 
industry (PC 2002b), measures constraining the scope for employees to take 
industrial action should be viewed as a safety-valve. Most workplace disagreements 
should be addressed cooperatively and without the need to resort to strike action or 
the threatened use of regulatory sanctions. In commenting on a similar set of 
proposals put forward by the Ai Group in that inquiry, the Commission noted 
among other things that: 
•  Establishing that an enterprise is suffering ‘significant damage’ is a much easier 
hurdle than establishing the likelihood of significant damage for ‘the economy or 
a significant part of it’, as applies under the current legislation. While the bar     




could be too high at present, it is equally possible that the Ai Group’s proposals 
could go too far in the opposite direction. 
•  The difficulty of establishing whether the proposals would achieve the right 
balance in constraining industrial action would be compounded by uncertainty 
about the AIRC’s interpretation of terms such as ‘significant damage’. 
•  Shortcomings in the current regulatory arrangements may relate more to the 
inadequacy of sanctions for non-compliance (the intent of the pattern bargaining 
amendment mentioned above), than to unduly high hurdles for securing orders to 
terminate protected action. 
•  Firms could make better use of the existing regulatory provisions. 
•  If proposals to further constrain the right to take ‘protected’ industrial action are 
generally perceived by the community as too stringent and therefore unfair, it is 
conceivable that their implementation could serve to reduce the commitment of 
employees to further necessary workplace change. 
In the light of these considerations, the Commission concluded that: 
… whether the proposed regulatory changes would strike a better balance between the 
rights of employees to further their perceived interests through industrial action and the 
rights of those who suffer significant damage from such action, is a more difficult 
judgment to make. (PC 2002b, p. 67) 
Moreover, given that much of the potential for disputation in the TCF sector 
appears to relate to the entitlements issue, dealing with that issue specifically may 
reduce the need for what would inevitably be contentious changes to workplace 
regulations in general. 
A review of the entitlements issue would be beneficial 
Given the large number of firm closures in the TCF sector in recent years and that 
the process of firm rationalisation is yet to run its course, the securing of employee 
entitlements is a very important issue. As the TCFL Forum noted: 
Some firms have exited without having adequate reserves to cover employee 
entitlements. The unions now spend considerable time on protecting workers’ jobs and 
entitlements, which can heighten tensions in industrial relations. (TCFL Forum 2002,  
p. 39) 
Legislative attempts to provide for security of entitlements have so far failed to 
quell the concerns of employees and the union movement. The General Employee     





Entitlements Redundancy Scheme (GEERS) was established in September 2001.3 It 
provides payments for unpaid wages; accrued annual leave and long service leave; 
accrued pay in lieu of notice; and up to 8 weeks redundancy pay. The maximum 
allowable redundancy amount is set with reference to an annually indexed salary 
cap ($81 500 in 2002-03). Contractors (which may include some TCF outworkers) 
are not covered by the scheme. By 30 June 2002, payments to some 4500 
individuals had been made under GEERS, with an average payment amount of 
around $10 000.  
The main criticism of the scheme has been that the level of redundancy payment is 
insufficient to cover the substantial redundancy entitlements accrued by employees 
in some parts of manufacturing, including the TCF sector. There have also been 
criticisms that GEERS does not cover unpaid superannuation entitlements. In 
summarising its concerns, the TCFUA contended: 
Although GEERS provides enhanced benefits for employees who are terminated in the 
context of their employer becoming insolvent, the TCFUA views both GEERS and its 
predecessor EESS as fundamentally flawed schemes. Neither EESS or GEERS satisfies 
the primary objectives of securing and protecting 100% of entitlements for workers in 
the TCF industries … (sub. 33, p. 50) 
To illustrate the perceived inadequacy of the GEERS safety net and the importance 
of the entitlements issue more generally, the union provided a list of examples of 
firm closures where employees received none, or only part, of their entitlements 
(see box 10.3). As further evidence of the extent of the potential shortfall between 
redundancy-related GEERS support and accrued redundancy entitlements, the 
Commission was told in discussions that entitlements to more than 70 weeks pay 
are not unheard of in the TCF sector. (Even where less generous provisions are in 
place, entitlements are often well in excess of the GEERS safety net.) Moreover, 
entitlements in particular firms have been uncapped and therefore continue to 
increase the financial exposure of firms (and risks to employees).  
The union was also concerned about the length of time taken to process GEERS 
claims and for payments to be made suggesting that ‘it takes a minimum of 6 
months before GEERS is in a position to make payments…’ (sub. 33, p. 55). A 
recent report by the Australian National Audit Office commented specifically on 
this aspect of the scheme. It said: 
There are substantial challenges in making prompt payments under the EESS and 
GEERS schemes. Overall, DEWR has taken 26 weeks to clear 80 per cent of claims, 
well short of either its original published standard, 80 per cent in 12 weeks, or its 
                                              
3 GEERS replaced the Employee Entitlements Support Scheme (EESS) which was introduced on 
1 January 2000 and which was applicable to employees retrenched between 1 January 2000 and 
11 September 2001 due to the insolvency or bankruptcy of their employer.     




revised standard, 80 per cent in 16 weeks. This may be attributable in part to the 
difficulty DEWR has in obtaining, promptly, verified information from [insolvency 
practitioners] on unpaid employee entitlements. However, it will only be possible to 
clarify this if DEWR keeps more detailed records of the key steps in processing. 
(ANAO 2003, p. 5) 
The union further noted that the GEERS process only begins when an insolvency 
practitioner (administrator, liquidator, receiver and manager, or controller) has been 
appointed to an insolvent company. In practice, this means that an employee made 
redundant prior to a firm being declared insolvent has no recourse to GEERS until 
that condition has been met. 
 
Box 10.3  Access to employee entitlements following TCF firm closures  
Examples of TCF firm closures over the last few years highlight a diversity of outcomes 
for employees in securing their accrued entitlements. Examples include: 
National Textiles 
–  Ceased trading January 2000 
–  342 employees owed $11 million in entitlements  
– Company deed of arrangement and a Commonwealth budget appropriation 
resulted in entitlements being paid out in full 
Coogi Australia Manufacturing Pty Ltd 
–  Placed in administration July 2002 
–  Employees owed $3.7 million in entitlements (including superannuation) 
–  Application for GEERS funding made November 2002 
– GEERS payment covering annual and long service leave and 8 weeks 
redundancy made March 2003 
–  $0.4 million in superannuation entitlements as yet unrecovered 
Tadbury Australia Pty Ltd 
–  Placed in administration October 1999 (pre EESS and GEERS) 
–  18 employees owed $1.3 million in entitlements (unrecovered) 
Dan Apparel Pty Ltd 
–  Liquidator appointed September 1996 (pre EESS and GEERS) 
–  39 employees owed $0.6 million in entitlements (unrecovered) 
Bedico Trading Pty Ltd 
–  Administrator appointed February 2000 
–  61 employees owed $0.6 million in entitlements 
–  EESS pays entitlements to the value of 26 per cent of amount outstanding 
Sources: TCFUA (sub. 33) and Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge (2000). 
 
     





But not all participants viewed GEERS as inadequate. Both the Ai Group and 
Australian Business Limited (ABL) voiced strong support for the scheme. In 
commenting specifically on the GEERS redundancy provisions, the Ai Group 
argued that the 8 week cap is in fact a ‘community standard’ and that paying 
entitlements on the basis of negotiated outcomes in enterprise agreements would 
discriminate between employers depending on their particular circumstances: 
The community standard for redundancy pay is found in the Termination Change and 
Redundancy provisions in the AIRC test case and the many and various awards which 
have adopted it. If the Federal Government’s scheme provided for a higher level of 
redundancy pay or unlimited benefits, the system would not treat all employees fairly. 
Some employees would receive the community standard while others would be more 
generously rewarded. By following the community standard, the Government is 
ensuring that all Australian workers are treated fairly in the relatively small number of 
cases when a company becomes insolvent and is unable to pay employees’ 
entitlements. (sub. PP140, pp. 13–14) 
Nonetheless, the inadequacy, from the employees’ perspective, of the GEERS 
safety net has led to various negotiated firm specific responses to secure 
entitlements. Some firms have set aside an amount of working capital to cover 
redundancy entitlements. And one firm told the Commission that it had moved from 
an uncapped scheme to one limited to 8 weeks pay (for new employees) in 
exchange for a number of new conditions (including a wage rise). 
In some cases, firm-level solutions may be effective and efficient. However, firm-
level responses can be costly — particularly for ‘at-risk’ firms. Moreover, 
negotiations on this issue at the firm level have been accompanied by industrial 
disputation and production stoppages. Even where there has been no formal dispute, 
the focus of negotiations appears to have been on ways to secure entitlements rather 
than on how to improve the prospects of the firm and thereby increase employment 
security. In either case, firm performance will have been diminished. 
Several alternatives to GEERS have been suggested to deal with the issue including: 
industry-wide trust funds; levy schemes such as that used to make provision for the 
entitlements lost after the collapse of Ansett Airlines; compulsory pooled insurance 
schemes; and amendments to the Corporations Law which would place employees 
above secured creditors in claims on the assets of insolvent companies. 
A somewhat different approach was advocated by DEWR which emphasised a need 
for firms to minimise or reduce their financial exposure to employee entitlements in 
the event of closure. It said: 
There are other options to trust funds. Audits can be conducted and liabilities could be 
reduced over time through mechanisms such as cashing out leave. Further, employers 
and employees should refrain from developing overly generous redundancy     




arrangements. Many firms report that the potential cost of redundancy has hampered 
their ability to restructure and adapt, eventually undermining the company’s long term 
viability. (sub. 84, p. 9) 
However, all these approaches have shortcomings (see also box 10.4). 
Trust funds have been criticised on several grounds, including that they would tie 
up large amounts of the working capital of viable (and secure) firms. The Ai Group 
estimated that employers would need to contribute close to 20 per cent of their 
payroll into a fund to cover entitlements. It also raised a range of tax-related issues 
and concerns (see sub. PP140, pp. 10–11).   
Problems with other suggested approaches to securing employee entitlements 
include: 
•  Taxpayer funded solutions could potentially send inappropriate signals to firms 
regarding the need to have adequate financial resources to pay for entitlements. 
•  Amendments to the Corporations Law to treat employees more favourably than 
other creditors disadvantaged by firm closures raise equity issues and could, in 
turn, lead to the failure of creditor companies. According to the Ai Group it 
would also raise the cost of obtaining finance for firms (sub. PP140, pp. 16–18). 
•  As concerns expressed by participants about workers compensation 
arrangements illustrate (see chapter 11), designing efficient pooled insurance 
arrangements would be difficult. 
•  The strategy proposed by DEWR may suit new firms, or viable established 
firms, but it is unlikely to be particularly helpful for firms which are ‘at-risk’ and 
therefore more likely to be unable to fully cover employee entitlements. 
Nonetheless, in the Position Paper, the Commission argued that given the 
potentially large costs of failing to resolve this issue in the TCF sector and other 
parts of the economy, a ‘circuit-breaker’ was needed. In bringing the parties 
together to develop a constructive way forward, the Commission suggested that a 
useful first step would be to conduct an independent review of the issue. It saw this 
as providing the basis for a thorough and unbiased assessment of the economy-wide 
magnitude of the problem and the relative merits of alternative solutions to it.     






Box 10.4  Alternative approaches to protecting employee entitlements  
A 2000 study by Productivity Commission staff into the impacts of business failures in 
Australia assessed, among other things, four approaches to the protection of employee 
entitlements. These approaches differ in terms of whether employees, governments or 
employers provide the funding, the basis on which payments would be made and the 
treatment of insolvency risk. They include schemes with characteristics similar to 
GEERS and those preferred by the union movement (trust funds). 
Voluntary employee insurance 
This would see employees purchasing insurance cover privately to protect their 
entitlements in the event of firm insolvency. Advantages of this approach were argued 
to include: providing employees with a choice of risk cover based on their individual 
needs; sending effective price signals (through differences in premiums) about the risk 
of firm insolvency to employees; and premiums that would vary with the size of the 
entitlements at stake. 
Potential problems identified included: employees viewing self-insurance of their legal 
entitlements as unjust; employees not seeking cover because of ignorance about the 
risks; prohibitive costs associated with monitoring and administering a large number of 
policies; and (if insurance premiums were initially set to cover average risk because of 
problems with identifying different degrees of insolvency risk across firms) the potential 
for only high risk employees, or no one, to eventually be left insured. 
Government provision (without risk rating of employers) 
The second approach examined was government provision of a national fund to insure, 
collectively, all employees for lost entitlements in the event of insolvency. This is the 
basis on which GEERS operates and is also the most common approach overseas. 
This mechanism was preferred by the authors (see below) with significant advantages 
identified as: by providing universal coverage, it avoids the potential problem with 
voluntary schemes of only some employees being left insured; it relies on existing 
mechanisms (taxation) for funding; it is simple and international experience shows 
administrative costs to be low. 
Limitations noted by the authors included: the failure to take account of differences in 
firms’ insolvency risk means firms are not provided with incentives (through insurance 
premiums) to reduce insolvency risk; budget funding exposes governments to unknown 
future liabilities; and that capping practices commonly associated with such 
mechanisms mean that some employees could receive low levels of insurance cover 
relative to entitlements. 
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Box 10.4  (continued) 
Compulsory risk-rated insurance funded by employers 
A third option canvassed the provision of private insurance cover by employers to 
protect employee entitlements in case of insolvency. Under this approach, insurance 
premiums would be based on the likely insolvency risk and associated non-payment of 
entitlements. The main advantage was found to be that it provides incentives (through 
potentially lower premiums) to employers to take steps to reduce their risk of 
insolvency. 
However, administrative complexity (common to risk-rated insurance schemes in 
general) was seen as a potentially major difficulty. To be effective, premiums would 
need to be commensurate with the likelihood of failure — and that can be difficult for 
commercial insurers to estimate. 
Trust funds 
Finally, the study assessed the use of employer funded trusts to safeguard accrued 
entitlements in the case of insolvency. The study noted that as well as covering 
accrued entitlements such as annual leave and long service leave, trust funds could 
also have a contingent liability element to cover potential insolvency expenses such as 
redundancy payments. The main advantage of this arrangement was seen as 
providing employees with secured creditor status in the event of insolvency. 
Problems identified with the approach included: ensuring that payments by employers 
found their way to the trust fund at regular intervals (avoiding similar problems with 
superannuation guarantee payments raised by the TCFUA); and accurately 
determining contingent liabilities leading to the possibility of excess provision and 
associated loss of working capital. And, unlike other approaches, trust fund 
mechanisms would introduce transitional issues as existing businesses would need 
time to move to full provisioning for entitlements.  
Findings 
The study concluded that government provision of employee protection funds (such as 
GEERS) has some significant design advantages. However, in the context of current 
redundancy entitlement levels in the TCF sector and other parts of manufacturing, the 
study’s observations on the adverse implications of capping are pertinent. 
Source: Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge (2000). 
 
 
There was widespread support for this suggestion from a cross-section of TCF 
interests, with the TFIA representatives at the public hearings summarising the 
views of the industry as follows: 
It [the entitlements issue] cannot be resolved at a firm level; it just simply cannot be. I 
welcome the position that the Commission took, and that is some sort of a tribunal 
perhaps that could be set up, or a commission of inquiry or something, that could 
maybe look at all these issues and get all of the participants around the table, including     





the Ai Group, the unions, employers, employer groups et cetera, and just to thrash the 
thing around. To some extent I think that perhaps all of those participants don't know 
some of the problems of the others within the process and they need to clearly 
understand some of these implications. (trans., p. 33) 
The union movement also expressed general support for a review, with the ACTU 
commenting on both the need to canvass options and to educate company directors 
on their responsibilities. 
… even if we could get a debate about options we would be a step ahead. It is not our 
will to break the industry. We actually understand that profitable industry means jobs 
and it means investment and it means growth. We are in this together but we cannot 
stand back and watch … industry just abdicate its responsibility for this and we say to 
them let us find the cheapest possible means for you to guarantee these most vulnerable 
workers their entitlements and we will stand with you. (trans., p. 426) 
But, while welcoming the proposed review, the TCFUA argued that the 
Commission had not gone far enough in making a specific recommendation as part 
of its evaluation of the TCF sector. 
The only outright opposition to the Commission’s suggestion came from the two 
employer groups (though not from some of their member companies) and DEWR. 
The Ai Group, for example, opposed a review on the basis of its perception that 
existing arrangements provide adequate protection for employees. It said: 
Ai Group does not believe that it is practicable or desirable for an industry level scheme 
to be implemented to protect entitlements in the TCF sector. Ai Group favours the 
Federal Government legislating the terms of GEERS as a safety net scheme generally 
applicable to all Australians. We therefore see no need for an independent review. (sub. 
PP140, p. 7) 
DEWR did not support a review on the grounds that aspects of the issue are already 
being considered by a Parliamentary Committee and that GEERS should not be 
regarded as inadequate for not covering negotiated entitlements which are ‘overly 
generous’. DEWR said: 
The Department does not support such a review. An inquiry into Australia’s insolvency 
laws is currently being conducted by the Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on 
Corporations and Financial Services. The treatment of employee entitlements is 
included in the terms of reference for that inquiry. 
… employers and employees need to refrain from developing overly generous 
redundancy arrangements. We recommend that the final report of the Commission 
contain recommendations for implementation at the workplace level that would reduce 
the incidence of abnormally high levels of redundancy entitlements in this industry, 
which have been identified as an impediment to restructuring. (sub. PP131, p.1)     




Australian Business Limited also opposed a review and expressed a commitment to 
the GEERS arrangements: 
ABL agrees with the preliminary finding that security of entitlements has been a 
concern for employees and has been associated with costly industrial action in TCF and 
elsewhere. It does not support a review of entitlements. ABL is supportive of the 
current GEER Scheme. (sub. PP181, p. 7) 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Commission remains of the view that an 
independent inquiry would be a useful circuit-breaker and a means of progressing 
this divisive and complex issue. Without some action, there is a prospect of more 
damaging industrial disputation in the TCF and other sectors, and a continued 
diversion of effort in workplace negotiations away from initiatives to improve 
firms’ viability. Moreover, the Commission is encouraged by the broad cross-
section of support it has received for its review proposal given that progression of 
this issue through an inquiry process and beyond will require considerable 
cooperation between the parties. 
It also reiterates that all the possible ‘solutions’ raised to date have problems and 
that no one solution is clearly preferable. Some level of compromise will inevitably 
be required. This is precisely the reason why an independent, economy-wide review 
would be helpful — to assess the costs and benefits of each option in a 
dispassionate way, placing the community’s interests ahead of the individual 
concerns of firms and employees. In progressing this issue, the Commission also 
endorses the argument put by the ACTU that there is a need to ensure that 
employers fully understand their obligations in this area. It is equally important that 
employees understand the consequences for firm viability of pursuing inappropriate 
means of securing their entitlements. Hence, industry associations, employer groups 
and unions all have an important educative role to play. 
•  While workplace arrangements in many Australian TCF firms are more 
productive and flexible than in the past, further improvement would help some 
firms to compete successfully with lower levels of assistance. 
•  Given the number of ‘at-risk’ firms, the TCF sector can ill-afford the industrial 
disputation recently witnessed in some enterprises. 
•  Responsibility for achieving better workplace outcomes rests largely with 
managers and employees within individual enterprises. Better communication 
and more cooperation between the parties is crucial. 
•  Human resource and industrial relations skills in the sector require 
improvement. Among other things, this would help to promote cooperative 
solutions to industrial relations issues and assist managers to convey to their 
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employees and union representatives the relationship between workplace 
outcomes and the viability of the enterprise and the industry. 
•  Workplace regulation has an important role in setting the framework for 
negotiations between firms and their employees and representatives. However, 
specific proposals put forward to constrain further the rights of employees to 
take industrial action raise complex issues that would have ramifications in 
other industries. This means that it is not possible to judge their merits solely on 
the basis of recent experience in the TCF sector. 
•  The protection of employee entitlements is a legitimate concern for employees in 
the TCF sector given its history, and has been a trigger for costly disputes in this 
and other sectors. An independent review of the broader entitlements issue is 
warranted.  
10.3  Skilling and training issues 
The sector’s skill requirements are changing 
The TCF sector draws on a wide range of skills including trade, technical, design, 
manufacturing, logistics, sales, marketing and general management skills. The 
required skill set has changed as the sector has moved toward higher value products, 
the boundaries between manufacturing and distribution have blurred, and new 
technologies have been introduced. Design, sales, marketing, information 
technology and e-commerce skills have become more important, while demand for 
traditional trade skills has declined. With the growing emphasis on innovation, an 
appropriately skilled workforce and supportive education and training infrastructure 
are becoming more important to the future international competitiveness of the 
sector. 
Despite the shift in TCF activity and the associated changes in skill requirements, 
there has not been a marked change in ‘entry level’ skills in the sector (see table 
10.1). This does not necessarily mean that there is a skills problem in the sector, 
however, because much skill development, as in manufacturing more generally, 
occurs within the workplace.     




Table 10.1  Educational attainment of TCF workers, 1996 and 2001 
per cent 
  Textiles, clothing and footwear  All manufacturing 
 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Bachelor degree or 
higher 
8 8 8  11 
Skilled  vocational  13  7 25 25 
Other post-schoola  10 19 13 14 
Total with post-
school qualifications 
31 34 46 50 
Total without post-
school qualifications 
69 66 54 50 
a Includes basic vocational training, undergraduate diplomas and associate diplomas. 
Sources: IC (1997) and ABS (2001b). See also appendix table B.14. 
Skill shortages are emerging in some areas 
Skill shortages were a concern for some participants, with designers, sewing 
machinists, textile production workers, tanners and fabric cutters being the most 
common employee-related examples cited (see box 10.5). A number of participants 
also pointed to deficiencies in management skills, particularly in the financial, 
industrial relations and human resource areas (see section 10.2). 
Some participants suggested skill shortages and deficiencies will become a more 
pressing issue for the sector in the next few years because of: 
•  the sector’s ageing workforce; 
•  a decline in apprenticeships making it more difficult for parts of the sector to 
access necessary trade skills (though others disputed that this was an issue); 
•  negative perceptions about the sector as a career choice; 
•  the failure of training institutions to adapt to the changing needs of TCF firms; 
•  loss of ‘critical mass’ making it difficult to retain certain skills; and 
•  a continuing lack of emphasis in some parts of the sector on skill development, 
with some participants commenting that the preponderance of small businesses 
poses particular challenges given financial and time constraints on operators and 
a lack of knowledge of training options.     






Box 10.5  Participants’ views on skill shortages 
Skill shortages and their underlying causes and consequences were discussed at 
length in some submissions. For example, the TCFUA said: 
It is expected that within the next three years the departure of a number of experienced 
sewing machine operators and cutters will leave skill gaps in the clothing sector. Alongside 
this the need for TCF mechanics remains high, while the need for textile technicians and 
technologists has increased as many companies look to innovation in order to remain 
competitive. Other trade areas such as electricians and fitters will be required to service the 
burgeoning number of small enterprises. Due to the current unpopularity of the TCF&L 
industries as a career choice for young people (with the exception of clothing design), the 
exit of experienced human resources presents a challenge for the industry.  
Concurrently, the industry will start relying even more on professional occupations such as 
sales people, marketing and warehousing personnel, who will all require high-level skills in 
information and communication technologies and supply chain management. 
(sub. 33, pp. 83–84) 
Defab Weavers commented that : 
The difficulties facing TCF companies adjusting to the changes in the sector include the … 
shortage of skilled labour entering the TCF industry and the lack of educational institutions 
offering textile related courses. Consequently, wages have steadily increased (eg skilled 
weavers) whilst the average age for TCF workers has also increased as younger people are 
choosing not to enter the TCF industry due to its relatively negative image. Whilst labour 
costs through awards have kept within the CPI, TCF companies, in reality, have to pay a 
premium for skilled labour well above award (eg dyers, technicians and administration). 
(sub. 65, p. 3) 
In commenting on the scope for the education and training regime to remedy skill gaps 
of this type, participants pointed to various deficiencies in that infrastructure (see the 
text below). Problems with education and training in the sector have also been 
canvassed extensively in some recent reports on the sector. For example, the Victorian 
TCFL Strategic Audit noted: 
Because of the low priority given to training by the industries neither vocational education 
and training (VET), nor higher education systems have recognised the nature of the 
industries’ problems or responded to them. … There is a view in industry that not enough 
government training funds ‘hits the floor’, that too many private providers offer poor value 
and quality, and that government training providers are inflexible with too little workplace 
provision available. (Victorian Government 2000, p. 16) 
 
A responsive education and training system is important 
Notwithstanding the heavy emphasis on ‘on-the-job-training’, formal education and 
training programs have an important role to play in helping to develop and maintain 
workforce and management skills in the TCF sector. TCF specific education and 
training includes vocational secondary school education, formal Vocational 
Education and Training (VET) and Higher Education.     




TCF employees also have access to generally available programs, including the 
Workplace/Workbased English Language and Literacy Program (WELL) funded at 
an annual level of $12 million since 1992 (sub. 41, p. 11), and the National Program 
for Excellence in Education and Training ($10 million in overall funding). 
Guidance on training issues is provided by several bodies including the Australian 
National Training Authority (ANTA), Light Manufacturing Training Australia 
(LMTA) and State based Industry Training and Advisory Boards (ITABs). 
The nature of education and training requirements has been changing as the skill set 
demanded by the sector has evolved. The growth of the technical textiles industry, 
for example, has increased the demand for skills in engineering, computer assisted 
design and manufacturing, industrial chemistry and project management. 
The main delivery vehicle for TCF training — the VET sector — has undergone 
considerable change over the last 15 years with the introduction of competency 
based training under the National Training Framework (NTF). The development of 
a specific TCF Training Package (currently being reviewed) setting industry skills 
within Units of Competency and providing national qualifications from Certificate 
to Advanced Diploma levels, is an important outcome of the NTF. Some TCF firms 
are registered VET providers. Allied to the development of a sector specific training 
package, a number of educational institutions have expanded their course offerings 
with components oriented to skill development in TCF-relevant areas. 
Development of the training infrastructure has also extended to collaborative links 
between some universities, firms and organisations in the TCF sector. For example, 
the TTNA said that through collaborative linkages it had been able to implement 
training in areas that were previously not catered for: 
Until recently, there were no courses or even modules on offer for this vital industry 
sector. To address this, the TTNA collaboratively with RMIT and the IFC, obtained the 
licence to deliver the EDANA nonwoven course annually in Melbourne. Whilst only a 
three day event, it covers all aspects of nonwoven technology and production and has 
been a considerable success. (sub. 68, p. 22) 
The TTNA further noted that it was planning to work collaboratively with the 
RMIT to attract students to the technical and nonwoven textile sector by way of 
scholarships (sub. 68, p. 20). 
While ‘in-house’ training will continue to be the major source of skill formation in 
the TCF sector, the evolution in institutional training options witnessed in recent 
years will need to continue in the future. The need for responsiveness relates not 
just to the delivery by educational and training institutions of ‘off-site’ courses that 
meet the sector’s changing needs, but also to those training packages that are     





delivered ‘in-house’. Indeed, the TFIA signalled the need for a shift in emphasis 
toward enterprise-based training saying: 
One clear issue is that the national training programs focus on the delivery of a 
qualification to a person in a particular field, whereas often the real need is for 
specialist training or skills acquisition to meet the needs of a particular enterprise. 
There needs to be more flexibility based on enterprise-based improvements through 
tailored programs. The training must be driven by the demand, not the supply. The 
TFIA believes that a shift towards enterprise needs as opposed to packaged learning 
objectives would be a valuable and positive contribution. (sub. 75, p. 8) 
Responsibility for improving current arrangements mainly rests with 
the industry and training providers 
From a policy perspective, it is important to recognise that periodic skill shortages, 
and lags in the focus of training packages relative to the needs of industry, 
characterise most labour markets. They do not necessarily require remedial action. 
If firms, education institutions and associated training infrastructure have the 
capacity to respond effectively and quickly to changing skill needs, deficiencies in 
skilling and training outcomes should be short-lived. 
However, there are some concerns that the current education and training system is 
not sufficiently responsive to the TCF sector’s changing needs and that, as a 
consequence, skill problems are likely to worsen in the future. Reasons given for 
this lack of responsiveness include the low priority accorded TCF training by 
training institutions because of the low skill image of the sector; insufficient 
dialogue between firms and education and training providers; a continuing over-
emphasis in current training packages on the lower end of the TCF skill spectrum; 
and the large number of small firms in the sector. In regard to the latter point, the 
TCF Resource Centre of WA, which has been organising training workshops for 
small TCF firms for the past five to six years, said that: 
… the national training packages for TCF are really good, but TCF assistance for the 
actual small business operator still is nonexistent. There are many, many gaps. Small 
business people in Australia need training provided to them in a way that they can 
afford to take it. (trans., p. 273) 
In the Commission’s view, much of the responsibility for addressing these sorts of 
concerns lies with the sector and the education and training providers rather than 
with government. As in the case of workplace arrangements, effective 
communication between the parties is a pre-requisite for the development of courses 
and training packages that meet the sector’s changing needs. The various industry 
associations have an important role to play in this area, both in communicating the 
sector’s needs to providers and in liasing with government where ‘systemic’     




deficiencies are identified. This point was acknowledged by the TTNA when it 
commented on inadequacies in the current training infrastructure: 
The industry requires for the future a rising number of skilled workers who are able to 
cover broad areas of employment with the support of flexible training. Rigid vocational 
training no longer does justice to the capital equipment and end-applications. A 
responsive educational and training system is crucial to all manufacturing industry 
sectors, as is ongoing dialogue between industry and training providers. (sub. 68, p. 21) 
The Commission also notes that the current review of national TCF training 
provides an opportunity to address these sorts of issues so as to improve the sector’s 
training regime. As Light Manufacturing Training Australia said: 
This Review presents the industry and governments (national, state and territories) with 
a unique opportunity to analyse the role that education and training has played in 
assisting the TCF industry to adjust into activities where it is internationally 
competitive and how it will help the industry to contribute to the overall improved 
performance of the Australian economy.  
The TCF Review will look closely at emerging needs and prepare Units of Competency 
to reflect the management and workforce skills to match these changes in business 
operations and systems. (sub. 41, p. 3) 
Some changes in detailed policy settings — particularly at the State and Territory 
level — may be required as a result of this review to facilitate the efforts of firms, 
industry associations and training providers more generally. A range of possible 
changes to those detailed settings were discussed in submissions from training 
organisations. However, an assessment of those proposals is beyond the scope of 
this inquiry. 
There is a related policy issue of whether Commonwealth budgetary support for the 
TCF sector should include specific funding assistance for training. Several 
participants raised concerns about the impact of expenditure cuts to TCF related 
programs in May 2002 (due to take effect at the end of 2003) and the earlier 
cessation of a TCF specific WELL program. 
The Commission notes that funding for several other industry specific training 
programs will also be discontinued at the end of 2003. More importantly, it is not 
clear that the needs of the TCF sector are sufficiently different from other activities 
as to warrant the ongoing provision by the Commonwealth of sector specific 
training support. While the workforce has some different characteristics to other 
industries, these are at least partly addressed through generally available programs 
funded by the Commonwealth. Moreover, there are various industry extension-type 
programs with the capacity to provide support for training operating at the State 
level. Notably, concerns about the prospective end to the Commonwealth programs 
were less evident amongst firms than from entities delivering training to the sector.     





•  Some skill shortages and deficiencies in available training packages are evident 
in parts of the TCF sector. However, identifying what specific responses may be 
required is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Importantly, responsibility for 
ensuring that skill and training needs are met lies largely with the sector, 
educational institutions and training providers, rather than with governments. 
10.4 Outworkers 
As in other countries, outworkers are a feature of clothing manufacturing in 
Australia. From the perspective of the manufacturer, outworkers can provide 
flexibility to respond quickly to varying customer needs which can be more difficult 
to achieve in a factory setting. The flexibilities offered by outworkers are 
particularly important in Australia now that much of the high volume clothing 
production has moved offshore with domestic producers now concentrating on the 
quick response/low volume production which can be difficult to source from 
imports. 
Some outworkers may benefit from the flexibility in pace and timing of work and 
being able to combine family responsibilities and paid employment. In some 
cultures sewing is seen as a traditional occupation for women which is compatible 
with home and family responsibilities. Indeed, outwork may provide one of the few 
job opportunities for newly arrived migrants, particularly those with poor English 
language skills and relatively low levels of formal education. 
At the same time, however, the use of outworkers raises concerns about 
exploitation. These relate not only to inadequate rates of pay, but also to excessive 
hours of work, poor working conditions and the use of children in outwork. Those 
engaged in outworking are typically women from East Asian backgrounds with 
often basic skills and frequently with low levels of English language proficiency 
and limited formal education. With few alternative job opportunities, they may also 
have limited negotiating power over pay and working conditions. DEWR 
commented on some of the consequences: 
It is generally accepted that TCF industry outworkers often receive payment and work 
under conditions which are inferior to those applicable to factory workers doing 
comparable work. Contract outworkers are often particularly disadvantaged due to a 
lack of clarity concerning their rights and entitlements. (sub. PP131, p. 2) 
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Several recent reports have similarly pointed to examples of exploitation and 
various examples and claims of exploitation were also raised in submissions to this 
inquiry (see box 10.6). 
In response to such concerns, governments have implemented a range of legislation 
to try to ensure outworkers receive at least minimum rates of pay and work in 
appropriate conditions. However, such minimum standards are widely regarded as 
having been ineffective because of difficulties in enforcement (or a lack of 
resources devoted to enforcement). Also, others have raised concerns about the 
potential for regulation, or heavy handed attempts to enforce regulation, to push 
more clothing production offshore, thereby reducing job opportunities for 
outworkers. 
However, there are indications that compliance with the legal requirements has 
recently improved (see below). Also, there are a number of factors that tend to limit 
the use of outworkers and hence the potential for exploitation. For example, the use 
of outworkers can result in poor quality control and variability in production due to 
the long and convoluted supply chains in garment production which removes 
contact between the principal/retailer and the outworker. Moreover, given the 
negative perception associated with this form of employment, some producers told 
the Commission they do not use outworkers, while some retailers indicated that they 
will not deal with suppliers who use outworkers. 
 
Box 10.6  Concerns regarding clothing outworkers 
According to a 2001 study by Cregan (sub.  30) covering a small group of 119 
outworkers, the average hourly rate paid to them was substantially below the award 
rate and hours of work in peak times ranged between 12 and 18 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. In addition, the TCFUA (sub. 33) claimed that: 
•  while outworkers rarely receive any workers compensation, they commonly suffer 
from overuse injuries caused by poor working conditions, long hours and a lack of 
adequate occupational health and safety procedures; 
•  children and other family members are often used to assist in meeting production 
deadlines; 
•  outworkers are often not paid for the work they do and receive no sick leave, annual 
leave, superannuation or overtime rates of pay; and 
•  because the supply chain consists of numerous subcontractors, outworkers may 
often not know the identity of the principal manufacturer, making it difficult for them 
to pursue any unpaid monies and/or other entitlements. 
 
     





How many outworkers are there? 
Estimating the number of people engaged in outwork in the TCF sector has proved 
to be difficult. This is partly due to the nature of outwork and the complex supply 
chains involved. Also, where outworkers are paid in cash, they may wish to remain 
unidentified for tax or social security reasons. 
A 2002 Parliamentary inquiry into the conditions of clothing outworkers in Victoria 
(Parliament of Victoria 2002) was ‘constantly aware of the invisible nature of 
outwork’. Similarly, Webber and Weller (2001) concluded that: 
Outworkers are often employed in the unregulated economy or on the margin of 
regulations, so the workers have been difficult to locate and study. (p. 291) 
Further, the seasonal demand patterns of the clothing industry mean that the number 
of outworkers employed at any one time is likely to fluctuate. 
Previous estimates of the number of outworkers have been compiled using different 
bases. For example, the TCFUA estimated that there are around 330 000 persons 
engaged in outworking in some capacity (sub.  33). This estimate is from the 
TCFUA’s 1994 ‘National Outwork Information Campaign’ which estimated the 
total pool of people who undertake outwork on either a part-time, full-time or 
irregular basis. In its 1997 inquiry into the sector, the Industry Commission 
(IC 1997) estimated there were around 23 000 full-time equivalent outworkers, an 
estimate often quoted as the most reliable available at that time. 
Since 1997, there have been several factors impacting on the number of outworkers. 
With the relocation of much high volume standardised production offshore and the 
associated increase in import penetration of the local market, total domestic clothing 
production has declined. This will have tended to reduce employment opportunities 
for outworkers. 
On the other hand, there has also been a shift of garment assembly from factories to 
the outworking sector to give firms greater flexibility to meet customer demands for 
fast turnaround supply. As Calcoup Knitting commented: 
… [of] the people that use outworkers the majority have already moved a lot of their 
stuff offshore … the outworker is only giving them the quick response back here in 
Australia on the short runs that they can’t fill overseas because it’s taking them about 
eight weeks to get the turnaround to get it back. (trans., pp. 458-59) 
Such contracting out of quick response/low volume production is likely to have 
increased the demand for outworkers. A further factor likely to have increased the 
number of people involved in outwork is the growth of open air market retailing,     




which has also provided outworkers and their associates with the opportunity to 
retail the garments they produce. 
It is very difficult to gauge the net effect of these developments on the total number 
of outworkers in Australia. Some participants, such as the TCFUA, thought that the 
number of outworkers had increased significantly since the Industry Commission’s 
1997 inquiry, though they provided no supporting data. However, using similar 
methodologies to update the figures from the 1997 inquiry, it seems unlikely that 
the full-time equivalent number would be much more than 25 000 (see box 10.7). 
 
Box 10.7  Estimating the number of outworkers 
The Industry Commission (1997) estimated there were 23  000 full-time equivalent 
outworkers in 1997. This estimate was constructed from data supplied by the TCF 
industry on the number of workers required to manufacture the total volume of locally 
produced apparel. 
If the proportional share of local clothing output attributed to outworkers in 1997 had 
remained constant, in line with the subsequent decline in total output, there would have 
been around 16 400 full time equivalent outworkers in 2002.  
However, the significant shift in garment production out of factories since 1997 
indicates that this number would now be considerably higher. Assuming that every 
factory based position lost since 1997 was transferred to the outwork sector would see 
the 16 400 figure increase to around 27 500. To the extent that productivity levels in 
the outwork sector are lower than in a factory based setting, this figure would increase 
further. On the other hand, part of the decline in employment in the clothing industry 
since 1997 reflects the shift of garment production offshore reducing the implied 
number of outworkers below the upper bound figure. 
Taking all these factors into account, the Commission considers that the full-time 
equivalent number of outworkers is unlikely to be much above 25 000. Nonetheless, 
with the decline in TCF employment over the last few years, this would mean that 
outworker employment is now around 40 per cent of total factory based employment 
across the whole TCF sector and exceeds factory based clothing manufacturing 
employment by about 25 per cent. 
 
 
Initiatives to protect outworkers 
Initiatives to protect outworkers have generally not sought to eliminate home-based 
work. Rather, the focus has been on ensuring that outworkers are provided with 
similar minimum pay and conditions as factory based workers.     





Clothing Trades Awards prescribe wages and conditions for factory based 
employees and outworkers alike 
The Federal Clothing Trades Award 1999 seeks to provide parity between factory 
based employees and outworkers irrespective of whether the latter are classed as 
employees or independent contractors. To this end, it prescribes rates of pay, the 
timing of payment of wages and the records employers are required to maintain 
with respect to outworkers. Under the award, an employer who engages contractors 
or outworkers is required to register with the Clothing Trades Board of Reference, 
comprised of union, employer and Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
representatives. At present, there are 111 firms registered across Australia. 
Registered employers are not allowed to employ more than 10 outworkers without 
the consent of the Board or the TCFUA. Failure to register can result in prosecution 
under the award (sub. 84). The award also requires employers and outworkers to 
enter into a written agreement concerning hours of work. This Federal award is 
mirrored closely by the clothing trades awards in each State. 
Enforcement of these awards as they apply to outworkers requires either an 
outworker to make a complaint that requirements concerning pay and conditions 
have been breached, or the TCFUA or relevant government industrial department to 
identify instances of non-compliance. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that compliance with these award requirements 
in parts of the sector has been poor. This has partly been attributed to the fact that 
outworkers may be unaware of the existence of the award, or unwilling to report 
breaches for fear of losing work. Moreover, the long and convoluted supply chains 
in garment production may make it difficult for the outworker to identify their 
actual employer. Given such concerns, additional initiatives have been implemented 
or proposed to encourage greater compliance with the award requirements.  
A Code of Practice has been established  
Negotiations between the TCFUA, retailers and the TCF manufacturing sector to 
establish a system of self-regulation commenced in 1996, following a Senate 
Inquiry into the conditions of outworkers. These negotiations resulted in the 
Homeworkers Code of Practice which is aimed at monitoring the production chain 
from the outworker to the retailer to encourage compliance with minimum wages 
and conditions for outworkers. However, the Code has only been widely operational 
since October 2002 when a large number of retailers became signatories.  
The Code has two parts. The first is an agreement between the Australian Retailers 
Association (ARA) and the TCFUA. It obliges retailers to require their suppliers to     




comply with the awards and other relevant legislation, spells out the role of the 
TCFUA in monitoring compliance, and establishes procedures in the event of 
breaches of the Code. It also allows retailers, through the ‘No Sweatshop’ label, to 
promote that they do not deal with companies that exploit outworkers. However, as 
far as the Commission is aware, such labelling has been little used to date — the 
Brotherhood of St Laurence’s Hunter-Gatherer retail establishment was the only 
example drawn to the Commission’s attention (sub. 74). 
The second part of the Code deals with manufacturers, wholesalers and fashion 
houses. It establishes a code of practice for manufacturers in dealing with their 
suppliers, provides for the accreditation of manufacturers complying with the Code 
and sets out dispute settlement procedures (see box 10.8). 
While the Code is now well supported by retailers, only four of over 130 
manufacturers and wholesalers signing the Code have become accredited. The 
Victorian Parliamentary Committee inquiry commented that manufacturers had 
been slow to seek accreditation as they were unsure about the commitment of 
retailers to either the Code or to those suppliers which achieve accreditation. It also 
found that the administration fee of $2200 was a deterrent for small manufacturers 
and contractors to seek accreditation (Parliament of Victoria 2002). However, the 
Commission was told that with the large number of major retailers signing on to the 
Code in late 2002, there should be a major ‘knock-on’ effect with more 
manufacturers and wholesalers seeking to become accredited. 
New legislation has been introduced 
Both the Commonwealth and a number of State Governments have implemented, or 
are proposing to introduce, legislation to add to the protection already provided to 
outworkers in awards and to achieve increased compliance with these awards.  
The New South Wales Industrial Relations (Ethical Clothing Trades) Act 2001, 
which commenced in February 2002, inserted special provisions into the Industrial 
Relations Act 1996 to ensure that outworkers are deemed to be employees; provides 
for outworkers to claim for unpaid remuneration by serving a written notice on the 
person that the outworker believes to be their employer; and increases the power of 
inspectors regarding access to records of employers and residential premises used in 
the clothing trade.  
 
 
     






Box 10.8  The Homeworkers Code of Practice 
Provisions for retailers 
Under the Code retailers must require their TCF suppliers to comply with the award 
provisions and other relevant laws in respect of outworkers. The TCFUA is responsible 
for monitoring compliance and advising retailers of any breaches of the Code by 
suppliers. 
As part of the arrangements, the ARA is to compile a list of all names and addresses of 
TCF suppliers from information provided by individual retailers. Where the TCFUA can 
demonstrate a likely breach of the Code by a particular supplier, the ARA will pass on 
details of the retailers dealing with the supplier. The relevant retailers must then 
provide assistance in investigating the matter.  
If the Code has been breached, the supplier is required to take remedial action. Where 
it does not do so, retailers are to cease dealing with that supplier. 
As part of the agreement, retailers may promote that they deal only with TCF suppliers 
that do not exploit outworkers.  
Provisions for manufacturers, wholesalers and others 
The second part of the Code establishes a Code of Practice Committee consisting of 
an equal number of employers and TCFUA representatives. The Committee deals with 
accreditation of manufacturers, disputes settlement in relation to the Code and the 
development of standard product specifications. (These standard specifications are 
designed to assist in determining whether outworkers are receiving prescribed rates of 
pay.) 
To become accredited, TCF suppliers are required to provide records or demonstrate 
that they or their sub-contractors are meeting the prescribed pay and conditions.  
Where a breach of the Code is identified by the TCFUA and is not rectified within an 
appropriate time, the accredited supplier will cease dealing with that contractor. 
Suppliers risk losing accreditation and contracts with retailers if their contractors 
continue to fail to pay outworkers correctly or do not otherwise comply with the Code.  
 
 
The legislation also established an Ethical Clothing Trades Council comprising 
retailers, manufacturers, the TCFUA and community groups. The Council’s role is 
to: 
•  provide advice to the New South Wales Government on the levels of compliance 
with both legal and voluntary obligations to outworkers; 
•  promote compliance with, and enhance the use of self regulatory mechanisms 
such as the Homeworkers Code of Practice; and      




•  advise the New South Wales Government on whether there is a need to 
introduce a mandatory code for the clothing industry and the content of any such 
code. 
In Victoria, the Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act — which is similar to the 
New South Wales legislation — was passed in May 2003. It defines outworkers as 
employees for the purposes of the legislation and makes it easier for them to claim 
for unpaid wages. As in New South Wales, the Victorian legislation also provides 
for an Ethical Clothing Trades Council of Victoria consisting of industry and 
employee representatives appointed by the Minister.  
The Victorian Government noted that the role of the Council is to foster the 
development of voluntary self-regulation and that further mandatory requirements 
would only be introduced if these arrangements were inadequate in improving 
compliance. It said:  
•  a primary role of the Ethical Clothing Trades Council of Victoria established under 
the Outworkers (Improved Protection) Act 2003 (Vic) (the Act) is to monitor and 
foster the development within the industry of voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms 
as a means of ensuring that outworkers receive their entitlements;  
•  the Council will promote, as may be appropriate, the Homeworkers Code of 
Practice; and 
•  a mandatory code of practice in Victoria with respect to outworkers can only be 
made under the Act if it is considered that current self-regulatory mechanisms are 
inadequate to achieve improvements in the level of compliance or that persons in 
the industry are not attempting in good faith to negotiate improvements or 
extensions to those voluntary self-regulatory mechanisms. (sub. PP173, p. 10) 
Also, in Queensland and South Australia there is similar industrial relations 
legislation that deems outworkers to be employees. 
In contrast, proposed Commonwealth legislation, the Workplace Relations 
Amendment (Improved Protection for Victorian Workers) Bill 2002, sought to 
preserve the status of those outworkers not covered by federal awards or agreements 
as contractors. (Victoria’s industrial jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Commonwealth by agreement in 1996.) Among a range of measures, the Bill would 
provide for minimum rates of pay for TCF contract outworkers equivalent to the 
rates of pay applicable had that work been carried out by an employee. 
Other initiatives 
Some State Government procurement policies specify that outworkers are not to be 
used in the manufacture of goods supplied to government agencies. As mentioned 
earlier, public awareness campaigns and ‘No Sweatshop’ label initiatives have also     





been used to promote the fair treatment of outworkers. For example, part of the 
New South Wales Government’s Clothing Outworker Strategy involves: 
•  education and training to assist outworkers; and 
•  informing employers of their legal obligations through publications, conducting 
seminars and workplace visits. (sub. PP175, p. 2) 
Further, retailers such as Coles Myer (sub. 95) have taken steps to reduce the risk 
that their buyers sourcing direct from Asia could purchase goods produced under 
‘exploitative’ conditions. One motivation has been to avoid negative publicity 
which has affected some high profile global companies in the TCF sector. 
A more recent approach has involved Nike signing an ethical clothing deed with the 
TCFUA to ensure that the company’s suppliers comply with legislated 
requirements. Under this deed, as part of their contract with Nike, suppliers will be 
required to allow the TCFUA to audit their compliance with the award. 
At the international level, the ILO adopted a convention (no. 177) on homework in 
1996. (Conventions provide binding legal obligations if they are ratified by a 
member country.) The convention requires the member country to implement a 
national policy to promote, as far as possible, equality of treatment between 
homeworkers and other wage earners, particularly in respect of minimum wage 
levels and working conditions.  
At the vote to adopt the convention, a number of countries including Australia and 
New Zealand, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Malaysia and Indonesia abstained, while 
others including the United Kingdom and Germany voted against its adoption. At 
the time, the Australian Government noted that homework arrangements can 
provide flexibility benefits to both employees and employers and that Australia 
already had adequate policies and legislation in place to protect outworkers. Hence, 
it did not support the adoption of the convention and has not proposed to ratify it.  
Does anything else need to be done? 
Despite the industrial relations legislation and awards in place at both the State and 
Federal level to provide outworkers with the same minimum pay and conditions as 
TCF workers operating in a factory environment, concerns about the degree of 
compliance with these requirements are still clearly widespread.  
Consequently, the focus of recent and proposed initiatives in relation to outworkers 
has been on improving compliance with legislated requirements relating to pay and 
conditions, through either:     




•  the use of voluntary arrangements as embodied in the Code (as favoured by 
retailers and manufacturers); or 
•  further legislation, including making the Code requirements mandatory (as 
favoured by the TCFUA and social welfare groups). 
In the Position Paper, in comparing the two approaches, the Commission noted the 
argument that further legislation could be a ‘double edged’ sword in that it could 
force further production offshore to the detriment of the outworkers concerned.  
In considering the likely magnitude of such an outcome, it is of course important to 
recognise the different types of production outworkers are engaged in: 
•  standard apparel; 
•  ‘high-end fashion’ garments based on very small production runs focusing on 
quality; 
•  quick response/small production run garments often to cater for late season ‘top 
up’ demand; and 
•  apparel for the open air market trade, sold in some cases by the outworkers 
themselves.  
The degree of price sensitivity attaching to these different types of production is 
likely to vary. For example, at one end of the spectrum, apparel produced for the 
market trade is likely to be highly price sensitive owing to competition from low 
cost imports and retail outlets. Conversely, in the high-end fashion market, the focus 
is on quality, design and brand rather than price. 
Discussions with clothing producers since the release of the Position Paper, indicate 
that a substantial number of outworkers are now engaged in the production of less 
price sensitive items, particularly in the quick response/low volume market segment 
which by its very nature is more difficult to source offshore. Consequently, 
concerns that more legislation to improve award compliance could simply see 
further large blocks of production migrate offshore may now have less force than in 
the past. That said, if further regulation were to be particularly intrusive, or there 
were heavy handed attempts to enforce regulation, there is the risk that retailers 
might simply vacate the markets concerned, or invest to establish air freight 
alternatives for their quick response requirements. In these circumstances, job 
opportunities for outworkers would be lost. 
The Commission also notes that the regulatory and voluntary approaches to 
encouraging compliance with award requirements applying to outworkers are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. At present, in the two main TCF producing States, 
compliance with the voluntary Homeworkers Code is underpinned by the ‘threat’ of     





mandatory regulation. That is, the current arrangements in New South Wales and 
Victoria place the industry on notice to improve compliance with the existing 
requirements or have mandatory regulations introduced.  
In the Commission’s view, the threat of more regulation should provide a strong 
incentive for TCF retailers and suppliers to comply with the Code requirements. 
Indeed, this threat may well have been a factor explaining the recent large increase 
in signatories to the Code.  
Further, given the nature of outwork and the supply chains involved, promoting 
compliance with award requirements will clearly require a considerable degree of 
cooperation between retailers, suppliers, their contractors and the unions. The 
implementation of more regulation, or heavy handed attempts to enforce regulation, 
could undermine such cooperation and in so doing reduce rather than increase 
compliance. In this regard, several participants indicated that were further 
regulations to be introduced, suppliers and retailers would seek to reduce their risk 
of exposure to any fines and penalties by devolving as much responsibility for 
ensuring compliance as legally possible down the supply chain. For these reasons, 
the Commission considers that to move quickly to legislate the Code requirements 
would be an unnecessary and possibly counterproductive step. Indeed, legislation 
itself is unlikely to ensure compliance without an extensive and potentially costly 
enforcement regime. 
In encouraging compliance with the requirements of awards and the Code, there is 
also an educative role for governments, employer and community groups, industry 
associations and trade unions. This role could variously involve dissemination of 
information on legal responsibilities, encouraging members to sign up to the Code 
and outlining the virtues of good employment practices to the sector’s future. In the 
end, negative perceptions concerning the treatment of outworkers are unlikely to 
assist in the development of an internationally competitive TCF sector. Nor will 
they motivate Australian consumers to purchase locally made products in 
preference to those manufactured offshore. 
•  The flexibility provided to manufacturers by the use of outworkers can assist 
them in responding more effectively and efficiently to the needs of their 
customers. For some outworkers, there are advantages from being able to 
combine paid employment with family and other responsibilities. 
•  While it is difficult to ascertain the number of people periodically engaged in 
outwork, the full-time equivalent number of outworkers in Australia is unlikely to 
be much above 25  000. Nonetheless, with the decline in factory based 
employment in the TCF sector over the past few years, outworker employment is 
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now about 40 per cent of total factory based employment in the sector and 
exceeds factory based clothing employment by about 25 per cent. 
•  Concerns about the exploitation of outworkers appear to have more to do with 
the levels of compliance with legislated requirements than with the provisions of 
those requirements.  
•  Given the nature of outwork and the supply chain involved, achieving greater 
compliance will inevitably require cooperation between retailers, suppliers, 
their contractors and unions. More regulation, or heavy handed attempts to 
enforce regulation, could undermine the increasing degree of cooperation now 
emerging under the voluntary Homeworkers Code of Practice and therefore be 
counterproductive. 
•  Governments, employer and community groups, industry associations and trade 
unions have a role to play in promoting compliance with awards and the Code, 
and the contribution that good employment practices more generally can make 
to the sector’s future prospects.     
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11 Other  issues 
Addressing the range of other weaknesses and impediments identified in chapter 3 
would also help the textiles, clothing, footwear and leather (TCF) sector to become 
more internationally competitive. In many instances, action to address these 
weaknesses and impediments is largely in the hands of the industry. In some cases, 
however, changes in government policy settings are needed. 
11.1  Microeconomic reform and taxes and charges 
During this inquiry there were relatively few concerns raised by participants about 
the costs and reliability of infrastructure services. This may be because 
microeconomic reform initiatives in recent years have increased the efficiency of 
service provision in many of these areas.  
It is important to note that not all microeconomic reforms that benefit the economy 
will benefit the TCF sector. In some cases, by removing cross subsidies and other 
distortions, the cost of infrastructure services may have increased for some users. 
However, this is not to deny the need for governments to continue to push ahead 
with microeconomic reform. Inefficiencies in service delivery are still a concern for 
some TCF firms (see box 11.1) and a constraint on improvements in international 
competitiveness across the economy in general. 
Similarly, there is a need to ensure that taxation arrangements are appropriate and 
efficient. Participants in this inquiry drew attention to various taxes and charges 
which they claim disadvantage them vis a vis overseas competitors, making it more 
difficult for them to make the transition to a lower assistance environment. 
The Tariff Concession System 
The Tariff Concession System (TCS) incorporates a 3 per cent duty on business 
inputs which before 1996 had been duty free. As it only applies to goods for which 
close substitutes are not produced in Australia, it provides no protection to local 
production and is just a revenue tax on imports.      





Box 11.1  Some concerns relating to infrastructure service provision 
Defab Weavers said: 
Power costs are increasing each year that is taking away the energy advantage we have 
enjoyed over major textile nations. (sub. 65, p. 6) 
The Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association noted: 
The Australian technical and nonwoven textile industry is a considerable user of 
infrastructure inputs including electricity, gas, telecommunications, road, rail and air and sea 
freight. 
By and large, these services have undergone many changes in structure, ownership and the 
way by which they do business over the last decade. While some cost savings were 
delivered, regional enterprises, particularly in Albury have reported paying more per unit 
than what is charged in the metropolitan areas. (sub. 68, p. 18) 
Genevieve Yarn Dyers said that because of peak pricing structures for setting 
electricity charges: 
We’re paying for energy that we’re not using. (trans., p. 119) 
The Carpet Institute of Australia commented: 
There is a strong perception in the carpet industry that the micro-economic reform program 
has failed to deliver a significant improvement in the cost structures facing the carpet 
industry. ( sub. 35, p. 19) 
 
 
While it raises only a modest amount of revenue for the Government — less than 
$200 million a year — it does put particular manufacturers at a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to their overseas competitors. Indeed, it is partly because of 
the existence of this impost that the Commission has suggested that the TCF policy 
by-laws remain in place. 
In its Review of the General Tariff Arrangements, the Commission (PC 2000) 
recommended that the concessional rate for business inputs be reduced to zero. No 
evidence has come to light in this inquiry that would invalidate this position — a 
position that was widely supported by inquiry participants.  
•  The 3 per cent revenue duty imposed under the Tariff Concession System 
continues to disadvantage Australian manufacturers — including TCF firms — 
and imposes unnecessary costs on their customers. 
Payroll tax  
Many participants alluded to the impact of payroll tax levied by State and Territory 
Governments on firms’ costs and hence their competitiveness against imports. 
FINDING ON THE TCS DUTY      
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Synthesising these concerns, the Carpet Institute of Australia said that payroll tax 
acts: 
… as an employment disincentive and increas[es] the cost of doing business. 
(sub. 35, p. 28)  
On initial examination, a tax on labour that reinforces inherent labour cost 
disadvantages is unhelpful to the sector. This led the Footwear Manufacturers 
Association of Australia (sub.  PP132,  p.  5), amongst others, to request that 
compensation for payroll tax liabilities be provided from the SIP funding pool.  
However, assessment of the efficacy of payroll tax on the TCF sector and efficiency 
more generally must have regard to a range other considerations. For example: 
•  in broad terms, payroll tax is more fiscally efficient than many narrowly based 
taxes used by State Governments; 
•  many of the adverse efficiency impacts of the tax are a result of the thresholds 
and rules that vary between States and the drawbacks and special exemptions 
provided by State and Territory Governments (see box 11.2); 
•  yet these same threshold exemptions for small business benefit many small TCF 
firms which could be disadvantaged if payroll tax were replaced by an 
alternative tax instrument. 
 
Box 11.2  Is payroll tax a good way to raise revenue? 
In 1999-00, payroll tax accounted for around 20 per cent of State and Territory taxation 
revenue (taxes on property accounted for nearly 40 per cent) (ABS Cat. no. 5506.0). 
While a major source of revenue, its revenue raising capacity is diminished by 
thresholds applied partly to minimise administration/compliance costs, but also to 
assist small business. In addition, State Governments have frequently granted 
exemptions for companies with larger payrolls in order to attract or retain investment 
and employment. 
A Productivity Commission staff research paper by Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998), 
found that the revenue forgone from such exemptions was just under half the total 
annual revenue collected from payroll tax, indicating that there was scope to improve 
efficiency by broadening the base and lowering the tax rate. The study also suggested 
that more harmonisation of payroll tax schemes between States (uniform definitions 
and exemptions) would lower compliance costs. 
Similarly, a report by Econtech (1998) suggested that the replacement of payroll tax by 
a broad based consumption tax would increase employment in the short to medium 
term and, in the long run, reduce the cost to the community of raising the revenue 
involved by around $600 million a year. 
 
     




Moreover, while there may be more efficient ways to raise revenue currently 
collected as payroll tax, it would be inappropriate for this inquiry to propose any 
specific changes. Any assessment of proposals for change would need to have 
regard to the effects across the whole of the community, not just the TCF sector, of 
replacing payroll tax with an alternative revenue raising instrument or reducing 
government expenditures in line with the revenue shortfall. 
•  As currently implemented, payroll tax has significant deficiencies. However, an 
assessment of possible changes to address those deficiencies, or of the case for 
abolishing payroll tax, would need to be judged in terms of the community-wide 
impacts, not just the benefits for some TCF producers. The efficiency of 
replacement revenue raising instruments, and/or the consequences of reducing 
government expenditures, would be important considerations in assessing the 
community-wide outcome. 
Workers compensation and other levies 
Some firms raised concerns about workers compensation arrangements, including: 
•  the cost of premiums and their impact on international competitiveness;  
•  the inability of firms to influence premiums through their own actions; and 
•  the complexity of the arrangements. 
For example, Genevieve Yarn Dyers commented: 
One of our biggest expenses in textiles is WorkCover. Now, we understand that textiles 
is very high labour, very intensive and there are a lot of back injuries and other injuries 
so we can expect a high level of WorkCover costs, but what the government doesn’t 
differentiate [in setting premiums] is between the white collar side of the company and 
shop floor side. (trans., p. 118) 
Workers compensation provisions are complex and subject to frequent changes. 
There are different schemes in each State and Territory as well as Commonwealth 
arrangements.  
In a separate terms of reference, the Commission has been directed to undertake a 
review of national frameworks for workers compensation and occupational health 
and safety. Given that workers compensation arrangements, like payroll tax, impact 
on all sectors of the economy, not just TCF, this broader review is the most 
appropriate forum to discuss the sort of concerns outlined above. The Commission 
has therefore passed on submissions to this inquiry dealing with workers 
compensation issues to the concurrent review. The Commission intends to release 
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an interim report, including preliminary proposals, for that review in September 
2003. 
Other cost imposts raised by TCF firms included, maternity leave, penalty rates of 
pay and various levies imposed by Commonwealth and State Governments. Again, 
however, these costs are not unique to the TCF sector, being general features of 
Australia’s business environment. 
11.2  Facilitating market access 
While some progress has been made in reducing the barriers faced by Australian 
TCF exporters, significant tariff and non-tariff barriers still remain (see chapter 3 
and appendix D). These were of considerable concern to many inquiry participants. 
Making Australia’s assistance policies conditional on what other countries do would 
not be in Australia’s best interests (see chapter 6). Many of the gains from trade 
liberalisation come from changes induced in the domestic economy that are largely 
independent of other countries’ actions. Moreover, Australia’s assistance regime in 
general, and for the TCF sector in particular, is unlikely to provide any real 
bargaining coin in international trade negotiations. This is because the Australian 
market is small, imports already account for over half of the local market and 
protection on most TCF products is already relatively low. 
However, this is not to deny that improved market access could assist some firms to 
compete successfully in the international marketplace with little or no government 
support. Indeed, for leading edge Australian TCF firms, barriers to entry in overseas 
markets will often be a significant constraint on growth. Accordingly, continuing 
endeavours by Australian Governments to achieve better market access for TCF 
(and other Australian) exporters are very important (see chapter 3). 
In this regard, many in the TCF sector have focused on the role of bilateral 
agreements, including those with the United States and Thailand. Some studies 
suggest that depending on their coverage and detailed rules, these agreements could 
provide significant benefits to Australian TCF firms and the economy more 
generally (see appendix D). 
However, a policy emphasis on bilateral agreements at the expense of continued 
efforts in multi-country forums such as the WTO and APEC would raise a number 
of concerns. For example:  
•  In contrast to multilateral tariff reductions, the overall benefit to participating 
countries in bilateral arrangements depends on the extent to which they create 
additional trade, as distinct from merely diverting it from other countries.      




•  A proliferation of bilateral arrangements could result in a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of 
trade rules covering things such as rules of origin, resulting in significant 
administrative and compliance costs. Yet as TCF interests in this inquiry have 
pointed out, those rules will be crucial to the outcomes for Australia and specific 
sectors such as TCF. 
Also, even though a particular arrangement may be beneficial to a country as a 
whole, suppliers in particular industries may be disadvantaged. For example, in a 
TCF context, the prospective free trade agreement with the United States might see 
Australian carpet producers facing much greater import competition given that the 
United States is by far the largest producer of synthetic floor covering in the world.  
The implication of the preceding discussion is that bilateral agreements are unlikely 
to be a panacea for improving market access generally or in particular sectors, and 
should not reduce the emphasis given to securing better access through the more 
broadly-based multilateral arrangements. 
•  Some progress has been made in reducing trade barriers faced by Australia’s 
TCF exporters, but widespread barriers still remain. While Australia’s tariff 
levels should not be tied to assistance levels in other countries, Australian 
Governments must continue to pursue improved market access for TCF and 
other sectors in multilateral, regional and bilateral forums. 
•  However, the benefits for Australia from bilateral trade agreements will depend 
crucially on their coverage and detailed rules. Such agreements are unlikely to 
be a panacea for market access problems — either generally or in particular 
sectors — and should not reduce the emphasis given to securing better access 
through more broadly-based multilateral arrangements. 
11.3 Dumping 
‘Dumping’ (defined as the sale of exported goods at below the price they sell for in 
their country of origin) has always been a contentious issue. Such practices can 
cause damage to competing local producers in the export markets concerned. 
However, there are a whole range of commercial reasons why producers might 
choose to sell at lower prices in export markets, for example, quitting excess stock, 
filling capacity and developing new markets. Hence, distinguishing between normal 
competitive pricing behaviour and intentional predatory behaviour designed to 
damage local competitors is very difficult. Also, consumers and user industries will 
benefit from lower prices.  
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WTO rules do not prohibit ‘dumping’, but focus on how governments can or cannot 
react to it . In effect, these rules discipline anti-dumping actions, and are contained 
in what is commonly referred to as the “Anti-Dumping Agreement”. In the absence 
of such rules, competitive overseas suppliers could be unreasonably subject to anti-
dumping duties. 
The legal definitions are more precise, but broadly speaking the WTO agreement 
allows governments to act against ‘dumping’ where there is genuine (‘material’) 
injury to the competing local industry. In order to take action, the government has to 
be able to show that ‘dumping’ is taking place, calculate the extent of ‘dumping’ 
(how much lower the export price is compared to the exporter’s home market price) 
and show that the dumping is causing injury. This is a complex and data intensive 
exercise. 
Few anti-dumping actions have been initiated by the Australian TCF sector 
According to the Global Trade Protection Report, on a global basis the TCF 
industries accounted for 10 per cent of all anti-dumping cases initiated in 2001 (sub. 
33). In contrast, in Australia, the TCF sector has accounted for only 5 per cent of all 
cases initiated in the last 5 years and there have been no cases in this sector since 
1998-99 (PC 2002c). Consequently, as at February 2003, there were no anti-
dumping measures in place against TCF imports into Australia (ACS 2003a). 
Disincentives for the TCF industries to take anti-dumping action  
However, this does not mean that ‘dumping’ is not a problem for the Australian 
TCF sector. Taking anti-dumping action can be costly, time consuming and 
uncertain in outcomes because it is often difficult to determine if ‘actionable’ 
dumping has occurred. For example, in taking action against least developed 
countries or countries with state-owned enterprises, it can be very difficult to 
determine the cost structure of the product allegedly dumped. Charles Parsons and 
Co. commented: 
Anti-dumping can be an effective tool but it is rarely used within TCF as target 
countries are those with ‘economies in transition’ where normal values and standard 
costs are not known. (sub. 26, p. 9). 
Also, some alleged dumping in the TCF sector is likely to be of a short term nature 
to dispose of excess stocks associated with fashion changes and ends of seasons. 
Thus, the TCFUA said: 
The TCF sector is also vulnerable in regards to fashion clothing because our season is 
at the tail end of the European season and it is a convenient place to off-load goods 
unsold overseas. (sub. 33, p. 28)     




The Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association similarly commented: 
When it’s winter in the United States the factories are slow. What do they do with the 
product they make? They dump it. It comes pouring into Australia and into Asia … 
(trans., p. 360) 
While such selling practices may cause damage to both local producers and other 
importers, several participants suggested that Australia's anti-dumping system does 
not provide effective remedies. For example, Standard Universal Textile Group 
said: 
… the Australian anti-dumping system is unable to inhibit or remedy the damage 
associated with one-off shipments of finished consumer items that are each individually 
off-loaded at opportunistic prices in Australia. (sub. 71, p. 8) 
Moreover, local TCF manufacturers may be reluctant to take anti-dumping action 
where the importer is the retailer to whom they also supply product. The Footwear 
Manufacturers Association of Australia commented that: 
… Australian companies are often wary of reprisals from their customers if they lodge 
dumping claims, which are often the major retailers. (trans., p. 408) 
Should anti-dumping arrangements be modified? 
Proposed amendments to Australia’s anti-dumping rules in relation to economies in 
transition would deal with one of the TCF sector’s major concerns. These 
amendments will provide greater flexibility in determining ‘normal value’ in respect 
of exports from countries such as China whose economies are in transition from 
command to market economies, including scope to use the price of a good in a 
surrogate country to determine its normal value. The TFIA said that it fully supports 
these amendments that deal with the ‘main issue’ confronting TCF firms in this area 
(trans., p. 11) 
However, a range of other possible changes to the current regime were proposed by 
participants most of which involved making remedies more accessible to local TCF 
suppliers including automatic triggers for the imposition of dumping duties (ie 
reversing the onus of proof). The Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of Australia 
said: 
In order to respond quickly to dumping we believe a set of automatic triggers should be 
set in place and through this the Australian Customs could automatically initiate an 
Inquiry and an appropriate bond once the set criteria had been passed. (sub. 28, p. 20) 
Similarly, Standard Universal Textile Group contended: 
… anti-dumping provisions should be set in place to automatically initiate an inquiry 
and apply a bond when potentially injurious shipments enter Australia. (sub. 71, p. 8)     
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A further proposed change was to pass on the duty raised in any countervailing 
action to the local supplier concerned. In this context, the TCFUA and others 
referred to the Byrd amendment which provides for such an arrangement in the 
USA (sub. 33).  
The views that the regime should be strengthened are not universally accepted. For 
example, as the outgoing Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) , Professor Allan Fels, recently remarked: 
The dumping laws … deny consumers the benefits of much fair competition from 
abroad. The principles of dumping law are quite incompatible with the principles that 
we [ACCC] apply in relation to predatory pricing. A private study commissioned by 
the OECD found that most cases that succeeded under dumping law because of lower 
prices would have failed under competition law. (Fels, 2003, p. 11) 
However, whatever the merits of these very different positions, changes of the sort 
put forward by participants would have wide-ranging ramifications beyond the TCF 
sector. Accordingly, an assessment of such changes would need to be encompassed 
in a broad ranging review of Australia’s anti-dumping arrangements. 
Nonetheless, even under the existing regime, the interests of all parties would be 
served by ensuring that any anti-dumping actions are processed transparently and 
expeditiously. The Commission notes that in 2001-02, one-third of all anti-dumping 
investigations took longer to process than the 155 days provided for in the revised 
guidelines stemming from the Willett Review of anti-dumping measures (ACS 
2002a). The time taken by Ministers to make decisions following an investigation 
can further add to these delays. Such extended time frames are unlikely to be 
helpful to TCF suppliers or producers in other industries. 
11.4 Other  matters 
Relationships between suppliers and retailers 
Some local TCF suppliers told the Commission that the practices of retailers are 
frustrating rather than helping the sector to improve its international 
competitiveness.  
Some of these concerns reflected the perceived use by large retailers of their 
purchasing power to unreasonably squeeze suppliers’ margins.  
However, a price viewed as ‘unreasonable’ by a supplier may simply reflect 
commercial reality. Given the considerable competitive pressures on retailers to     




deliver value for money products to consumers and the growing availability of low 
cost imports, it is inevitable that many suppliers will be under pressure to constrain 
prices. As Coles Myer commented: 
The retail environment is intensely competitive with growing numbers of retailers of all 
sizes, often operating with very similar offers. Each retailer is striving to gain a greater 
share of the consumer’s limited spend on apparel which is placing downward pressure 
on prices. (sub. 95, p. 1) 
Moreover, the pressure on suppliers to constrain prices does not preclude 
constructive and effective working relationships. Indeed, the Commission met with 
a number of smaller suppliers who appear to have developed such a relationship 
with the major retailers.  
A possibly more significant concern is the contention that recent purchasing 
decisions taken by buyers for the major retailers to source offshore had often been 
made purely on the basis of product price, and had not fully taken into account the 
supply chain management costs, which are often higher for imported products. 
While this contention is difficult to substantiate, purchasing decisions which ignore 
some supply chain costs could be inimical to the interests of both local TCF 
suppliers and Australian consumers. Greater cooperation and information sharing 
between retailers and their suppliers to ensure that sourcing decisions properly 
reflect all the costs involved would therefore be beneficial. 
At a more specific level, previous reviews such as the TCFL Forum Strategic Plan 
(TCFL Forum 2002) identified scope for a more cooperative approach between 
suppliers and retailers in regard to the provision of logistical services by suppliers. 
There has been some progress made in this area with several Australian TCF 
producers offering retailers vendor managed inventory services (see chapter 3). The 
scope for such arrangements is increasing with IT developments in the areas of 
barcoding and scanning, enabling suppliers to offer a more sophisticated ‘just-in-
time’ stock service.  
Further development of these sorts of relationships and associated services will 
almost certainly occur as part of the evolution of the TCF sector. Indeed, it was 
pointed out to the Commission that retailers want and need a local TCF sector. As 
Coles Myer said: 
Coles Myer is the largest purchaser of local product and we would like to see a viable 
local industry. (sub. 95, p. 2) 
•  There is scope for improved cooperation and information sharing between TCF 
suppliers and major retailers to help optimise the means of providing Australian 
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consumers with TCF products at the lowest overall costs (including all supply 
chain costs). 
Environmental legislation 
As discussed in chapter 3, increasingly stringent environmental regulation is one of 
the variety of pressures helping to reshape the TCF industries globally. For some 
local TCF producers, this will be a new source of opportunity. For example, the 
Technical Textiles and Nonwovens Association (sub.  68) noted that stringent 
controls to promote better environmental outcomes more generally are increasing 
the demand for technical textiles. 
In other cases, however, more stringent environmental regulation may adversely 
impact on the competitiveness of TCF firms. For example, the costs imposed on 
Australian tanning and dyeing operations by effluent disposal regulations are 
apparently in the order of $3 to $5 per hide, compared to only $1 per hide in China. 
Also, Australia’s site rehabilitation requirements may be costly and inhibit the exit 
of some non-viable firms from the sector. 
The fact that such costs are higher in Australia than in some other countries does not 
of itself indicate that there is a problem. Environmental regulation has to balance 
many interests that extend well beyond the compliance costs for firms. While those 
costs may make it more difficult for Australian producers to compete against 
countries with lower standards, relaxing those regulations could impose significant 
environmental and clean-up costs on the wider community and may not be 
acceptable. Also, while Australia may have more stringent environmental 
regulations than many developing countries, the Australian regime is apparently less 
stringent than in some other developed countries. 
That said, it is important that procedures for determining regulations are transparent, 
provide scope for input from all affected parties and are administratively efficient. 
The issue of procedural efficiency is particularly germane to another environmental 
issue drawn to the Commission’s attention in this inquiry. Several participants told 
the Commission that complying with Australia’s NICNAS (National Industrial 
Chemicals Notification and Assessment Scheme) has delayed firms’ access to 
chemicals used by their overseas competitors, even though those chemicals have 
undergone testing in countries (such as Germany) which have equally stringent 
environmental regulation. In commenting on the associated cost implications, 
Genevieve Yarn Dyers said that this means:     




… [a firm has] to spend $75 000 or whatever it costs to get a product into this country, 
when all the work’s been done in Europe or America where it’s manufactured. 
(trans., p. 119) 
In the Commission’s view, requirements for the retesting of chemicals that have 
already been demonstrated to be safe are inefficient and conflict with the thrust of 
standards reform in Australia. An important element of those reforms has been 
mutual recognition of compliance with like standards across jurisdictions. 
Consistent with this approach, proof of safety for new industrial chemicals which 
have been certified as safe in other developed countries, would seemingly only be 
warranted if the regulator can demonstrate both that a particular chemical is ‘high 
risk’ and that specific circumstances in Australia make retesting essential. 
•  The application of ‘proof-of-safety’ requirements (NICNAS) for new industrial 
chemicals which have been certified as safe in other developed countries would 
only be warranted if the regulator can demonstrate both that a particular 
chemical is ‘high risk’ and that specific circumstances in Australia make re-
testing essential. 
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A  Inquiry processes and information 
sources 
Because of the relatively short reporting period for the inquiry, the Commission 
streamlined its inquiry processes. Among other things, it: 
•  sought information on key issues using a list of questions circulated to inquiry 
participants rather than through a detailed Issues Paper; 
•  produced a Position Paper, rather than a full Draft Report, concentrating on 
preliminary options for post 2005 assistance for the TCF sector — the principle 
focus of the inquiry; and 
•  elected not to hold public hearings prior to releasing the Position Paper. In 
preparing that paper, it relied on information gained from an extensive program 
of industry visits, written submissions and a number of recent reports on the 
Australian TCF sector (see below). 
Discussions with interested parties 
Over the period November 2002 to March 2003 the Commission met with more 
than 70 interested parties. They are listed below. 
Submissions 
At the outset of the inquiry, the Commission indicated that it was seeking written 
submissions on the matters under reference. Prior to the release of the Position 
Paper, the Commission received nearly 100 submissions. More than 80 additional 
submissions commenting on the analysis and preliminary findings in the Position 
Paper were subsequently received. A full listing of those who made submissions to 
the inquiry is provided below.  
Public hearings 
To elicit views on the Position Paper, the Commission held public hearings in 
Melbourne on 3 and 4 June, in Geelong on 5 June, and in Sydney on 12 and 13 
June. Some 35 entities participated in discussions with the Commission at those 
hearings. They are listed below.     





The Commission engaged three organisations — the Centre of Policy Studies, 
Econtech and the Centre for International Economics — to provide quantitative 
modelling services to the inquiry (see appendix E). The contracts for these 
consultancies, ‘stylised’ modelling scenarios and the modelling reports were posted 
on the inquiry website. 
Modelling workshop 
A workshop to discuss preliminary results from some of the modelling studies 
available to the inquiry was held in Canberra on 20 March 2003. As well as the 
modellers, representatives from the TCF industries, unions, government and 
academia attended the workshop. The Commission placed a summary of the 
workshop proceedings and final versions of the papers presented on the inquiry 
website. 
However, some modelling work undertaken for inquiry participants after the release 
of the Position Paper was not discussed at the workshop. The limited explanation 
and details provided for some of the results provided to the Commission made it 
difficult to reconcile all of them with related results in the studies which were 
exposed to scrutiny at the workshop (see chapter 6 and appendix E). 
Previous reports 
Since the 1997 review of the TCF sector by the Industry Commission, there have 
been several reports looking at the sector and its prospects, and at related 
government policy settings. These reports include: 
•  an action agenda for the textile, clothing, footwear and leather industries 
prepared by the TCFL Action Agenda Advisory Board (2000); 
•  a strategic plan for the industries arising from this action agenda, prepared by the 
TCFL Forum (2002); 
•  two reports prepared for the TCFL Forum on overseas market access issues 
(TFIA 2002a, Werner International 2003); 
•  the Victorian Government’s (2000) strategic audit of that State’s textile, 
clothing, footwear and leather industries; 
•  the ensuing Victorian Government (2002) plan for the industries; and 
•  the review by the Commonwealth Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources (2002) of the TCF Strategic Investment Program.      
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While inquiry participants have questioned aspects of some of these reports, the 
information they contain assisted the Commission to identify and analyse matters 
germane to its terms of reference. 
A.1  List of meetings with interested parties 
Industry associations and groups 
Australian Association of Leather Industries 
Australian Business Limited  
Australian Industry Group  
Australian Retailers Association 
Australian Wool Industries Secretariat/Australian Wool Processors Council 
Carpet Institute of Australia 
Council of Textile and Fashion Industries of Australia 
Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of Australia 
Furnishing Industry Association of Australia 
Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association 
Victorian Wool Processors  
Labour associations 
Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
TCF suppliers 
Auspac Gale  Pacific 
Austanners (Vic)  Geofabrics Australasia 
Australian Country Spinners  Godfrey Hirst Australia 
Australian Defence Apparel  Harold Boot Company 
Australian Weaving Mills  Howe Leather 
Bekaert (Australia)  J. Robins and Sons 
Berkeley Apparel  Kimberly Clark 
Billabong (by phone conference)  Lisa Barron Fashion Design 
Bisconte Leather  Logan Textiles 
Bradmill Textiles  Macquarie Textiles 
Brooks  Neat n’ Trim Uniforms 
Bruck Textiles  New Balance Australia 
Canningvale Towels (by phone conference)  Norman Ritchie Textile Group 
Dowd Corporation  Pacific Brands 
DPK Australia  R.M. Williams 
Driza-Bone  Rocklea Spinning Mills 
DR Manufacturing  S & R Fashions 
Feltex Carpets  Standard Universal Textile Group 
Figleaf Clothing  Textor     




Ulster Tascot Carpets  Wild Card 
Victorian Hide & Skin Producers  Yakka 
Commonwealth Government 
AusIndustry 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
State Governments 
New South Wales Government (Cabinet Office, Departments of Industrial Relations, State 
and Regional Development) 
Queensland Government (Departments of Industrial Relations, Employment and Training) 
South Australian Government (Departments of Premier and Cabinet, Industry and Trade) 
Tasmanian Government (Department of Economic and State Development) 
Victorian Government (Departments of Industry and Regional Development, Premier and 
Cabinet, Treasury and Finance) 
Local Government and regional associations 
Geelong Council 
Geelong Textile Network 
Wangaratta Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Wangaratta Council 
Other 
Coles Myer  
Kreitals Consulting Group 
Logistinet 
Mr Peter Morgan, Chairman TCFL Forum 
Ms Sally Weller 
TCF Services 
A.2  Modelling workshop participants 
Access Economics 
ACIL Tasman 
Australian Business Limited 
Centre for International Economics 
Centre for Sustainable Regional Communities 
Centre of Policy Studies 
Council of Textile & Fashion Industries of Australia 
Department of Industry and Regional Development (Vic)     
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Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
Department of Treasury and Finance (Vic) 
Econtech 
Kreitals Consulting Group 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
Wangaratta Council 
A.3  Public hearing participants 
Melbourne, 3 June 2003 
Council of Textile and Fashion Industries of Australia 
Godfrey Hirst 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
Australian Dyeing Company 
Australian Defence Apparel 
Yakka 
Carpet Institute of Australia 
Furnishing Industry Association of Australia 
Melbourne, 4 June 2003 
NIETL/Northlink 
Flickers Australia 
City of Whittlesea 
Harold Boot Co 
Australian Industry Group 
Textor 
Moreland City Council 
Feltex Australia 
Geelong, 5 June 2003 
City of Greater Geelong 
Geelong Manufacturing Council/Geelong Textile Network 
Ian Trezise MLA, Member for Geelong 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
City of Ballarat 
Geelong and Region Trades and Labour Council 
Geelong West Branch of the ALP 
Geelong Chamber of Commerce 
TCF Resource Centre of Western Australia 
Victorian Farmers’ Federation 
Australian Wool Processors Council 
Western Region Councils Forum      




Sydney, 12 June 2003 
Bruck Textiles 
Albany International 
Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association 
Geofabrics Australasia 
Pacific Brands 
Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of Australia 
Sporting Footwear Importers Group 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Australian Fashion Innovators 
Sydney, 13 June 2003 
Australian Business Limited 
A.4  List of submissions 
Note: ‘PP’ indicates submission was received after the Position Paper was finalised. 
Name Sub.  No. 
A Linear Bridal   58 
A.I. Topper & Co Pty Ltd  38 
Albany International Pty Ltd  49, PP142 
Anderson, Mr John  PP145 
Austanners (Vic) Pty Ltd  73 
Austrade 85 
Australian Association of Leather Industries   32, PP161 
Australian Business Limited  98, PP181 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry  PP147 
Australian Council of Trade Unions  92, PP169 
Australian Defence Apparel  24, PP130 
Australian Dyeing Company  1, PP106, PP121, PP137 
Australian Fashion Innovators  PP 144 
Australian Industry Group  11, PP140 
Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union  9 
Australian Weaving Mills  67, PP163 
Australian Wool Innovation Limited  PP158 
Australian Wool Processors Council Inc  45, PP127 
Banyule City Council  PP170 
Berkeley Apparel Pty Ltd  50 
Bradsal 90     
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Name Sub.  No. 
Brotherhood of St. Laurence  74 
Bruck Textiles  55, PP109, PP165 
Carpet Institute of Australia Limited  35, PP126, PP162 
Casaveen Knitwear  6 
Centre For Sustainable Regional Communities (La Trobe University)  PP 149 
Charles Parsons & Co.  26 
City of Ballarat  14, PP112 
City of Darebin  25, PP 151 
City of Greater Bendigo  PP150 
City of Greater Geelong  16, PP118 
City of Whittlesea  PP102, PP115 
Colbeck, Senator Richard  61, PP166 
Coles Myer  95, PP143 
Coronet 10 
Council of Textile & Fashion Industries of Australia Ltd  75, 97, PP100, PP164 
Cregan, Ms Christina  30 
CSIRO - Textile and Fibre Technology  52 
Defab Weavers  65 
Department of Agriculture Fisheries & Forestry  PP176 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations  84, PP131 
Department of Industry and Resources (WA)  PP179 
Done Art and Design  93 
DR Manufacturing  57, PP146 
Draggin' Jeans Pty Ltd  17 
Enterprise Skills  29 
Envitan Consultancy — Tannery, Technology & Environment  PP110 
Fabrics Australia Inc.  70 
Fashion Technicians Association of Australia  82 
Feltex Australia Pty Ltd  80, PP116 
Flicker's Australia Pty Ltd  63, PP168 
Footwear Manufacturers’ Association of Australia  28, PP132 
Furnishing Industry Association of Australia Ltd  22, PP125 
Furst Fashions  2 
Geelong Chamber of Commerce  62, PP114, PP136 
Geelong and Region Trades and Labour Council  18, PP141 
Geelong Manufacturing Council and Geelong Textile Network  47, PP139     




Name Sub.  No. 
Geelong West Branch of the ALP   23 
Gilmour's Pty Ltd  81 
Godfrey Hirst Australia Pty Ltd  77, PP129 
Hampshire, Mr Don  20 
Harold Boot Company  PP124, PP157 
J. Robins & Sons Pty Ltd  34 
James Nelson Textiles Group  64 
Job Watch Inc.  43 
Koci, Mr Stephen  PP178 
Labour Council of NSW  60 
Light Manufacturing Industry Training Council (WA) Inc.  48 
Light Manufacturing Training Australia  41 
LincLab Australia  56 
Longina Phillips Designs Pty Ltd  99 
Macpherson, Ms Elizabeth  5 
Melba Tex Pty Ltd  83 
Melbourne Textiles Knitting Co.  4, 51, PP134 
Mitchell Shire Council  PP 148 
Moreland City Council  PP119 
Municipal Association of Victoria  PP159 
National Farmers Federation  PP104 
National Footwear Retailers' Association Ltd  12 
New South Wales Government  PP175 
NIETL/North Link  96 
Northern Grampians Shire Council  PP133 
Pacific Brands  72, PP138 
PHM (NSW) Pty Ltd  3, 15, 91 
Queensland Light Manufacturing Industry Training Council Inc.  36 
Rocklea Spinning Mills  44, PP108 
S & R Fashions Pty Ltd  39, PP120 
SHARP Dummies Pty Ltd  13, PP107, PP155 
Shoe Last & Components  PP172 
South Australian Government  87, PP177 
South West Trades and Labour Council  19 
Specialty Coatings (Aust.) Pty Ltd  79 
Sporting Footwear Importers Group   27, PP122     
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Name Sub.  No. 
Standard Universal Textile Group  71 
SuitsU Pty Ltd  PP105 
Tasmanian Government  89, PP180 
TCF Council of Fiji and Fiji Ministry of Commerce, Business  66, 94, PP117 
   Development and Investment 
TCF&L Manufacturers of SA  37 
TCF Resource Centre (WA)  69, PP111, PP167 
TCF Services Pty Ltd  PP174 
Technical Textiles and Nonwoven Association  68, PP113 
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia  33, 88, PP154 
Textor Pty Ltd  76, PP135 
The Textile Institute  PP153 
The Uniting Church in Australia  59, PP160 
Tuffa Workwear Pty Ltd  8 
Ulster Tascot Carpets  53 
Uniform City Pty Ltd  PP123 
Victor Footwear   54, PP156 
Victoria Carpet Co Pty Ltd  86 
Victorian Council of Social Service  42 
Victorian Farmers Federation  PP 152 
Victorian Government  78, PP173 
Victorian Regional Trades and Labour Councils Association  21 
Victorian Trades Hall Council  40 
Wangaratta Chamber of Commerce  7 
Wangaratta Rural City Council  46 
Wax Convertors Textiles  PP171 
Wool Interiors Limited  PP101 
Wool Producers  PP103 
Yakka Pty Ltd  31, PP128 
       




B  Industry and workforce data 
As in the rest of the report, the abbreviation TCF has been used to describe the 
entire textiles, clothing, footwear and leather sector. The figures presented in this 
appendix cover all of these segments. 
B.1 Market  data 
Table B.1  Industry composition — 2000-01 
Industry  Employment








  Number $m  $m
Wool scouring  1 792  746  172
Synthetic fibre textile mfg  2 960  602  191
Cotton textile mfg  2 172  359  112
Wool textile mfg  1 628  188  82
Textile finishing  1 215  169  73
Made-up textile product mfg  8 447  1 018  321
Textile floor covering mfg  3 307  823  227
Rope, cordage and twine mfg  407  92  27b
Textile product mfg n.e.c.  2 003  214  78
Hosiery mfg  2 121  277  48
Cardigan and pullover mfg  1 126  151  39
Knitting mill product mfg n.e.c.  2 246  422  124
Men’s and boys’ wear mfg  5 970  729  225
Women’s and girls’ wear mfg  7 780  1 033  251
Sleepwear, underwear and infant clothing mfg  1 384  268  74
Clothing mfg n.e.c.  5 797  581  191
Footwear mfg  4 223  558  182
Leather tanning and fur dressing  2 787  843  156
Leather and leather substitute product mfg  399  39  12
All TCF  57 764  9 111  2 583
a Includes working properties. b Data subject to sampling variability of between 25 per cent and 50 per cent. 
Note: n.e.c means not elsewhere classified. 
Source: Manufacturing Industry, Australia, 2000-01 (cat. no. 8221.0).     




Table B.2  Industry shares of sectoral employment and production,  
2000-01 
  Employment  Share of total  Value added  Share of total 
 Number Per  cent $ million  Per cent 
Textile fibre, yarn and 
woven fabric mfg 
9 766 16.9  629.9 24.4 
Textile product mfg  14 164 24.5  652.8 25.3 
Knitting mills  5 493 9.5  211.0 8.2 
Clothing mfg  20 931 36.2  740.4 28.7 
Footwear mfg  4 223 7.3  181.7 7.0 
Leather and leather 
product mfg 
3 187 5.5  167.5 6.5 
All TCF  57 764 100.0  2 583.3 100.0 
Source: ABS 8221.0. 











Change   
1991-92 to 
1998-99 
  ’000 ’000 % 
Wholesaling      
Textile products  6.3  8.0  27.0 
Clothing   7.5  11.9  58.7 
Footwear 1.0  1.5  50.0 
Floor coverings  1.4  1.1  -21.4 
Total wholesaling   16.2  22.5  38.9 
      
Retailing      
Fabrics and other soft goods  10.7  10.9  6.9 
Department stores  93.5  103.1  10.3 
Clothing 53.2  55.0  3.4 
Footwear 11.8  13.3  12.7 
Floor coverings  4.2  4.3  2.4 
Total retailing  173.4  186.7  7.7 
Total wholesaling and retailing  189.6  209.2  10.3 
a Some establishments do not deal exclusively in TCF products (eg department stores). 
Source: ABS (2000a, 2000b).     




Figure B.1  Australia’s TCF trade by country and sub-sector, 2001-02 
Percentage shares  




















































































Data source: TFIA (2002b).     




Table B.4  Share of clothing and footwear consumption in total household 
consumption, 1990 to 2000 
per cent 






 % change 
1990 to 2000 
Australia  4.9 4.3 3.8  -22.0 
France 6.3  5.4  4.9  -21.9 
Italy 10.3  9.6  9.3  -9.8 
Japan 7.5  7.1  6.0  -19.9 
United Kingdom  6.3  6.3  5.8  -7.3 
United States  6.8  5.5  5.3  -22.1 
Source: OECD (2002). 
B.2 Workforce  data 
This section presents data relating to the characteristics of the TCF workforce. 
Much of this data is drawn from the ABS Labour Force Survey or the ABS 
Population Census. This is mainly because they provide more detailed data on 
workplace characteristics than other sources of information such as the ABS 
Manufacturing Survey. 
The Manufacturing Survey indicates that sectoral employment in the TCF sector 
was around 58  000 persons at June 2001, whereas the Labour Force Survey 
suggests a figure of around 90 000 at that time. (TCF employment as measured by 
the Labour Force Survey has since declined to about 68 000 (May 2003).) This 
difference arises from three main sources: different methodologies between 
collections, sampling error and changes in industry structure. In particular, the 
manufacturing survey data exclude sole proprietors and owner operators; and also 
all persons working on commission, contract or as consultants, including 
outworkers. In contrast, the Labour Force Survey and the Population Census data 
include outworkers to the extent that they identify themselves as such. 
Most of the data presented in this section relate to the period from 1996-97. As far 
as possible, they are presented on a comparable basis to the data presented in the 
Industry Commission’s earlier report into assistance arrangements for the TCF 
sector (IC 1997). However, some of the data presented in that report have since 
been revised by the ABS.     














industry  Male Female Persons  Male  Female Persons  Male  Female  Persons










11.9 9.9  21.8 9.1  9.4  18.5  -23.5 -5.0  -15.1
Knitting 
mills (223) 
1.1 2.6  3.7 0.9  1.2  2.1 -18.2  -53.8  -43.2
Clothing 
mfg (224) 
13.1 36.5  49.6 10.4  24.4  34.8 -20.6  -33.2  -29.8
Footwear 
mfg (225) 





5.9  4.2  10.1  2.5 0.6  3.1  -57.6 -85.7 -69.3
All TCF 
(22) 
42.9 60.8  103.7 29.6  38.8  68.4 -31.0  -36.2  -34.0
All mfg  830.3  297.4  1 127.7  810.6  296.9  1 107.5  -2.4  -0.2  -1.8
All 
industries 
4 754.3  3 629.0  8 383.3  5 269.7  4 248.9  9 518.6  10.8  17.1  13.5
a  See tables C.2, C.3 and C.10 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey Data.     




Table B.6  The contribution of TCF employment to overall employment, 
2001a 
  TCF employment as  a proportion of : 
  Total manufacturing employment in  Total employment in 
 Metro Other  Total Metro Other  Total 
 % % % % % % 
NSW  6.3 4.9 5.9 0.8 0.5  0.7
Vic  9.0 8.2 8.9 1.5 1.1  1.4
Qld  5.0 4.5 4.7 0.6 0.4  0.5
WA  5.0 2.4 4.4 0.5 0.2  0.3
SA  4.8 2.6 4.2 0.7 0.3  0.6
Tas  8.1 6.5 6.9 0.8 0.8  0.8
NT  4.5 2.7 3.9  -  -  0.2
ACT  4.0 -  4.0 - -  0.1
Australia  6.8 5.3 6.4 0.9 0.6  0.8
a  See table C.4 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Source: ABS 2002 Census Data.     




Table B.7  Distribution of TCF employment by State, May 2003a 
ANZSIC industry  NSW  VIC  QLD  WA  SA  TAS  NT  ACT  Australia
  ’000  ’000  ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000  ’000
Textile fibre, yarn 
and woven fabric 
mfg (221) 
1.9  2.6  0.8 0.9 0.5 0.3  - -  6.9
Textile product mfg 
(222) 
5.4  7.0  1.8 1.9 1.8 0.6  -  0.1  18.5
Knitting mills (223)  - 2.1  -  - -  0.1 -  - 2.1
Clothing mfg (224)  14.2  15.2  2.6 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1  34.8
Footwear mfg 
(225) 
1.1  1.2  0.2 -  0.3  0.2 - -  3.0
Leather and 
leather product mfg 
(226) 
0.7  0.8  1.3 -  0.2  0.1 - -  3.1
  All TCF (22)  23.2  28.8  6.7  4.0  3.6  1.7  0.1 0.2  68.4
All manufacturing  344.2  351.4  181.3  100.5 96.9 22.8  3.8  6.7 1  107.5
All industries  3 152.1  2 390.4  1 814.9 972.3 716.5 206.6  94.5 171.5  9  518.6
  %  %  % % % % % %  % 
Textile fibre, yarn 
and woven fabric 
mfg (221) 
27.1 37.1 11.4  12.9 7.2 4.3  - -  100.0
Textile product mfg 
(222) 
29.0  37.6  9.7 10.3  9.7  3.2  -  0.5  100.0
Knitting mills (223)  - 95.2  - - -  4.8  - -  100.0
Clothing mfg (224)  40.8  43.7  7.5 3.7 2.3 1.4 0.3 0.3 100.0
Footwear mfg 
(225) 
36.7 40.0  6.6  -  10.0 6.7  - -  100.0
Leather and 
leather product mfg 
(226) 
22.6 25.8 41.9  - 6.5 3.2  - -  100.0
All TCF (22)  34.0  42.2  9.8  5.8  5.3  2.5  0.1  0.3 100.0
All manufacturing  31.0  31.7  16.5 9.1 8.7 2.1 0.3 0.6 100.0
All industries  33.1  25.1  19.1  10.2 7.5 2.2 1.0 1.8 100.0
a  See table C.5 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     








Statistical Division and code 
 
Main centres 
Per cent of State 
TCF employment 
    
NSW  Sydney 105  Sydney  75.2
 Illawarra  115  Wollongong  4.6
 Hunter  110  Newcastle  4.0
  South Eastern 145  Queanbeyan, Goulburn  2.7
  Richmond-Tweed 120  Lismore, Tweed Heads  2.2
 Northern  130    Tamworth  2.2
  Other NSW    9.1
     100.0
    
VIC  Melbourne 205  Melbourne  79.1
 Barwon  210  Geelong  7.7
  Ovens Murray 245  Wodonga, Wangaratta  3.4
  Loddon 235  Bendigo, Castelmaine  2.6
  Other VIC     7.1
     100.0
    
QLD  Brisbane 305  Brisbane  56.4
  Moreton 310   Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast 
Ipswich 
25.1
  Darling Downs 320   Toowoomba  5.0
  Wide Bay –Burnett 315  Maryborough, Bundaberg  3.8
  Other QLD    9.8
     100.0
    
WA  Perth 505  Perth  88.2
  South West 510  Bunbury, Busselton  4.7
  Other WA    7.1
     100.0
    
SA  Adelaide 405  Adelaide  85.8
  Outer Adelaide 410  Mt Barker  5.3
  South-East 425  Mt Gambier, Bordertown  4.9
  Other SA    4.0
     100.0
    
TAS  Greater Hobart 605  Hobart  41.8
  Mersey – Lyell 620  Burnie, Devonport  31.2
 Northern  615  Launceston  20.7
 Other  TAS    6.3
     100.0
Source: ABS 2002 Census Data.     




Figure B.2  Geographical distribution of TCF manufacturing employment 
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a  See table C.3 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Data source: ABS 2002 and 1996 Census Data. 
Table B.9  TCF manufacturing employment by 3 digit ANZIC code as a 
proportion of total State TCF employment, May 2003a 



























 %  % % %  % % ’000
NSW  8.2 23.3  -  61.2  4.7 3.0  23.2
Vic  9.0  24.3  7.3  52.8  4.2 2.8  28.8
Qld  11.9 26.9  -  38.8 3.0 19.4  6.7
WA  22.5 47.5  -  32.5 -  -  4.0
SA  13.9 50.0  -  22.2 8.3  5.6  3.6
Tas  17.6 35.3  5.9  29.4 11.8  5.9  1.7
NT -  -  -  100.0 -  -  0.1
ACT -  50.0  -  50.0 -  -  0.2
Australia 10.1  27.0  3.1  50.9  4.4 4.5  68.4
a  See table C.6 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     




Table B.10  Part time employment, November 1997 and May 2003 
Part time employees as a  
proportion of total 
 
 
ANZSIC industry  1997 2003
  % %
Textile fibre, yarn and woven fabric mfg (221)  16.1  8.7
Textile product mfg (222)  11.2  16.8
Knitting mills (223)  35.5 28.6
Clothing mfg (224)  17.4  19.3
Footwear mfg (225)  12.1  6.7
Leather and leather product mfg (226)  7.7 9.7
All TCF (22)  16.2  16.7
All manufacturing  11.0  11.8
All industries  26.0  28.9
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data. 
Table B.11  Age profile of employed persons, May 2003a 
Employment distribution by age   
ANZSIC industry  15-19 20-34 35-54  55+ 
Total 
employees
 %  %  %  %  ’000 
Textile fibre, yarn and woven fabric mfg (221)  2.9 23.1 55.0 18.8  6.9
Textile product mfg (222)  1.1 21.2 61.6  16.2  18.5
Knitting mills (223)  - 19.0 66.6 14.3  2.1
Clothing mfg (224)  2.9  24.4 58.3 14.3  34.8
Footwear mfg (225)  - 40.4 43.3 16.7  3.0
Leather and leather product mfg (226)  12.9 54.8 32.2  -  3.1
All TCF (22)  2.6  25.3  57.3  14.8  68.4
All manufacturing  3.9  34.1  49.2  12.8  1 107.5
All industries  7.1  34.4  46.1  12.4  9 518.6
a  See table C.9 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     




Figure B.3  Workforce aged 35 or more by industry, May 2003a 
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a  See figure C.4 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Data source: ABS Labour Force Survey data. 
Table B.12  Employment distribution by country of birth, May 2003a 
 







  % % %  ’000
Textile fibre, yarn and woven fabric mfg (221)  62.2 4.3  33.5  6.9
Textile product mfg (222)  73.2  4.5 22.3  18.5
Knitting mills (223)  47.0 13.0 40.0  2.1
Clothing mfg (224)  38.8  2.5  58.7 34.8
Footwear mfg (225)  30.9 -  69.1  3.0
Leather and leather product mfg (226)  78.6 11.5  9.9  3.1
All TCF (22)  52.2  3.8  43.9 68.4
All  manufacturing  66.8 11.2 22.0  1  107.5
All  industries  75.2 10.4 14.4  9  518.6
a  See table C.11 in IC 1997 for earlier data. b The ABS defines main English speaking (MES) countries as 
Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     




Figure B.4  Country of birth of non-MESa born TCF employees, 2001b 
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a  The ABS defines main English speaking (MES) countries as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, United 
Kingdom, Ireland and the United States. b See figure C.5 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Data source: ABS 2002 Census data. 
Table B.13  Marital status of TCF employees, May 2003a 
Proportion of employees who are married   
ANZSIC industry  Male Female  Persons
 %  %  % 
Textile fibre, yarn and woven fabric mfg (221)  69.3 64.2  68.5
Textile product mfg (222)  71.0  70.2  70.8
Knitting mills (223)  100.0 50.0  71.4
Clothing mfg (224)  78.8  75.0  76.1
Footwear mfg (225)  41.6 88.8  70.0
Leather and leather product mfg (226)  56.0 50.0  51.6
All TCF (22)  71.9  72.9  72.3
All manufacturing  68.7  69.5  69.0
All industries  65.2  62.3  64.0
a  See table C.12 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     




Table B.14  Educational profile of the TCF and manufacturing workforce, 
























Textile, fibre, yarn and woven fabric mfg 
(221) 
na na 66.3  32.7
Textile products mfg (222)  10.0 7.6 62.9 45.4
Knitting mills (223)  na  na  57.8  47.0
Clothing mfg (224)  5.6 4.6 67.8 42.9
Footwear mfg (225)  na  19.3 74.4  59.2
Leather and leather product mfg (226)  16.6  na  55.1  40.2
All TCF (22)  7.7  6.9  65.4  43.8
All manufacturing  11.2  24.5  49.6  34.4
All industries  20.3  14.7  44.3  26.6
a  See table C.16 in IC 1997 for earlier data. Categories are not complete nor mutually exclusive. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
na: not available 
Source: ABS 2001b (Cat. no. 6227.0). 







Textile, fibre, yarn and woven fabric manufacturing (221)  $774  42.5
Textile products manufacturing (222)  $552  35.9
Knitting mills (223)  np  np
Clothing manufacturing (224)  $485  31.0
Footwear manufacturing (225)  $480  33.0
Leather and leather product manufacturing (226  $576  38.8
All TCF (22)  $592 35.6
All manufacturing  $740 37.2
a  See table C.18 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
np: not provided 
Source: ABS Employee Earnings and Hours survey.     




Table B.16  Average weekly earnings and hours, May 2002 
  Full time adult total 
weekly earnings 




TCF $670  36.47  $18.37
Manufacturing $874  38.31  $22.82
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey and Average Weekly Earnings information. 
Figure B.5  Average weekly earnings in the manufacturing sector, May 2002 
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Data source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     




Table B.17  Labour market experience of retrenched workers 
  3 years to June 1997  3 years to June 2001 
  Industry from which retrenched  Industry from which retrenched 










’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 
Employed  8.4 89.0  374.9  6.8 80.7 400.5
Unemployed  4.9 53.6  200.5  1.5 26.3  99.1
Not in the Labour 
Force (NILF) 
4.4 24.2  110.0  0.3 15.0  96.8
Total  17.  7 166.9 685.4  8.6 122.1  596.4
Labour market 
outcomes 
% % % % % % 
Employed  47.5 53.3 54.7 79.1 66.1  67.2
Unemployed  27.7 32.1 29.3 17.4 21.5  16.6
NILF  24.9 14.5 16.0  3.5 12.3  16.2
Unemployed or 
NILF 
52.5 46.6 45.3 20.9 33.8  32.8
Labour Mobility  % % % % % % 
Found job in TCF  27.4  3.4  1.3  27.9  5.5  1.3
Found  job  in  Mfg  45.2 49.3 18.2 39.7 49.7  15.4
Found job in 
other industries 
54.8 50.7 81.8 60.3 50.4  84.6
Note: The data is drawn from surveys of workers who had been retrenched, at any stage, in the three years to 
June 1997 or the three years to June 2001. 
Source: Unpublished ABS Retrenched and Redundancy data (Cat. no. 6266.0), included in sub. 84.     




Figure B.6  Outcomes for retrenched TCF workers, 3 years to 1997 and 3 
years to 2001 


















Data source: Table B17. 
Figure B.7  Working days lost per thousand employees due to industrial 













Data source: DEWR.  
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Table B.18  Workforce occupational composition, persons employed, August 1996 and May 2003a 
  All TCF    All manufacturing    All industries 
ASCO occupation (and code)  1996  2003    1996  2003    1996  2003 
  ’000  %  ’000  %   ’000  % ’000  %   ’000  %  ’000 % 
Managers and administrators 
(1) 
7.8 7.4 8.0  11.6   86.5 7.7  113.4 10.2   624.1  7.5  677.7  7.1 
Professionals (2)  2.9 2.8 4.1  6.1    87.2  7.8  109.8  9.9    1 389.7  16.7  1 757.7  18.5 
Associate professionals (3)  2.4 2.3 2.8  4.1   55.8 5.0 60.4 5.5    867.2  10.4  1  191.7  12.5 
Tradespersons and related 
workers (4) 
18.7 17.8  9.5  13.9   291.4 26.1 283.9  25.6    1 141.2  13.7  1 220.0  12.8 
Advanced clerical and service 
workers (5) 
3.3 3.1 1.3  1.9   35.7 3.2 26.4 2.4    403.2 4.9 382.0  4.0 
Intermediate clerical, sales and 
service workers (6) 
7.8 7.4 6.1  8.8    102.7 9.2  114.6  10.3    1 394.8  16.8  1 645.2  17.3 
Intermediate production and 
transport workers (7) 
46.7 44.5 30.4  44.5   240.0 21.5 203.6 18.4   793.4  9.5  817.3  8.6 
Elementary clerical, sales and 
service workers (8) 
2.8 2.7 2.1  3.0   26.0 2.3 17.4 1.6    862.3  10.4 956.5  10.0 
Labourers and related workers 
(9) 
12.5 11.9  4.1 6.1   192.9 17.3 178.0 16.1   834.4 10.0  870.6 9.1 
Total  104.9 100.0  68.4  100.0   1  118.2 100.1 1 107.5  100.0    8 310.3  100.0  9 518.6  100.0 
a See table C.14 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data. 
     




Table B.19  TCF persons employed by occupation, August 1996 and 
May 2003a 
’000 
 1996    2003 
ASCO occupation  Male  Fem.  Pers.    Male  Fem.  Pers.
Managers and administrators  5.3  2.5  7.8   6.4  1.6  8.0
Professionals  1.1 1.8  2.9    1.6 2.6  4.1
Associate professionals  1.5 0.9  2.4    1.7 1.1  2.8
Tradespersons and related 
workers 
10.2 8.4 18.7    4.3  5.3 9.5
Advanced clerical and service 
workers 
0.2 3.1  3.3    - 1.3  1.3
Intermediate clerical, sales and 
service workers 
1.9  5.8 7.8   1.1  4.9 6.1
Intermediate production and 
transport workers 
18.2  28.6 46.7   11.0 19.4  30.4
Elementary clerical, sales and 
service workers 
0.4 2.4  2.8    1.0 1.1  2.1
Labourers and related workers  6.5  6.0  12.5    2.5 1.6  4.1
Total 45.3  59.6  104.9    29.6  38.8  68.4
a See table C.15 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: ABS Labour Force Survey data.     
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Table B.20  Selected TCF regional workforce characteristics, 2001 











































             
105 Sydney  60.4  51.6  52.7 73.4 59.2  65.1  65.2
120 Lismore,   
Tweed Heads 
53.7 74.9 49.4  76.7  65.1 20.2  53.5
125  Coffs  Harbour  60.3 76.8 44.3  71.3  54.6 11.2  61.6
130 Tamworth  58.5  72.9  55.2 54.8 31.1  5.2  52.4
140 Orange,   
Bathurst 
67.0 77.1 63.9  64.2  33.7  7.5  57.6
145 Queanbeyan, 
Goulburn 
64.9 75.5 62.5  68.7  55.3 17.0  56.9
155  Albury  63.1 76.2 64.6  70.1  46.3 18.6  60.1
205  Melbourne  67.5 59.2 62.3  72.5  54.6 63.0  67.0
210  Geelong  65.6 67.8 66.6  66.0  44.6 26.0  57.2
220  Ballarat  68.3 73.4 61.9  69.2  41.9 11.9  58.1
235 Bendigo  73.4  79.2  74.0 67.8 59.0  9.3  55.9
245 Wodonga, 
Wangaratta 
66.3 76.5 74.4  69.3  39.0 17.2  58.4
255  Traralgon  66.5 80.8 72.1  70.5  58.0 12.0  56.8
305  Brisbane  70.5 62.1 57.1  68.7  60.3 44.4  62.2
310 Coolangatta, 
Surfers 
65.7 67.0 49.4  72.3  62.2 35.8  55.9
405 Adelaide  67.6  66.7  58.9 70.1 56.2  39.1  58.9
505  Perth  63.6 60.8 52.9  67.8  59.1 54.7  60.6
605 Hobart  68.3  74.5  57.6 45.9 51.3  10.3  42.5
620 Burnie, 
Devonport 
70.2 82.0 73.5  61.6  53.9  8.4  54.8
705  Darwin  65.9 71.3 39.7  63.0  64.3 24.6  48.8
805 Canberra  53.0  44.8  35.9 73.3 67.4  42.8  61.1
Total  Australia  65.5 62.0 58.4  70.9  56.0 49.1  63.1
a A statistical division is listed if it relates to a capital city or TCF employment in 2001 equalled or exceeded 
250 and the TCF share of total manufacturing employment equalled or exceeded 5 per cent. b These groups 
refer to intermediate clerical, sales and service workers, intermediate production and transport workers, 
elementary clerical, sales and service workers and labourers and related workers. 
Source: Estimates based on unpublished ABS Population Census data. 
     




Table B.21 Employees  without  leave  entitlements, August 2002a 
Previously known as casual employees 
ANZSIC industry  Proportion of total employees  Total employees
 %  ’000 
Textile, fibre, yarn and woven 
fabric mfg (221) 
13.2  7.6
Textile products mfg (222)  25.2  15.1
Knitting mills (223)  S 5.0
Clothing mfg (224)  28.6 32.2
Footwear mfg (225)  -  2.9
Leather and leather product 
mfg (226) 
S  3.2
All TCF (22)  22.9 66.0
All manufacturing  16.2 1  055.4
All industries  27.3  7 927.0
a See table C.8 in IC 1997 for earlier data. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data.  
S: denotes estimate suppressed because of insufficient sample. 
Source: ABS, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, August 2002. 
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Table B.22  Employees with and without leave entitlements by trade union membership, August 2002 
Previously known as permanent and casual employees 























  ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000 ’000  ’000 
All TCF (22)  13.2  35.9  50.9  1.1  13.5 15.1 14.4 49.4  66.0 
All  manufacturing  269.6 590.8 883.9  18.8 148.8 171.4 288.4 739.7  1  055.4 
All industries  1 646.3  3 998.9  5 766.7  187.4  1 927.1  2 160.3  1 833.7  5 926.0  7 927.0 
            
  % % % % % % % %  % 
All TCF (22)  26.9  73.1  100.0  7.5  92.5 100.0  22.6  77.4  100.0 
All manufacturing  31.3  68.7  100.0 11.2 88.8  100.0 28.1 71.9 100.0 
All industries  29.2  70.8  100.0  8.9 91.1  100.0 23.6 76.4 100.0 
a Total numbers includes persons whose trade union membership status is not known. Percentages refer to persons whose trade union membership status is known. 
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data.  
Source: ABS, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, August 2002. 
 
     




Table B.23  Labour mobility — TCF, February 1995 to February 1996 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working in TCF at beginning of survey year    105.7
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  1.0 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  9.7 
    Working in other industries at end of survey year  7.2 
Working in TCF at beginning and at end of survey year:    87.8
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  84.7 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  3.1 
Plus:  Working in TCF at end, but not beginning, of survey year:   
    -  Working in other industries at beginning of survey year  5.3 
    -  Not working at beginning of survey year  10.3 
Working in TCF at end of survey year    103.4
   
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
 
 
Table B.24  Labour mobility — all industries, February 1995 to February 
1996 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working at beginning of survey year    8047.7
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  128.4 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  430.2 
Working at beginning and at end of survey year:    7489.1
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  6412.4 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  1076.7 
Plus:  Not working at beginning of survey year  790.5 
Working at end of survey year    8279.6
   
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
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Table B.25  Labour mobility — TCF, February 1999 to February 2000 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working in TCF at beginning of survey year    90.9
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  0.5 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  7.8 
    Working in other industries at end of survey year  4.9 
Working in TCF at beginning and at end of survey year:    77.7
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  74.5 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  3.2 
Plus:  Working in TCF at end, but not beginning, of survey year:   
    -  Working in other industries at beginning of survey year  3.8 
    -  Not working at beginning of survey year  4.7 
Working in TCF at end of survey year    86.2
   
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
 
 
Table B.26  Labour mobility — all industries, February 1999 to February 
2000 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working at beginning of survey year    8583.7
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  110.3 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  436.5 
Working at beginning and at end of survey year:    8036.9
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  6844.7 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  1192.3 
Plus:  Not working at beginning of survey year  834.5 
Working at end of survey year    8871.5
   
Source: Unpublished ABS data.     




Table B.27  Labour mobility — TCF, February 2001 to February 2002 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working in TCF at beginning of survey year    80.9
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  0.6 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  6.9 
    Working in other industries at end of survey year  3.9 
Working in TCF at beginning and at end of survey year:    69.5
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  65.3 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  4.2 
Plus:  Working in TCF at end, but not beginning, of survey year:   
    -  Working in other industries at beginning of survey year  4.0 
    -  Not working at beginning of survey year  6.8 
Working in TCF at end of survey year    80.3
   
Note: Figures in italics have relative standard errors greater than 25 per cent, or are derived from such data. 
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
 
 
Table B.28  Labour mobility — all industries, February 2001 to February 
2002 
’000 employed persons 
   
Working at beginning of survey year    8813.9
Less:  Not working at end of survey year:   
    -  Employer/business/locality changed during year  115.4 
    -  Did not change employer/business/locality during year  458.2 
Working at beginning and at end of survey year:    8240.3
-  Did not change employer/business/locality  7070.3 
- Changed  employer/business/locality  1170.0 
Plus:  Not working at beginning of survey year  820.4 
Working at end of survey year    9060.7
   
Source: Unpublished ABS data. 
     





C  Current assistance arrangements 
Australia, like most developed countries, has a long history of protecting its textile, 
clothing, footwear and leather (TCF) sector.  
However, since the late 1980s a succession of Australian Governments have sought 
to expose the TCF sector to greater international competition in keeping with the 
general shift in assistance policy. A major initial step was the TCF industry plan in 
1987 which included a systematic reduction in tariffs. These reductions were 
accelerated in the 1991 industry statement and import quotas were terminated in 
1993.  
In conjunction with the reductions in protection, a range of adjustment assistance 
was provided. For example, the 1987 TCF industry plan included the Industry 
Development Strategy and a Labour Adjustment Program. Following the 1991 
statement, some programs were modified and additional programs such as the 
Import Credit Scheme, Overseas Assembly Provisions Program and the Further 
Wool Processing Program were introduced. Further modifications of existing 
programs and the introduction of new programs occurred following the 1995-96 
Commonwealth budget and as part of the TCF 2000 Development Strategy. 
In July 2000, after 13 years of the gradual phasing down of TCF tariffs, further 
reductions were put on hold until January 2005. One effect of this pause has been to 
maintain a disparity in tariff rates for the TCF sector and the rest of manufacturing 
(see figure C.1). The sector has, however, continued to receive budgetary support to 
help it prepare for lower levels of tariff protection that will apply from 2005. 
The current assistance regime for the TCF industries is complex. It consists of: 
•  tariffs on imports which vary across products; 
•  budgetary assistance through the Textile, Clothing and Footwear Strategic 
Investment Program (SIP); 
•  policy by-laws specific to the sector which enable concessional entry for certain 
imported TCF products; and 
•  concessional entry for some imports through the Expanded Overseas Assembly 
Provisions Scheme (EOAP).     




Tariffs and the SIP are by far the most important of these measures. TCF firms also 
have access to general industry support offered by the Commonwealth and State 
Governments. The latter also provide a small amount of sector-specific assistance. 
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The pause in tariff reductions until January 2005 has left general tariff levels at: 
•  25 per cent for apparel and certain finished textiles; 
•  15 per cent for cotton sheeting and woven fabrics, carpets and footwear; 
•  10 per cent for sleeping bags, table linen, tea towels and footwear parts; and 
•  5 per cent for textile yarns, sewing threads and finished leather. 
There are no tariffs on unprocessed wool, although importation is subject to 
quarantine regulations. 
In January 2005, following amendments made in 1999 to the Customs Tariff Act 
1995, items at 25 per cent will be reduced to 17.5 per cent, those at 15 per cent to 10 
per cent and those at 10 per cent to 7.5 per cent. Those items currently at 5 per cent 
will not change.     





C.2  The TCF Strategic Investment Program (SIP) 
The SIP is intended to encourage TCF firms to improve their international 
competitiveness by increasing their levels of investment and innovation. It also 
makes financial assistance available for firm restructuring in ‘TCF dependent 
communities’. 
The SIP, which was developed in consultation with the sector, was introduced in 
conjunction with the tariff pause in 2000. It applies to the financial years from 
2000-01 to 2004-05, but included two ‘pre-program’ years, 1998-99 and 1999-00. 
The program is open to any entity undertaking eligible TCF manufacturing and/or 
design activities in Australia. These are defined as activities involving goods which 
fall under the ANZSIC industry classification of textiles, clothing, footwear and 
leather. 
Funding under the scheme is capped at $700 million, an amount equivalent to the 
anticipated cost of the previous Import Credit Scheme (see box C.1) had it 
continued past its termination date of July 2000 through to June 2005 (Department 
of the Parliamentary Library, 1999). Of this, around $22 million has been used to 
supplement the Regional Assistance Program. The remaining $678 million is 
available for distribution as one of five grant types (see below). 
 
Box C.1  Import Credit Scheme 
The Import Credit Scheme commenced in 1991 as part of a larger package of tariff and 
other reforms. It was aimed at making the TCF sector more trade orientated and 
capable of taking advantage of overseas opportunities.  
Under the Scheme, companies were provided with ‘import credits’ in return for exports 
of TCF products. These credits, which were freely tradeable, could then be used to 
reduce customs duty on TCF imports. At the high point of the scheme in 
1995-96, nearly $150 million of duty was forgone under the scheme. 
In effect, the scheme made available a subsidy to TCF exports. That is, at a firm level it 
was profitable to subsidise exports provided that the required level of subsidy was less 
than the value of the import credits earned. As such, the scheme was vulnerable to 
action as a prohibited subsidy under WTO rules. This led to its replacement with the 
current SIP arrangement which focuses on promoting investment and R&D, rather than 
directly fostering exports (see text). 
 
 
There is provision for a ‘modulation’ factor to be applied to grants to prevent the 
total funding cap from being exceeded. Further, assistance to an individual firm in 
any given year is capped at 5 per cent of the firm’s sales of eligible products in the     




previous year. This is because, at the time the scheme was being developed, WTO 
rules specified that subsidies of more than 5 per cent were deemed to cause ‘serious 
prejudice’ to competing activities in other countries. While this rule is no longer 
explicit, maintaining subsidies below this level is likely to minimise the risk of 
actions in the WTO. 
So far, modulation has not been applied. However, a number of firms have ‘capped 
out’ at the 5 per cent limit. Following a 2002 review by the Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (DITR), the Government agreed to amend the scheme to 
enable firms to carry forward grant entitlements in excess of the 5 per cent sales 
cap. 
Grants available under SIP 
There are five types of grants available under the SIP: 
•  Type 1: grants for investment (up to 20 per cent of eligible expenditure); 
•  Type 2: grants for research and development including product development (up 
to 45 per cent of eligible expenditure); 
•  Type 3: matching value added grants (see below); 
•  Type 4: grants to purchase state-of-the-art second hand plant and equipment for 
restructuring by firms in TCF dependent communities (up to 20 per cent of 
eligible expenditure); and 
•  Type 5: special miscellaneous grants for ancillary activities relating to 
restructuring initiatives in TCF dependent communities (up to 20 per cent of 
eligible expenditure). 
To access Type 1, 2 and 3 grants, which are administered by AusIndustry, a firm 
must have a minimum of $200 000 of eligible expenditure:  
•  Eligibility for Type 1 grants is restricted to expenditure on new TCF plant and 
equipment; the buildings or alterations to house that plant and equipment; and 
the upgrading of existing plant or equipment to comply with environmental 
legislation. Investment in second hand equipment, other than for environmental 
upgrading, does not qualify for Type 1 assistance. 
•  Eligible expenditure for Type 2 grants includes both research and development 
and product development activities that are considered to be ‘innovative’. SIP 
does not define precisely what is ‘innovative’, instead placing the onus on the 
applicant to make a case . However, various guidelines have been put in place to 
assist claimants (see box C.2).      





•  Type 3 grants enable a firm to claim additional support linked to the value added 
in the program year the claim was made for a Type 1, 2 or 4 grant. These grants 
are capped at either 5 per cent of the total eligible value added, or by the sum of 
the Type 1, 2 and 4 grants received, whichever is the lesser. Valued added grants 
in excess of the cap cannot be carried forward. In effect, access to Type 3 grants 
means that, subject to its capping arrangements, firms can receive a subsidy of 
up to 40 per cent on investment in plant and equipment and up to 90 per cent for 
research and product development expenditures. 
The reasons for the 5 per cent cap on value added grants are obscure. According to 
the DITR review, this 5 per cent was applied ‘to minimise WTO compliance risks’ 
(DITR 2002, p. 31). However, it is not clear why the overall 5 per cent cap on 
funding as a proportion of a firm’s sales would not be sufficient to address concerns 
in regard to action in the WTO. 
 
Box C.2  Innovation and the SIP 
While there is no precise definition of ‘innovation’ in the SIP, AusIndustry has provided 
guidelines to assist applicants applying for Type 2 grants for product development. 
The guidelines note that innovation does not encompass: 
•  activities that are routinely undertaken; 
•  doing more of the same type of activities; 
•  day-to-day design activities that are a standard part of the production process; and 
•  activities directed at achieving visual differences in a product (eg style, colour). 
Rather, ‘innovative’ activities must involve introducing something new or different in the 
sense of changing the manner in which a product is developed. Applicants are 
generally required to demonstrate that their innovation is new to the industry as 
opposed to being new to the firm. For example, developing fabrics to overcome 
specific usage problems such as moisture build up in sporting clothes, or to increase 
fabric strength for industrial clothing, would be considered eligible, but variations in 
style such as fabric colour or clothing style would be ineligible in the absence of any 
functional innovation.  
Design activities are eligible where they relate to new or improved methods of design 
such as computer assisted design systems that enable integration with computerised 
fabric cutting. 
Source: AusIndustry (2002). 
 
In order to facilitate the access of smaller firms to funding support, eligible 
spending activity can be cumulated over several years. 
The other two types of grants to facilitate restructuring in TCF dependent 
communities, require Ministerial approval. They are available to support     




expenditures such as the purchase of state-of-the-art second hand equipment as part 
of the consolidation of TCF activity in those communities.  
SIP includes provision for appeals against decisions not to register a firm as eligible 
to participate in the program, as well against non or reduced payments for specific 
claims. Appeals can be made to the scheme’s administrators and to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
The operation of SIP to date 
A total of 400 firms were registered under the program in 2001-02, slightly down 
from the previous year of operation (DITR 2002). Of these registered firms, 264 or 
around 5 per cent of total TCF enterprises had funding approved for the 2000-01 
program year. However, those firms receiving SIP funding in 2000-01 accounted 
for around three-quarters of the TCF sector’s value-added and two-thirds of its 
employment (information supplied by AusIndustry).  
In the 2000-01 program year, $130 million of SIP payments were made (including 
some $27 million in respect of the pre-program years) and around $100 million has 
so far been paid for 2001-02. To date, Types 1 and 2 grants have accounted for 
about 60 per cent of payments and the Type 3 grants nearly all the rest (see table 
C.1).  
Table C.1  TCF SIP program payments (by program year and grant type)a 
Program 
year 
Type 1  Type 2  Type 3  Type 4  Type 5  Total
  $’000 $’000 $’000 $’000 $’000  $’000
Pre program 
1998-99 
11  522  na - - -  -
Pre program 
1999-00 
14 660  na  -  -  380  -
2000-01  28 251  27 737  45 797  500  1 263  130 112b
2001-02   22 272  34 456  42 147  72  28  98 977
Total  76 705  62 193  87 944  572  1 671  229 089
a The exact totals for each type of grant may vary slightly as some apportioning has been done between the 
three types to reflect the effect of the capping requirement. Payment figures for both the 2000-01 and 2001-02 
program years are also still subject to change pending any reconsideration or appeals that are in the pipeline 
pertaining to these years. 
b This total includes some $27 million paid in respect of the two pre-program years. 
na: not applicable 
Source: Information supplied by DITR.     





By industry, of the funding paid in the first two years of the program, textiles fibre 
manufacturing received 39 per cent, textile product manufacturing (including carpet 
manufacturing) 27 per cent, clothing and footwear 23 per cent and leather 4 per cent 
(see table C.2). 
Table C.2  SIP funding by industry for 2000-01 and 2001-02 
Industry  Payments  Share of funding
 $‘000  per  cent 
Textile fibre, yarn and woven fabrics   90 035  39.3
Textile product   62 116  27.1
Knitting mills   11 150  4.9
Clothing   34 019  14.8
Footwear   19 855  8.7
Leather and leather products   9 733  4.2
Other 2  176  1.0
Total 229  089  100.00
Source: Information supplied by DITR. 
All payments are made in arrears of the firm undertaking eligible expenditure. The 
period between undertaking the expenditure and receiving payment can vary widely 
— from as little as two months or so, to a year or more. The lag in payment depends 
on administrative and modulation processing requirements and to some extent on 
when the firm lodges its claim. For example, assistance for expenditure, particularly 
investment, made late in a financial year can often be received by the firm very 
early in the next financial year. Reimbursement for R&D/innovation can take longer 
to process. However, advances of 50 per cent of the expected assistance can be paid 
to a firm prior to AusIndustry’s full auditing and assessment of the claim. 
AusIndustry employs 18 people to administer the scheme, with administrative costs 
of about $1.6 million since 2000 (information supplied by DITR). In addition there 
are: 
•  application costs for firms, with many using consultants (see chapter 5); and 
•  costs associated with the appeals process.  
In the first program year, there were 16 appeals to the AAT or around 4 per cent of 
total claims. Of these, 12 were resolved by negotiation, 1 was withdrawn, 1 went to 
hearing and was decided in the favour of the applicant and the other 2 matters are 
still before the Tribunal. However, in the second program year there were only 2 
appeals, one of which is still being processed with the other dismissed by the 
Tribunal.     




C.3  Recently terminated schemes 
Three smaller Commonwealth grant schemes for the sector — the Market 
Development Program, the National Framework for Excellence in TCF Training 
and Education and the TCF Technology Development Fund — were closed from 
July 2002 as part of the May 2002 Commonwealth Budget. These schemes had 
been initiated specifically as part of the post 2000 assistance package for the sector. 
Funding for these three schemes during their limited period of operation was $32 
million (McFarlane 2002).  
Limited comment was received from participants regarding these terminated 
schemes. 
C.4  The EOAP Scheme 
The EOAP Scheme provides incentives for the offshore assembly of fabrics and 
leather manufactured in Australia. In essence, the scheme seeks to preserve the 
higher value and skilled parts of the production process in Australia by allowing the 
lower skilled, labour intensive assembly stages to be carried out offshore. Under the 
scheme, duty on imported footwear and garments assembled from predominantly 
Australian fabric and/or leather is only payable on the cost of the overseas 
processing and content (see box C.3).  
The scheme, which commenced in 1992, was rolled over in June 1999 and is 
scheduled to end in 2005. To date, usage has been limited — in   
2001-02, only $4.75 million of duty was forgone under the arrangements (ACS 
2002b). 
 
Box C.3  Key features of the EOAP scheme 
Any Australian textile, clothing, footwear, leather manufacturing or design firm can 
participate in the scheme. To qualify for concessional duty treatment: 
•  the participant must be both the exporter of the fabric and/or leather and the 
importer of the assembled goods; 
•  there can be no transfer of ownership of the materials or the assembled goods 
between the time of export from, and import into, Australia; and 
•  the value of non-Australian fabric and/or leather must be no greater than 20 per cent 
of the total value of fabric and/or leather used to manufacture each article. 
Source: AusIndustry (1999). 
 
     





C.5  The Tariff Concession System and policy by-laws 
Under the generally applicable Tariff Concession System (TCS), concessional entry 
is available for otherwise dutiable products deemed to have no locally produced 
Australian substitute. (Consumption goods are afforded duty free entry, while 
business inputs are subject to a 3 per cent revenue duty.) 
While a few items, such as specialist footwear, incontinence pants and rubber 
gloves, receive concessional entry under the TCS, most clothing, footwear and 
headwear is excluded from the system by virtue of its listing on the Excluded Goods 
Schedule (see chapter 7).  
However, there are around 20 so-called policy by-laws which enable specified TCF 
goods to be imported duty free. These are mainly blended cotton and blended 
synthetic lightweight fabrics.  
In contrast to the TCS, concessional entry under the policy by-laws is available 
even if there is actual or potential domestic production of substitute goods. Thus, 
while reducing the costs of firms using the products concerned, it is possible that 
these by-laws adversely affect some other Australian TCF producers. 
As general tariffs have declined and the local TCF sector has contracted, the amount 
of duty forgone under these policy by-laws has fallen substantially. Duty forgone in 
2001-02 was around $40 million compared to a (recent) peak of $150 million in 
1994-95 (ACS 2002b). Moreover, two by-laws accounted for over 80 per cent of the 
total duty forgone in 2001-02: 
•  Nearly half was accounted for by a by-law for certain dyed and printed plain 
weave cotton fabrics.  
•  A further one-third was accounted for by the by-law applicable to synthetic 
fabrics for use in headwear and clothing manufacture. (information provided by 
Australian Customs Service). 
C.6  Other concessional provisions 
In addition to concessional entry under the EOAP, the TCS and policy by-laws, 
some imported TCF products enter duty free, or at reduced rates, under other 
(generally applicable) arrangements: 
•  developing country and least developed country preferences;  
•  free trade agreements with New Zealand, and most recently Singapore; and     




•  the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA) providing duty free access to the Australian and New Zealand 
markets for goods produced in Forum Island countries. 
The removal of tariff preferences for TCF imports from countries such as China, 
India and Indonesia has greatly reduced the significance of the developing country 
preference regime for Australia’s TCF sector. However, from 1 July 2003, imports 
— including TCF products — from least developed countries and from East Timor 
have been allowed duty free entry. This may lead to some increase in TCF imports 
from countries such as Bangladesh. As discussed in chapter 11, concerns have also 
been expressed that the rules of origin applying to imports from least developed 
countries may allow for duty free entry of significant embodied content from 
countries such as China. 
There is also considerable TCF trade between New Zealand and Australia under the 
Closer Economic Relations (CER) arrangement and, until recently, significant duty 
free importation of clothing from Fiji under the SPARTECA provisions. 
In the latter case, however, the now defunct Import Credit Scheme (ICS), rather 
than duty free access under SPARTECA, was the main driver of this trade. As 
described in box C.1, the ICS provided duty or ‘import’ credits in return for exports 
of Australian TCF products. Along with incentives offered by the Fijian 
Government and high tariffs in Australia on imports from most other countries, 
these credits made it profitable to export fabric to Fiji for assembly into clothing for 
subsequent re-import into Australia duty free.  
However, with the termination of the ICS, reductions in Australian TCF tariffs and 
political unrest in Fiji, assembly of clothing (and footwear) in that country for the 
Australian market has declined markedly. This is despite the provision for the 
reduction from 50 to 35 per cent in the minimum local content of TCF products 
necessary to qualify for duty free entry into Australia and New Zealand under the 
SPARTECA-TCF provisions. (This reduced level of local content is in turn 
conditional on Fijian producers accruing ‘Excess Local Area Content’ from the 
production of finished garments, or other eligible TCF products, which have local 
area content of more than 70 per cent). In effect, without capacity to earn duty 
credits on fabric exports and with general tariffs on TCF products now lower, the 
benefits for most firms from duty free access to the Australian market for finished 
clothing products from Fiji are not sufficient to outweigh the additional freight and 
logistical costs of this sort of operation. (It is for much the same reason that there 
has been only limited recent use of the EOAP provisions.)     





C.7  State Government support 
Most State Governments provide support to industry, including TCF firms, through 
generally available schemes such as business innovation and regional development 
programs. Some limited TCF-specific assistance is also provided by certain State 
Governments (see box C.4). 
 
Box C.4  Examples of State Government TCF-specific assistance 
Victoria released its TCFL Strategic Plan in June 2002. It includes a business 
innovation program for the sector, a supply chain management program and a market 
access and development forum. Funding for these programs amounts to $1.5 million. 
The Victorian Government is also providing around $1  million annually to fund a 
training and education program for the sector and has provided over $1 million to 
establish the TCFL centres of excellence (Victorian Government 2002). 
The Tasmanian Government now holds 49 per cent of the equity in Australian Weaving 
Mills (AWM) to secure employment in the Devonport area after the major equity holder, 
National Textiles, was placed in receivership. The Tasmanian Government has also 
provided debt funding for plant and equipment upgrades. 
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D Market  access 
Notwithstanding the recent progress in liberalising world trade in manufactured 
goods, TCF trade barriers remain relatively high and frequent in both developing 
and developed nations. While these barriers have similar effects, the rationales for 
their use differ somewhat between the two country groupings. In developed 
countries, TCF industries are often large employers of low skilled workers and 
receive government support as a means of protecting these jobs. Developing 
countries, on the other hand, often view TCF manufacturing as a vehicle to 
industrialisation and TCF trade barriers have been used to facilitate this process. 
Many participants to this inquiry argued that high barriers in overseas markets 
restrict exports of Australian TCF products and thereby impede the development of 
the Australian TCF sector. For instance, the Council of Textile and Fashion 
Industries of Australia (TFIA) stated that:  
Enhanced market access provides the key platform for the TCF industry’s future 
development. It is fundamental for the industry in the future to be growing on the basis 
of an export platform, especially as in the aggregate, the domestic market share will 
become more and more pressured as import penetration grows. (sub. 164, p. 9) 
Improved market access will not be a panacea for most of the TCF sector, however. 
As the quote from the TFIA recognises, future increases in imports will place 
increasing pressure on many domestic producers (especially those engaged in the 
production of standardised labour intensive commodities). While some may be able 
to develop alternative markets overseas, others will not be able to compete 
internationally. In this regard, a recent market access study prepared for the TCFL 
Forum estimated that, trade liberalisation in Asian markets (which according to 
many participants are virtually impenetrable at present) would lead to export growth 
equivalent to less than 1 per cent of the current turnover of the Australian TCF 
sector (Werner International 2003). 
Nonetheless, progress in reducing the extensive array of barriers to TCF trade 
would assist some internationally competitive Australian TCF firms to expand their 
businesses. For example, trade barriers on finished clothing from developing 
countries to the US and the EU (see below), restrict demand for Australian yarns, 
textiles and leather. And while some successful Australian TCF firms (such as 
Billabong and Gale Pacific) have established offshore manufacturing facilities to     




circumvent trade barriers, others (who may otherwise be globally competitive) lack 
the resources to do the same. 
D.1  What is the current state of play? 
TCF tariffs, quotas and a variety of non-tariff barriers impose large costs on the 
world economy.1 In addition, some countries (including Australia) provide direct 
subsidies to TCF firms, which further distort world TCF trade. However, quotas on 
textiles and clothing products from WTO members are scheduled to be removed in 
2005 and some countries have been able to reduce the barriers that they face in 
overseas markets by entering into preferential trading agreements.  
Tariff barriers vary considerably across countries and TCF products 
Some key characteristics of global TCF tariff barriers are listed below: 
•  Among developed countries, maximum applied tariffs are higher in the United 
States than in the European Union (EU) or Japan (these three markets accounted 
for 50 per cent of world textile and clothing imports in 2001). Since the mid-
1990s, maximum tariff rates in these three markets have for the most part either 
fallen marginally or remained stable (a notable exception being a sharp rise in 
certain man-made fibre tariffs in the United States). 
•  Tariffs in developing countries have generally been falling at a faster rate than 
those in most developed countries (DFAT 1998). For example, China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001 required it to reduce tariffs across a broad range 
of TCF products (by up to 22 percentage points from the maximum levels 
applied in the mid-1990s). Nonetheless, tariffs in many developing countries are 
still higher than in developed countries and in a few cases have risen, rather than 
fallen. Korea, for instance, has raised tariffs on most TCF products in the last 
five years (though this has been from a low base). 
•  In Australia, in contrast to the EU, the US and Japan, tariffs on all TCF products 
have been reduced significantly over the last decade and a half (albeit from a 
much higher starting point). For example, tariffs on clothing, footwear and 
woven fabrics have fallen by between 10 and 30 percentage points since 1990. 
Further reductions have been legislated to take effect from 2005 (see 
appendix C).  
                                              
1A recent study by the IMF and World Bank estimated the cost to be about US$65 billion. The 
study further found that, on average, every job saved in developed countries (as a result of 
textiles and clothing protection) costs 35 jobs in developing countries. (IMF and World Bank, 
2002).     
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a Figures for Australia, the United States and the European Union refer to 2002. Figures for China, Indonesia, 
Japan and Malaysia refer to 2000.  
Data source: Information provided by DFAT. 
Quota restrictions have been a highly distorting influence on global 
TCF trade 
Despite the extensive use of tariffs, developed countries have historically used 
import quotas as the main mechanism for protecting their textiles and clothing 
industries. Since 1961, bilateral agreements have allowed certain developed 
countries to impose quotas on imports of textiles and clothing from a range of 
developing countries. The United States, the EU and Canada continue to restrict 
imports through such quotas. (Australia imposed quotas on all TCF imports 
between 1971 and 1993.)  
Although Australian TCF exports are not subject to these restraints directly, the 
impact on world trade is likely to have adversely affected some Australian TCF 
firms. As noted above, the restriction on exports of final TCF products from 
developing countries, such as China, India and Pakistan, has almost certainly 
reduced demand for Australian intermediate goods (such as yarns, textiles and 
leather). Further, quota restrictions may have caused a redirection of some finished 
textile and clothing products (from countries that cannot access quota protected 
markets) to Australia. Allegations that some products are commonly sold at less 
than their ‘normal value’, or dumped in Australia have been raised in this context 
(see below).     




Developed countries have agreed to remove quotas by 2005 
Recognising the costs to the global economy of TCF quotas, an outcome of recent 
multilateral trade initiatives was an agreement to phase out their use. The 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), signed during the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, establishes a schedule to remove remaining textiles and clothing 
quotas that apply to WTO members by 2005. (Importantly, however, quotas on 
Chinese exports, the world’s largest producer of textiles and clothing, can 
potentially remain in place until 2008, as China was only admitted to the WTO in 
2001.) 
Other non-tariff barriers are commonplace 
As well as these remaining quantitative restrictions, a variety of other non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) serve to restrict trade in TCF products. 
It is important to recognise that, while some NTBs are specifically imposed to 
reduce imports, others may be in place for primarily non trade-related reasons. For 
instance, quarantine restrictions may reduce imports, but are usually enacted for 
health and environmental reasons. Similarly, country specific product labelling 
requirements are often intended to provide information to consumers, rather than 
being a protective device against imports. 
From a firm’s viewpoint, however, the underlying intent of barriers which prevent 
them from accessing overseas markets will be of little significance. Hence, the 
examples put forward by inquiry participants included (see table D.1) incidental 
barriers to trade (see table D.1).  
This is not to deny, however, that some of the barriers mentioned in table D.1, have 
the intent of restricting imports. For example, TCF Services commented on the 
effect of cumbersome customs procedures on apparel exports: 
In the absence of the exact export paperwork required by each country including 
quotas, import licences, country of origin certificates etc., the whole shipment is often 
embargoed by the overseas Customs department, and later sent back to Australia. 
Because of the interruption to supply, orders are then lost, customer relationships are 
damaged, and export marketing investment is wasted. (sub. 174, p. 3) 
Further, export constraints that reduce the price of raw materials (such as leather) in 
India, China and Bangladesh, in turn reduce the costs of early stage processors 
within those countries. This can harm early stage processors in Australia which 
compete against those producers.      
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In recognition of their deleterious impact on trade, the removal of such restrictions 
is currently on the agenda for the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Further, the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade already encourages 
members to ensure that regulations, standards, testing and certification procedures 
do not create unnecessary obstacles. 
Concerns about dumping and anti-dumping actions 
As quota removal under the auspices of the ATC draws nearer, many developing 
countries are concerned about the possible proliferation of anti-dumping measures 
as a substitute for other forms of industry protection.  
Conversely, many TCF producers in developed countries see dumping as an activity 
which unfairly undermines their viability. In this inquiry, a number of participants 
commented on the alleged dumping of TCF products into the Australian market. 
Participants were particularly concerned about the difficulty of preventing dumping 
due to its seasonal and short-term nature and because current administrative 
processes are protracted and unwieldy (see chapter 11).  
Regional trading arrangements have a major impact on TCF trade and 
production 
Regional trading blocs, such as NAFTA and the EU, can greatly reduce trade 
opportunities for non-member countries. This is illustrated by the high levels of 
intra-bloc trade within the EU and NAFTA, including in TCF products. Under 
NAFTA, for example, there has been a major shift of production facilities from the 
United States to Mexico to take advantage of duty free access back into the US 
market. As a result, Mexico at one stage became the largest textile and clothing 
supplier to the United States. China has now assumed that mantle.     




Table D.1  Participants’ examples of non-tariff barriers to TCF trade 
Country Non-tariff  barrier  Description 
Argentina Customs  procedures  Exchange  control procedure does not allow pre-
payment, nor payment terms less than 90 days 
  Labelling  Fibre composition, care instructions, name of 
manufacturer, importer and exporter 
China  Distribution systems  Importers may receive lower prices than domestic 
producers 
  Internal taxes  Value added taxes increase with the degree of 
processing and are arbitrarily applied 
  Customs procedures  Arbitrarily imposed labelling requirements 
  Labelling  Name and address of manufacturer, size, fibre 
composition, care instructions 
EU  Labelling  Fibre composition, care instructions, fire hazard 
warning on children’s garments 
India  Customs procedures  Arbitrary valuation and classification of goods  
  Labelling  Name and address of manufacture, description and 
sort number of cloth, care instructions, length in metres 
and width in cm, month and year of packing, 
health/environmental certificate 
Indonesia Customs  procedures  Non-transparent procedures, corruption (‘unofficial 
fees’ often required) 
  Distribution systems  Regulations favour local manufacturers 
  Taxation  VAT charged on imported goods but not always on 
domestic goods 
Japan  Labelling  Name of manufacturer/supplier, fibre composition, care 
instructions, size in metric units and fire hazard 
warnings on children’s clothing 
New Zealand  Labelling  Fibre composition, care instructions, country of origin, 
size in metric units, fire hazard warning for children’s 
clothing 
South Korea  Distribution systems  Most internal trade controlled by domestic monopolists 
who generally shut out imported goods 
  Labelling  Name of manufacturer/importer, date of manufacture, 
size, country of origin, fibre composition, care 
instructions  
Thailand  Customs procedures  Arbitrary valuation and classification of goods, 
excessive documentation, customs clearance fees  
United States  Customs procedures  Burdensome compulsory origin of product 
documentation  
Source: Werner International (2003) and TFIA (2002a).      
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The United States and the EU also grant duty and quota free access to a number of 
developing countries. For example, the USA has bilateral free trade agreements 
with emerging TCF producers such as Vietnam; gives preferential access to least 
developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa; and uses countries in the Caribbean 
Basin for overseas assembly arrangements. Similarly, the EU gives duty free entry 
to non-member countries such as Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia and uses countries 
in Eastern Europe (such as Romania and Poland) for its overseas assembly 
requirements (Stengg 2001).  
There is also considerable TCF trade between Australia and New Zealand under the 
auspices of the Closer Economic Relations Agreement. In addition, provision of 
duty free entry into Australia for products from Fiji, in combination with a previous 
export facilitation scheme for the TCF sector in Australia, led to thriving offshore 
assembly operations in Fiji during the 1990s (see appendix C). 
Financial incentives for TCF producers are widely available 
The use of government financial incentives to support TCF activity has also been a 
feature of government TCF support programs in some countries. As well as 
budgetary support for specific investments, TCF firms often benefit from subsidies 
for R&D and for regional development. Signatories to the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are, however, constrained in relation to the 
types of incentives that can be provided specifically to TCF producers (see 
box D.1). 
Moreover, compared with some other manufacturing industries (notably the 
automotive industry), the use of sector-specific government subsidies to support 
TCF activity has been relatively modest. In one respect, the extensive use of quotas 
and other non-tariff barriers on textiles and clothing products has reduced the ‘need’ 
for such subsidies. Some specific examples of TCF subsidies include: 
•  In South Africa, exports of textiles and clothing earn import duty credits in a 
manner similar to Australia’s now defunct Import Credit Scheme (see 
appendix C). 
•  The South Korean Government is providing US$600 million towards the 
‘Milano Project’, a program designed to establish the city of Daegu as a major 
textile and clothing manufacturing centre. 
•  The Indian Government plans to spend US$6 billion to modernise its textile and 
clothing sector. 
•  In the United States, AMTEX and the Textile/Clothing Technology Corporation 
programs both offer R&D assistance exclusively to textiles and clothing firms.     




The schemes are of limited significance, however, providing around 
US$6 million annually. 
 
Box D.1  WTO agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) regulates the use of 
‘specific’ subsidies (that is, subsidies which are not available to all industries). A 
subsidy is: 
•  Prohibited if it is contingent on export performance or on the use of domestic inputs 
over imported goods.  
•  Actionable if it causes adverse trade effects. For example, a production subsidy 
(through its effects on exports) may cause material injury or serious prejudice to 
producers in the importing country. 
In the past, the conditions under which serious prejudice was deemed to exist included 
cases where the total subsidy provided to a product was greater than 5 per cent of its 
sales value in the previous year. This benchmark had a significant impact on the 
design parameters of Australia’s SIP arrangements and the Automotive 
Competitiveness and Investment Scheme. While this transitional benchmark formally 
lapsed at the end of 1999, the 5 per cent level will inevitably still be a consideration in 
evaluating whether a subsidy is likely to be actionable. 
Source: WTO (2003a). 
 
 
In most developed countries, TCF producers receive the bulk of any budgetary 
support through more general programs. Most of these general programs are 
designed to either subsidise R&D or to support disadvantaged regional areas. For 
instance, participants to this inquiry reported that leather processors in Italy receive 
large amounts of funding under a regional EU scheme. Australia has been an 
important exception to this general pattern, with the TCF sector receiving very 
substantial sector specific support in recent years through the Strategic Investment 
Program (SIP — see chapter 5 and appendix C). 
While production subsidies (whether general or sector-specific) do not directly 
restrict trade, they can affect the location of production and thereby indirectly 
impact on trade patterns. That said, they currently appear to have less influence on 
TCF production and trade than tariffs, quantitative restrictions or other non-tariff 
barriers. In the case of Australia, for example, the Commission estimates that the 
value of tariff assistance to TCF producers is several times greater than the value of 
support provided through the SIP.      
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D.2  What is in prospect? 
Removal of quotas by the US, the EU and Canada under the ATC, and multilateral 
initiatives to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers, should lead to a more open 
trading environment for TCF products in the medium term. Current multilateral 
negotiations are moving slowly, although this has also been typical of the early 
stages of past negotiations. In parallel to these negotiations, many countries 
(including Australia) are entering into free trade agreements which will further 
liberalise trade in TCF goods. 
Quota removal under the ATC  
Progress under the ATC has been slow and there are fears that full implementation 
may not be achieved by 2005. For instance, in a recent review of the ATC, the 
WTO found that in the United States, the EU and Canada, products on which quotas 
had been removed were predominantly less sensitive items such as yarns, fabrics 
and finished textile products (WTO 2002). 
For their part, Canada, the EU and the United States have re-affirmed their 
commitment to the full removal of quotas by 1 January 2005 and point to 
significantly higher levels of import penetration by developing countries as 
evidence of the extent of liberalisation to date. 
Developing countries will benefit most from the removal of quotas  
The elimination of quotas under the ATC would provide a major fillip to TCF 
production in developing countries — China in particular. One study cited by the 
WTO estimates that quota removal could increase developing country textile and 
clothing exports to OECD countries by 82 per cent and 93 per cent respectively 
(WTO 2003c). The potential for China to increase its exports to North America and 
the EU is illustrated by the growth in Chinese exports to developed countries that no 
longer apply quotas. For example, since quotas were removed in Australia, Chinese 
clothing exports have increased 3 fold and now account for 70 per cent of 
Australia’s clothing imports. A similar outcome has been evident in Japan since it 
removed quotas on Chinese clothing products. 
But the effect on the Australian TCF sector is less clear 
The flow-on impacts of future quota removal in the United States, the EU and 
Canada on Australia’s TCF sector will depend on a range of factors. These include 
the extent to which:     




•  Chinese exports currently going to Australia are diverted to the United States, 
the EU and Canada; 
•  Australian products are displaced in those markets by developing country 
producers no longer facing quotas; 
•  there are increased opportunities to export intermediate inputs to developing 
countries, consequent on their increased exports of finished goods to the United 
States, the EU and Canada; and 
•  quotas are replaced by alternative trade barriers. 
In this inquiry, there were differing views on how these factors would play out for 
Australian firms. Some saw competitive pressures in the domestic market easing as 
a result of the diversion of Chinese textiles and clothing to the much larger US and 
EU markets. Others, however, envisaged no significant lessening of competition 
from Chinese imports and potentially greater competition from those developing 
countries displaced by China in the United States and the EU. 
Quantitative modelling undertaken for the Commission by the Centre for 
International Economics (CIE 2003 — see appendix E) sheds some light on the net 
impact of global trade liberalisation on the Australian sector. It suggests that the 
removal of quotas and tariffs on textiles and clothing products by the United States 
would result in higher production of Australian textile and leather intermediate 
inputs mainly because China would significantly expand its finished product 
exports to the US.  
But it also projects that some Australian products would be displaced by exports 
from developing countries. For example, in the case of EU liberalisation, some 
developing countries face significantly higher barriers than Australia in EU markets 
and would receive a larger competitive boost from EU trade liberalisation leading to 
a substitution away from Australian TCF products. 
The Doha Round offers scope for further reductions in protection 
The latest round of trade negotiations — the Doha Development Agenda — is in 
progress and WTO members aim to finalise these negotiations by 1 January 2005. 
Particularly relevant to the TCF sector will be negotiations on market access for 
non-agricultural products. The three key aims of negotiations on these products are 
to reduce or eliminate: 
•  tariff peaks, usually tariffs of or above 15 per cent for developed countries; 
•  tariff escalation (tariffs that increase with the degree of processing); and  
•  non-tariff barriers.     
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As with the removal of textiles and clothing quotas, multilateral tariff reductions 
would have both benefits and costs for the Australian TCF sector. In this respect, 
the modelling undertaken by the CIE, projects that global removal of protective 
barriers would in fact decrease total Australian production of textiles and clothing 
substantially. However, more optimistic commentators suggest that global trade 
liberalisation will lead to an increase in Australian exports of textiles and clothing 
(see, for example, Werner International 2003). 
In any event, many participants in this inquiry expressed scepticism about the 
degree of liberalisation that would come from WTO processes. For example, the 
TFIA said: 
Looking forward, it is possible that there will be reductions in TCF&L tariffs as a result 
of the Doha Round. However, the policy of the world’s leading players to make any 
reductions conditional on being linked and reciprocated means that unilateral 
unconditional reductions are unlikely to occur.  
… There is, therefore, little to suggest [that] the Australian TCF&L industries will 
significantly benefit in the next five to 10 years from reductions in … tariffs. 
(sub. 75, p. 30) 
Yet at the same time, the TFIA recognised that aspects of these processes could be 
helpful to Australian firms: 
Equally with China’s entry into the WTO, and the resulting commitments to open its 
markets, the opportunity exists for the Australian TCF&L industries to take advantage 
of the inherent demand in China and supply appropriate products into the Chinese 
market, thereby further diversifying Australia’s exports. (sub. 75, p. 30) 
The APEC process may also provide opportunities 
APEC was established in 1989 as a forum to progress the liberalisation of trade and 
investment among both members and non-members. A milestone for APEC was the 
1994 Bogor Declaration in which member countries agreed to the goal of achieving 
free and open trade and investment in the region, by 2010 for developed member 
countries and by 2020 for developing member countries. 
Unlike WTO agreements, APEC is not predicated on the notion of reciprocal 
‘concessions’ by member countries. Nor does it impose penalties for failure to meet 
its goals. It seems generally accepted that achievement of the Bogor timetable for 
free trade and investment in the region is less certain than if it involved a binding 
agreement. Nonetheless, in its own right and in supporting the WTO process, APEC 
should help to promote further trade liberalisation, including in TCF products.     




Some mooted free trade agreements could benefit local TCF firms 
Australia has been negotiating a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States 
since a framework was agreed upon in June 2002. A recent ACIL Tasman study 
(2003) projected that an FTA with the US would result in a small overall welfare 
loss for the Australian economy (though it did not forecast impacts for the 
Australian TCF sector). Conversely, a study by the CIE (2001) projected that the 
removal of tariffs on trade between the two countries would increase consumption 
in both Australia and the US and, in so doing lead to an increase in Australian TCF 
exports and production of around 10 and 1.5 per cent respectively. Such projections 
are, however, likely to overstate the impacts of an FTA because they do not account 
for potentially restrictive rules of origin conditions usually included in such 
agreements (see chapter 11).  
But regardless of the overall effect on the Australian economy and the TCF sector 
specifically, there are likely to be both winners and losers among individual TCF 
firms. In this context, concern was expressed by some participants about the likely 
impacts of an FTA with the United States on particular segments of TCF production 
(such as carpet manufacture — see chapter 3). There were also concerns that the 
application of the existing US ‘yarn forward’ rule (stipulating that TCF products 
must be made from both domestically produced yarn and fabric to gain duty free 
entry to the US) would significantly limit the scope for many Australian TCF firms 
to expand their exports to the US. 
Australia also recently signed an FTA with Singapore and is discussing a similar 
agreement with Thailand. Manufacturing trade between Singapore and Australia 
was largely unencumbered prior to the signing of the FTA, which suggests that the 
agreement is likely to have a minimal impact on the Australian TCF sector. There is 
some concern, however, that an agreement with Thailand could pose a threat to 
Australian apparel manufacturers. As well as being a low-cost producer of garments 
in its own right, some participants suggested that Thailand could be used as a 
conduit for Chinese product seeking to gain duty free access to Australia. 
D.3  Implications for the Australian TCF sector 
Market access is an important issue for the sector, with some positive developments 
in prospect. Removal of quota restrictions in the United States and the EU is likely 
to create some new opportunities for Australian suppliers of yarns, textiles and 
leather to developing countries. And further reductions in barriers to TCF trade 
resulting from the Doha Round of trade negotiations should benefit some Australian 
TCF firms.     
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What is less clear, however, is whether trade liberalisation in overseas countries will 
provide a significant boost to the sector’s overall export performance. The 
Australian TCF sector faces strong competitive pressures from low-wage countries, 
pressures that are likely to increase with global trade liberalisation. For many TCF 
products, high Australian labour costs, in conjunction with improving productivity 
and quality in developing countries, will militate against export growth even if trade 
barriers are reduced. Indeed, it is possible that, in aggregate, opportunities for 
Australian textiles and clothing producers, may be reduced rather than increased by 
liberalisation in the world’s major TCF markets. 
Nonetheless, some TCF firms would share in the very significant benefits that 
broadly based trade liberalisation would bring to the Australian economy. Hence it 
is imperative that Australian Governments continue to pursue further trade 
liberalisation, including in the TCF sector, in multinational, regional and bilateral 
forums.     
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E  Modelling the effects of assistance 
options 
The reference requires the Commission to analyse post 2005 assistance options that 
would encourage the textiles, clothing, footwear and leather (TCF) sector to adjust 
into activities where it will be internationally competitive with lower levels of 
assistance. This appendix summarises the quantitative evaluations, undertaken 
during this inquiry, of some potential assistance options beyond 2005.  
Quantitative analysis of the industry and economy–wide impacts of changes in 
domestic assistance options was undertaken for the Commission by the Centre of 
Policy Studies (CoPS) at Monash University, and by Econtech Pty Ltd. A 
quantitative assessment of the implications of international developments in 
assistance to TCF activity was provided to the Commission by the Centre for 
International Economics (CIE).  
In addition to these analyses sponsored by the Commission, the results from a 
number of other modelling studies were made available to the inquiry: 
•  ACIL-Tasman undertook an analysis of the implications of domestic and global 
TCF assistance developments for the Council of Textile and Fashion Industries 
of Australia.  
•  The Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance provided summary results 
from in-house modelling of the impacts of implementing the Commission’s 
preliminary preferred post 2005 assistance options (as set out in the Position 
Paper — PC 2003).  
•  The National Institute for Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) undertook 
an analysis, for Victoria’s Manufacturing Industry Consultative Council, of the 
regional employment effects in Victoria of TCF sector developments, including 
an implementation of the Commission’s preliminary preferred post 2005 
assistance options.  
•  At a regional level, the Centre for Sustainable Regional Communities at Latrobe 
University assessed the effects of changes in TCF activity for the Wangaratta 
Rural City Council, the City of Greater Bendigo and the Western Region 
Councils Forum.     




The modelling studies sponsored by the Commission, and those undertaken for the 
Council of Textile and Fashion Industries of Australia and the Wangaratta Rural 
City Council, were presented in draft form at a workshop in Canberra on 20 March 
2003. The final versions of the papers sponsored by the Commission are posted on 
the Commission’s web site. Also included in submissions that are available on the 
web site is the modelling work undertaken for the Council of Textile and Fashion 
Industries of Australia (submission PP100), the Victorian Government (submission 
PP173), the Wangaratta Rural City Council (submissions 46 and PP149), and the 
City of Greater Bendigo (submission PP150).  
E.1  Modelling of assistance scenarios 
Modelling domestic policies 
The effects of post 2005 reductions in assistance for the Australian TCF sector were 
analysed for the Commission by Econtech using the MM600+ comparative static 
long run equilibrium model of the Australian economy (Murphy 2002) and by CoPS 
using the MONASH dynamic general equilibrium model of the Australian economy 
(Dixon and Rimmer 2002).  
In the base case scenario for these simulations, it is assumed that: 
•  tariffs on TCF products will fall as legislated, from current levels of 25 per cent, 
15 per cent and 10 per cent, to 17.5 per cent, 10 per cent and 7.5 per cent, 
respectively, on 1 January 2005; and 
•  SIP funding, currently capped at $678 million for the 5 year period to 30 June 
2005, will continue at a level such that the ratio of SIP funding to turnover in 
each TCF industry is consistent with that observed to date.  
Modelled assistance options beyond 2005 were: 
•  all TCF tariffs lowered to 5 per cent in 2010; and 
•  SIP style funding removed in 2010. 
Although the modelling specifications on the Commission’s web-site identify these 
changes as occurring in 2010, they represent an assistance outcome that would not 
be fully realised until 2015 under the Commission’s preferred tariff and SIP options 
(see chapters 7 and 8).  
In the remainder of this appendix, the likely effects of changes in domestic TCF 
assistance are primarily illustrated using the results from the Econtech (2003) and     
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CoPS (2003) studies. However, most of the projected outcomes are similar across 
all of the modelling studies. Where relevant, projections from the modelling work 
submitted by inquiry participants are reported for comparative purposes.  
In preparing this final report, the Commission did not ask Econtech or CoPS to 
model its preferred option for TCF assistance reduction. Given the relatively small 
differences between the preferred option and the assistance scenarios modelled by 
Econtech and CoPS, and the very small magnitude of the economy–wide outcomes 
projected by all the modelling exercises, the Commission’s judgment was that such 
additional projections would add little value. However, the Commission provided 
detailed information and assistance to the Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance to assist them in their modelling of the Commission preferred assistance 
option, as set out in the Position paper. At least as far as the modelling 
specifications are concerned, this option was identical to the Commission’s final 
preferred option for tariffs and SIP funding. 
Model Features 
The MM600+ model distinguishes 108 industries in 23 regions producing 672 
products. It includes the ANZSIC 3 digit TCF industries of (i) textile fibres, yarns 
and woven fabrics; (ii) textile products; (iii) knitting mill products; (iv) clothing; (v) 
footwear; and (vi) leather and leather products. The model quantifies output for 57 
separate products of these sectors.  
The MM600+ model results provide a long run snapshot of the impacts of policy 
options, once they have been fully implemented and all subsequent economic 
adjustments have taken place. The results from MM600+ are interpreted as 
deviations from a long run base case. The base case uses the 1993-94 ABS input-
output tables, but is updated to include 1998-99 labour force survey data, the new 
tax system introduced in Australia in 2000, and reductions in government assistance 
for the TCF industry that will have occurred by 2005.  
The MONASH model distinguishes 144 industries disaggregated to 57 sub-state 
regions, and includes results for a single aggregated product for each of the same six 
TCF industries as the MM600+ model. In contrast to the MM600+ model, the 
MONASH model allows examination of the effects of an assistance reduction over 
time. Thus, the MONASH model projects the effects of policy changes, such as 
variations in TCF assistance, as deviations from a base case, or business-as-usual 
future path.  
The base case in the MONASH model has been formulated by first undertaking an 
historical analysis of the TCF industry to update the database from 1996-97 to     




2001-02. This historical analysis not only facilitates the development of a 
hypothesised database for the TCF industry, but can then be projected forward in 
time to include the influence of macroeconomic factors.  
However, constructing base cases of what might happen to an industry or sector in 
the absence of an assistance reduction is fraught with difficulty. If the base case is 
to reflect recent experience, then construction requires extrapolation into the future 
of trends evident today. The base cases that such extrapolations produce may 
become unrealistic the further forward in time they are taken.  
This is a particular problem in the construction of a base case for the modelling in 
this inquiry: 
•  Were the Commission’s preferred tariff option to be implemented, the reduction 
to 5 per cent in tariffs on clothing and certain finished textile products would not 
occur until 2015. Hence, to project the impacts of such tariff reductions requires 
the base case to be extended out for at least another 15 years from 2003. 
•  Extrapolating the output and employment declines recently observed in the 
sector over an extended time frame will lead to output and employment levels 
that are much lower than present levels. However, as noted in chapter 2, TCF 
employment may not have fallen as rapidly as the manufacturing statistics 
show.1 Also, some in the sector believe that recent steep declines in employment 
will not continue at the same rate into the future (TCFL Forum 2002). 
•  It is difficult to distinguish the respective contributions of global competitive 
pressures and lagged adjustment to previous reductions in TCF assistance, to 
recent changes in activity and employment in the sector. 
In modelling the policy options, both the MM600+ and MONASH models assume: 
•  Substitution between domestic and imported products occurs in response to 
changes in the relative prices of these products; 
•  Export demand is responsive to prices; 
•  Investment is responsive to post-tax rates of return; and 
•  Real wealth of Australians is the same under each policy option in the long run 
as in the base case. This means that any change in household incomes as a result 
of changes in assistance levels is assumed to be manifested in current 
                                              
1 The recent decline in TCF manufacturing employment has been accompanied by an increase in 
TCF-related employment in distribution activities – some firms previously recorded as 
undertaking mainly manufacturing activities have moved to sourcing a majority of their products 
from offshore and are now recorded as retail or wholesale firms. Also, part of the recent decline 
in TCF manufacturing employment, as reported by the ABS, may reflect outsourcing of garment 
assembly to outworkers.     
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consumption levels rather than affecting the level of savings and hence capital 
stocks. This assumption allows aggregate real consumption to be used as a single 
indicator of the change in economic welfare resulting from a change in TCF 
assistance. 
The MONASH model was run with two ‘closure’ assumptions regarding 
employment. The first assumes wage rates adjust slowly in the short run but are 
fully flexible in the long run. This allows aggregate employment to change in the 
short run in response to a policy change. The second assumes fully flexible wage 
rates with the result that aggregate employment is the same as in the base case in 
both the short and long run. The latter closure assumption is also used by the 
MM600+ model. 
The levels of assistance for the ANZSIC 3 digit TCF sectors used in modelling 
assistance options are detailed in table E.1. In both the MM600+ and MONASH 
models, reductions in TCF tariffs from the base case levels can be modelled 
directly. Changes in the level of funding provided under SIP are incorporated in 
both models by treating SIP funding as a subsidy to TCF production, with the 
subsidy rate calculated by dividing recent levels of funding by corresponding 
turnover figures. These modelled production subsidies range from 0.5 per cent of 
annual turnover in leather and leather products manufacturing, to 2 per cent for 
textile fibres, yarns and woven fabrics manufacturing.  
Table E.1  Modelled levels of assistance 
Per cent 
 Tariffs  a SIP  b 










Textile fibres, yarns, and woven fabrics  4.5 3.5  2.2 2.0  0.0 
Textile products  7.1 6.4  3.4 1.6  0.0 
Knitting mill products  15.8 13.5  4.6  0.7  0.0 
Clothing  16.4 13.9  4.1  0.7  0.0 
Footwear  11.8 8.7  4.7  1.8  0.0 
Leather and leather products  3.5 1.2  1.2 0.5  0.0 
a cif basis; b per cent of annual turnover in each industry sector. 
Source: PC estimates and Econtech (2003). 
Modelling international developments 
The implications of changes in global assistance levels to the TCF industries were 
analysed for the Commission by the CIE using GTAP (Hertel 1997). GTAP is a 
multi-commodity, multi-region comparative static model of the world economy. A     




region may be either a single country or a composite of many countries. Each region 
produces its own version of each commodity, which is imperfectly substitutable 
with the versions produced by other regions.  
The CIE used GTAP to examine how the following scenarios would affect the 
broad prospects for the Australian TCF industry: 
•  unilateral and multilateral liberalisation in, and between, Australia, the US, the 
EU, China and the APEC region; and 
•  full TCF liberalisation (Australia and the rest of the world). 
The tariff rates in the GTAP base case are derived from country rates applicable in 
1997. For Australia, the average modelled tariff rates on TCF imports were 15.8 per 
cent for textiles, 27.4 per cent for clothing and 12.1 per cent for leather products. 
These rates are well above current tariff rates and the even lower rates that will 
apply from 2005. This means that some of the projected impacts of the modelled 
scenarios may have already been felt in the Australian economy in the period since 
1997, or will be evident prior to 2005.  
In addition to tariffs, TCF trade is often restricted by import quotas (see 
appendix  D). In GTAP, import quotas in the protected country are treated as 
destination specific export taxes from the point of view of the exporting countries. 
The largest export taxes in GTAP apply to textile and clothing exports from China, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Japan to the US and Canada. 
E.2  Impacts of domestic assistance reductions 
Economy–wide impacts on welfare 
Changes in the level of assistance to an industry generate winners and losers across 
the economy as a whole. Not surprisingly, the model results indicate that a 
reduction in TCF assistance, through either lower tariffs and/or a lower level of SIP 
funding, will reduce TCF activity in Australia (the impacts are detailed in the 
following section). However, a reduction in TCF activity need not translate to 
adverse affects for the economy as a whole. In both the MM600+ and MONASH 
models, the projected overall outcomes for the economy will depend on the 
interplay of the following factors: 
•  Improved allocative efficiency — resources will be directed toward more 
productive and less protected activities in the economy.     
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•  An increased resource base for the economy — reductions in tariffs may 
stimulate investment and a net inflow of capital from overseas (as by 
assumption, additional capital is financed by foreign inflows and real wealth of 
Australians is held constant in the long term). 
•  A decline in the terms of trade and an associated depreciation in the exchange 
rate — other factors being equal, while Australia’s exports rise, the price of 
these exports declines relative to the price of imports, imposing a cost on the 
economy (see box E.1).  
Overall, the MM600+ and MONASH model results suggest that the economy–wide 
effects of tariff and SIP reductions would be very small (see figure E.1 and table 
E.2). This is because: 
•  the TCF industry is a comparatively small component of the Australian 
economy; and 
•  TCF assistance levels are now much lower than in the past — as assistance 
levels fall, the allocative efficiency gains from further reductions also diminish.  
The projected allocative gains from tariff reductions are consistently higher than 
those projected to arise from an elimination of SIP funding. This is because tariffs 
account for the bulk of assistance provided to the sector and also that tariff 
reductions are projected to have a larger effect on trade than does the removal of 
SIP support (see table E.2). Reducing tariffs leads to a more open economy than 
does the elimination of SIP, and therefore the supply of exports increases to restore 
the trade balance.2  
                                              
2 These outcomes are based on TCF export demand elasticities of 10 to 12 in the MM600+ model, 
4 in the MONASH model and about 20 implicit in GTAP. Lower assumed values for this 
elasticity result in lower projected export growth in response to reductions in assistance levels, 
and can contribute to terms of trade effects which dominate allocative efficiency and capital 
effects, to yield small losses in welfare rather than increases. A detailed discussion of the 
implications of alternative values of export elasticities is included in Productivity Commission 
(2002b) for the MONASH model and in Econtech (2003) for the MM600+ model.     





Box E.1  Putting terms of trade effects in context 
A feature of the modelling for both the current TCF inquiry and the recent automotive 
inquiry (PC 2002b) is that projected small allocative efficiency gains from further tariff 
reductions are largely (or more than) offset by projected welfare losses associated with 
a decline in Australia’s terms of trade. As tariff levels fall, the projected allocative 
efficiency gains from further reductions also diminish. This has meant that in analysing 
the potential impact of assistance reductions, there is now more weight in the 
modelling outcomes on the still small terms of trade effects which were previously 
swamped by significant resource allocation gains.  
Such terms of trade effects are often viewed as being inconsistent with Australia’s 
position as a small country with little influence on world prices for goods and services. 
However, terms of trade effects are consistent with the idea that Australian firms may 
sell differentiated products into niche markets — increased sales may require a lower 
price for the Australian product, even if all other overseas prices are unaltered (see 
Brown 1987 for an elaboration of this argument). A reduction in the prices received for 
Australia’s exports relative to prices paid for its imports imposes a cost on the 
Australian economy, even if activity levels in some industries have risen in the process. 
However, any terms of trade effects associated with reductions in Australia’s TCF 
assistance need to be considered in a multilateral context. As some submissions to the 
inquiry noted, the projected adverse terms of trade effects from unilateral reductions in 
Australia’s support for the TCF sector may be mitigated if other countries are also 
reducing the level of assistance to their TCF industries. 
More importantly, in considering results from the MM600+, MONASH and GTAP 
models, it should be recognised that in each of these models the terms of trade effects 
are projected to be small. But with projected resource allocation gains also now small, 
assessments of the impacts of TCF assistance reductions at an economy–wide level 
tend to swing, with underlying model assumptions playing a disproportionate role in 
whether assistance reductions are projected to result in a small gain or a small loss for 
the economy.  
Thus, with TCF tariff levels at comparatively low levels, it is factors not included in the 
modelling which are critical in determining the appropriate future direction of 
assistance. As discussed in chapter  6, these factors include the extent to which 
assistance reductions would reinforce incentives for firms to lower production costs 
further, to innovate and improve the quality of their products; and the magnitude of 
accompanying adjustment costs for firms, their employees and surrounding regions.     
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Figure E.1 Economy–wide  impacts 





















































Terms of trade effect
 
Data source: Econtech (2003). 
Table E.2  Economy wide effects of post 2005 assistance options 
Model projections: percentage deviation from base case in the long run 
  Tariff cuts  SIP removal  Tariff cuts and SIP removal 
 MM600+  MM600+  MM600+  MONASH 
Real  GDP  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Real Consumption  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.01 
Real Investment  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.01 
Export volumes  0.6  0.1  0.8  0.07 
Import volumes  0.5  0.1  0.6  0.07 
Consumer price index  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.00 
Exchange rate  -0.2  -0.1  -0.2  -0.05 
Real after tax wage rate  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.00 
Source: Econtech (2003) and CoPS (2003). 
That the economy–wide impacts would be very small is supported in modelling 
undertaken independently by ACIL-Tasman using a version of the GTAP model 
and an analysis of the Commission’s preliminary preferred assistance option by the 
Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance using a version of the MONASH 
model. In both the ACIL-Tasman and the Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance studies, the projected small allocative efficiency gains for the Australian 
economy associated with a reduction in TCF assistance, lie between the projections 
of the MM600+ and MONASH models. Specifically, the Victorian Department of 
Treasury and Finance reported that the Commission’s preliminary preferred TCF 
assistance option would result in a small allocative efficiency gain of 0.01 per cent.     




As in the MM600+ and MONASH models, these projected gains are at least 
partially offset by small terms of trade losses.3  
The relative contribution of allocative efficiency gains and terms of trade effects 
differs between the models for several reasons:  
•  The need, for computational reasons, to restrict the number of commodities and 
to assign relatively small export demand elasticities (or import substitution 
elasticities in multi-country models), may reduce projected allocative efficiency 
gains and increase terms of trade losses, respectively. This means that the gains 
to Australia from reductions in TCF assistance may be higher than projected by 
models such as MONASH or GTAP. Econtech (2003) shows that increased 
commodity disaggregation results in greater projected allocative efficiency 
gains, and justifies the use of higher export demand elasticities (or import 
substitution elasticities in multi-country models), at least in the long run, thereby 
reducing projected terms of trade costs. 
•  In the version of the MONASH model used by CoPS, there is an annual 
updating of the base case to include underlying trends such as improvements in 
labour productivity and reductions in the local firms’ share of the domestic TCF 
market. This means that TCF output and employment are smaller in the long run 
in the MONASH model than in the MM600+ and ACIL-Tasman models. Hence, 
the projected allocative efficiency effects of policy changes are also lower. 
Further, assumed lower substitutability between domestic and imported TCF 
products in the MONASH and ACIL-Tasman models means that for a given fall 
in the relative price of TCF imports, the increase in import volumes tends to be 
smaller than in the MM600+ model.  
Impacts of assistance reductions on the TCF industry 
Table E.3 presents the projected long run effects of the modelled assistance options 
on output in the TCF sector, under the MM600+ and MONASH models. With a 
reduction in TCF tariffs to 5 per cent and an elimination of SIP funding, TCF 
production is projected by Econtech to be 15 per cent lower and by CoPS to be 4 
per cent lower, than would otherwise be the case in the long run. Using a different 
version of the MONASH model, the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance 
                                              
3 The results presented by ACIL-Tasman are not directly comparable with those generated by the 
MM600+ and MONASH models because the ACIL-Tasman base case assumes that tariffs are 
retained at current levels rather than the legislated 2005 levels. Nevertheless, a comparison of 
ACIL-Tasman’s ‘accelerated tariff reduction’ scenario (which assumes tariffs on apparel and 
textiles are reduced to 5 per cent by 2015) with its ‘business as usual’ scenario, provides a basis 
for comparison with the MONASH and MM600+ model projections.     
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projected that the Commission’s preliminary preferred TCF assistance option would 
similarly reduce TCF production by around 4 per cent.4  
Table E.3  Effects of post 2005 assistance reductions on TCF activity 
Model projections: percentage deviation of output from base case in the long run 
  Tariff cuts  SIP removal  Tariff cuts and SIP removal 
 MM600+  MM600+  MM600+  MONASH 
Textile fibres, yarns & woven fabrics  -6.7  -8.1  -14.4  -3.9 
Textile products  -1.2  -2.3  -3.5  -2.7 
Knitting mill products  -19.3  -3.7  -22.5  -5.7 
Clothing -19.8  -3.2  -22.9  -4.3 
Footwear -2.1  -2.2  -4.2  -8.4 
Leather & leather products  -0.1  -3.1  -3.2  -1.9 
TCF total   -10.5  -4.5  -14.8  -3.5 
Source: Econtech (2003) and CoPS (2003). 
The reduction in sectoral production reflects both a loss in domestic market share of 
finished TCF products and a reduction in exports (see figure E.2). These changes 
arise because the price of TCF products available from overseas suppliers falls 
relative to locally produced substitutes — reducing TCF tariffs directly lowers the 
price of imported TCF products while eliminating SIP funding effectively raises the 
price of locally produced items. In turn, lower output of finished TCF products 
reduces demand for intermediate products such as yarns and textiles, reinforcing the 
overall decline in sectoral output. In the MM600+ results, the projected declines in 
production are largest in the clothing, knitting mill products and textiles industries. 
In the MONASH results, footwear, knitting mill products and clothing are the most 
affected industries. The variations in the degree of projected contraction between 
industries arise from differences in:  
•  current assistance levels afforded to individual TCF industries and hence, the 
extent of the reductions involved in moving to a 5 per cent tariff level and 
abolishing SIP funding5; and  
                                              
4 Details of the in-house modelling undertaken by the Victorian Government are not reported in its 
submission. However, it is likely that the base case in the version of the MONASH model used 
may be slightly different from that used by CoPS, due to differences in historical updates and 
forecast procedures.  
5 SIP funding to date has been concentrated in the more capital intensive sectors of textile fibres, 
yarns and woven fabrics manufacturing (see table E.1). Hence the removal of SIP initially affects 
mainly intermediate products, with flow on impacts to downstream TCF producers. For example, 
the domestic clothing industry uses about 40 per cent of the combined output of the textile fibres, 
yarns and woven fabrics industries (ABS 2001a).     




•  the assumed substitutability between imported and domestic products in these 
industries (relatively high for textile fibres and yarns, and knitting mill products, 
but relatively low for textile products, and leather and leather products). 
Figure E.2  Changes in the composition of TCF activity 
a 





















Production Exports Imports Local Sales
(domestic and
imported)
5% TCF tariff   No SIP   5% TCF tariff & no SIP  
a All activity components include both intermediate and final products. Data source: Econtech (2003). 
Consistent with the decline in TCF production, employment in the sector is 
projected in the MM600+ and MONASH models to be 15 and 4 per cent lower, 
respectively, than in the base case in the long run (see table E.4). From the 
MM600+ model, this would correspond to a reduction of around 9600 in the TCF 
workforce, with the largest reductions projected to occur in the clothing, knitting 
mill products and textiles industries.  
With its lower import substitution elasticities and smaller base case TCF sector, the 
projected employment impacts in the MONASH model are much lower. 
Specifically, the MONASH results suggest that a reduction in tariffs to 5 per cent 
and the removal of SIP funding could reduce the TCF workforce by around 1590 
jobs, relative to the base case, in 2010, easing to a loss of 1080 jobs in the long run. 
The largest projected decline occurs in the footwear industry because of a 
comparatively high degree of substitutability assumed between imported and locally 
produced footwear.  
Notably, the projected reductions in TCF employment are small compared with 
declines that have occurred in the sector’s workforce in recent years. They are also 
likely to be smaller than future reductions in employment that will inevitably occur     
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in response to the global competitive pressures confronting TCF producers in all 
developed countries (refer to chapters 2 and 3 of this report). 
Table E.4  Effects of post 2005 assistance reductions on TCF employment 
Model projections: deviation of employment from base case in the long run 
  Tariff cuts  SIP removal  Tariff cuts and SIP removal 
 MM600+ 
  Number 
of jobs 
MM600+ 
    Number of 
jobs 
       MM600+ 
 
Number 




of jobs        %
Textile fibres, yarns & woven 
fabrics 
-1074 -1285 -2292 -14.4 -3.6
Textile products  -131  -253  -384 -3.5 -2.6
Knitting mill products  -1138  -216  -1325 -22.5 -5.4
Clothing -4532  -737  -5247 -22.9 -4.0
Footwear -114  -119  -225 -4.2 -8.0
Leather & leather products  -4  -87  -90 -3.2 -1.9
TCF total a -6993  -2697  -9563 -15.0 -1080 -3.6
a While the effects on activity and employment for individual TCF industries are approximately equivalent, the 
effects on total TCF employment differ slightly from the effects on total TCF production because of different 
weights used to aggregate the individual industries to the totals. Sources: Econtech (2003) and CoPS (2003) 
Moreover, the projected impacts of assistance reductions on sectoral output and 
employment may be unduly pessimistic because neither model is able to allow for 
the likelihood that assistance reductions will reinforce the incentives for firms to 
innovate, improve quality and productivity, and reduce production costs. Nor does 
the modelling allow for the possibility that further rationalisation of TCF activity 
may raise the output of individual producers, thereby generating productivity 
improvements through economies of scale. The exclusion of these effects means 
that the results presented here may overstate the adjustment pressure on the sector 
and TCF dependent regions that will arise from post 2005 assistance reductions. 
Wider industry and regional impacts 
Industries projected in both the MM600+ and MONASH model results to benefit 
from reductions in assistance to the TCF sector include: 
•  Export industries, particularly those that are capital intensive, such as mining. 
These industries are well positioned to benefit from the projected small decline 
in capital costs (relative to wages) and the depreciation in the Australian dollar. 
•  Industries that purchase TCF products as inputs, including the furniture and 
hospitality industries. These industries benefit from the lower prices for TCF 
products as a result of tariff reductions.     




•  Industries such as retail and wholesale trade that benefit from increased activity 
stimulated by the tariff reductions. 
Apart from the TCF sector itself, industries that may be adversely affected by a 
reduction in TCF assistance are those which provide inputs to the sector and, to a 
lesser extent, labour intensive activities in the services sector. Notably, the 
projections suggest that a decline in TCF output would reduce the sector’s demand 
for inputs from agricultural industries such as cotton, wool and livestock hides. 
However, the Victorian Farmers Federation (submission PP152) and the 
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (submission 
PP176) argued that overall, a reduction in TCF assistance could be expected to have 
a positive impact on agricultural production. Specifically, they noted that as 
production in Australia’s cotton, wool and livestock hides industries is largely 
determined by international demand and prices, the positive effects on agricultural 
production of the small projected depreciation in the Australian dollar are likely to 
outweigh any reduction in domestic TCF demand for agricultural inputs. A 
decomposition of the industry impacts projected by the MM600+ model is 
presented in figure E.3. 
Figure E.3  Effects on the output of selected industries 



























5% TCF tariff no SIP 5% TCF tariff & no SIP
 
Data source: Econtech (2003). 
At the regional level also, the MM600+ and MONASH model results are very 
similar. They indicate that the employment effects of reducing TCF assistance 
would generally be small (see figure E.4), particularly in light of recent strong     
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employment growth in many of the regions where TCF activity is located (see 
chapter 4).  
Figure E.4 Employment  effects for selected regionsa 
MONASH model projections: percentage deviation from base case in long run 























a The numerical TCF employment changes associated with the projected percentage deviations may be 
comparatively small for some statistical divisions (for example in the Wimmera) and comparatively large in 
other regions (for example in NSW). Data source: CoPS (2003). 
Axiomatically, the regions most adversely affected by a reduction in TCF assistance 
are those where TCF industries are located. The greatest declines (albeit small) in 
total activity are expected to occur in Victoria. Output in that State is projected by 
the MM600+ model to be around 0.3 per cent lower, which translates to a loss of 
around 7800 TCF and non-TCF jobs in the long run. With its lower import 
substitution elasticities and smaller base case TCF sector, the MONASH model     




projects a much smaller employment loss for Victoria of 0.02 per cent in the long 
run, or about 460 TCF and non-TCF jobs. This is consistent with MONASH model 
projections reported by the Victorian Government indicating that implementation of 
the Commission’s preliminary preferred assistance option would reduce Victoria’s 
gross state product by 0.02 per cent. At the statistical division level, Barwon (with 
its regional centre being Geelong) and Melbourne are projected to incur the greatest 
reductions in employment. 
However, these projected effects may be an underestimate of the immediate 
employment consequences for particular regions of lower TCF assistance. This is 
because the MM600+ and MONASH models are unable to adequately capture the 
lumpy adjustment that often occurs in response to assistance reductions. In the 
models, output and employment of regional industries move in line with the 
economy–wide outcomes, subject to restrictions on which products are traded 
between regions. In reality, adjustment through firm closures will mean that the 
impacts on regions may be more variable. 
An estimate of the regional employment effects of a reduction in TCF assistance 
was provided to the Victorian Government by the NIEIR. The NIEIR work suggests 
that implementation of the legislated 2005 tariff reductions and the Commission’s 
preliminary preferred option for post 2005 assistance, would lead to a total job loss 
in Victoria of 19 600 — 6300 of which would be in the TCF sector. When adjusted 
to remove the effects of the legislated 2005 tariff cuts, projected job losses in the 
TCF sector decline to around 4000 post 2005, with a total reduction of around 
12 000 direct and indirect jobs in Victoria. The largest losses are projected to occur 
in the Yarra, Whittlesea, Whitehorse and Greater Geelong areas. At a State level, 
the TCF employment changes projected by the NIEIR are higher than those 
projected by the MONASH model (as reported by both CoPS and the Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance) but lower than the MM600+ model 
projections.6  
While little detail has been provided to the Commission on the models used by 
NIEIR and no industry results are presented other than for the TCF sector, the 
results do not appear to incorporate any positive flow–on effects for either the TCF 
sector or for non-TCF industries. The studies by Econtech, CoPS and the Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance indicate that TCF assistance reductions would 
provide benefits to Victorian industries and consumers through a more efficient 
                                              
6 While the NIEIR does not report its assumptions about changes in TCF output and employment 
in the absence of a policy change, the use of input-output tables as a basis for its approach 
suggests that its results are likely to be more comparable to the static approach taken in the 
MM600+ model than to the MONASH model (which allows, in its base case, for the TCF sector 
to continue to contract over time as a result of broader competitive pressures).     
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allocation of resources and TCF price reductions. Indeed, the Victorian Department 
of Treasury and Finance modelling suggests that the overall impact on state 
employment is likely to be very small, particularly in the context of general growth 
in that State’s employment base. 
Modelling of regional impacts was also undertaken by the Centre for Sustainable 
Regional Communities for several local government authorities. These projections 
use regional multipliers to estimate the effects of TCF job reductions — whether 
due to assistance reductions or more general competitive pressures. For the 
Wangaratta region, which has a TCF workforce of 785 persons, a loss of 100 TCF 
jobs was projected to reduce the value of the sector’s output by around 14 per cent. 
Flow-on effects to other industries (principally agricultural, wholesale and retail 
trade industries) were estimated to result in the loss of a further 70 jobs, with 
offsetting gains in the region of 5 jobs in TCF user industries as a result of lower 
prices for TCF inputs.  
Less detailed results were provided to the Commission for modelling by the Centre 
of the impacts of TCF assistance reductions in the regions encompassed by the 
Bendigo and Western Region Councils Forum.7 In the Greater Bendigo economy, 
the TCF sector directly employs nearly 500 people and contributes almost 
$100 million to regional turnover. Loss from the region of the entire TCF sector and 
all businesses which indirectly rely on the sector was projected to reduce 
employment by 1300 jobs, with a corresponding reduction in regional output of 
nearly $200  million. Similarly, in the western region of Melbourne, loss of the 
entire TCF sector was projected to result in direct employment losses of over 1900 
persons with an additional 3400 jobs lost in other sectors in the region and an 
associated reduction in gross regional output of $370 million.  
While providing an indication of the potential magnitudes of first round effects of a 
reduction in TCF activity in the regions concerned, the projections for the Greater 
Bendigo and Western Region Councils Forum do not allow for the positive regional 
effects associated with lower prices for TCF products for consumers and user 
industries (including within the TCF sector). Also not captured in the Centre’s 
projections of regional output effects is that some of those workers who lose jobs in 
the TCF sector will find employment in other sectors. Welfare payments and access 
to employee entitlements will act to further cushion declines in regional output. 
                                              
7 The Western Region Councils Forum is a partnership of the local government areas of Brimbank, 
Hobsons Bay, Maribyrnong, Melton, Moonee Valley and Wyndham.     




Estimated adjustment costs 
The Econtech, ACIL-Tasman and the Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance modelling do not capture any of the potential adjustment costs associated 
with a reduction in TCF assistance. However, using MONASH model projections, 
CoPS (2003) provided an estimate of two aspects of adjustment costs — the loss of 
labour input through unemployment and retraining costs. In deriving an estimate for 
the latter, CoPS assume that training costs for displaced TCF workers are equivalent 
to 0.25 of a labour year per person.  
Under the assumption that aggregate employment is unchanged from the base case, 
such adjustment costs associated with a reduction in TCF assistance are projected to 
be very small, reducing aggregate economic welfare by an estimated $2.5 million. 
Under the alternative assumption that wage rates adjust slowly in the short term, 
economy–wide employment is projected to fall in the short term by around 0.03 per 
cent, or 2700 jobs. As a result of this additional unemployment in the economy and 
the associated lost productivity and retraining costs, projected adjustment costs 
increase to around $100 million.  
However, the reductions in aggregate employment underlying these projected 
adjustment costs are small relative to employment growth that has recently been 
observed in many of the regions where TCF activity is located (see chapter 4). 
Equally, it is important to recognise that there may be other adjustment costs 
associated with a reduction in assistance — for example, relocation costs and costs 
associated with a premature scrapping of capital — which the above estimates do 
not capture.  
E.3  Effects of international developments in assistance 
on Australia 
Results from a GTAP analysis by the CIE (2003) of alternative scenarios for 
reductions in assistance to TCF industries in Australia and other countries, are 
summarised in figure E.5. As in the MM600+ and MONASH studies, these 
projections suggest that the gains to Australia from a unilateral reduction in TCF 
tariffs would be small, with an increase in real income of less than 0.05 per cent in 
the long run.8  
                                              
8 While this projected gain to Australia is marginally above the projections of the MM600+ and 
MONASH models, it should be noted that the comparatively higher level of tariffs in the GTAP 
base case combined with a simulated complete removal of tariffs, means that the modelled tariff 
reduction in GTAP is substantially greater than that in the MM600+ and MONASH models.     
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Figure E.5  Impact of international TCF assistance reductions 
























Data source: CIE (2003). 
Though small, the overall benefits to Australia from a unilateral removal of its TCF 
tariffs are projected to exceed the benefits that Australia would receive from a 
unilateral reduction of protection in other countries (the US, the EU or China). The 
principal reason for this is that Australia is a net importer of TCF products and most 
of these imports are final products. Hence, although liberalisation in other countries 
may reduce the price that Australia pays for its TCF imports (and provide some 
benefits to consumers of these products), it is not expected to generate any 
significant allocative efficiency improvements within the economy. For Australia, 
the largest projected gains from TCF assistance reductions in other countries come 
through collective liberalisation in the APEC region, with little additional benefit 
from liberalisation in a wider group of countries.9 
While providing small benefits for Australia as a whole, unilateral liberalisation of 
TCF assistance in the US, the EU, China and APEC are all projected to have a very 
small dampening effect on the Australian TCF sector. In the cases of liberalisation 
by the US and the EU for example, current barriers to imports of Australian TCF 
products are low compared with those on products from Asian countries. Hence, a 
general reduction in restrictions enables other countries to displace Australia in 
those markets. The ACIL-Tasman study similarly projected a small negative impact 
on Australia’s clothing, footwear and leather products industries from the 
prospective removal of Multi Fibre Agreement quotas in 2005. 
The CIE projections indicate that the least adverse result for Australia’s TCF sector 
would come from a unilateral removal of TCF protection in the US.  Unilateral 
removal by the US would provide small benefits to the Australian textiles and 
                                              
9 However, GTAP projections reported in Productivity Commission (2002b) indicate that there are 
likely to be substantial benefits for Australia if liberalisation extends to all other industries and 
occurs globally.     




leather industries from higher demand by final good producers in countries such as 
China which would have better access to the US market. However, such 
liberalisation would also lower the price of clothing on the world market leading to 
a projected contraction in the Australian clothing industry. Indeed, under all of the 
liberalisation scenarios considered by the CIE, output of Australia’s clothing and 
footwear industry is projected to fall.  
E.4  Summary of modelling outcomes 
Overall, the quantitative analyses presented above suggest that the economy–wide 
impacts of TCF tariff reductions in Australia and the abolition of SIP funding would 
be very small. This is because the TCF sector is a comparatively small component 
of the Australian economy and because assistance afforded the sector is much lower 
than in the past. While the models differ over whether there would be a small gain 
or a small loss at the economy–wide level, very small orders of magnitude one way 
or the other are a feature of both the Commission sponsored studies by Econtech, 
CoPS and the CIE, and the independently conducted studies by ACIL-Tasman and 
the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance.  
The Commission did not explicitly model its preferred option for post 2005 TCF 
assistance reduction. However, the similarities between the modelling outcomes of 
the CoPS and Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance studies— which, in 
terms of tariff levels and post 2005 SIP support, did model the Commission’s 
preferred option — indicate that there is little additional information to be gained 
from using long run general equilibrium type approaches to undertake further more 
detailed modelling of the timing of TCF assistance reductions. 
The Econtech, CoPS and the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance studies 
concur that some of the largest impacts of TCF assistance reductions will be evident 
in Victoria. Reflecting this, the other modelling studies (by the NIEIR and the 
Centre for Sustainable Regional Communities) focussed on regional impacts within 
Victoria. At a State level, the NIEIR projections for TCF employment losses are 
higher than those suggested by CoPS but below those suggested by the Econtech 
modelling. The Wangaratta study by the Centre for Sustainable Regional 
Communities indicates that flow–on effects of job losses in the TCF sector resulting 
from assistance reductions may be sizeable in some regions. Nevertheless, projected 
employment losses as a result of TCF assistance reductions are small compared 
with the employment growth observed recently in many regions where TCF activity 
is located.      
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Finally, the CIE and ACIL-Tasman studies indicate that gains to Australia from 
TCF liberalisation in other countries are likely to be at best, very small, with the 
possibility that such liberalisation may lead to reductions rather than increases in 
TCF sector output and employment. This projected outcome reinforces the notion 
that liberalisation in overseas markets will not be a panacea for the local TCF 
sector.      
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